Corruption is a serious concern in countries all around the world. With the
passing time there are also changes in the forms and ways of corruption. Though
it is a world-wide problem, it reached alarming levels in India. Not only that
it affected every level of government in our country but it is in a stage of
rapid growth especially in the political activists and functionaries.
The
presence of widespread public cynicism against it, the recognition of corruption
as a fact of life by citizens and the impression that those guilty of political
corruption in public life, inevitably go scot-free and more 'power, status and
riches' have led to a situation in which even the most deterred attempts to
tackle venality have failed miserably in the process.
Talking about corruption and condemning others of corruption has become a
favourite pastime among Indians. But still very little efforts are made to curb
it. The government is very much aware about the existence of the evil in our
society, however, no action is taken against it.
In the 1960s Gunnar Myrdal, the earliest students of the subject, highlighted
the need to examine the folklore of corruption and the extent to which in India
it reflected `a weak sense of loyalty to organised society'. If there were `a
general asociality that leads people to believe that anybody in a position of
power is likely to exploit it in the interest of himself, his family or other
social groups to which he has a feeling of loyalty ...', Myrdal insisted,
`people's beliefs about the corruptibility of politicians and administrators
would be in part a reflection of what they would like to do, given the
means'.[1]
Corruption in 1960's was like a shoot growing but by the 1980's and 1990's it
grew up into a fully grown plant, moving into the heart of national and
provincial political institutions. Charges of corruption have become a common
ingredient consumed by almost every political figure. But the most astonishing
feature here is that many people, in India, consider being corrupt as some
feature that is necessary to survive in politics these days. India's rank on the
Corruption Perception Index slipped from 80 to 86 in 2020.
In my essay I talked about various scams that took place in India since
Independence and analysed the role of political personnel in them. An attempt is
also made to analyse the dimensions of these scams and also to highlights the
efforts made by the government and investigation agencies to investigate them
and the extent to which the guilty are held.
Political Scams In India
Since independence many incidents shaped the form of Indian politics. Corruption
has passed through various stages like obtaining legitimacy, everyone's
indulgence and shapeless defence. Very often political corruption in India takes
in collusion with the bureaucracy in the shape of huge kickbacks in big national
and international deals which go undetected and unchecked for obvious
reasons[2].
As explicated by the famous Santhanam Committee, "political
corruption includes all forms of `improper or selfish exercise of power and
influence attached to a public office or to the special position one occupies in
public life"[3].
The constitutional legacy of the colonial government, with its refined sense of
constitutional ownership of the position of elected officials and bureaucrats,
strongly shaped what was seen as a proper or unselfish exercise of power and
authority in public life. The official philosophy of public morality popularised
by M. further reinforced this legacy.
During the nationalistic struggle before
independence, M.K. Gandhi. Together, these two factors succeeded in establishing
a relatively exclusionary political corruption discourse that ultimately had the
repercussions of isolating political corruption from 'above' while at the same
time stressing its 'behind' corrosive, degenerative and detrimental impact.
Thus, while the misuse of public office has caused the current scandals, the
zeal with which the anti-corruption movement is now being pursued has raised
fundamental concerns about the legitimacy of political corruption as a legal
term.
To understand better the contemporary ambivalence of the political corruption,
we shall discuss how it was institutionalised in the Nehruvian Era. The
following are a brief recollection of the scams that happened right after
independence.
Mudgal Affair:
A member of the provisional parliament, in the first of the
events immediately after Independence, H.C. Mudgal, on behalf of the Bombay
Bullion Association in Parliament on a payment of Rs. 20,000, was accused of
agreeing to canvas support and rendering propaganda. The accusation was refuted
by Mudgal. A Parliament Committee under the chairmanship of T.T. Krishnamachari
was named t o investigate the allegations.
The Committee held that the actions
of Mudgal were "derogatory to the dignity" of Parliament and inconsistent with
the expectations that Parliament is entitled to demand from its members. On 25
July 1951, the report was submitted to Parliament.The committee's 387-page
paper, sent in August 1951 to Parliament, speaks for itself.
In conjunction with
some transactions with the Bombay Bullion Association (BBA), the committee was
to examine Mudgal's actions and practises, which included canvassing support and
propaganda in Parliament on matters such as option company and stamp duty and
reception of financial or business benefits from the BBA; and to consider and
report whether Mudgal's behaviour was negative. 24 witnesses were investigated
by the committee, and Mudgal was found guilty.[4]
On April 20, 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru presented Mudgal with the government
nominee's report on the BBA and Mudgal's offer to receive a deputation from the
president and the directors of the BBA in a letter to the finance minister, and
sought his clarification. Finance Minister C.D. Deshmukh refused the appeal from
Mudgal, indicating that he should be approached directly by the BBA.
Mudgal denied that he had sought Rs.20,000 from the BBA, and said that whatever
he had received (he acknowledged he had received Rs.2,700) was linked to his
professional work and there was nothing underhanded about it.
The committee found that he felt it fitting to put his services at the
discretion of the business sector by a circular to around 200 business companies
shortly after he was elected MP, and it was titled "Your spokesman in the
Parliament - H.G. Mudgal" The committee expressed its dismay that it had not
been informed of its target. However, Mudgal's lawyer before the committee
argued that there was nothing wrong with the attempt to approach his
constituents, but he was not chosen as a leader of the corporate group.
The committee was pleased that on and after March 9, 1951, all the dealings
between the BBA and Mudgal Publications (a business owned by Mudgal) were on the
basis that whatever services Mudgal Publications might provide them with, Mudgal
would also provide them with services in exchange for a consideration paid to
Mudgal Publications. The committee clarified that the services to be offered by
Mudgal were to include asking concerns in Parliament, moving an amendment to the
Forward Contracts (Regulation) Bill (on which the BBA had some reservations),
and scheduling ministerial interviews[5].
