India's nuclear doctrine and policy have undergone significant developments since its first successful nuclear test in 1974. This abstract provides a concise overview of the evolution, principles, and strategic considerations that shape India's approach to nuclear weapons.

The analysis begins by tracing the historical context of India's nuclear program, emphasizing the pivotal moments such as the 1998 Pokhran-II tests, which marked a paradigm shift in India's nuclear policy. The paper explores the factors that have influenced the development of India's nuclear doctrine, taking into account regional security dynamics, geopolitical considerations, and the evolving global nuclear landscape.

The core principles of India's nuclear doctrine, including a commitment to "No First Use" (NFU) and a credible minimum deterrence posture, are examined in depth. The rationale behind these principles is explored, as well as their implications for regional and global security. The paper also discusses the challenges and debates surrounding India's NFU policy and the ongoing discourse on potential revisions.

The evolving technological aspects of India's nuclear capabilities, including advancements in missile technology, command and control systems, and the incorporation of a triad-based structure, are analysed to provide insights into the nation's efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal.

Furthermore, the paper explores India's stance on arms control and disarmament initiatives, as well as its engagement with international non-proliferation regimes. The impact of changing geopolitical dynamics, such as India's strategic partnerships and its role in global forums, on its nuclear policy is also considered. This comprehensive analysis aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of India's nuclear doctrine and policy. By examining the historical, strategic, and technological dimensions, it provides a nuanced perspective on India's role in the nuclear domain and its implications for regional and global security.

Introduction
India's nuclear doctrine and policy stand at the intersection of complex historical, strategic, and geopolitical considerations. Since its independence in 1947, India has pursued a path of strategic autonomy while navigating regional tensions, security challenges, and aspirations for global recognition. Central to India's strategic calculus is its nuclear program, which has evolved from its inception to becoming a cornerstone of national security strategy.

The journey of India's nuclear program began with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1948, driven by the vision of utilizing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, the security dynamics of the region, especially the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, underscored the imperative for India to reassess its strategic posture. This culminated in the "Smiling Buddha" nuclear test in 1974, marking India's entry into the nuclear club and signaling its emergence as a nuclear-capable state.

The seismic shift in India's nuclear policy occurred in 1998 with the Pokhran-II tests, which demonstrated India's ability to weaponize its nuclear capabilities. This watershed moment not only reshaped the regional security landscape but also drew global attention to India's nuclear ambitions and raised questions about its strategic intentions.

Central to India's nuclear doctrine is the principle of "No First Use" (NFU), enshrined as a cornerstone of its nuclear posture. The NFU policy reflects India's commitment to maintaining nuclear weapons solely for deterrence purposes and underscores its adherence to responsible nuclear behaviour. However, debates surrounding the credibility and flexibility of the NFU policy persist, amidst evolving security challenges and strategic uncertainties.


India's nuclear doctrine also emphasizes a policy of credible minimum deterrence, aimed at ensuring the survivability and effectiveness of its nuclear arsenal while avoiding an arms race. The pursuit of a triad-based nuclear force comprising land, sea, and air-based delivery systems further enhances India's strategic capabilities and resilience.

History
The history of India's nuclear doctrine is characterized by a trajectory of strategic decisions, geopolitical imperatives, and evolving security considerations. It traces back to the early years following India's independence in 1947, when the country's leaders recognized the potential of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as energy production and scientific research. However, the security environment in South Asia, marked by regional rivalries and nuclear proliferation concerns, compelled India to reassess its stance on nuclear weapons.

1. Early Years and Peaceful Intentions (1947-1960s): In the immediate aftermath of independence, India's nuclear program was primarily geared towards civilian applications. The establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1948 reflected India's commitment to harnessing nuclear technology for developmental purposes under the leadership of Homi Bhabha.
    
2. Security Imperatives and Regional Challenges (1960s-1970s): The 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War heightened India's security concerns, particularly in light of China's nuclear tests in 1964. The perceived threat from China and the increasing nuclear capabilities of Pakistan prompted India to reconsider its nuclear posture. The "Smiling Buddha" nuclear test in 1974 marked India's first foray into nuclear weapons development, emphasizing peaceful nuclear explosions for civilian purposes.
    
3. Shift Towards Nuclear Weaponization (1980s-1990s): The 1980s witnessed a significant shift in India's nuclear doctrine, with growing calls for a more assertive stance in the face of regional security challenges. The failure of global disarmament efforts and the emergence of Pakistan as a nuclear-capable state intensified India's resolve to bolster its nuclear deterrent capabilities. However, India maintained a policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither officially declaring itself a nuclear-armed state nor openly acknowledging its nuclear weapons program.
    
4. Pokhran-II and Formalization of Nuclear Doctrine (1998): The defining moment in India's nuclear history came with the Pokhran-II tests in May 1998, conducted under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. These tests, which included both fission and fusion devices, unequivocally demonstrated India's nuclear capabilities to the world. Following the tests, India declared itself a nuclear-armed state and outlined the principles of its nuclear doctrine, which included the commitment to "No First Use" (NFU) of nuclear weapons and a policy of credible minimum deterrence.
    
