{"id":33234,"date":"2026-10-01T10:53:31","date_gmt":"2026-10-01T10:53:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/?p=33234"},"modified":"2026-10-01T11:05:33","modified_gmt":"2026-10-01T11:05:33","slug":"posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/","title":{"rendered":"Beyond Vishaka: Does the Internal Committee Under the POSH Act Really Give a Fair Hearing?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h2 id=\"h-abstract\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Abstract\"><\/span>Abstract<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Most people studying Indian labor law first meet the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), and most are taught that the story has a happy ending: Parliament eventually passed a law, so the problem is solved. This paper argues that the ending is not that simple. It traces how the Vishaka guidelines grew into the Internal Committee (IC) set up under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, and asks a plain question: does the IC actually give people a fair hearing, and does the law push employers to make that fairness real? Using the Supreme Court&#8217;s 2023 judgment in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa as the main example, along with a short look at later High Court cases, this paper shows that basic problems such as lack of notice, wrong composition, and no real chance to be heard are still showing up in IC inquiries, a full decade after the Act came into force. It then studies Sections 19 and 26 of the Act, the provisions dealing with employer duty and punishment, and argues that these sections mostly punish an employer for not having an IC at all and barely touch an employer whose IC exists but runs an unfair inquiry. The paper closes with four modest reform ideas that keep the IC model but try to fix its weakest points.<\/p><div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_88 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-grey ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title\" style=\"cursor:inherit\">Table of Contents<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #0c0c0c;color:#0c0c0c\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #0c0c0c;color:#0c0c0c\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 ' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Abstract\" >Abstract<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Introduction\" >Introduction<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Vishaka_Where_It_All_Began\" >Vishaka: Where It All Began<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#The_Internal_Committee_Under_the_2013_Act\" >The Internal Committee Under the 2013 Act<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#What_the_Case_Law_Shows_Aureliano_Fernandes_and_Beyond\" >What the Case Law Shows: Aureliano Fernandes and Beyond<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#The_Numbers_Behind_the_Gap\" >The Numbers Behind the Gap<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Employer_Liability_Sections_19_and_26\" >Employer Liability: Sections 19 and 26<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-8\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#What_Can_Be_Done_Reform_Suggestions\" >What Can Be Done: Reform Suggestions<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-9\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Conclusion\" >Conclusion<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-10\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Bibliography\" >Bibliography<\/a><ul class='ez-toc-list-level-3' ><li class='ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-11\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Cases\" >Cases<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-12\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Statutes_Rules_and_the_Constitution\" >Statutes, Rules and the Constitution<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-13\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Reports\" >Reports<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-3'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-14\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Articles_and_Online_Sources\" >Articles and Online Sources<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-2'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-15\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalserviceindia.com\/Legal-Articles\/posh-internal-committee-fair-hearing-natural-justice\/#Table_of_contents\" >Table of contents<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-introduction\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Introduction\"><\/span>Introduction<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Almost every paper on workplace sexual harassment law in India begins with Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, and I am going to begin the same way, because I think the repetition tells us something useful. Vishaka was not the result of a legislature calmly deciding to protect women at work. It came out of a gap in the law, and the Supreme Court stepped into that gap using Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution. [1] It took Parliament sixteen years to turn those guidelines into an actual statute. When it finally did, through the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (the \u201cPOSH Act\u201d), the old Complaints Committee became the \u201cInternal Committee\u201d (IC). [2] A lot of commentary treats this renaming as the end of the story: there is now a statute, so the gap Vishaka identified has been closed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I do not think it has been fully closed, and this paper explains why, using one case as its anchor: Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, decided by the Supreme Court on 12 May 2023. [3] In that case, an inquiry by the IC at Goa University, which had led to the appellant being dismissed and barred from future government jobs, was struck down because the inquiry did not follow the basic rules of natural justice. This happened almost exactly ten years after the POSH Act came into force. If the 2013 Act was meant to be the complete answer to the gap Vishaka left open, it is hard to explain why a properly set-up IC could still get the basics wrong in 2023, in a case that reached India&#8217;s highest court. That gap between what the law promises and what it actually delivers is what this paper investigates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Research Problem: Section 11 of the POSH Act tells the IC to hold its inquiry \u201cin accordance with the principles of natural justice&#8221; but does not explain much about what that means in day-to-day terms. There is no detailed evidence code like the Indian Evidence Act, no right to a lawyer before the IC (Rule 7(6) of the 2013 Rules actually excludes advocates from representing the parties), and no special appeal body for POSH matters\u2014an appeal under Section 18 simply goes to the ordinary courts. [4] On top of this thin procedure sits a structural issue: the IC is appointed by the employer, headed by a senior woman employee of that same employer, and funded by that employer. It is sometimes\u00a0to look into the conduct of a colleague or a superior within that very organization. This paper asks whether a body built this way can be trusted to deliver a fair hearing as a matter of routine and whether Sections 19 and 26, the penalty provisions, are actually built to catch a bad inquiry or only a missing one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Central Research Question: Does the Internal Committee under the POSH Act really give a fair hearing, and does the Act&#8217;s penalty structure push employers to make that fairness real, or does the design of the law leave a gap between the promise on paper and what an employer-run committee can actually deliver?