{"id":22863,"date":"2026-04-27T11:03:30","date_gmt":"2026-04-27T11:03:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/?p=22863"},"modified":"2026-04-27T11:06:30","modified_gmt":"2026-04-27T11:06:30","slug":"signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/","title":{"rendered":"Signed Or Forged? Section 139 NI Act &#8211; Presumption, Handwriting Experts &amp; Fair Trial Rights"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"case-overview\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Anchored_In_Mahesh_Tiwari_v_State_Of_Rajasthan_Anr\"><\/span>Anchored In Mahesh Tiwari v. State Of Rajasthan &amp; Anr.<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>In S.B. CRLMP No. 1175\/2015 | High Court Of Rajasthan (Jaipur) &#8211; Decided: 13 April 2026<\/p><div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_82_2 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-grey ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title\" style=\"cursor:inherit\">Table of Contents<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #0c0c0c;color:#0c0c0c\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #0c0c0c;color:#0c0c0c\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Anchored_In_Mahesh_Tiwari_v_State_Of_Rajasthan_Anr\" >Anchored In Mahesh Tiwari v. State Of Rajasthan &amp; Anr.<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Section_138_Of_The_Negotiable_Instruments_Act_1881\" >Section 138 Of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Reversal_Of_Presumption_Of_Innocence\" >Reversal Of Presumption Of Innocence<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Role_Of_Forensic_Science_Laboratory_Handwriting_Expert\" >Role Of Forensic Science Laboratory Handwriting Expert<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Fair_Trial_And_Judicial_Duty\" >Fair Trial And Judicial Duty<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Legal_Framework_And_Constitutional_Safeguards\" >Legal Framework And Constitutional Safeguards<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Scope_Of_This_Article\" >Scope Of This Article<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-8\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Key_Legal_Takeaways\" >Key Legal Takeaways<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-9\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#I_Introduction\" >I. Introduction<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-10\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Comparison_Section_138_Trial_vs_Ordinary_Criminal_Trial\" >Comparison: Section 138 Trial vs Ordinary Criminal Trial<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-11\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Critical_Issue_Dispute_Over_Signature\" >Critical Issue: Dispute Over Signature<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-12\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Landmark_Judicial_Precedent\" >Landmark Judicial Precedent<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-13\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#II_The_Statutory_Framework_Sections_138_and_139_NI_Act\" >II. The Statutory Framework: Sections 138 and 139 NI Act<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-14\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#A_Section_138_The_Offence\" >A. Section 138: The Offence<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-15\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#B_Section_139_The_Presumption_%E2%80%94_Text_and_Effect\" >B. Section 139: The Presumption \u2014 Text and Effect<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-16\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#III_The_Presumption_Is_Rebuttable_Supreme_Court_Authority\" >III. The Presumption Is Rebuttable: Supreme Court Authority<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-17\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Kumar_Exports_v_Sharma_Carpets_2009_2_SCC_513\" >Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-18\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Rangappa_v_Sri_Mohan_2010_11_SCC_441\" >Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-19\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Key_Legal_Principles_from_These_Judgments\" >Key Legal Principles from These Judgments<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-20\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Importance_of_Rangappa_in_Judicial_Practice\" >Importance of Rangappa in Judicial Practice<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-21\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Basalingappa_v_Mudibasappa_2019_5_SCC_418\" >Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-22\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Key_Principles_Under_Section_139\" >Key Principles Under Section 139<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-23\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Importance_of_the_Fifth_Proposition\" >Importance of the Fifth Proposition<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-24\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#MS_Narayana_Menon_alias_Mani_v_State_of_Kerala_Anr_2006_6_SCC_39\" >M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala &amp; Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 39<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-25\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Burden_of_Proof_on_Accused\" >Burden of Proof on Accused<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-26\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#IV_The_Right_to_Handwriting_Expert_Evidence_Sections_45_and_73_Indian_Evidence_Act_1872_and_Section_243_CrPC\" >IV. The Right to Handwriting Expert Evidence: Sections 45 and 73, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 243 CrPC<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-27\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#A_Section_45_Indian_Evidence_Act_1872\" >A. Section 45, Indian Evidence Act, 1872:<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-28\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#B_Section_73_Indian_Evidence_Act_1872\" >B. Section 73, Indian Evidence Act, 1872:<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-29\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#C_Section_2432_CrPC_%E2%80%94_The_Accuseds_Statutory_Right\" >C. Section 243(2) CrPC \u2014 The Accused&#8217;s Statutory Right<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-30\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#V_Kalyani_Baskar_And_Mahesh_Tiwari_The_Core_Propositions\" >V. Kalyani Baskar And Mahesh Tiwari: The Core Propositions<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-31\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Kalyani_Baskar_Mrs_v_MS_Sampoornam_Mrs_2007_2_SCC_258\" >Kalyani Baskar (Mrs) v. M.S. Sampoornam (Mrs) (2007) 2 SCC 258<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-32\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Application_In_Mahesh_Tiwari\" >Application In Mahesh Tiwari<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-33\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Key_Proposition_Section_2432_CrPC_And_FSL_Examination\" >Key Proposition: Section 243(2) CrPC And FSL Examination<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-34\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Key_Proposition\" >Key Proposition<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-35\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#The_Law_Fortified_Supreme_Court_Decisions_Beyond_The_Judgment\" >The Law Fortified: Supreme Court Decisions Beyond The Judgment<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-36\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#A_Fair_Trial_As_A_Fundamental_Right_Under_Article_21\" >A. Fair Trial As A Fundamental Right Under Article 21<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-37\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Zahira_Habibulla_H_Sheikh_v_State_of_Gujarat\" >Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-38\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Manu_Sharma_v_State_NCT_of_Delhi\" >Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-39\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Rattiram_v_State_of_Madhya_Pradesh\" >Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-40\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#B_The_Right_To_Adduce_Defence_Evidence\" >B. The Right To Adduce Defence Evidence<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-41\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#State_of_Punjab_v_Naib_Din\" >State of Punjab v. Naib Din<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-42\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Vikram_Singh_v_State_of_Punjab\" >Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-43\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#C_Expert_Evidence_And_Its_Indispensable_Role\" >C. Expert Evidence And Its Indispensable Role<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-44\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Anvar_PV_v_PK_Basheer\" >Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-45\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Ram_Narain_v_State_of_Rajasthan\" >Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-46\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Fakhruddin_v_State_of_Madhya_Pradesh\" >Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-47\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#D_The_Consistent_Denial_Rule\" >D. The