5. Formalization and Articulation of Nuclear Doctrine: India's nuclear doctrine was formally articulated in August 1999 in the aftermath of the Pokhran-II tests. The doctrine emphasized the principles of NFU, credible minimum deterrence, and a commitment to nuclear disarmament. The NFU policy, in particular, underscored India's pledge to use nuclear weapons solely in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or its forces.
    
6. Evolution and Modernization (2000s-Present): Since the formalization of its nuclear doctrine, India has focused on modernizing its nuclear arsenal and enhancing its deterrence capabilities. The development of a triad-based nuclear force comprising land, sea, and air-based delivery systems has been a key aspect of India's nuclear modernization efforts. Additionally, India has engaged in strategic dialogues with other nuclear powers and participated in international non-proliferation initiatives while reaffirming its commitment to its nuclear doctrine principles.

India's Nuclear Doctrine

In light of India's historical stance on nuclear disarmament and the complexities surrounding its decision to pursue nuclear weapons, it's imperative to reframe the narrative. India's trajectory towards nuclear armament wasn't solely driven by political motives or a quest for national prestige, but rather anchored in the fundamental principle of national security.

The genesis of India's nuclear program can be attributed to the visionary scientist Homi Bhabha, who advocated for investment in nuclear technology to bolster the nation's scientific capabilities. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, initiated the program with the primary objective of achieving energy self-sufficiency and advancing the country's technological prowess, particularly in electricity generation.

The milestone 1974 nuclear test, while labelled as a "peaceful nuclear explosion," was met with international condemnation due to perceived breaches of agreements governing nuclear technology transfers. This event underscored the need for India to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics, particularly concerning its neighbours, China and Pakistan, with whom it had longstanding territorial disputes and past conflicts.

In response to regional security challenges, notably the nuclearization of neighbouring states, India conducted a series of nuclear tests in 1998, formalizing its status as a nuclear-armed state. However, it's crucial to note that alongside these developments, India remained committed to advocating for nuclear disarmament, exemplified by its submission of an Action Plan for a nuclear weapons-free world to the UN General Assembly.

Following the 1998 tests, India took significant steps to articulate its nuclear doctrine and establish institutional frameworks for strategic planning. The formation of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and the subsequent drafting and operationalization of the official nuclear doctrine in 2003 underscored India's commitment to responsible nuclear stewardship.

Moreover, the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement and subsequent endorsement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) provided India with opportunities for international nuclear engagement, facilitating participation in nuclear trade while adhering to global non-proliferation norms.

The draft Indian nuclear principle and order and control of nuclear weapons were first archived by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on August 17, 1999. Consequently, the Bureau board on Security on January 4, 2003, summed up the notable elements of the draft precept as follows:

• Constructing and keeping a dependable least hindrance.
• Strategy of "No First Use" (NFU): nuclear weapons may be utilized in counter against a nuclear assault an on Indian Area or on Indian powers anyplace.
• Nuclear counter to a first strike by the rival will be enormous and intended to cause unsuitable harm. Nuclear retaliatory assaults must be approved by the regular citizen political administration through the NCA.
• Non-utilization of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
• In case of a significant assault against India, or Indian powers anyplace, by natural or substance weapons, India holds the choice of fighting back with nuclear weapons.
• A duration of severe controls on product of nuclear and rocket related materials and advances, cooperation in the Fissile Material End Arrangement dealings, and proceeded with recognition of the ban on nuclear tests.
• Proceeded with obligation to the objective of a nuclear weapon liberated world, through worldwide, certain and non-oppressive nuclear demobilization.

In essence, India's journey towards nuclear armament, though complex and multifaceted, was driven by imperatives of national security, technological advancement, and a nuanced understanding of regional dynamics, while simultaneously advocating for broader nuclear disarmament objectives on the global stage.

India-Us Civil Nuclear Deal

In July 2005, a significant milestone was reached when India and the US unveiled a comprehensive set of initiatives aimed at strengthening their bilateral relationship[1]. Central to this initiative was a proposed agreement wherein India would segregate its military and civilian nuclear facilities, subjecting many, though not all, of its civilian nuclear reactors to oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Notably, India's military installations and existing nuclear fuel reserves would remain outside the purview of inspections or safeguards.