In his defence, Mudgal had argued that everything he was alleged to have done
was as an editor, publicist or proprietor of Mudgal Publications in his
professional capacity and that it had no relation to his capacity as an MP. It
was a normal business transaction completely above board, and in the name of
Mudgal Newspapers, the cheques were received, crossed to order, he told the
Chamber. He said that his sincere concern about the problem influenced the
questions he raised in Parliament. H.G. Mudgal immediately resigned his seat.
The report was submitted to Parliament on 25 July 1951. No further action was
taken.
Nevertheless, two of the members of the committee - Vaidya and Shah - dismissed
this claim, stating that if some monetary consideration was approved by any
member, except for professional services, in relation to matters before
Parliament for disposal, it would not be compatible with the conception of the
codes of conduct to be required of MPs.
It is debatable whether accepting an MP's consideration for an issue would
constitute a crime, attracting criminal prosecution under the law - as even the
ad hoc committee formed in 1951 had not assumed so.
If the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
(1998) is any indication, those who succeeded in raising questions in Parliament
after gaining consideration could not be tried on account of the immunity
provided by Article 105(2) of the Constitution from any prosecution in any court
with regard to anything said or any vote given in Parliament.
No doubt, once the case hits the courts of law, the evidentiary validity of the
tapes concerning the MPs must be proved, for those MPs who were unsuccessful in
asking the questions for which they obtained any attention and those MPs who
sought commissions to approve funds under the MP Local Area Development Scheme
may be prosecuted under the Corruption Prevention Act.
Mudgal was a case of real conflict of interests in his positions as a publicist
and as an MP; the new "cash for query" scam is a case of media trapping, of
fictional calls for legitimate attention, in the public interest.
It could be legitimate to inquire, in cases of incarceration, whether the MPs
involved were prepared to commit the crime they are convicted of in order to
prove their guilt or innocence.
Jeep Scandal Case:
In independent India, this was the first financial scandal
involving an amount of around Rs. 216 crores (about $ 500 million at the
exchange rate at the time), as the country was the first High Commissioner to
the UK. Krishna Menon, on behalf of the government, signed an unfulfilled but
entirely paid-up deal. Mr. Menon haas has purportedly placed an order for these
jeeps from a foreign company without following the due procedure.
These jeeps
were to be utilised in Hyderabad and Kashmir in turbulent areas. The first
incident included the procurement of 200 jeeps for which a complete payment of
80 lakh was made, but only 155 jeeps were produced. Of 45 jeeps, for which about
20 lakh had been paying, the government was robbed[6]. The reluctance of Menon
to face an investigation triggered a public outcry . However, despite this, no
action was taken against Menon, who subsequently became Minister of Defence of
India in the Cabinet of Nehru.
Mundhra Deal 1957[7]:
The Mundhra Agreement introduced crucial issues relating
to the extent of the powers of independent credit agencies, the position of
civil servants and, above all, Parliament's ministerial duty. In 19S7, the
acquisition of the weakening shares of the Mundhra Companies by the nationalised
Life Insurance Company drew substantial critical public interest. A Commission
of Inquiry, led by Chief Justice M.C. Chagla of the Bombay High Court, was asked
to investigate the question posed by Feroze Gandhi, a member of parliament.
Chagla maintained the theory of Ministerial accountability and indicted H.M. for
the lapses on the part of the then Minister of Finance, T.T. Krishnamachari.
Patel, the Chief Secretary, and the President of the LIC. All three had to
withdraw from their respective jobs as a result of the enquiry.
Haridas Mundhra, an industrialist and stock speculator based in Calcutta,
directed the government-owned Life Insurance Company (LIC) to spend Rs
1,26,86,100 (one crore, twenty-six million, eighty-six thousand and one hundred)
in the shares of six of his distressed firms. This investment was carried out
under political pressure and without the investment committee of LIC being
consulted.
In the meantime, Feroze Gandhi, son-in-law of then-Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru and a Member of Parliament for the Indian National Congress, called for a
clarification of the decision of the LIC. There was a well-known divide between
Mr. Gandhi and his father-in-law that sensationalised the matter when Feroze
Gandhi discussed the issue in Parliament and charged the Senior Secretary of
Finance, H.M. Patel, and the Minister of Finance, T.T. Krishnamachari, with
influencing the expenditure of LIC.
He also stated that he was in possession of
classified letters surrounding this investment between Mr. Patel and Mr. Krishnamachari. Mr. Nehru, seeing these charges, named former Chief Justice M.C.
Chagla, as a one man commission of inquiry.
Mr. Chagla performed incredibly quickly in one of the most open inquiries ever
and submitted his report in just 24 days. The Chagla commission's hearings were
held in public. Numerous leading stockbrokers who were on the Investment
Committee of the LIC testify that, as the Ministry of Finance said, the
investment should not have been done in order to help the market. They also
reported that if the LIC had approached the Investment Committee, they would
have found out the 1956 episode of Mundhra's forged shares.
On February 18, 1958, Mr. Krishnamachari resigned from his position as Minister
of Finance after Mr. Chagla lodged his paper. Mr. Mundhra was also convicted and
he spent 22 years in prison.
We ought to acknowledge the pace at which the investigation was carried out in a
straightforward way, leading to the culprits being nabbed. Such a case has been
going on for years in contemporary India, with the culprits roaming openly at
large. I wish that the same clarity and pace will be used in all the
controversies of today!