Consistent Denial Rule<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-48\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Bir_Singh_v_Mukesh_Kumar\" >Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-49\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#E_The_Magistrates_Duty_%E2%80%94_Discretion_Is_Not_Unfettered\" >E. The Magistrate&#8217;s Duty \u2014 Discretion Is Not Unfettered<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-50\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Krishna_Janardhan_Bhat_v_Dattatraya_G_Hegde\" >Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-51\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#VII_The_%E2%80%98Fag_End_of_Trial_Fallacy_Timing_Is_Not_a_Disqualification\" >VII. The &#8216;Fag End of Trial&#8217; Fallacy: Timing Is Not a Disqualification<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-52\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Applicability_of_Section_2432_CrPC_Defence_Stage_Explained\" >Applicability of Section 243(2) CrPC: Defence Stage Explained<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-53\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Stages_of_Trial_Under_CrPC_Simplified\" >Stages of Trial Under CrPC (Simplified)<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-54\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Valid_Grounds_for_Refusal_Under_Section_2432_CrPC\" >Valid Grounds for Refusal Under Section 243(2) CrPC<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-55\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Supreme_Court_Ruling_Delay_vs_Bona_Fide_Defence\" >Supreme Court Ruling: Delay vs Bona Fide Defence<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-56\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#VIII_What_Happens_After_The_FSL_Report_Weight_Not_Conclusiveness\" >VIII. What Happens After The FSL Report: Weight, Not Conclusiveness<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-57\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Lalit_Popli_v_Canara_Bank_2003_3_SCC_583\" >Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-58\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Surendra_Nath_Gupta_v_State_of_Uttar_Pradesh_2011_14_SCC_466\" >Surendra Nath Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 14 SCC 466<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-59\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Key_Legal_Principles\" >Key Legal Principles<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-60\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#IX_Practitioners_Guide_For_The_Defence_Counsel\" >IX. Practitioner\u2019s Guide For The Defence Counsel<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-61\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#A_At_The_Stage_Of_Legal_Notice\" >A. At The Stage Of Legal Notice<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-62\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#B_During_Trial_%E2%80%94_Before_Filing_The_Application\" >B. During Trial \u2014 Before Filing The Application<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-63\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#C_Drafting_The_Application_Under_Section_2432_CrPC_Section_45_IEA\" >C. Drafting The Application Under Section 243(2) CrPC \/ Section 45 IEA<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-64\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#D_If_The_Application_Is_Rejected\" >D. If The Application Is Rejected<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-65\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#X_Conclusion\" >X. Conclusion<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-66\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Key_Legal_Principles-2\" >Key Legal Principles<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-67\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Landmark_Judgments_and_Legal_Standard\" >Landmark Judgments and Legal Standard<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-68\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Case_Law_Summary\" >Case Law Summary<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-69\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Table_of_Cases\" >Table of Cases<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-70\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Lead_Case\" >Lead Case<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-71\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Supreme_Court_Judgments\" >Supreme Court Judgments<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-72\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/signed-or-forged-section-139-ni-act-presumption-handwriting-experts-fair-trial-rights\/#Tabular_Format_for_Quick_Reference\" >Tabular Format for Quick Reference<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"introduction-section-138-ni-act\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Section_138_Of_The_Negotiable_Instruments_Act_1881\"><\/span>Section 138 Of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, creates a statutory offence of cheque dishonour that has become the single largest category of criminal litigation in India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At its heart lies a drastic reversal of the common law presumption of innocence: Section 139 presumes that the cheque was drawn for a legally enforceable debt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"presumption-of-innocence-reversal\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Reversal_Of_Presumption_Of_Innocence\"><\/span>Reversal Of Presumption Of Innocence<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>When an accused denies that the signature on the cheque is his\u2014asserting forgery or fabrication\u2014he must be afforded every legitimate means to rebut that presumption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"role-of-forensic-handwriting-expert\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Role_Of_Forensic_Science_Laboratory_Handwriting_Expert\"><\/span>Role Of Forensic Science Laboratory Handwriting Expert<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The most potent such means is the opinion of a forensic science laboratory handwriting expert under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"fair-trial-and-judicial-duty\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Fair_Trial_And_Judicial_Duty\"><\/span>Fair Trial And Judicial Duty<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Courts that refuse such an application \u2014 particularly where the denial is consistent and contemporaneous \u2014 deny the accused a fair trial and violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"legal-framework-analysis\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Legal_Framework_And_Constitutional_Safeguards\"><\/span>Legal Framework And Constitutional Safeguards<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Section 139, Negotiable Instruments Act:<\/strong> Presumption of legally enforceable debt<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Section 45, Indian Evidence Act, 1872:<\/strong> Expert opinion on handwriting<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Section 243, CrPC:<\/strong> Right of accused to present defence evidence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Article 21, Constitution of India:<\/strong> Protection of fair trial rights<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"conclusion-scope-of-article\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Scope_Of_This_Article\"><\/span>Scope Of This Article<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>This article examines the law on the rebuttable nature of the Section 139 presumption, the statutory right to examine a handwriting expert under Section 243 CrPC, and the constitutional imperative of fair trial, fortified by a comprehensive survey of Supreme Court authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"key-legal-takeaways\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Legal_Takeaways\"><\/span>Key Legal Takeaways<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Legal Provision<\/th><th>Core Principle<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Section 138 NI Act<\/td><td>Criminal liability for cheque dishonour<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Section 139 NI Act<\/td><td>Presumption of legally enforceable debt<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Section 45 Evidence Act<\/td><td>Admissibility of expert opinion<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Section 243 CrPC<\/td><td>Accused\u2019s right to lead defence evidence<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Article 21 Constitution<\/td><td>Guarantee of fair trial<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"introduction\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"I_Introduction\"><\/span>I. Introduction<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act), is today the most litigated criminal offence in India, accounting for an estimated 35 per cent of all pending criminal cases in the country. The legislature, in crafting this provision, made two deliberate choices that render it sui generis among criminal offences:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>First, it created a statutory presumption under Section 139 that the cheque was issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Second, it shifted the burden of rebutting this presption to the accused.