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Objectives: This paper has five goals. First, to see what changed and what did not change between the 1997 Vishaka guidelines and the 2013 statutory IC, because some of the Act&#8217;s silence on procedure may simply be inherited from a scheme that was never written as a detailed code in the first place. Second, to read Aureliano Fernandes and a small set of later High Court decisions closely, to check whether they share a common pattern of defect (composition, notice, or representation) or whether they are just scattered, unrelated failures. Third, to examine, purely as a question of institutional design and not personal honesty, whether an employer-appointed and employer-funded IC can ever be independent enough to be reliably fair. Fourth, to check whether Sections 19 and 26 actually reward a well-run inquiry or whether they are aimed only at an employer who fails to set up a committee at all. Fifth, to suggest reforms that are realistic for India\u2014reforms that keep the IC model (since it is not going anywhere) but try to fix its weak points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hypothesis: My working idea, which the rest of the paper tries to test, is that the problems seen in Aureliano Fernandes are not the fault of one badly-run committee at one university. They are a fairly predictable result of how the IC is built: an employer-run body doing a court-like job without a court&#8217;s independence and without a court&#8217;s settled procedure. I also think the current penalty structure barely touches this problem, because it is aimed almost entirely at employers who never set up an IC and does very little to an employer whose IC exists on paper but runs a defective inquiry. If this is right, the answer is not to scrap the IC model, as the Justice J.S. Verma Committee once suggested when it proposed an Employment Tribunal instead. [5] The better fix, I will argue, is to strengthen the IC&#8217;s own procedure and connect an employer&#8217;s legal exposure more directly to the quality of the inquiry that was actually run, not just to whether a committee exists on paper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Methodology: This is a doctrinal, library-based paper. I have read the Act, the 2013 Rules, and the two anchor cases (Vishaka and Aureliano Fernandes) directly rather than relying only on secondary summaries, because a lot of what people say Vishaka \u201cheld\u201d gets simplified with each retelling. I have also tried to group a small sample of post-2023 High Court decisions by the type of defect they point out so that Section 4 of this paper can speak of a pattern rather than a list of unrelated stories. I return to the Verma Committee Report of January 2013 to ask whether its warning about internal, employer-run bodies still holds true a decade later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The rest of the paper works as. Section 2 looks at Vishaka closely, including the facts behind it and the standard of fairness it actually set. Section 3 looks at how the 2013 Act built the statutory IC on top of that inheritance, focusing on where the Act stays quiet on procedure. Section 4 reviews the case law, with Aureliano Fernandes at the center, grouped by the type of defect involved. Section 5 turns to employer liability under Sections 19 and 26. Section 6 sets out reform ideas. Section 7 concludes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-vishaka-where-it-all-began\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Vishaka_Where_It_All_Began\"><\/span>Vishaka: Where It All Began<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vishaka did not come from an abstract policy debate in a seminar room. It came from the gang rape of Bhanwari Devi, a social worker employed under the Rajasthan government&#8217;s Women&#8217;s Development Programme, who was attacked in 1992 after she tried to stop a child marriage in her village. Her case went through the criminal courts and, notoriously, ended in an acquittal at trial, which is often cited as the reason women&#8217;s rights groups turned to public interest litigation in the Supreme Court instead. The petition that became Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan was filed by Vishaka and other women&#8217;s organizations, not to reopen Bhanwari Devi&#8217;s criminal case, but to ask the court to build a legal framework so that women facing harassment \u201cin the course of employment\u201d would not be left, as she effectively was, without any workplace-specific remedy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Court&#8217;s response is worth reading closely rather than just citing in passing. It held that gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and grounded this in Articles 14 and 15 (equality and non-discrimination), Article 19(1)(g) (the right to practice any profession, which is not much of a right if the workplace itself is unsafe), and Article 21 (life and personal liberty, read to include the right to live and work with dignity). Since Parliament had not legislated on the subject, the Court used Article 141 to say its guidelines would have the force of law until Parliament stepped in. This is what people mean by \u201cVishaka &#8220;law&#8221;\u2014judge-made, grounded in the Constitution, and openly meant to be temporary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What did the guidelines actually require? At the core, they placed a duty on every employer to take steps to prevent sexual harassment and to set up a Complaints Committee to look into complaints\u2014headed by a woman, with at least half the members being women, and with an outside third party (an NGO or similar body) involved, precisely so the committee would not simply be made up of the employer&#8217;s own management chain. The guidelines also said the process should be time-bound and confidential and should broadly follow natural justice, even though they did not set out a detailed evidence code. In other words, Vishaka set a standard of fairness\u2014women-led, partly external, confidential, time-bound\u2014without setting out a detailed procedure of fairness. It described what a fair process should look like from a distance, but not what it should look like up close: how evidence is taken, whether cross-examination is allowed, and what representation the parties get.