P.S. Kairon Case 1963:
In 1963, after Justice S.R. was assigned to investigate
the charges of corruption and nepotism etc. against a politician, an
Investigation Committee was first appointed. Das was ordered to probe the
allegations against Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, then the Chief Minister of
Punjab. As a result of the Commission's conclusions, Kairon had to quit from his
position as Head of Ministership.
This were the times when, in the first years
since Emancipation, the residual memory of the freedom struggle and the high
expectations of rectitude in matters of managing public funds helped maintain
certain rules of public behaviour. Stuff started to change afterwards, and the
norms of public morals under Mrs. Indira Gandhi began to collapse, hitting the
lowest ebb under Rajiv Gandhi and his successors.
Nagarwala Mystery 1971:
On 4 May 1971, Ved Prakash Malhotra, Chief Cashier of
the State Bank of India, received a phone call allegedly from the office of the
Prime Minister, asking him to make available from the bank an amount of Rs. 60
lakhs (six million) needed for a top secret mission in Bangladesh. After a
delay, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's voice came on the line to direct Malhotra to hand
over the number to someone with a code word who would address him. Rustom Sohrab
Nagarwala was the person who asked Malhotra to drive straight to the house of
the Prime Minister and receive a voucher for the number.
Nagarwala took the
money-containing package and escaped. Malhotra disclosed the prank to the
police, and after confessing to the crime, Nagarwala was convicted to four years
of stringent incarceration. Mrs. Gandhi did not respond whether she ever spoke
to Malhotra on that particular day or not. The survivor of that episode, of
course, was Mr. Malhotra, who was dismissed from his employment.
Political corruption was governed, handled and institutionalised under Nehru
through the 'machine' of the Congress. Democratic corruption went from the level
of folklore to being an integral part of national political culture as this
machine started to disintegrate. Most interpretations appear to blame this
accomplishment on Mrs Gandhi and her son Rajiv; in fact, while both inventions
were made, they merely intensified the decline under Nehru that had begun.
Indira Gandhi was initially cast as a puppet prime minister in the hands of the
regional congress ministers[8]. When she refused to play such a role then need
parties are formed. But Indira was a women with strategic planning and hence
with certain calculated measures she made the split in the party a less
disastrous one. In 1969, there were severe changes in the financial sector - the
nationalisation of banks.
Also, corporations are prevented from donating to
political parties. With increasing controls on big businesses, black money
started generating due to tax evasions, black marketing, and illegal
transactions. These moves started the era of briefcase politics[9].
Briefcase politics provided the required financial support for the new congress.
Mrs. Gandhi established herself as the new leader committed to the poor but due
to her quest for power she ensured centralisation of power not only in Delhi but
also in and out of the congress by using briefcase politics. Indeed, poor
organisational power within the party contributed to a focus on fund generation
as a means of protection and upward mobility. The Cabinet Office has sanctioned
the procedure of using controls to extract funds.[10]
As one representative recalls:
"[11]Often representatives of trade and industry were called ... to Delhi and
asked to produce specific amounts. Those who declined were threatened with
possible raids by the Revenue Intelligence and Enforcement Directorate, which
was now operating under the Cabinet Secretariat. In Bombay Financial circles
stories started circulating of the amounts secured by the Foreign Trade Minister
under such threats. Others who came forward willingly with whatever was asked
for, received concessions . . . to expand their businesses and amass further
resources."
Businesses who accepted and worked along it benefitted. Many small businesses in
India grew into large business dynasties under the protection of these
politicians (congress politicians in particular) and they also had monopoly
access to domestic markets and imported raw materials. During the 1970's there
were many Indian businesses that underwent a drastic change in their size and
profitability. They turned out to be the major controllers of non-banking and
non-governmental assets in the country.
Doubts that were raised on the credibility and morality of Indira Gandhi and her
indulgence in 'Briefcase politics' disappeared when she imposed a national wide
emergency (1975 -1977) breaking the regular democratic process in the country.
She was charged with expulsion from office on charge of corrupt electoral
practises by the High Court, for she got many arrested during this period.
During this time, her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi, emerged as a source of
authority who mobilised black money, thugs and reluctant institutions of the
state to affect his mother's policies. Terms like criminalisation of politics
emerged from this era.[12]
In the 1980 elections, the alleged trial of Mrs Gandhi backfired and led to her
return as Prime Minister. By further centralising authority in New Delhi, where
'fawners and flatterers' ruled supreme, Mrs Gandhi, however, soon returned to
her old ways. In preference to confronting imaginary issues, the deterioration
of the economy, the demands of the regions and the decay of her own party were
neglected. The last Machiavellian act of Mrs. Gandhi was to stoke the sentiments
of nationalism among the Sikhs only by putting them to the sword. She faced the
consequences for her life by doing so.
Although the governing Congress party was suspected of collecting huge sums by
contributions in the form of commercials for a party souvenir in the pre- and
post-1975-' 77 emergency period, the expense of which was extremely
disproportionate to the sum of advertising space obtained by the large
corporations[13]. So when a leader or politician is generating more funds, they
are most likely to be promoted and be kept in the forefront in case of any
promotions.
Moreover they are most likely to be chosen for the positions of ecumenic ministries so that they can shower benefits on the their donors. As we
all know that these donations are mostly from corporate house holds and large
industrial firms, this method of practise calls for a quid pro quo[14], where
the parties once elected to power show their gratitude to these firms for
providing them with donations by showering policies in their favour. This made
our political system 'a mortgage of money to power'. Scams related to these kind
of politics is also further discussed.
Both the political and economic structures showed symptoms of structural
collapse and decline at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's reign. By embarking on a
programme of democratic regeneration and economic liberalisation, Rajiv Gandhi,
who became Prime Minister in the big 'Indira wave' of 1984, reacted to these
challenges. However, neither of these policies were followed with any vigour or
zeal, with the effect that Rajiv was ultimately forced to resort to his mother's
tactics that he personally detested so much.