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>These features make Section 138 prosecution fundamentally different from ordinary criminal trials. The distinction is critical and can be understood as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"comparison-section-138-vs-ordinary-trial\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Comparison_Section_138_Trial_vs_Ordinary_Criminal_Trial\"><\/span>Comparison: Section 138 Trial vs Ordinary Criminal Trial<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Aspect<\/th><th>Ordinary Criminal Trial<\/th><th>Section 138 NI Act Trial<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Burden of Proof<\/td><td>On prosecution<\/td><td>Shifts to accused (after presumption)<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Standard of Proof<\/td><td>Beyond reasonable doubt<\/td><td>Accused must rebut presumption<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Presumption of Innocence<\/td><td>Fully applies<\/td><td>Statutorily diluted under Section 139<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>In an ordinary criminal trial, the prosecution must prove every ingredient of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused need only raise a reasonable doubt in his defence. In a Section 138 trial, the accused stands presumed guilty unless he can prove the contrary. This inversion of the constitutional presumption of innocence \u2014 grafted on to Article 21 \u2014 demands, as a necessary corollary, that the accused be given the fullest legitimate opportunity to adduce the evidence he needs to rebut the presumption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"critical-issue-signature-dispute\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Critical_Issue_Dispute_Over_Signature\"><\/span>Critical Issue: Dispute Over Signature<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The most acute question arises where the accused denies that the signature on the cheque is his. In such cases, the authenticity of the signature is not a peripheral issue \u2014 it is the entire case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>If the signature is not the accused&#8217;s, there is no cheque within the meaning of Section 138<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>No cheque means no dishonour<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>No dishonour means no offence<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>The accused who raises this defence \u2014 consistently, from the moment of receiving the legal notice \u2014 and who applies for FSL examination of the signature is not seeking delay. He is seeking justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"landmark-judicial-precedent\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Landmark_Judicial_Precedent\"><\/span>Landmark Judicial Precedent<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The Rajasthan High Court&#8217;s decision in Mahesh Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan &amp; Anr. (S.B. CRLMP No. 1175\/2015, decided 13 April 2016 by Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand) correctly quashed a Magistrate&#8217;s order that had refused such an application.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Relied on Supreme Court judgment in Kalyani Baskar (Mrs) v. M.S. Sampoornam (Mrs) \u2014 (2007) 2 SCC 258<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Grounded in constitutional guarantee of fair trial under Article 21<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Directed trial court to send cheque to FSL<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ordered obtaining specimen signatures from the accused<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>This article examines the legal propositions underpinning that decision and fortifies them with a comprehensive body of Supreme Court authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"statutory-framework\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"II_The_Statutory_Framework_Sections_138_and_139_NI_Act\"><\/span>II. The Statutory Framework: Sections 138 and 139 NI Act<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"section-138-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"A_Section_138_The_Offence\"><\/span>A. Section 138: The Offence<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Section 138 of the NI Act creates a criminal offence when:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>A cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him is presented to the bank;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>the cheque is returned unpaid due to insufficiency of funds or an amount exceeding the arrangement;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>the cheque was drawn for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>the payee gives notice in writing demanding payment within 30 days of receipt of information of the return; and<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>the drawer fails to pay within 15 days of receipt of such notice.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Key Element<\/th><th>Description<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Cheque Presentation<\/td><td>Cheque must be presented to the bank<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Dishonour<\/td><td>Due to insufficient funds or exceeding arrangement<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Purpose<\/td><td>For discharge of debt or liability<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Notice Requirement<\/td><td>Written notice within 30 days<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Failure to Pay<\/td><td>Payment not made within 15 days of notice<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The offence is punishable with imprisonment of up to two years, or a fine which may extend to twice the cheque amount, or both. The provision was inserted in 1988 to promote confidence in the banking system and to discourage the dishonest issuance of cheques.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"section-139-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"B_Section_139_The_Presumption_%E2%80%94_Text_and_Effect\"><\/span>B. Section 139: The Presumption \u2014 Text and Effect<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Section 139 reads thus:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;139. Presumption in favour of holder. \u2014 It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is a rebuttable presumption of law \u2014 not of fact. The distinction is significant. A presumption of fact may be rebutted by any evidence raising a reasonable doubt. A presumption of law, such as that in Section 139, requires the accused to discharge a burden \u2014 to prove &#8216;to the contrary&#8217; by a preponderance of probabilities. He need not prove his case beyond reasonable doubt, but he must adduce evidence that makes it more probable than not that the presumption is inapplicable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Type of Presumption<\/th><th>Meaning<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Presumption of Fact<\/td><td>Rebutted by raising reasonable doubt<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Presumption of Law (Section 139)<\/td><td>Requires proof to the contrary on a balance of probabilities<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The presumption under Section 139 covers two things:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>(a) that a legally enforceable debt or liability exists, and<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>(b) that the cheque was issued for the discharge of that debt.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>It does not, however, presume that the signature on the cheque belongs to the accused. Authentication of the signature is a preliminary question \u2014 a threshold issue \u2014 that must be resolved before the presumption can even be invoked. If the accused consistently denies that the signature is his, the foundation of the prosecution&#8217;s case is itself under challenge, and the accused must be given the means to demonstrate that the cheque is not his document.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"presumption-rebuttable-supreme-court\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"III_The_Presumption_Is_Rebuttable_Supreme_Court_Authority\"><\/span>III. The Presumption Is Rebuttable: Supreme Court Authority<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The following landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of India clarify that the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is rebuttable and outline the standard of proof required to challenge it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"kumar-exports-v-sharma-carpets\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Kumar_Exports_v_Sharma_Carpets_2009_2_SCC_513\"><\/span>Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court comprehensively analysed the nature of the presumption under Section 139 and the standard of proof required of the accused to rebut it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a presumption of law. Once the execution of the cheque is either admitted or proved, it is mandatory for the court to presume that the cheque was issued for a legally enforceable debt or liability. But this presumption is a rebuttable one. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the cheque was not issued for a debt or liability or may raise a probable defence from the facts and circumstances of the case to rebut the presumption. The standard of proof to rebut the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rangappa-v-sri-mohan\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Rangappa_v_Sri_Mohan_2010_11_SCC_441\"><\/span>Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>A constitution bench of five judges settled once and for all the scope and nature of the presumption under Section 139. This is the authoritative statement on the subject:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;We are in agreement with the respondent that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the NI Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the accused does indeed bear an evidential burden. However, this is a rebuttable presumption, and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested&#8230; The accused can rely on the preponderance of probabilities to raise a defence that leads the court to doubt the veracity of the complainant&#8217;s case.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"key-legal-principles\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Legal_Principles_from_These_Judgments\"><\/span>Key Legal Principles from These Judgments<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The presumption under Section 139 is a <strong>legal presumption<\/strong>, not merely factual.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>It arises once the execution of the cheque is <strong>admitted or proved<\/strong>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The presumption is <strong>rebuttable<\/strong>, not absolute.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The accused can rebut it through:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Direct evidence, or<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Probable defence based on facts and circumstances<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The standard of proof is <strong>preponderance of probabilities<\/strong>, not beyond reasonable doubt.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"importance-of-rangappa\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Importance_of_Rangappa_in_Judicial_Practice\"><\/span>Importance of Rangappa in Judicial Practice<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Rangappa is of particular importance in the present context because the Constitution Bench emphasised that the accused&#8217;s defence \u2014 however raised \u2014 must be considered seriously by the court. The magistrate who dismisses an accused&#8217;s application to produce expert evidence without examining whether that evidence is relevant to the defence commits a jurisdictional error.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"basalingappa-v-mudibasappa-2019-5-scc-418\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Basalingappa_v_Mudibasappa_2019_5_SCC_418\"><\/span>Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>This three-judge bench decision is the recent authoritative restatement of the principles governing the rebuttable presumption under Section 139. The Court held thus:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"principles-under-section-139\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Principles_Under_Section_139\"><\/span>Key Principles Under Section 139<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Once the execution of the cheque is either admitted or proved, the presumption under Section 139 mandatorily arises.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The presumption is rebuttable. The accused has to raise a probable defence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The standard of proof for rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The accused can raise a probable defence either from the material brought on record during cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or by adducing defence evidence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The court has to consider the defence raised by the accused and determine whether the accused has discharged the initial burden of making the presumption rebuttable.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"importance-of-fifth-proposition\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Importance_of_the_Fifth_Proposition\"><\/span>Importance of the Fifth Proposition<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The fifth proposition in Basalingappa is critical: the court has an active duty to consider the defence evidence. An accused who wishes to adduce scientific expert evidence to challenge the very authenticity of the cheque is exercising the statutory right conferred by Section 243(2) CrPC. The court must give him that opportunity unless the request is vexatious or dilatory without justification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"ms-narayana-menon-v-state-of-kerala-2006-6-scc-39\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"MS_Narayana_Menon_alias_Mani_v_State_of_Kerala_Anr_2006_6_SCC_39\"><\/span>M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala &amp; Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 39<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The Supreme Court held that the burden on the accused to rebut the presumption is not a heavy one and that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising from the evidence:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"burden-of-proof-on-accused\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Burden_of_Proof_on_Accused\"><\/span>Burden of Proof on Accused<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The accused in a case under Section 138 of the NI Act need not prove his defence beyond a reasonable doubt. He is only required to raise a defence which creates a doubt in the mind of the court as to the existence of the legally enforceable debt. Once such a defence is raised, the burden shifts back to the complainant to prove his case. The accused, for raising such a defence, is entitled to rely on all the evidence on record, including the cross-examination of the complainant.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"right-to-handwriting-expert-evidence\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"IV_The_Right_to_Handwriting_Expert_Evidence_Sections_45_and_73_Indian_Evidence_Act_1872_and_Section_243_CrPC\"><\/span>IV. The Right to Handwriting Expert Evidence: Sections 45 and 73, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 243 CrPC<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"section-45-indian-evidence-act-1872\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"A_Section_45_Indian_Evidence_Act_1872\"><\/span>A. Section 45, Indian Evidence Act, 1872:<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, science, or art, or as to the identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science, art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions \u2014 called experts \u2014 are relevant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The authenticity of a signature is squarely within the domain of Section 45.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A handwriting expert from the Forensic Science Laboratory is a &#8216;person specially skilled&#8217; in the comparison of handwriting and signatures.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"section-73-indian-evidence-act-1872\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"B_Section_73_Indian_Evidence_Act_1872\"><\/span>B. Section 73, Indian Evidence Act, 1872:<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Section 73 independently empowers the court to direct a comparison of disputed writing with admitted or proved writing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The court itself may compare the disputed signature with specimen writings.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>However, Section 73 is not a substitute for expert opinion under Section 45; the two operate as complements.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The court uses its own comparison for corroboration; for conclusive scientific analysis, the FSL expert&#8217;s opinion is indispensable.