Simultaneously, the US would be permitted to construct nuclear reactors within India and supply nuclear fuel for its civilian energy purposes. This marked a departure from a three-decade-long prohibition on the export of civilian nuclear fuel and technology from the US to India. The endorsement of this legislative change came in December 2006, following the approval of the US Congress. However, this approval was contingent upon several conditions: the finalization of a formal nuclear cooperation agreement between the US and India, the negotiation of a nuclear safeguard's agreement between India and the IAEA, and the endorsement of the deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

In July 2007, a crucial step forward was taken with the adoption of the "123 agreement" by Presidents Bush and Singh. This agreement aimed to grant India the ability to reprocess spent nuclear fuel under IAEA oversight. Furthermore, the US committed to supporting the establishment of an "Indian strategic fuel reserve" and facilitating India's access to the international nuclear fuel market. However, the implementation of these measures awaited approval from the US Congress.

This series of developments exemplified a significant shift in US-India relations, marked by a willingness to engage in nuclear cooperation and bolster strategic ties.

India's Resolution In The UN

India has long championed disarmament efforts on the global stage, advocating for two key resolutions at the United Nations: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons and Reducing Nuclear Danger. Since 1982, India has consistently tabled the resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of nuclear weapons, garnering support from a majority of UN members. The primary objective of this resolution is to establish a universal and legally binding agreement aimed at galvanizing global political will toward the complete eradication of nuclear weapons.

Central to India's vision is the pursuit of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, which would outlaw the possession and use of nuclear weapons. While the concept of such a treaty has been proposed in the past, negotiations on it have remained inactive within the Conference on Disarmament. Despite this, India remains steadfast in its commitment to fostering dialogue and cooperation among nations to address the pressing issue of nuclear disarmament.

The advocacy for these resolutions underscores India's unwavering dedication to promoting peace, security, and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons on a global scale. Through sustained diplomatic efforts and engagement with the international community, India continues to strive for a world free from the threat of nuclear proliferation and devastation.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation As An International Legal Norm

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[1] came into effect on March 5, 1970[2], marking a significant milestone in global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This treaty stands as the most comprehensive endeavour to date aimed at regulating the spread of nuclear armaments. It delineates obligations between two distinct categories of states: nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.

Nuclear weapon states are expressly prohibited from transferring nuclear weapons or related technology to any entity. Additionally, they are mandated to refrain from facilitating or endorsing the acquisition of such weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, nuclear weapon states are obliged to engage in sincere negotiations aimed at curbing the nuclear arms race, ultimately aiming for complete disarmament.

Conversely, non-nuclear weapon states are obligated not only to abstain from developing or manufacturing nuclear weapons but also to submit to international oversight and safeguards on their peaceful nuclear programs. The administration of these safeguards is entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[3].

Given that India has never formally signed or ratified the NPT, its actions as a non-nuclear weapon state, particularly its nuclear testing activities, have raised questions regarding compliance with key provisions of the treaty. Specifically, India's conduct appears to contravene the fundamental principles outlined in the NPT, including the prohibition against the development of nuclear weapons and the requirement for international oversight of peaceful nuclear endeavors.

The legality of India's nuclear program hinges on the interpretation of whether the NPT holds sufficient weight as customary international law to bind states that have not acceded to the treaty. This underscores the complex legal and ethical considerations surrounding nuclear proliferation and the extent to which international norms influence the behavior of nations, even those not party to specific treaties.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the examination of India's nuclear policy through the lens of international law unveils a multifaceted landscape characterized by intricate legal considerations, geopolitical dynamics, and national security imperatives. India's decision to pursue nuclear capabilities outside the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has sparked debates regarding its compliance with established norms of non-proliferation and disarmament.

While India has consistently emphasized its commitment to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and ensuring national security, its nuclear program has raised concerns regarding its alignment with international legal frameworks and principles. The absence of India's formal accession to the NPT has led to questions regarding the applicability of its provisions to the country and the broader implications for global non-proliferation efforts.

Furthermore, India's engagement in nuclear testing activities, along with its stance on issues such as nuclear disarmament and arms control, has underscored the complex interplay between national interests and international obligations. The evolving nature of India's nuclear policy necessitates ongoing scrutiny and analysis within the framework of international law to ensure alignment with established norms and principles.

As India continues to navigate the complexities of its nuclear policy in the international arena, there is a pressing need for dialogue, cooperation, and adherence to established legal frameworks to foster peace, stability, and security at both regional and global levels. By engaging constructively with the international community and upholding its commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament, India can contribute meaningfully to the advancement of international law and the pursuit of a safer and more secure world for all.

End-Notes:

1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839
2. The treaty entered into force with 97 signatures and 47 ratifications. Smith, NA TO Nuclear Information Sharing Arrangements and the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Collective Defense Confronts Arms Control, 13 ATowc ENERGY L.J. 331, 341 (1972). As of January 1, 1974, ratifications, accessions, or notifications of successions had been deposited by 82 states. TREATIES IN FORCE, Jan. 1, 1974, at 366.
3. See generally Questor, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 24 INT'L ORG. 163 (1970). The treaty does not set forth specific safeguard requirements. It merely requires that non-nuclear weapon states conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA. The agreements must be designed so as to provide effective monitoring of the use and production of source (natural uranium) or special fissionable material (enriched uranium).