The picture of Rajiv as 'Mr Clean', untouched by the usual corruption of Indian
politics, made it possible for him to prepare an agenda to take India into the
next century. The structural regeneration of Congress was at the centre of this
programme. He chastised his fellow party-men during the party's centenary
celebrations (1985).
'We [Congressmen],' he said,' observe no discipline, no
statute, follow no public morality concept, show no sense of social awareness,
and show no regard for public resources. Not only is corruption accepted, but it
is viewed as the symbol of leadership. These words were going to bounce back on Rajiv like a boomerang in two years. He consistently refused to hold intra-party
elections and became directly involved in one of Indian history's most infamous
corruption scandals.
If the personal opinion of Rajiv soon became that Congress was unreformable, his
half-hearted economic liberalisation created a new polarisation among some
leading disenchanted Congressmen between the institutionalised graft lobby of 'licence-permit
raj' and the emerging anti-corruption moralists. While the selective
liberalisation of the economy initially created a powerful import-based consumer
boom, it soon resulted in an increasing fiscal deficit in the absence of
sufficient structural change. V. P. Singh, the Finance Minister, and leader of
the anti-corruption faction within Rajiv's administration, responded to this
development by launching high profile tax cases against leading business houses.
Scandal followed scandal (Reliance Industries, Fairfax and Bofors) until V. P.
Singh was first demoted to the Ministry of Defence and, subsequently, compelled
to resign over his prosecution of the inquiry into illegal payments in the
purchase of submarines from the Howaldt Deutsche Werke of Kiel. It was widely
believed that business pressure had led to V. P. Singh's demotion and
resignation. The elaborate tax enforcement machinery estabished during his
tenure as Finance Minister was quickly dismantled and his very own income tax
return was subjected to extraordinary audit.
The following are some of the most talked about scandals that shook the image of
India. They happened during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi.
The Infamous BOFORS Scam:
India signed a Rs 1,437-crore deal on 18 March 1986 with Swedish arms
manufacturer AB Bofors to supply the army with 400 155 mm Howitzer guns. A year
later, a Swedish radio station reported on 16 April 1987 that the company had
bribed top Indian officials and security personnel to win the contract. The
conflict rattled the Rajiv Gandhi-led government in the late 1980s.
The Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) lodged a FIR on 22 January 1990 against the then
President of Bofors, Martin Ardbo, the alleged broker, Win Chadda, and the Hindu
brothers, on charges of criminal conspiracy, fraud and forgery.Any public
officials and private persons in India and abroad entered into a criminal
conspiracy to commit bribery, corruption, fraud and forgery between 1982 and
1987.
On 22 October 1999, the first accusation in the case was brought against Chadda,
Ottavio Quattrocchi, and Ardbo and Bofors, SK Bhatnagar, the then Secretary of
Defense. A supplementary indictment sheet was filed on 9 October 2000 against
the Hindu brothers. In the Bofors pay-off affair, on 31 May 2005, Judge R S
Sodhi of the Delhi High Court quashed the CBI lawsuit.
Previously, on 4 February
2004, retired Justice J D Kapoor had exonerated late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
in the case and ordered the trial of forgery against Bofors under Section 465 of
the Indian Penal Code, not allowing the company to expend its money on his
extradition, which had already cost him Rs 250 crore or more or less.
Quattrocchi, who had fled from here earlier on 29-30 July 1993, never appeared
to face trial before any court in India. On July 13, 2013, he died. Bhatnagar,
Chadda and Ardbo were the other defendants who died.
Bofors is a tale of mystery. For more than two decades, from 1987 to 2009, the
investigation proceeded. It happened nine years after it was recorded in the
First Details Study (FIR). Basically, this was a classic case of collaboration
between the manufacturer/seller of weapons and the buyer of the government.
There was nothing new about the activities that this individual arms trader
practised.
Many leading figures in the corporate sector have told me that
without paying fees to middlemen, no arms sales or purchases in any part of the
world would ever take place. The situation has acquired enormous political
overtones and a battle between the Congress Party and the Opposition has taken
place. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's defeat in the 1987 general election was
attributed to the Congress Party's role in the scandal.
In 1988, a Preliminary Survey (PE) was reported. Two years later, on 22 January
1990, under the Indian Penal Code (IPC), a Regular Case (RC) was registered by
the CBI for alleged conspiracy, cheating and forgery offences, along with parts
of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Martin Ardbo, then President of Bofors AB,
and Win Chadha, a Dubai-based intermediary, and a few others, were the
defendants.
Consequently, the name of another intermediary, Ottavio Quattrocchi,
an Italian national who had for some time been the executive of Snamprogetti,
headquartered in Delhi, and who was generally perceived to be loyal to the
Gandhi family, was added during the investigation process.
The naming of Rajiv Gandhi on the charge sheet as "unsent to trial accused" was
a momentous and controversial development because he was no longer alive.
The High Court of Delhi quashed all prosecutions in the case in June 2002, an
order that was reversed in July 2003 by the Supreme Court of India. When the
High Court of Delhi quashed charges against Rajiv Gandhi and others, the CBI
suffered another setback in February 2004.The three Hindu brothers were
successful in getting the charges against them dismissed by the same judge in
May 2005. It was for a range of reasons, including the transition of government
in 2004 and a series of contentious judicial rulings, that the retrospective
investigation did not ultimately succeed in court.
It should be remembered, however, that a range of limitations and challenges
were encountered by the CBI. The CBI required the node either of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs or of the Department of Personnel (the administrative department
of the CBI) or of the Ministry of Law for every step in the process of
approaching governments and courts of other countries such as Switzerland,
Malaysia and Argentina (the latter two countries where Quattrocchi requested
refuge).