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This gap did not go unnoticed even before the 2013 Act arrived. In Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, a case that produced a series of interim orders between roughly 2004 and 2013, the Supreme Court kept the Vishaka-era Complaints Committee mechanism under continuing supervision precisely because state governments and institutions were not implementing it properly, or were implementing it only on paper.[6] Medha Kotwal Lele is, I think, an under-discussed case in student writing on this subject, because it shows that the \u201cthin procedure\u201d problem this paper is about was already a live issue in the 2000s, well before Aureliano Fernandes made it visible again in a different form. The Supreme Court in that case was, in effect, monitoring compliance because compliance could not be trusted to happen on its own \u2014 a supervisory role the POSH Act largely handed over to the ordinary courts once it was enacted, with much less continuous oversight than the Supreme Court itself had been giving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two points from this section carry forward through the rest of the paper. First, Vishaka&#8217;s standard of fairness was inspiring and constitutionally grounded, but thin and skeletal in its detail \u2014 it told employers to be fair without building much of a mechanism to make fairness reliable across thousands of workplaces with very different levels of capacity. Second, even under continuous Supreme Court supervision in Medha Kotwal Lele, compliance was patchy. If a body under active judicial watch still struggled with implementation, that should make us doubt whether turning the guidelines into an ordinary statute, without any similar ongoing oversight, would by itself solve the problem. That assumption is more or less exactly what the 2013 Act made, as the next section explains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-the-internal-committee-under-the-2013-act\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"The_Internal_Committee_Under_the_2013_Act\"><\/span>The Internal Committee Under the 2013 Act<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The POSH Act took the Vishaka Complaints Committee and relaunched it as the Internal Committee, which every employer with ten or more employees must set up under Section 4. Section 4 describes its composition in much more detail than Vishaka ever did: a Presiding Officer who must be a senior woman employee, at least two members from among employees who are committed to the cause of women or have relevant social work or legal experience, and one member from an NGO or association working on women&#8217;s issues or familiar with sexual harassment matters. At least half the total members must be women, and the Presiding Officer and the external member get an allowance for participating, which at least shows the Act meant for the role to be somewhat professional.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On paper, this is a real improvement on Vishaka&#8217;s simple instruction that the committee be \u201cheaded by a woman\u201d with an outside party \u201cinvolved.\u201d Section 4 gives numbers, gives qualifications, and makes an external member compulsory on every IC, not just a vague instruction that an NGO be involved somehow. If the problem in Vishaka was a standard without a mechanism, Section 4 gives more of a mechanism, at least for composition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The trouble is that composition is only one part of what makes a body reliable, and the Act becomes noticeably thinner exactly where it deals with how the inquiry itself is run. Section 11 governs the conduct of the inquiry. It tells the IC to follow the service rules that apply to the respondent, or, where there are none, to proceed \u201cin such manner as may be prescribed\u201d \u2014 language that pushes the real content of the procedure down into the 2013 Rules rather than the Act itself. Rule 7 carries most of the detail: it deals with the help a complainant may have while presenting her case (a friend, but not a lawyer, under Rule 7(6)), how evidence is taken, and timelines \u2014 an inquiry is meant to finish within ninety days under Section 11(4). Section 11 also gives the IC, for the purpose of the inquiry, \u201cthe same powers as are vested in a civil court\u201d under the Code of Civil Procedure for things like summoning witnesses and asking for documents. That is a significant power to give a body that Section 4 itself describes as internal and employer-appointed rather than as an independent tribunal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Section 12 adds the possibility of interim relief \u2014 for example, transferring the complainant or the respondent, or granting leave to the complainant \u2014 while the inquiry is still going on, again modelled on what a court might order in the meantime. Read together, Sections 4, 11 and 12 show a design that is clearly court-like in its ambition: quasi-judicial powers, evidence-taking functions, and the ability to grant interim protection. But the Act does not give the IC a court&#8217;s independence. Every IC member, except the outside NGO representative, is an employee of the very employer whose workplace is under scrutiny. The Presiding Officer, while senior, still has her own career and reporting line inside the same organisation as the respondent, who may be senior to her.[7] Nothing in Section 4 or Section 11 requires that IC members be trained in evidence law, questioning technique, or sensitive interviewing before they exercise \u201cpowers vested in a civil court.\u201d Section 19, discussed in Section 5, does require the employer to run \u201cworkshops and awareness programmes\u201d and support the IC generally, but that is a broad capacity-building duty, not a safeguard built into any specific inquiry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The clearest way to put the problem this section has been building toward is this: the Act gives the IC a court&#8217;s toolkit without a court&#8217;s conditions of independence, and tells it to follow \u201cprinciples of natural justice\u201d without giving it a natural-justice rulebook of the kind a civil court or a labour tribunal builds up over decades of precedent. \u201cPrinciples of natural justice\u201d is a real and substantial area of law \u2014 notice, the right to be heard, the rule against bias, the right to see the evidence against you \u2014 but it is an area lawyers know how to apply because they train in it for years. Handing that same standard to a committee of employees, most without legal training, appointed for a three-year term under Section 4(3), and simply telling them to apply it, asks a great deal of a body that was never built to be a court. This gap between the sophistication of the standard and the ordinariness of the body asked to meet it is, in my reading, exactly what set up the problem the Supreme Court dealt with in Aureliano Fernandes, discussed next.