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"section-243-crpc-accused-statutory-right\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"C_Section_2432_CrPC_%E2%80%94_The_Accuseds_Statutory_Right\"><\/span>C. Section 243(2) CrPC \u2014 The Accused&#8217;s Statutory Right<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Section 243 CrPC (corresponding to Section 281 BNSS, 2023) governs the defence evidence stage in a Magistrate&#8217;s trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Sub-section (2) reads:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;(2) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This provision creates a near-absolute right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Condition<\/th><th>Legal Position<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Default Rule<\/td><td>The Magistrate must issue process<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Ground 1<\/td><td>Application made for vexation<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Ground 2<\/td><td>Application made for delay<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Ground 3<\/td><td>Application defeats the ends of justice<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Magistrate must issue process unless one of three grounds is established: vexation, delay, or defeating the ends of justice.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The burden of establishing these grounds is on the court \u2014 not on the accused.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A mere suspicion of delay, or the fact that the application is made at the defence evidence stage, is not sufficient.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>As the Supreme Court held in <strong>Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) (supra)<\/strong>, the stage at which the application is made under Section 243(2) \u2014 after the prosecution has closed its evidence and the accused has entered on his defence \u2014 is precisely the stage contemplated by the provision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"vkalyani-baskar-mahesh-tiwari-core-propositions\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"V_Kalyani_Baskar_And_Mahesh_Tiwari_The_Core_Propositions\"><\/span>V. Kalyani Baskar And Mahesh Tiwari: The Core Propositions<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"kalyani-baskar-case-details\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Kalyani_Baskar_Mrs_v_MS_Sampoornam_Mrs_2007_2_SCC_258\"><\/span>Kalyani Baskar (Mrs) v. M.S. Sampoornam (Mrs) (2007) 2 SCC 258<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>This Supreme Court decision is the foundational authority on the accused&#8217;s right to FSL examination of a disputed cheque signature in a Section 138 trial. The facts were on all fours with Mahesh Tiwari: the accused denied issuing the cheque, the signature was disputed, the Magistrate rejected the application for expert examination, and the High Court upheld the Magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed &amp; held thus:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>Section 243(2) is clear that a magistrate holding an inquiry under CrPC in respect of an offence triable by him does not exceed his powers under Section 243(2) if, in the interest of justice, he directs to send the document for enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the magistrate to compare the disputed signature or writing with the admitted writing or signature of the accused and to reach his own conclusion with the assistance of the expert. The appellant is entitled to rebut the case of the respondent, and if the document, viz., the cheque on which the respondent has relied for initiating criminal proceedings against the appellant, would furnish good material for rebutting that case, the magistrate having declined to send the document for the examination and opinion of the handwriting expert has deprived the appellant of an opportunity of rebutting it. The appellant cannot be convicted without an opportunity being given to her to present her evidence, and if it is denied to her, there is no fair trial. A fair trial includes fair and proper opportunities allowed by law to prove her innocence. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of that right means denial of a fair trial. The magistrate should have granted such a request unless he thinks that the object of the appellant is vexation or delaying the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"application-in-mahesh-tiwari\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Application_In_Mahesh_Tiwari\"><\/span>Application In Mahesh Tiwari<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The Rajasthan High Court in Mahesh Tiwari applied these principles, noting that the accused had denied the signature consistently from the moment of receiving the legal notice \u2014 not as an afterthought at the trial stage. The High Court correctly held that the magistrate&#8217;s refusal \u2014 premised on the ground that the application was made &#8216;at the fag end of trial&#8217; \u2014 was legally untenable, because Section 243(2) itself contemplates the application being made at precisely that stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"key-proposition-section-243-crpc\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Proposition_Section_2432_CrPC_And_FSL_Examination\"><\/span>Key Proposition: Section 243(2) CrPC And FSL Examination<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Legal Issue<\/th><th>Position Established<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Stage Of Application<\/td><td>The defence evidence stage is the correct stage for filing an application under Section 243(2) CrPC.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Ground For Refusal<\/td><td>An application cannot be refused merely on the ground that it is filed late in the trial.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Right Of The Accused<\/td><td>The accused has a valuable right to rebut evidence, including seeking FSL examination of disputed signatures.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Fair Trial Principle<\/td><td>Denial of opportunity to lead defence evidence amounts to denial of a fair trial.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"key-proposition-summary\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Proposition\"><\/span>Key Proposition<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>An application under Section 243(2) CrPC for FSL examination of a disputed cheque signature, made at the defence evidence stage by an accused who has consistently denied the signature, cannot be refused merely on the ground that the application comes late in the trial. The defence evidence stage is the correct stage for such an application.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"law-fortified-supreme-court-decisions\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"The_Law_Fortified_Supreme_Court_Decisions_Beyond_The_Judgment\"><\/span>The Law Fortified: Supreme Court Decisions Beyond The Judgment<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"fair-trial-fundamental-right\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"A_Fair_Trial_As_A_Fundamental_Right_Under_Article_21\"><\/span>A. Fair Trial As A Fundamental Right Under Article 21<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><tbody><tr><th>Case<\/th><th>Citation<\/th><th>Principle<\/th><\/tr><tr><td>Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat<\/td><td>(2004) 4 SCC 158<\/td><td>Fair trial is part of Article 21<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)<\/td><td>(2010) 6 SCC 1<\/td><td>Equal opportunity for prosecution and defence<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/td><td>(2012) 4 SCC 516<\/td><td>Denial of fair trial vitiates proceedings<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"zahira-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Zahira_Habibulla_H_Sheikh_v_State_of_Gujarat\"><\/span>Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The Supreme Court \u2014 in the Best Bakery case \u2014 authoritatively established that the right to a fair trial is an inseparable component of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The principle of fair trial pervades all criminal proceedings. It is not merely a procedural right but a substantive guarantee rooted in the fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. A trial that is not fair is no trial at all. The right to a fair trial encompasses the accused&#8217;s right to present his defence, to examine witnesses, and to produce such evidence as he considers necessary for his defence, subject only to the law of evidence. Courts must be zealous in protecting this right.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"manu-sharma-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Manu_Sharma_v_State_NCT_of_Delhi\"><\/span>Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The right to a fair trial is the cornerstone of the administration of criminal justice. It has two dimensions: the prosecution must be given a fair opportunity to establish the guilt of the accused, and the accused must be given a fair opportunity to establish his innocence. Neither dimension can be sacrificed for the sake of the other or for administrative convenience. Courts must therefore be alert to ensure that the accused&#8217;s right to adduce evidence in his defence is not thwarted by procedural rigidity.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"rattiram-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Rattiram_v_State_of_Madhya_Pradesh\"><\/span>Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The right of the accused to a fair trial is not a procedural formality but a substantive fundamental right. Any violation of this right taints the entire trial and renders the resultant conviction unsustainable. A court that refuses an accused&#8217;s legitimate request to produce evidence necessary for his defence has denied him a fair trial and the conviction that follows must be set aside.