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Ejusdem
generis is a rule of construction. While interpretation or
construction of a statute the first thing which is done by the
court is to assign literal meaning to the statute in question, but
in case, there exist an ambiguity or vagueness, then the courts go
a step further in its interpretation, and try knowing the intent
of the legislature in constructing of such a statute; which can be
inferred and determined from the application of statutory rules of
interpretation out of which one of them is ejusdem generis.
Ejusdem generis means "of
the same kind"
and is more restricted than the word analogous. It is for
application in the construction of statutes.
In the instant
article the doctrine has been comprehended by applying it to
Section 364-A of the Indian Penal Code.
The true scope
of the rule of ejusdem generis is that words of a general nature
following specific and particular words should be construed as
limited to things, which are of the same nature as those
specified. But the rule is one, which has to be applied with
caution and not pushed too far (held in
UPSE Board v.
Hari Shankar Jain
AIR 1979 SC
65). It is essential for the application of the rule that
enumerated things before the general words must constitute a
category or a genus or a family, which admits number of species
and members. In
S.S Magnhild
(Owners) v. Macintyre BROS. & Co.
[1920] 3 KB 321 the King's Bench held that: unless a category is
found, there is no room for application of the ejusdem generis
principle.
In
Amar Chandra
v. Excise Collector, Tipura AIR [1972] SC 1836
Justice Dua was of the opinion that the rule strives to reconcile
the incompatibility between specific and general words. This
doctrine applies when:
(i) where the statute contains an enumeration of specific words;
(ii) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
(iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(iv) the general term follows the enumeration, and;
(v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.
Now
approaching to Section 364-A of IPC which follows as:
Kidnapping for ransom, etc. - Whoever kidnaps or abducts any
person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping or
abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or
by his conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such
person may be put to death or hurt or causes hurt or death to such
person in order to compel the government or any foreign state or
international inter-governmental organization or any other person
to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay ransom, shall be
punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine.
This section
was introduced in 1993 and was amended in 1995 with a view to
provide punishment for kidnapping, abduction or detention for
ransom. This section provides for a very serious punishment
against the offender. Now the question arises that what could be
the reason behind providing of such a stringent penalty against
the offender, where as in cases where kidnapping and abduction is
done either with an intention to murder or disposing of as to be
put in the danger of being murdered then the punishment granted is
only life imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment which may extend
to ten years and an liability to pay fine (Referring to Section
364 of IPC).
Prima facie
the imposition of punishment under this section (Sec 364-A IPC) as
compared to the other sections related to kidnapping may appear to
be highly unreasonable and unjust.
But
determining the legislative intent and on application of the
doctrine of ejusdem generis it could be inferred that the
application of this section is to be made in highly particular and
peculiar situations keeping in view the feat of the terrorists and
other anti-social groups who kidnap or abduct in order to nag the
government
The rule of
"ejusdem generis" has its head on application in section 364-A
of IPC, because the words "any other person" as mentioned in the
section should be interpreted only in light of its preceding words
i.e. government, foreign government...so on. This necessarily
means that any other person cannot embrace in its ambit any
private body or an individual. It has been held that where words
of general nature follow specific and particular words they should
be construed as limited to things, which are of same nature as
those specified. When particular words pertaining to a class or
category or genus are followed by general words, the general words
are to be construed as limited to things of the same kind as
specified (State of Karnataka v. Kempaiah AIR 1998 Bom 3047). The
Privy counsel construed the words "any other person" as follows:
"When
a section of an Act of Parliament after enumerating several
office-holders proceeds to add the words 'any other person or
persons whatever,' the doctrine of 'ejusdem generis' applies. Any
'other person' means any one who holds an office in the Government
of a similar kind to those enumerated. In the matter of Sir Stuart
Sammuel."
The Bombay
High Court in
Sundrabai
Dalichand v. Moneshwar Mahadeo Gokhle,
AIR 1959 Bom 178 has also interpreted 'any other person' specific
to the words proceedings in particular statute (in that case CPC)
as follows:
"The
expression "any other person" has reference to those other
persons, who have been mentioned in the preceding rules of Order
5, who according to those rules, are entitled, to receive service
on behalf of the parties to litigation."
The Punjab &
Haryana High Court has held in Balwant Singh & Anr. v. State of
Haryana 2002(2) RCR (Cri) 369
as under:
"From
the language of s 364-A IPC it becomes crystal clear that this
section is applicable only when the kidnapping for ransom etc, is
done in order to compel the government or any foreign state or
international inter-governmental organization to do or abstain
from doing any act. When an individual person has been compelled
to pay the ransom amount, the offence under s 364-A IPC is not
made out at all."
Hence the rule
is founded upon the idea that if the Legislature intended the
general words to be used in an unrestricted sense, the particular
classes would not have been mentioned (Referring
to Crawford Statutory Construction, Article 191 at p. 327).
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Application of the doctrine of Ejusdem generis
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The
author can be reached at:
shelly@legalserviceindia.com /