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-what-the-case-law-shows-aureliano-fernandes-and-beyond\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"What_the_Case_Law_Shows_Aureliano_Fernandes_and_Beyond\"><\/span>What the Case Law Shows: Aureliano Fernandes and Beyond<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa is the anchor case for this paper and deserves to be read in some factual detail rather than just cited for its headline. The appellant, Aureliano Fernandes, faced multiple complaints of sexual harassment, and an IC set up by Goa University inquired into them. The IC&#8217;s findings led to his dismissal and a bar on his future government employment in Goa. He challenged this before the High Court of Bombay at its Goa Bench, which upheld the IC&#8217;s findings, and the matter went up to the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On examining the record, the Supreme Court found that the IC&#8217;s inquiry had not actually followed the principles of natural justice that Section 11 requires, even though a full decade had passed since the Act was enacted. The Court, made up of Justices A.S. Bopanna and Hima Kohli, allowed the appeal and set aside the findings against the appellant on that ground.[8] But the judgment &nbsp;&nbsp;not stop with the individual case. The Court used the opportunity to issue directions about the state of POSH implementation across the whole country: it directed the Union and all State Governments and Union Territories to run a time-bound check that every ministry, department, public body, public sector undertaking, and institution has actually set up its IC, and that these committees are composed strictly in line with the Act; it directed that IC composition and member contact details be published on the relevant organisation&#8217;s website and kept updated; it extended a similar check to statutory professional bodies (covering doctors, lawyers, chartered accountants, and engineers, among others) and to universities, colleges, training centres, and hospitals; and it directed immediate and effective training for IC members. Read together with the individual finding, the most important lesson from Aureliano Fernandes is that the Supreme Court itself, in 2023, did not treat this as one isolated failure at one university. It treated it as a symptom of a nationwide implementation gap serious enough to justify a fresh set of systemic directions a full ten years after the statute came into force \u2014 which is exactly the \u201cgap between promise and delivery\u201d this paper set out to study.[9]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Beyond Aureliano Fernandes itself, later High Court decisions applying it show a pattern rather than scattered coincidence, even allowing for the modest size of the sample a student paper can realistically cover. One recurring category is about notice and disclosure: courts have set aside IC findings where the respondent was never given a copy of the complaint or the material relied on against him before the inquiry went ahead, holding that Rule 7 makes such service compulsory and that its absence, on its own, is enough to break natural justice. A second category is about composition \u2014 cases where the IC did not actually meet the Section 4 requirements, whether because the external member was missing, the numbers fell short of the statutory minimum, or the committee that actually ran the inquiry was not properly constituted at all. A third, related category is about representation and a genuine opportunity to be heard \u2014 not necessarily a right to a lawyer, which Rule 7(6) withholds, but a right to know the case against you, respond to it, and have that response actually considered before the IC reaches its conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What stands out from this small sample is that none of these three types of defect are complicated legal problems. Notice of the case against you, a properly constituted tribunal, and a real chance to respond are about as basic as natural justice gets \u2014 usually the very first things taught in administrative law, well before harder questions like whether cross-examination is compulsory. If IC after IC, a decade into the Act&#8217;s life, is still getting these basics wrong, that is not evidence that natural justice is a hard standard to meet. It is evidence that the body asked to meet it \u2014 untrained, put together for one case at a time, sitting inside the very organisation under scrutiny, with no detailed procedural rulebook beyond Rule 7 \u2014 is simply not well suited to meeting it reliably, even when its members act in good faith. This is the practical support for the structural half of my hypothesis: the problem in Aureliano Fernandes looks less like one committee&#8217;s individual failure and more like the predictable output of the design discussed in Section 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-the-numbers-behind-the-gap\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"The_Numbers_Behind_the_Gap\"><\/span>The Numbers Behind the Gap<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The case law reviewed above tells us that individual inquiries are going wrong. It is worth asking whether the aggregate numbers, at the level of India Inc.&nbsp;as a whole, tell a similar story. The most useful dataset I found for this is a 2024 analysis by the Centre for Economic Data and Analysis (CEDA) at Ashoka University, which tracked POSH disclosures made by 300 companies listed on the National Stock Exchange over an eleven-year period.[10] Figure 1 plots the number of cases reported by this set of companies for the years in which CEDA reports an exact figure. Figure 1: Sexual harassment cases reported under the POSH Act by 300 NSE-listed companies, select years, FY2012-13 to FY2022-23. Source: Akshi Chawla (2024), CEDA, Ashoka University.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two things stand out. First, reported cases have gone up more or less every year since the Act came into force \u2014 from 161 in FY2013-14, the first year of the Act, to 1,160 in FY2022-23, dipping only in FY2020-21, the first pandemic year. On its own, that rise is not proof that harassment itself has increased; it more plausibly reflects greater awareness and a growing, if still limited, willingness to use the IC route at all.