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"right-to-adduce-defence-evidence\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"B_The_Right_To_Adduce_Defence_Evidence\"><\/span>B. The Right To Adduce Defence Evidence<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Rooted in Article 21<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Statutorily reflected in Sections 233\u2013243 CrPC<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Denial amounts to constitutional violation<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"state-punjab-naib-din\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"State_of_Punjab_v_Naib_Din\"><\/span>State of Punjab v. Naib Din<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>(2001) 8 SCC 578<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The accused in a criminal trial has a constitutional right to present his defence by adducing evidence. This right flows from Article 21 of the Constitution and finds statutory expression in Sections 233 to 243 of the CrPC. A magistrate who arbitrarily refuses an application under Section 243 to summon a witness or produce a document, without recording specific grounds to conclude that the request is vexatious, commits not merely a procedural error but a constitutional wrong.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"vikram-singh-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Vikram_Singh_v_State_of_Punjab\"><\/span>Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>(2010) 3 SCC 56<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The right to adduce evidence in defence is a fundamental procedural right without which a fair trial is inconceivable. Where the trial court has prevented the accused from producing evidence that could have material bearing on his guilt or innocence, the entire proceeding stands vitiated. The accused must be given a full and unrestricted opportunity to present his defence, subject only to the rules of evidence.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"expert-evidence-role\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"C_Expert_Evidence_And_Its_Indispensable_Role\"><\/span>C. Expert Evidence And Its Indispensable Role<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><tbody><tr><th>Case<\/th><th>Key Principle<\/th><\/tr><tr><td>Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer<\/td><td>Expert evidence often indispensable<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan<\/td><td>Handwriting expert opinion relevant<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/td><td>Court may seek expert assistance<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"anvar-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Anvar_PV_v_PK_Basheer\"><\/span>Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>(2014) 10 SCC 473<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The role of expert evidence in establishing facts that are beyond the common understanding of the court has assumed increasing importance. Courts are not equipped to determine questions of scientific fact by their own observation. In such matters, the expert&#8217;s opinion is not merely relevant \u2014 it is often indispensable. To deny a party the opportunity to place expert opinion before the court, where the expert&#8217;s evidence is relevant to the central issue in the case, is to commit a grievous error.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"ram-narain-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Ram_Narain_v_State_of_Rajasthan\"><\/span>Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>(1973) 2 SCC 661<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;When the identity of handwriting is a matter in issue, the opinion of a person who has made a special study of handwriting and has practical experience in examining and comparing handwriting is admissible and relevant. The weight to be attached to such expert opinion is a matter for the court, but the relevance of the opinion cannot be doubted. A court that refuses to receive expert opinion on a disputed signature is refusing to consider relevant evidence.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"fakhruddin-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Fakhruddin_v_State_of_Madhya_Pradesh\"><\/span>Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>AIR 1967 SC 1326<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;In the matter of comparison of handwriting, the court is not bound by the opinion of the handwriting expert but may form its own opinion with or without the aid of such opinion. However, where signatures are seriously disputed and the resolution of the dispute requires scientific analysis, the court should avail itself of expert assistance. It would be erroneous to deny the parties an opportunity to obtain expert opinion in such circumstances.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"consistent-denial-rule\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"D_The_Consistent_Denial_Rule\"><\/span>D. The Consistent Denial Rule<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"bir-singh-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Bir_Singh_v_Mukesh_Kumar\"><\/span>Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>(2019) 4 SCC 197<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Denial at first opportunity is crucial<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Consistency strengthens bona fide defence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Not a delaying tactic if consistently maintained<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;Where an accused in a Section 138 NI Act case raises the defence of forgery or denial of signature at the very inception of the proceedings \u2014 in his reply to the legal notice itself \u2014 and maintains that position throughout the trial, the application for expert examination of the cheque cannot be treated as a delaying tactic. Consistency of the defence is a relevant factor that the magistrate must weigh when considering an application under Section 243(2) CrPC.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"magistrate-duty-discretion\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"E_The_Magistrates_Duty_%E2%80%94_Discretion_Is_Not_Unfettered\"><\/span>E. The Magistrate&#8217;s Duty \u2014 Discretion Is Not Unfettered<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"krishna-janardhan-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Krishna_Janardhan_Bhat_v_Dattatraya_G_Hegde\"><\/span>Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>(2008) 4 SCC 54<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The legislative scheme under Sections 138 and 139 of the NI Act must be understood in light of the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. Section 139 creates a rebuttable presumption. The word &#8216;rebuttable&#8217; is not merely a linguistic formality; it is a substantive protection. The accused must be given a genuine and effective opportunity to rebut the presumption \u2014 not a theoretical one. A statutory right to adduce rebuttal evidence means nothing if the court refuses to allow that evidence.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"fag-end-of-trial-fallacy\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"VII_The_%E2%80%98Fag_End_of_Trial_Fallacy_Timing_Is_Not_a_Disqualification\"><\/span>VII. The &#8216;Fag End of Trial&#8217; Fallacy: Timing Is Not a Disqualification<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>One of the most commonly cited \u2014 and most frequently misapplied \u2014 grounds for rejecting an application under Section 243(2) CrPC is that the application is made &#8216;at the fag end of trial&#8217; or &#8216;at the last stage&#8217;. Both the trial court in Mahesh Tiwari and the magistrate in Kalyani Baskar used this reasoning. Both were wrong, for the same reason: Section 243(2) CrPC expressly applies at the defence evidence stage, which is by definition a late stage of the trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"section-243-2-crpc-applicability-stage\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Applicability_of_Section_2432_CrPC_Defence_Stage_Explained\"><\/span>Applicability of Section 243(2) CrPC: Defence Stage Explained<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Section 243(2) CrPC applies &#8216;when the accused has entered upon his defence&#8217;. This stage arrives after (i) the prosecution has closed its evidence, (ii) the accused has been examined under Section 313 CrPC, and (iii) the accused has decided to lead defence evidence. An application at this stage is not late \u2014 it is timely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"trial-stage-breakdown-crpc\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Stages_of_Trial_Under_CrPC_Simplified\"><\/span>Stages of Trial Under CrPC (Simplified)<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Stage<\/th><th>Description<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Prosecution Evidence<\/td><td>Prosecution presents witnesses and