The alleged apathy of the government of PM Narasimha Rao (1991-96) to
the task of ensuring rapid progress in the CBI investigation compounded this.
nt. The Central Bureau of Investigation is still pursuing the case to unravel
the mystery of political kickbacks alleged to have been paid in the deal.
The Bofors case will remain a notorious example of how a government run by a
party that has a lot to hide from the public will purposely sabotage a real
case. In the 1990s and later in 2004-14, the burden lay on the shoulders of
those who managed the CBI. If a preliminary enquiry was reported by the CBI in
1988, it was only due to the huge public furor caused by the Swedish Radio and
Hindu Publication.
While it meant an unbridled 'whitewash operation,' the
government headed by Rajiv Gandhi had no alternative but to launch a thorough
investigation. It was never known that the money had arrived Rajiv's way, but by
being hesitant to conduct inquires into the matter, he blinded the atmosphere.
Amid speculation that he was defending those who had taken bribes, Rajiv was
charged with lying in Parliament. An picture of Rajiv as the innocent Pinocchio
whose nose replicated the long cannon of a Bofors rifle was one of the most
unforgettable posters of the 1989 election.
Fairfax Affair:
A Commission composed of two justices of the Supreme Court, Justice MP. Thakkar
with Justice S. Natarajan.In April 1987, they began investigating the Fairfax
affair. It investigated the agreements entered into with Fairfax Group Inc., an
American detective firm, to investigate violations of FERA (For-eign Trade
Control Act) and in their report implicated the former finance minister, V.P.
Singh. Mr. V.P. Singh later became India's Prime Minister in 1989.
Fodder Scam:
A former Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) speaker, Balram Jakhar,
was accused of supporting the interests of Mr. Brady*, a foreign acquaintance,
by waiving import duties in exchange for 50 machines processing fodder. The
outfit of Mr. Jakhar, the Bharat Krishak Samaj (Indian Agriculturist Society),
reportedly played a questionable role in a transaction that relieved the Indian
people of taxes of Rs. 36 million and foreign exchange of over Rs. 35 million.
While the case is still ongoing, it is probable that no action will take place.
Jakhar was the Minister of Agriculture in Narasimha Rao's Cabinet.
HDW Deal:
Under a contract signed in 1981, the Government of India purchased two
sub-marines from a West German firm. Under the terms of an open-ended deal, a
seven per cent fee, which turned out to Rs. 3,000 million, was paid to HDW's
Indian agents. No body interested with the book has been brought in.
Airbus A 320 Deal:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation in April 1990 - A lawsuit was lodged against
the senior officials of the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Indian Airlines for
the hasty procurement of aircraft A-32.0. Bribeiry and incompetence in
negotiating the purchase amounting to Rs. 25,000 million were paid to the
officers. Nothing came out of this programme, however.
This is the latest scandal that rocked the nation and the government. It is
during the early 1990's, P.V. Narasimha Rao took over as the prime minister
after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The amount involved is Rs. 55000
millions; 80 times more amount than in Bofors.
BSE Stock Market Scam 1992: The Harshad Mehta Scam
The year 1992 maintains a curious position in India's history of scams. The
planet saw the ingenious machining of stock markets for the first time that
year. The 'Securities Scam,' as it has been known, involving fraud of Rs. 4,000
crore, is now one of the biggest frauds to date on the Indian stock market. It
was a systemic scam involving bank receipts and stamp records that eventually
resulted in the stock market collapsing. The scam rocked the country and finally
modified the rules of the Dalal Lane game (Das, October 20, 2020).
By exploiting the loopholes in the banking system, Harshad Mehta, a licenced and
well-known broker, manipulated the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) along with its
associates. Mehta reportedly clashed with bank workers to get the publication of
fake bank receipts (BRs). Under the presumption that they were investing against
government securities, he used these bank receipts to get other banks to lend
him money.
To boost share prices by up to a whopping 4,400 percent, this figure was then
put on the stock market. These shares were subsequently sold at a significant
profit by Mehta and the principal amount was returned to the banks. In all,
Mehta has defrauded about Rs 4,000 crore from the banks.Since uncovering and
exposing their modus operandi on the stock market, banks learned that they were
in charge of fake BR holdings. As a result, the BSE Sensex rose from 2,000 in
January to 4,000 in March 1992. People started to look up to him as the Big Bull
when shares began to reach new heights and began buying the stocks in which he
had invested. Most retail investors have ended up investing huge amounts on
inventories. The tax department raided the Mehtas on February 28, 1992, after
the scam came to the government's attention. Many papers and trade certificates
have been seized.
On 4 June 1992, the CBI carried out the Mehtas probe. In a turn of events,
Harshad Mehta's tax return for the 1992-93 appraisal year was rejected. In 1992,
Mehta was arrested. In 1992, the Janakiraman Committee was created by the RBI to
provide a comprehensive picture of the scam. In order to address irregularities
in securities and financial transactions after the Harshad Mehta case, a Joint
Parliamentary Committee (JPC) was also created in 1993.
Both the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court convicted Mehta and charged her
with 74 criminal offences. His court battles lasted until 2001, when he died
from heart arrest in prison. He was now 47 years of age. A host of changes in
the financial regulatory system of India have been triggered by the Harshad
Mehta scam. In 1995, the Securities Laws (Amendments) Act was passed, expanding
SEBI's power and empowering it to regulate depositories, FIIs, venture capital
funds and credit rating agencies. The Indian stock exchange has come a long way
ever since the scam. Down the years, clients have been cleaned up from other
stock market controversies and left officials red-faced. But Mehta was the one
who got all started. Events he has scripted continue to serve as a lesson to be
vigilant at all times for investors and regulators.