[11] Second, and more relevant to this paper&#8217;s argument, CEDA&#8217;s data shows that the number of complaints resolved has not kept pace with the number reported. In FY2013-14, 109 of the 161 reported complaints were resolved; by FY2016-17, even as reported cases rose by 12.9 percent over the previous year, the number resolved actually fell by 2.1 percent, and CEDA finds that this gap has widened further since the FY2020-21 pandemic dip.[12] That is exactly the pattern this paper&#8217;s case-law review would predict: more complainants are willing to come forward, but the machinery meant to give them a fair and timely hearing is not growing at the same rate. A rising bar chart of complaints, in other words, is not by itself evidence that the IC is working well \u2014 it may just as easily be evidence of a widening backlog.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-employer-liability-sections-19-and-26\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Employer_Liability_Sections_19_and_26\"><\/span>Employer Liability: Sections 19 and 26<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the IC&#8217;s inquiry is supposed to deliver fairness, Sections 19 and 26 of the Act are supposed to make sure employers take that seriously. It is worth asking directly what these two provisions actually do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Section 19 lists the employer&#8217;s duties. These include providing a safe working environment; displaying, at a visible place at the workplace, the penal consequences of sexual harassment and the order setting up the IC; organising workshops and awareness programmes at regular intervals; giving the IC the facilities it needs to handle a complaint and run an inquiry, including security for the complainant or witnesses where needed; treating sexual harassment as misconduct under the applicable service rules; helping to secure the attendance of the respondent and witnesses before the IC; and, under Section 21, monitoring the timely submission of the IC&#8217;s annual report and passing it on to the District Officer. Taken together, Section 19 is a list of institutional duties \u2014 set up the committee, publicise it, train people, cooperate procedurally, report annually. What it does not do is impose any duty tied to the quality of a specific inquiry once it is underway. Nothing in Section 19 says the employer must ensure the IC actually serves the complaint on the respondent, or that the employer must ensure a given inquiry&#8217;s composition meets the Section 4 threshold, or that the employer faces any consequence if the IC it appointed runs an inquiry that a court later finds unfair. Section 19 works at the level of policy and infrastructure, not accountability for the individual case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Section 26 is the penalty provision and closely follows what Section 19 already covers. It says that where an employer fails to set up an IC under Section 4, or fails to act on the Committee&#8217;s recommendations, or contravenes or attempts to contravene the other provisions of the Act or its rules, that employer is punishable with a fine that may go up to fifty thousand rupees. A second or later offence attracts a higher penalty, possibly double the fine, and under Section 26(2), cancellation or non-renewal of any licence or registration needed to carry on the business. On its face, \u201ccontravention of the provisions of the Act\u201d is broad language, and one could argue it is broad enough to cover a defective inquiry as a breach of Section 11&#8217;s natural-justice requirement. But in practice, as far as secondary literature and reported enforcement show, Section 26 operates mostly as a penalty for not constituting the IC at all, or for not acting on its recommendations, or for other clear procedural omissions like failing to file the annual report.[13] I have not come across a reported case where an employer was penalised under Section 26 specifically because a properly constituted IC ran an inquiry that later turned out to violate natural justice. The consequence in that situation, as Aureliano Fernandes itself shows, falls on the inquiry&#8217;s findings, which get set aside, and by extension on the complainant, who has to start again, and the respondent, whose case reopens \u2014 but not distinctly on the employer as a statutory penalty for allowing a defective process to run.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is, I think, the second half of the structural problem this paper describes. An employer who never sets up an IC risks a fine of up to fifty thousand rupees, rising on repetition, with possible licence trouble on a second offence. An employer whose IC exists, looks compliant on paper, and then runs an unfair inquiry risks, from the statute itself, very little. The cost of a bad inquiry mostly falls on the courts, who have to hear the appeal and set the finding aside, and on the parties, who have to relitigate. The employer&#8217;s own liability under Sections 19 and 26 is barely touched, because those sections were written to police the existence of institutional machinery, not the quality of what that machinery actually produces in a given case. If the hypothesis stated earlier is right \u2014 that fairness needs to become the employer&#8217;s own concern, not something a court has to force after the fact \u2014 Sections 19 and 26 as they stand do very little of that work. They reward having an IC. They do not, in any direct statutory way, reward having a good one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-what-can-be-done-reform-suggestions\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"What_Can_Be_Done_Reform_Suggestions\"><\/span>What Can Be Done: Reform Suggestions<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Before proposing my own ideas, it is worth engaging with the reform path that was actually on the table when the Act was drafted: the Justice J.S. Verma Committee&#8217;s Report of January 2013, written after the December 2012 Delhi gang rape case as part of a wider review of criminal law relating to crimes against women. The Verma Committee was notably sceptical of the internal-committee model that would go on to become the POSH Act&#8217;s centrepiece. Its worry matches this paper&#8217;s concern: that an employer-appointed body investigating complaints connected to that same employer&#8217;s workplace carries a built-in risk of institutional bias, and that sexual harassment, as a serious wrong, might be better handled outside the internal disciplinary space altogether, in a dedicated external forum closer to an Employment Tribunal.[14] This same concern has resurfaced in recent litigation seeking statutory safeguards for IC members against retaliation by management.