documents<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Section 313 CrPC Examination<\/td><td>Accused is questioned on evidence<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Defence Evidence Stage<\/td><td>Accused presents defence, including expert evidence<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"valid-grounds-refusal-section-243-2\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Valid_Grounds_for_Refusal_Under_Section_2432_CrPC\"><\/span>Valid Grounds for Refusal Under Section 243(2) CrPC<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The only valid grounds for refusal under Section 243(2) are that the application is made for &#8216;the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice&#8217;. These grounds require a finding of subjective malice or objective futility \u2014 not mere timing. Where the accused has disputed the signature from day one, the application for FSL examination is not vexatious; it is the logical evidentiary step in the defence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Application made for the purpose of vexation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Application intended to cause delay<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Application aimed at defeating the ends of justice<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"supreme-court-ruling-delay-vs-bonafide\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Supreme_Court_Ruling_Delay_vs_Bona_Fide_Defence\"><\/span>Supreme Court Ruling: Delay vs Bona Fide Defence<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Shailendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) SCC OnLine SC 3022<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;A court considering an application under Section 243(2) CrPC must distinguish between delay caused by the nature of the defence and delay caused by the conduct of the accused. Where the accused requires scientific examination of a document to prove a defence that he has consistently maintained, the application cannot be treated as dilatory. The question is not when the application was made but whether the evidence sought is relevant to the defence and whether the request is bona fide.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"fsl-report-weight-not-conclusive\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"VIII_What_Happens_After_The_FSL_Report_Weight_Not_Conclusiveness\"><\/span>VIII. What Happens After The FSL Report: Weight, Not Conclusiveness<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>A common misconception is that an FSL report in favour of the accused will be decisive. It will not. Expert opinion under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act is relevant \u2014 it is not conclusive. The court is not bound by the expert&#8217;s opinion and may form its own view by comparing the disputed signature with the specimen signature, using the process under Section 73 of the Evidence Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"lalit-popli-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Lalit_Popli_v_Canara_Bank_2003_3_SCC_583\"><\/span>Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The Supreme Court clarified the weight to be attached to the opinion of a handwriting expert in a Section 138 NI Act case:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The opinion of a handwriting expert is a relevant piece of evidence which the court must consider along with all other evidence on record. It is not conclusive and does not bind the court. The court may accept the opinion, reject it, or accept it in part. However, where the opinion supports the accused&#8217;s defence that the signature on the cheque is not his, the court must consider that opinion carefully before recording a conviction and must give reasons for accepting or rejecting it.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"surendra-nath-gupta-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Surendra_Nath_Gupta_v_State_of_Uttar_Pradesh_2011_14_SCC_466\"><\/span>Surendra Nath Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 14 SCC 466<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The court held that even where two expert opinions conflict \u2014 one in favour of the prosecution and one in favour of the defence \u2014 the court must independently assess both and cannot mechanically prefer one over the other:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;Where the prosecution and the defence each rely on the opinion of a handwriting expert, and the two experts give conflicting opinions, the court must analyse both opinions critically. It must examine the methodology used, the samples compared, and the reasoning given. It cannot simply prefer the prosecution&#8217;s expert over the defence&#8217;s expert without reasons. The accused is entitled to have his expert opinion given equal consideration.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"key-legal-principles\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Legal_Principles\"><\/span>Key Legal Principles<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Expert opinion under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act is relevant but not conclusive.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The court is not bound by expert evidence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The court may independently compare signatures under Section 73 of the Evidence Act.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Conflicting expert opinions must be evaluated critically and fairly.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Reasons must be recorded for accepting or rejecting expert evidence.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"practitioners-guide-defence-counsel\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"IX_Practitioners_Guide_For_The_Defence_Counsel\"><\/span>IX. Practitioner\u2019s Guide For The Defence Counsel<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"stage-legal-notice\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"A_At_The_Stage_Of_Legal_Notice\"><\/span>A. At The Stage Of Legal Notice<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The accused&#8217;s reply to the legal notice under Section 138 must explicitly state the denial of signature and identify the cheque as forged or fabricated. This consistent denial, made at the earliest opportunity, is crucial evidence of bona fides at the later application stage.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Preserve the original envelope of the legal notice and its receipt, as these prove the date of the accused&#8217;s first categorical denial.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"during-trial-before-application\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"B_During_Trial_%E2%80%94_Before_Filing_The_Application\"><\/span>B. During Trial \u2014 Before Filing The Application<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>In the cross-examination of the complainant, elicit the circumstances of the cheque: when was it given? Where? Who was present? Was it written by the complainant or the accused? Contradictions in the complainant&#8217;s account strengthen the case for expert examination.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Do not concede the signature in any written submission or under a Section 313 examination. The denial must be maintained throughout.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"drafting-application-crpc-iea\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"C_Drafting_The_Application_Under_Section_2432_CrPC_Section_45_IEA\"><\/span>C. Drafting The Application Under Section 243(2) CrPC \/ Section 45 IEA<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>State clearly that the signature on the cheque has been denied since the receipt of the legal notice, with reference to the reply filed.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Demonstrate relevance: the authenticity of the signature is the central issue in the case.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Address the objection of delay pre-emptively: cite Section 243(2) CrPC, which itself envisages applications at the defence evidence stage.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Cite Kalyani Baskar (Mrs) \u2014 (2007) 2 SCC 258.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Specifically pray for:<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Prayer<\/th><th>Details<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>(a)<\/td><td>Collection of specimen signatures of the accused in court<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>(b)<\/td><td>Transmission of the cheque and specimen signatures to the FSL with a direction for an expeditious report<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Cite Mahesh Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. CRLMP No. 1175\/2015, Rajasthan High Court, 13 April 2026) as the most recent authority supporting the application.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"if-application-rejected\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"D_If_The_Application_Is_Rejected\"><\/span>D. If The Application Is Rejected<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>File a criminal miscellaneous petition before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC \/ Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the magistrate&#8217;s order as violative of Article 21.