The beginning of the end began for Harshad Mehta when it was announced that Rs
500 crore had been missing from SBI's books in the form of Subsidiary General
Ledger (SGL) at the RBI Public Debt Office.
This anomaly led to a wider inquiry by the Janakiraman Committee, the Joint
Legislative Committee formed by the Central Bank.
Harshad Mehta had already developed close ties in the banking sector during his
rise through the 1980s. As several other traders at the time, Mehta used the
'shortcut' used by banks to deal with government securities. While RBI
guidelines required banks to negotiate directly with other banks in the event of
security transactions, they preferred to focus on brokers as it was simpler and
time-consuming. Although RBI guidelines allowed banks to deal directly with
other banks in the event of security transactions, since it was cheaper and
time-consuming, they preferred to rely on brokers. To optimise the value of
their government bond portfolios, many banks have used a process called
Ready-forward (RFD) deals. Short-term 15-day loans were also secured from one
bank to another via RFDs.
Later, he was sued and convicted of diverting Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) public
sector funds to his own accounts and misappropriating nearly Rs 2.5 billion. He
was convicted by the CBI again in 2001 for the latter crime and was not bailed
until his death later that year.
Two facts about corruption in India are highlighted in the Harshad Mehta
suitcase episode. The former is that it is more prominent than before; the
latter is that it barely matters. There was a time when a minister who took
money from industrialists was perceived to be a crook and his peers regarded him
with a certain scorn. Any other minister today takes money from businessmen and
many are not going to try to refute it. Rather, they defend this on the basis of
increasing election spending costs and explain that it is only possible to raise
those funds from private enterprise. There needs to be quid pro quo at a certain
amount and no entrepreneurs can part with cash for free.
The following are some of the latest scams that happened in the past two
decades:
2G Spectrum Case[15]:
Huge crowds stalled the 2G scam court hearings earlier today, a deception that
rocked the nation and was ranked by Time magazine as the second-largest misuse
of executive authority in the country. After a short delay, however, the court
declared that both defendants had been acquitted in the 2G scam case.
Special CBI judge OP Saini is claimed to have said when acquitting all suspects
in the 2G scam case, "The prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case,
and all accused are acquitted,".
Raja, then Telecom Minister, along with 14 others were accused in the 2G Case.
Companies like Swam Telecom, Reliance Telecommunications and Uninor are also
involved. It is estimated that a loss of Rs. 1.76 lakh cr occurred to the Indian
National Exchequer.
The scam is a collection of three cases filed by the Enforcement Directorate and
the CBI.
A research by India's CAG reported that 2G, or second-generation mobile network
licences, were provided at throwaway prices instead of free and equal auctions.
A Raja was primarily reported to be allocating airwaves and licences for
wireless networks in exchange for bribes. He had played a major role in
facilitating the 217-crore bribe from Swan Telecom to Kalaingar TV, the
propaganda arm of the DMK party, according to allegations put forward by DMK MP
Kanimozhi.
According to the CAG report, all the demand proposals were already backdated,
suggesting that telecommunications companies had advance knowledge of the
licences to be given.
Swan telecom was merely a cover for Reliance Telecom, the CBI charge sheet
states, and that Reliance breached telecom policy to gain more than 10% share as
permitted under the statute.
In 2008, in the Delhi High Court, a PIL against A Raja's supposed wrongdoings
was accepted. The court found out about the so-called lies given by the
telecommunication ministry during the PIL hearing.
The then Minister of Telecom, A Raja, refuted all allegations and claimed that
the decisions were taken after PM Manmohan Singh was apprised at the time. On
allegations of cheating, forgery and conspiracy, A Raja was arrested in 2011.
In 2012, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) submitted to the court that
it will also pursue a probe with respect to the actual beneficiaries of the Anil
Dhirubhai Ambani Party spectrum fraud (ADAG).
In February 2012, the Supreme Court revoked all 122 licences issued for a paltry
Rs 9,200 crore in 2008, ordering that these licences and, eventually, all
natural resources should be reserved exclusively by auctions/fair tendering. The
spectrum distribution was declared by the court as' illegal and discriminatory.'
The Supreme Court then sentenced Unitech Wireless, Swan Telecom and Tata
Teleservices to a fine of Rs 5 crore each. Furthermore, the court claimed that A
Raja "wanted to benefit some corporations at the cost of the public exchequer"
and "virtually gifted away crucial public asset".
The UPA II government was rocked by the broad publicity given to the 2G spectrum
scam. It is perceived to be one of the key factors in the 2014 Lok Sabha polls
that contributed to the demise of the Manmohan Singh administration.
In 2011, Manmohan Singh, the then Prime Minister, also acknowledged that this
government seems to have "failed in managing perceptions" "It is quite possible
that we have failed to manage perceptions. We should focus on changing
perceptions" he said to journalists.
Kapil Sibal took charge of the telecommunications ministry after A Raja resigned
and came up with the idea of 'zero loss' in 2011. He stated that the allocation
of 2G licences on a first-come-first-served basis incurred no to zero damages.
Coal Gate Scam:
Coalgate snowballed into a huge political scandal that pulled top leaders and
bureaucrats from the previous UPA regime into the probe, as it was popularly
known.
The Coal Allocation or Coalgate fraud is a controversy that happened during the
tenure of the UPA government. Since the then Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)
levied charges against the government for allocating coal blocks to public and
private companies, it came into reckoning in 2012. Out of the estimated 216 coal
blocks allotted from 1993-2010, 194 were sold for captive use by these public
and private undertakings.