[15] Parliament did not take up that suggestion. It kept the Complaints Committee model, renamed it the Internal Committee, and gave it the more detailed composition and quasi-judicial powers discussed in Section 3, apparently judging that a strengthened internal model was more workable for a country with millions of workplaces of very different sizes and levels of formality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ten years on, having read Aureliano Fernandes and the pattern of decisions that followed it, I do not think Parliament&#8217;s underlying choice was wrong, even though I think the Verma Committee&#8217;s diagnosis of the risk was correct. A fully external tribunal system, however cleaner in theory, would face real practical difficulties in India: the sheer number of establishments covered by the Act, many small and under-resourced, means a fully externalised body for every workplace complaint would need an administrative capacity that does not currently exist and would take years to build \u2014 during which time complainants would likely be worse off than under even an imperfect internal mechanism, not better. My own view is that the Verma Committee&#8217;s tribunal idea is worth revisiting in the long run, perhaps as an appeal layer specifically for POSH matters rather than a replacement for the IC at first instance, but that the more realistic, immediately usable reform is to keep the IC and fix its weak points directly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With that framing, four reforms follow, each tied to a specific gap identified earlier in this paper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, procedural codification. Rule 7 of the 2013 Rules should be expanded into a genuine, detailed code of IC procedure covering, at minimum, mandatory timelines for serving the complaint and supporting material on the respondent (addressing the notice defect that recurs so often in the case law discussed in Section 4), a structured format for recording evidence and witness statements, and a clear written statement of the standard of proof the IC must apply. This would not require touching the Act itself, since rule-making power already exists under Section 29, and it would target the specific, recurring defects this paper identified rather than leaving IC members to work out what \u201cnatural justice\u201d means from scratch, case by case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Second, mandatory pre-service training and certification for IC members, tied to the allowance they already receive under Section 4. At present, Section 19 only requires the employer to organise \u201cworkshops and awareness programmes\u201d in a general sense, but nothing requires that a person actually sitting on an IC for a given inquiry has received specific training in evidence-taking, natural justice, or sensitive interviewing before that inquiry begins. IC members should not be allowed to sit on an inquiry until they complete a standardised training module, ideally developed and certified centrally by a body such as the National Commission for Women, rather than left entirely to each employer to design in-house, which would also reduce the variation in IC competence that the case law in Section 4 suggests exists across organisations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Third, and following most directly from Section 5, Section 26 should be genuinely amended to create a distinct penalty, or at least a distinct compliance consequence such as a mandatory re-inquiry at the employer&#8217;s own cost, specifically for an IC inquiry that a court finds violated natural justice, rather than the present position where employer exposure under Section 26 is triggered almost entirely by non-constitution of the IC or non-implementation of its recommendations. If Sections 19 and 26 currently reward the mere existence of an IC, this amendment would begin to reward, or at least penalise the absence of, the quality of what that IC actually does. This is the most legally difficult of the four proposals, since it raises real drafting questions about how \u201cquality\u201d would be measured without turning every set-aside finding into an automatic penalty regardless of how minor the defect was \u2014 but the difficulty of the drafting problem is exactly why it has not yet been attempted, not evidence that the underlying gap does not exist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fourth, a lighter structural change to composition: for the more serious category of complaints (for instance, where the respondent holds a position of authority over the complainant, as in Aureliano Fernandes), the external NGO member under Section 4 should be drawn from a government-empanelled list rather than chosen by the employer itself, and should have some kind of supplementary role, such as a mandatory dissent note attached to the IC&#8217;s findings where the external member disagrees with the internal majority, which a reviewing court would specifically have to consider on appeal. This would not fully externalise the process, avoiding the capacity problem raised earlier, but it would give the existing external-member requirement more institutional weight than it currently has, where the external member is simply one voice among several employer-affiliated ones with no distinct procedural standing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">None of these four proposals require abandoning the IC model, and each targets a specific weakness traced through this paper \u2014 Rule 7&#8217;s thinness from Section 3, the recurring composition and notice defects from Section 4, and the liability gap from Section 5. This is, I think, the realistic middle path between simply defending the status quo because a statute now exists, and reviving the Verma Committee&#8217;s full externalisation proposal, which does not look administratively achievable in the near term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-conclusion\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Conclusion\"><\/span>Conclusion<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This paper began by asking whether the Internal Committee under the POSH Act actually gives a fair hearing, and whether the Act&#8217;s liability structure pushes employers to make that fairness real, or whether the law&#8217;s design leaves a gap between promise and delivery. Having worked through Vishaka&#8217;s origins and its skeletal procedural standard in Section 2, the statutory IC&#8217;s court-like powers without a court&#8217;s independence in Section 3, the recurring pattern of composition, notice, and representation defects visible in Aureliano Fernandes and the decisions that followed it in Section 4, and the narrow, existence-focused reach of Sections 19 and 26 in Section 5, the evidence seems to point closer to the second answer than the first. The gap is real, and it does not look like an accident of implementation at one university; it follows from how the