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Invoke Kalyani Baskar (Mrs) \u2014 (2007) 2 SCC 258 and Mahesh Tiwari (2026) as direct authorities.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Also place reliance on Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh\u2014(2004) 4 SCC 158 for the proposition that denial of a fair trial vitiates the entire proceeding.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Seek an interim stay of the trial pending disposal of the petition.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"conclusion-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"X_Conclusion\"><\/span>X. Conclusion<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The legislative inversion of the presumption of innocence in Section 138 NI Act cases is a calculated policy choice \u2014 one that serves the legitimate goal of protecting commercial transactions and banking confidence. But it is a choice that comes with a constitutional price: the accused who contests the presumption must be given a genuine, effective, and unimpeded opportunity to rebut it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Where the accused denies that the signature on the cheque is his, he is not merely contesting a fact \u2014 he is contesting the very existence of the document that forms the foundation of the prosecution. A consistent denial, maintained from the legal notice stage through trial, is strong circumstantial evidence that the accused is not engaging in delay. The denial points to a genuine dispute that science can resolve. To refuse the accused access to that science \u2013 on the bare ground that the application comes &#8216;at the fag end of trial&#8217; \u2013 is to misread Section 243(2) CrPC, to misapply Kalyani Baskar (Mrs), and to violate Article 21.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"key-legal-principles\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Key_Legal_Principles-2\"><\/span>Key Legal Principles<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The accused must have a real opportunity to rebut the statutory presumption.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Denial of signature raises a foundational dispute about the document itself.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Scientific evidence (FSL examination) is crucial in resolving such disputes.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Rejecting such requests solely due to delay may violate fair trial rights.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"landmark-judgments\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Landmark_Judgments_and_Legal_Standard\"><\/span>Landmark Judgments and Legal Standard<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Mahesh Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan (2026) and Kalyani Baskar (Mrs) v. M.S. Sampoornam (Mrs) (2007) together establish an unequivocal rule: the Magistrate must allow the FSL examination unless he records specific findings that the application is vexatious, dilatory, or designed to defeat the ends of justice. A standard lesser than this is no standard at all. The word &#8216;rebuttable&#8217; in Section 139 must mean something real. And a fair trial, as the Supreme Court has said, is not a procedural formality \u2014 it is a fundamental right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"case-law-summary-table\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Case_Law_Summary\"><\/span>Case Law Summary<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Case Name<\/th><th>Year<\/th><th>Key Principle<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Mahesh Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan<\/td><td>2026<\/td><td>FSL examination must be allowed unless application is proven vexatious or dilatory.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Kalyani Baskar (Mrs) v. M.S. Sampoornam (Mrs)<\/td><td>2007<\/td><td>Accused has a right to present evidence essential for a fair trial.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"table-of-cases\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Table_of_Cases\"><\/span>Table of Cases<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"lead-case\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Lead_Case\"><\/span>Lead Case<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Mahesh Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan &amp; Anr.<\/strong><br>S.B. CRLMP-1175\/2015, Rajasthan High Court, 13.04.2026<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"supreme-court-judgments\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Supreme_Court_Judgments\"><\/span>Supreme Court Judgments<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) v. M.S. Sampoornam (Mrs.) (2007) 2 SCC 258<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>M.S. Narayana Menon alias Mani v. State of Kerala (2006) 6 SCC 39<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 516<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>State of Punjab v. Naib Din (2001) 8 SCC 578<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab (2010) 3 SCC 56<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan (1973) 2 SCC 661<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1967 SC 1326<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Shailendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of UP (2021) SCC OnLine SC 3022<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank (2003) 3 SCC 583<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Surendra Nath Gupta v. State of UP (2011) 14 SCC 466<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"tabular-format\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Tabular_Format_for_Quick_Reference\"><\/span>Tabular Format for Quick Reference<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Case Name<\/th><th>Citation<\/th><th>Court<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Mahesh Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan &amp; Anr.<\/td><td>S.B. CRLMP-1175\/2015<\/td><td>Rajasthan High Court<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornam<\/td><td>(2007) 2 SCC 258<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets<\/td><td>(2009) 2 SCC 513<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Rangappa v. Sri Mohan<\/td><td>(2010) 11 SCC 441<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa<\/td><td>(2019) 5 SCC 418<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala<\/td><td>(2006) 6 SCC 39<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat<\/td><td>(2004) 4 SCC 158<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)<\/td><td>(2010) 6 SCC 1<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/td><td>(2012) 4 SCC 516<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>State of Punjab v. Naib Din<\/td><td>(2001) 8 SCC 578<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab<\/td><td>(2010) 3 SCC 56<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer<\/td><td>(2014) 10 SCC 473<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan<\/td><td>(1973) 2 SCC 661<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/td><td>AIR 1967 SC 1326<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar<\/td><td>(2019) 4 SCC 197<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde<\/td><td>(2008) 4 SCC 54<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Shailendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of UP<\/td><td>(2021) SCC OnLine SC 3022<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank<\/td><td>(2003) 3 SCC 583<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Surendra Nath Gupta v. State of UP<\/td><td>(2011) 14 SCC 466<\/td><td>Supreme Court of India<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Anchored In Mahesh Tiwari v. State Of Rajasthan &amp; Anr. In S.B. CRLMP No. 1175\/2015 | High Court Of Rajasthan (Jaipur) &#8211; Decided: 13 April 2026 Section 138 Of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, creates a statutory offence of cheque dishonour that has become the single largest<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":73,"featured_media":22953,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"two_page_speed":[],"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"_joinchat":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[4765,28],"class_list":{"0":"post-22863","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-banking-finance-laws","8":"tag-banking-finance-laws","9":"tag-top-news"},"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/section-138-ni-act-fsl-handwriting-expert-fair-trial-presumption.webp","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22863","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/73"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22863"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22863\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":22954,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22863\/revisions\/22954"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22953"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22863"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22863"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22863"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}