In the CAG report, concerns were raised about unreasonable managerial decisions
when allocating the coal blocks and not observing the relevant competitive
bidding protocol. A report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India
revealed that the allocation of coal blocks between 2004 and 2009 was
inefficient and possibly illegal. It assumed the loss to the exchequer at the
rate of Rs 10.7 lakh crore, but in the final report it later toned this amount
down to Rs 1.86 lakh crore.
In the Coal Scam probe, industrialists such as Naveen Jindal and Kumar Mangalam
Birla have also found their names in FIRs. A report by the parliamentary
standing committee reported that the distribution of blocks was not approved
between 1993 and 2008. It proposed that all blocks be distributed where
construction had not begun and bank guarantees in some be forfeited.
The Coal Ministry is creating an inter-ministerial panel to study the block
allocation process and to determine if bank guarantees will be de-allocated or
forfeited.The government has since taken back over 80 coal fields, while bank
guarantees have been forfeited in 42 situations.Over the process of the
investigation, a special court was formed by the Supreme Court to prosecute all
cases relevant to the coal scam.
Point to note:
From the above two mentioned scams we can see that CBI's politicisation is very
clearly reflected in the investigation process. The SC had directed the Director
of CBI Ranjit Sinha to reduce himself from and not to interfere in the 2G
Spectrum Case. This clearly shows the level of damage caused to the credibility
of the nation's premier investigative agency. With increasing high profile
corruption cases in India, like 2G Spectrum and Coalgate scam, it is important
to insulate and restructure the CBI from political interference and by granting
it more autonomy.
The investigation done by the CBI in coal allocation probe was subjected to
change based on the suggestions of the government officials. CBI can be compared
with a parrot (caged) that repeats its master's voice. The apex court questioned
the credibility of the investigation agency and observed that if the agency is
not made independent then the court would step in. Justice RM Lodha also asked
the government whether it was contemplating a law to make the working of the CBI
independent and to insulate it from external intrusions and interferences[16].
The erstwhile United Progressive Alliance government following the directive of
the Supreme Court submitted a 41-page proposal on how to free the CBI of
political control. In the affidavit the government assured the court that it
would amend the 1946 Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, which created the
CBI, thereby giving it more autonomy.
The government promised to set up a three-member "Accountability Commission"
under Section 7(i) consisting of retired judges to investigate complaints
against any officer or employee serving under or associated with the 1946 Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act. Changes were also proposed to bolster the
independence of the CBI chief, who would be appointed by a three-member panel
comprising the Prime Minister , the Supreme Court Chief Justice and the Leader
of the Opposition in Parliament. The director would have a fixed tenure of two
years.
Only the president would be in a position to remove the CBI director on grounds
of proved misbehaviour or incapacity only after a proper enquiry conducted by
the Central Vigilance Commissioner (cvc). As far as the question of financial
autonomy was concerned, the CBI director would have the same powers as enjoyed
by the director general of the Central Reserve Police Force (NDTV 2013A[17]).
Despite these new changes, CBI cannot hire its own lawyers, which would have
ensured greater autonomy. Moreover the CBI lacks financial independence from the
Parliament. Every expense like an officer travelling abroad has to sanctioned by
the government. Though the revisions made are to provide autonomy to our
nation's premier investigative agency, it lacks support in key areas like
independent decision making and financial resources.
The Supreme Court has accepted and appreciated the move to words depoliticising
the CBI despite several short comings. But still the court questioned why CBI is
being denied the right to employe its on lawyers. The Supreme Court also asked
why the CBI should need the government's sanction to prosecute officials and
public servants, saying "The supervision of the chi is entrusted with the cvc.
The Centre has no role. How can the CBI say government permission is needed for
sanction? We need to discuss this" (NDTV 2013[18]).
It is very important to depoliticise the CBI as we have seen in various cases
like this 2G spectrum case and COAL GATE scam, the way government has influenced
and intertwined in the investigation process. The ruling governments have
misused the institution of CBI for getting regional parties under their control
and also to settle political scores against the opposition.
For example, the CBI consciously did not oppose the bail petition of Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) MP Kanimozhi, daughter of the DMK party founder M
Karunanidhi, and one of the prime accused in the multimillion dollar 2G spectrum
scam. Apart from Kanimozhi, the CBI had also not opposed the bail pleas of
Kalaignar tv MD Sharad Kumar, Kusegaon Fruits and Vegetables directors Asif
Balwa and Rajiv Agarwal and film-maker Karim Morani, whose names had figured in
the supplementary charge sheet of the 2G spectrum case (Times of India
2011[19]).
This unhealthy trend not only demoralised the organisation but also eroded the
credibility of the CBI in the public eye. For all practical purpose the CBI is
largely fettered and final decisions, especially in high profile cases of
political corruption, seem to be taken outside its four walls. This predicament
was succinctly described by the former CVC chief N Vittal who had said, "Our
system is like a spider's web in which only small insects are caught and big
bumble bees can breeze through…" (Chakraborty 2013[20]).
Moreover the 'single directive' is the main reason for no autonomy for CBI. It
makes it compulsory for the CBI to get prior permission before initiating
investigation against officers at the level of joint secretaries and above.
There is always a delay in obtaining sanction from the government to investigate
any senior government officials.
To put all these in a few words, CBI must be refurbished, and be made sure that
it is depoliticised. It has be given paramount importance. Radical measures need
to be brought up in the CBI such that police personnel are not taken in, as they
are more susceptible to political influence. In oder to achieve this all, it is
very important for us to have that political will.
To quote Quah[21]:"Political will refers to the commitment of political leaders
eradicate corruption and exists when these three conditions are met: (1)
comprehensive anti-corruption legislation exists (2) independent anti-corruption
agency (3)the anti-corruption laws are fairly enforced by the independent
ACA(anti-corruption agency)."