IC was built in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">My hypothesis, stated at the start, was that the problems in Aureliano Fernandes reflect the structure of the IC rather than one committee&#8217;s individual failing, and that the current penalty system does little to change this because it mostly punishes the absence of an IC rather than the poor conduct of one. The case law review and the reading of Sections 19 and 26 in this paper support that hypothesis, at least within the limits of a student paper working from a necessarily small sample of post-2023 decisions. I have also argued, in Section 6, that the right response is not to abandon the IC model for the Verma Committee&#8217;s tribunal, sound as that Committee&#8217;s underlying diagnosis of institutional bias may have been, because India&#8217;s administrative capacity does not currently support full externalisation without leaving complainants worse off in the meantime. Instead, I have argued for strengthening the IC from within: a genuine procedural code under Rule 7, mandatory pre-service training for IC members, a liability structure under Section 26 that actually engages with inquiry quality rather than only institutional existence, and a somewhat stronger role for the external member in the more serious category of cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If this paper makes any contribution beyond the existing commentary I came across while writing it, it is this: most writing on this subject either explains Vishaka as history or treats Aureliano Fernandes as a one-off correction of a single institution&#8217;s mistake. This paper has tried instead to connect the two \u2014 to show that Aureliano Fernandes is evidence of a problem that was already built into the Complaints Committee model in 1997, carried largely unaddressed into the statutory Internal Committee of 2013, and only made visible again, a decade later, because one case happened to reach the Supreme Court. The Act gave the IC a court&#8217;s tools. It did not give the IC a court&#8217;s conditions for using them well. Closing that gap does not require dismantling the IC that Vishaka and the 2013 Act together built. It requires finishing the job of making it fair.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To put it simply, Vishaka opened the door, and the 2013 Act built a proper frame for that door. What is still missing is someone checking, case by case, whether the door actually opens fairly for the person standing in front of it. That, I think, is the work still left for the next round of reform.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 id=\"h-bibliography\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Bibliography\"><\/span>Bibliography<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-cases\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Cases\"><\/span>Cases<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011. Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 297. Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, Civil Appeal No.&nbsp;2482 of 2014, decided on 12 May 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-statutes-rules-and-the-constitution\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Statutes_Rules_and_the_Constitution\"><\/span>Statutes, Rules and the Constitution<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Constitution of India, Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g), 21 and 141. The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-reports\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Reports\"><\/span>Reports<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Justice J.S. Verma Committee, Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, January 2013.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 id=\"h-articles-and-online-sources\" class=\"wp-block-heading\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Articles_and_Online_Sources\"><\/span>Articles and Online Sources<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Akshi Chawla, \u201cA Decade of the POSH Act: What the Data Tells Us About How India Inc.&nbsp;Has Fared,\u201d Centre for Economic Data and Analysis (CEDA), Ashoka University, 16 May 2024. Available at: ceda.ashoka.edu.in\/a-decade-of-the-posh-act-what-the-data-tells-us-about-how-india-inc-has-fared\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Rupin Chopra &amp; Ananyaa Banerjee, \u201cDealing with Biases and Conflict of Interest in POSH Committee,\u201d SSRana &amp; Associates, 11 October 2022. Available at: ssrana.in\/articles\/dealing-biases-conflict-of-interest-posh-committee\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Anuradha Gandhi &amp; Isha Sharma, \u201cSupreme Court Issues Guidelines to Bridge the Lacuna in POSH Implementation,\u201d SSRana &amp; Associates, 22 May 2023. Available at: ssrana.in\/articles\/supreme-court-guidelines-bridge-lacuna-posh-implementation\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cSupreme Court\u2019s Landmark Ruling: Directions for Effective Implementation of the POSH Act,\u201d Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas Blog, June 2023. Available at: corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com\/2023\/06\/supreme-courts-landmark-ruling-directions-for-effective-implementation-of-the-posh-act\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cSupreme Court Guidelines for POSH Implementation,\u201d India Law Offices, 1 November 2023. Available at: indialawoffices.com\/legal-articles\/supreme-court-guidelines-for-posh-implementation<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cIndia\u2019s Workplace Sexual Harassment Law: A Decade On,\u201d International Bar Association. Available at: ibanet.org\/india-decade-of-posh-act<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201cNeed Safeguards for Members of Internal Complaint Committees; PIL Before Bombay HC Seeks Changes to the POSH Act,\u201d LiveLaw, 2023. Available at: livelaw.in\/amp\/news-updates\/bombay-high-court-sexual-harassment-of-women-at-workplace-act-pil-167926<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>End-Notes:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (India).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, No. 14 of 2013, \u00a7 4, India Code (2013).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, Civil Appeal No. 2482 of 2014 (Decided May 12, 2023) (India).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013, Rule 7(6) (India).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ministry of Home Affairs, Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (Justice J.S. Verma Committee) (Jan. 23, 2013) (India).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 297 (India).