Conclusion
By the end of this essay I came to a conclusion that it is the greed that is
driving men to commit all these shady things and then walk away with loot. They
are looting the people who stood for them, who voted for them and in return what
they are getting is betrayal. Moreover with primitive investigation techniques
and tight bureaucratic control over the investigating agencies we hardly see the
accused being convicted.
With passing times the number of scams and scandals
came increasing and not decreasing. As a result we need to be formulating tough
policies that protect the whistle blowers and prevent the law breakers from
escaping.
List Of References
- Understanding Political Corruption in Contemporary Indian politics by Gurhalpal
Singh
- The Craft of Political Graft in India: An Analysis of Major Scams by R.B.
Jain
- An Impossible Dream ? Depoliticising The Central Bureau of Investigation by
Shiladitya Chakraborty
- https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30207963.ece
- https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/the-exponential-rise-of-corruption/article8393707.ece
- https://www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/what-is-2g-scam-in-india-2g-scam-verdict-upa-a-raja-cbi-judge-op-saini-verdict-things-to-know-1113444-2017-12-21
- https://thelogicalindian.com/news/independent-indias-first-big-financial-scam-mundhra-scandal/?infinitescroll=1
End-Notes:
- G. Myrdal, 'Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernisation in South Asia', in A. J. Heidenheimer (ed.), Political Corruption (New Brunswick NJ, Transaction, 1978), p. 232..., cited from Gurhalpal Singh, 'Understanding Political corruption in Contemporary Indian Politics', 1997, pg 626, accessed on 05-02-2021.
- Puri, K.K., 'Malignant Malady', Indian Express, July 13, 1993 cited from R.B. Jain, The Craft of Political Graft In India: An Analysis of Major Scams', The Indian Journal of Political Science, Oct - Dec 1994, Vol. 55, No. 4, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41855706, accessed on 05-02-2021.
- Government of India, Report of the Committee on the Prevention of Corruption (Santhanam Report) (New Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1964), p. 5.
- https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30207963.ece
- ibid
- https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/the-exponential-rise-of-corruption/article8393707.ece, accessed on 06-02-2021.
- https://thelogicalindian.com/news/independent-indias-first-big-financial-scam-mundhra-scandal/?infinitescroll=1, accessed on 06-02-2021.
- Called as the Syndicate
- "a phase that is used to describe the transfer of vast amounts of black money in the form of cash into the coffers of the Congress Party. Prices for licences or other permits were quoted in the number of briefcases required. Initially, prices were set as fixed fees, but later they were levied as a percentage of the benefits."
- S. A. Kochanek, 'Briefcase politics in India; the Congress Party and business elite', Asian Survey, xxvii (1987), p. 1290. Cited in Gurhalpal Singh, 'Understanding Political corruption in Contemporary Indian Politics', 1997, pg 631, accessed on 05-02-2021.
- Ibid pg no. 632.
- C. S. Pandit, End of an Era (New Delhi, Allied, 1977), p. 113. Cited from Gurhalpal Singh, 'Understanding Political corruption in Contemporary Indian Politics', 1997, pg 632, accessed on 06-02-2021.
- For a review of the causes see P. B. Mayer, 'Congress (I) Emergency (I): Interpreting Indira Gandhi's India', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, xxvi (1984) 128±50.
- One such analysis of Souvenir Committee accounts before the 1977 general elections see Shourie, Amn, "A Crumb for the Historian" in Indian Express, New Delhi, April 11, 1982. Also see Noorani, A.G., Ministers' Misconduct, Vika, New Delhi, 1973, p. 263. For DMK's method see Times of India, New Delhi, October 18, 1972; and op.cit., pp. 339-40 and 355.
More recently, the name Antulay has become inextricably bound up with the most sophisticated techniques of raising funds for ostensibly charitable, or party purposes, or for promoting personal interests.
- It is a Latin term meaning favor for favor.
- https://www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/what-is-2g-scam-in-india-2g-scam-verdict-upa-a-raja-cbi-judge-op-saini-verdict-things-to-know-1113444-2017-12-21, accessed on 07-02-2021.
- An article in The Hindu 2013, cited from S. Chakraborty, 'An Impossible Dream? Depoliticising the Central Bureau of Investigation', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50, No. 32 (Aug 8, 2015), pg 16, accessed on 08-02-2021.
- Government Submits Affidavit on CBI Autonomy in Supreme Court," All India, NDTV, 3 July, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/government-submits-affidavit-on-cbi-autonomy-in-supreme-court-387598, viewed on 27 November 2014.
- "Parliament Will Decide on CBI Autonomy, Says Supreme Court," 11 July, http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/parliament-will-decide-on-cbi-autonomy-says-supreme-court-390306
- HC Notice to CBI on Bail Pleas of Kani, 4 Others," 9 November,
http:// www.timesnow.tv/HC-notice-to-CBI-on-bail pleas-of-Kani-4-others/articleshow/4388472.
cms, viewed on 24 November 2014.
- Chakraborty, Shiladitya (2013): Public Service Reforms in India: A Fight
against Corruption, Kolkata: Towards Freedom Publishers. Cited from S.
Chakraborty, 'An Impossible Dream? Depoliticising the Central Bureau of
Investigation', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50, No. 32 (Aug 8, 2015), pg
17, accessed on 08-02-2021.
- Quah, Jon S Τ (2007): "Anti-Corruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries: A
Comparative Analy sis," International Public Management Review, Vol 8, Issue 2.
cited from S. Chakraborty, 'An Impossible Dream? Depoliticising the Central
Bureau of Investigation', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 50, No. 32 (Aug 8,
2015), pg 17, accessed on 08-02-2021.
Please Drop Your Comments