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Rupin Chopra &amp; Ananyaa Banerjee, Dealing with Biases and Conflict of Interest in POSH Committee, SSRana &amp; Associates (Oct. 11, 2022), https:\/\/ssrana.in\/articles\/dealing-biases-conflict-of-interest-posh-committee\/. This article lists a few cases where Indian courts cancelled IC findings because the committee itself was not neutral.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Aureliano Fernandes, Civil Appeal No. 2482 of 2014, supra note 3.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>For a summary of the Supreme Court\u2019s directions in this case, see Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas Blog, Supreme Court\u2019s Landmark Ruling: Directions for Effective Implementation of the POSH Act (June 2023), https:\/\/corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com\/2023\/06\/supreme-courts-landmark-ruling-directions-for-effective-implementation-of-the-posh-act\/; and India Law Offices, Supreme Court Guidelines for POSH Implementation (Nov. 1, 2023), https:\/\/www.indialawoffices.com\/legal-articles\/supreme-court-guidelines-for-posh-implementation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Akshi Chawla, A Decade of the POSH Act: What the Data Tells Us About How India Inc. Has Fared, Centre for Economic Data and Analysis (CEDA), Ashoka University (May 16, 2024), https:\/\/ceda.ashoka.edu.in\/a-decade-of-the-posh-act-what-the-data-tells-us-about-how-india-inc-has-fared\/. All figures in this section and in Figure 1 are drawn from this source; I have not added or estimated any numbers for years that the original analysis does not report.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Akshi Chawla, A Decade of the POSH Act: What the Data Tells Us About How India Inc. Has Fared, Centre for Economic Data and Analysis (CEDA), Ashoka University (May 16, 2024), https:\/\/ceda.ashoka.edu.in\/a-decade-of-the-posh-act-what-the-data-tells-us-about-how-india-inc-has-fared\/. All figures in this section and in Figure 1 are drawn from this source; I have not added or estimated any numbers for years that the original analysis does not report.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Akshi Chawla, A Decade of the POSH Act: What the Data Tells Us About How India Inc. Has Fared, Centre for Economic Data and Analysis (CEDA), Ashoka University (May 16, 2024), https:\/\/ceda.ashoka.edu.in\/a-decade-of-the-posh-act-what-the-data-tells-us-about-how-india-inc-has-fared\/. All figures in this section and in Figure 1 are drawn from this source; I have not added or estimated any numbers for years that the original analysis does not report.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>My reading of Section 26 draws on the compliance literature cited earlier in this paper, particularly Chopra &amp; Banerjee, noted above, and Anuradha Gandhi &amp; Isha Sharma, Supreme Court Issues Guidelines to Bridge the Lacuna in POSH Implementation, SSRana &amp; Associates (May 22, 2023), https:\/\/ssrana.in\/articles\/supreme-court-guidelines-bridge-lacuna-posh-implementation\/. Both pieces point out that POSH enforcement in practice tends to focus on whether an IC exists at all, rather than on the quality of the inquiry it runs.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Verma Committee Report, supra note 5.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>A Bombay High Court PIL raises a similar point about IC members needing protection from the management they work under; see LiveLaw, Need Safeguards for Members of Internal Complaint Committees; PIL Before Bombay HC Seeks Changes to the POSH Act (2023), https:\/\/www.livelaw.in\/amp\/news-updates\/bombay-high-court-sexual-harassment-of-women-at-workplace-act-pil-167926.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Written By: Mohammad Cheena<\/strong>, MA (HRM &amp; Labour Relations), First Year, Veer Narmad South Gujarat University, Surat<br>Email: mohammadcheena84@gmail.com<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-yoast-seo-table-of-contents yoast-table-of-contents\"><h2><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Table_of_contents\"><\/span>Table of contents<span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h2><ul><li><a href=\"#h-abstract\" data-level=\"2\">Abstract<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-introduction\" data-level=\"2\">Introduction<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-vishaka-where-it-all-began\" data-level=\"2\">Vishaka: Where It All Began<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-the-internal-committee-under-the-2013-act\" data-level=\"2\">The Internal Committee Under the 2013 Act<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-what-the-case-law-shows-aureliano-fernandes-and-beyond\" data-level=\"2\">What the Case Law Shows: Aureliano Fernandes and Beyond<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-the-numbers-behind-the-gap\" data-level=\"2\">The Numbers Behind the Gap<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-employer-liability-sections-19-and-26\" data-level=\"2\">Employer Liability: Sections 19 and 26<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-what-can-be-done-reform-suggestions\" data-level=\"2\">What Can Be Done: Reform Suggestions<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-conclusion\" data-level=\"2\">Conclusion<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-bibliography\" data-level=\"2\">Bibliography<\/a><ul><li><a href=\"#h-cases\" data-level=\"3\">Cases<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-statutes-rules-and-the-constitution\" data-level=\"3\">Statutes, Rules and the Constitution<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-reports\" data-level=\"3\">Reports<\/a><\/li><li><a href=\"#h-articles-and-online-sources\" data-level=\"3\">Articles and Online Sources<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/li><\/ul><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Abstract Most people studying Indian labor law first meet the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), and most are taught that the story has a happy ending: Parliament eventually passed a law, so the problem is solved. This paper argues that the ending is not that simple. It traces how the Vishaka guidelines<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1864,"featured_media":33233,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"two_page_speed":[],"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"_joinchat":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[4766],"tags":[774],"class_list":["post-33234","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-labour-law","tag-labour-law"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v28.4 (Yoast SEO v28.6) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Beyond Vishaka: Does the Internal Committee Under the POSH Act Really Give a Fair Hearing? - Legal Service India - Articles<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Does the POSH Internal Committee ensure a fair hearing? 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