In India there was a demand for the removal of the fundamental right to property
from part III of the Constitution. It was argued that the retention of it as a
fundamental right leaves it to the judges rather than to the Parliament to
decide the quantum of compensation payable when property is acquired for public
purposes. Secondly, it was argued that the implementation of the Directive
Principles of State Policy in the Constitution is rendered impossible by the
right of property in India.
Property under Indian Constitution means any proprietary interest that can be
acquired, disposed or taken possession of. It is not only tangible but also
includes any bundles of right which the owner can exercise to the exclusion of
others. Article 19(1) f defines Right to Property. Earlier Supreme Court was of
the view that it is an abstract right only and not concrete but later in
Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments v. Swamiar
 , it accepted right to
property as a concrete right also.
So in the text ahead we would finally trace that how the above two arguments
have actually amounted to the deletion of right to property form Part III and it
becoming a legal right.
Article 31 A saves laws providing for acquisition of estates , temporary
management of any property by the state in public interest , amalgamation of two
or more corporations either in public interest or for their proper management ,
extinguishment or modification of any rights of managing directors , directors
or managers of corporations , or of any voting rights of shareholders thereof ,
or the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any
agreement , lease or license for the purpose of searching for , or winning , any
mineral or mineral oil , or the premature termination or cancellation of any
such agreement .
These powers of the state have two provisions:
Any such laws made by a state legislature shall have to secure the assent of the
President of India.
If the state acquires any land under personal cultivation of a person, the
compensation paid against such acquisition shall not be lower than at the market
Article 31 B a ninth schedule to the constitution was created in order to
exclude certain legislations from the scope of judicial review. Originally the
acts put there related to land reform. Some of the later legislations, included
in the ninth schedule, related to other kinds of property too. But , when the
Tamil Nadu Backward Classes , Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes (Reservation
of Seats in Educational Institutions and appointments or posts in the Services
under State) Act, 1993 , was added to the schedule as entry no. 257 A , the
inclusion was challenged and the Supreme Court , in 2007 , decided to examine
the entire ninth schedule .
Article 31C had a worse fate. This article , inserted by the 25th amendment in
1971 , to mitigate the effect of the Supreme Court judgement in the bank
nationalization case of 1970 , provided that, notwithstanding anything contained
in Article 13, no law giving effect to any of the directive principles of state
policy would be void and no court could call in question any such law. In the Keshavananda Bharti v state of Kerala
,the Supreme Court declared void that
portion of the 25th amendment that precluded judicial review of such law.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
The introduction of the First Amendment bill was witnessed by the Provisional
Government because general elections took place in 1952, the bill basically
centered on the 'certain difficulties that had been brought to light by the
judicial decisions and pronouncements especially in regard to fundamental
After the independence India's Political Leaders and planners embarked on social
and economic reconstruction of Indian society by first of all removing the evils
of zamindari system .The First Five year plan was in support of this ad it
excluded the presence of intermediaries and had given the land to tiller.
Consequently land reforms were enacted in UP, Bihar and elsewhere.
But at the
same junction of time the apex court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar
 held that
the Bihar State Management of Estates and Tenures Acts, 1949 void on the ground
that compensation provided was no compensation. So as to nullify the effect of
this judgment and also to uphold the validity of Zamindari Abolition Regulation
first Amendment was done and Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru the then Prime Minister had
enunciated the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy during the constituent
assembly debate on compensation. He declared:
'No Supreme Court and no judiciary can stand in judgment over the sovereign will
of the Parliament representing the will of the entire community. If we go wrong
here and there it can point out ultimate analysis, where the future of the
community is concerned, no judiciary can come on its way, and ultimately the
whole Constitution is a creature of Parliament.'
Therefore his first amendment added to art 31 two explanatory clauses 31-A and
31-B to fully secure the abolition of zamindari.
The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955
In 1954 when the Parliament adopted a resolution for the establishment of
"socialistic pattern of society" in India the State started assuming the role of
a welfare state and were vitally concerned with reducing disparities in income,
to prevent monopolies and concentration of economic power in a few hands.
Consequently in furtherance of the above objective it started regulating and
controlling the private business of several commercial companies and
undertakings as done in Sholapur mills Case, Subodh Gopal's Case and Belle
, the Supreme Court was of the view that words 'taken possession
of or acquired' amounted to deprivation hence compensation must be paid even
though merely state took the possession and not acquired it. And according to
Bella's case the compensation should be equivalent to what the owner is deprived
Thus the above judgment of the court stood as a brake in the regulatory power of
the state and property was given a very wide connotation. So it became necessary
that the power to fix ceilings on land holdings, to distribute excess of land
and lastly to remove the jurisdiction of the judiciary from fixing the
This led to Fourth Amendment which brought a change in the substantial character
in 31(2) and also inserted (2-A). This way the State acquired the right to pass
any law restricting, modifying and curtailing the right of ownership in property
without being liable to pay compensation .It also provided that there can be no
taking or acquisition till the time the title is transfer to the state.
In Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector
, Madras and another, the
Supreme Court accepted the amendment to the effect that equivalence
(compensation) could not be questioned , but held that 'if a law lays down
principles which are not relevant to the property acquired , it may be said that
they are not principles contemplated by Article 31(2) of the constitution'.
The Constitution (Seventeen Amendment) Act, 1964
It appeared that notwithstanding the amendments, certain other legislative
measures by different States for the purpose of giving effect to agrarian policy
were effectively challenged. So thus the Parliament thought that it was
necessary to make amendment in Art 31-A and Art 31-B . Accordingly, the
expression 'estate' in At 31-A was amended retrospectively by a new definition
given in Art 31-A (2) and another proviso was added to 31 �A (1) . In article
31-B instead of 13 acts 44 amendments act were added to the schedule.
The validity of the above amendments were challenged in Golak Nath's case
the amendments were upheld but it was held that any amendment made under art 368
is a law under art 13 due to which state can take no action which infringes or
abridges fundamental rights due to which j. Hiddayatulah said that the
constitution needs to be amended as putting right to property as a fundamental
right was in his opinion an error. But this defect was resolved by the 24th
Amendment 1971 and the basic reason for the initiation of this bill was a
conflict between the fundamental rights and the Directive Principles of State
Policy. And from then onward amendment under art 368 was not considered to be a
law any longer.
The Constitution (twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971
By this amendment a new clause was substituted for Art 31(2) replacing the
expression 'Compensation' by the for 'Amount' and making the amount and mode of
payment for takeover of property non �justiciable .And also by this time the
conflict between the fundamental rights and Directives was over and Directive
Principles of State Policy gain precedence over fundamental rights conferred
under Art 14, 19 and 31. It had made special provision with regard to law
intended to give effect to the directive principles contained in art 39 (b) and
39 (c) of the Constitution.
Again Kesavananda Bharati's Case
the validity of 24th and 25th Amendments were
challenged along with the judgment of Golak Nath. Golak Nath was overruled and
the Doctrine of Basic Structure was propounded by which any constitutional
amendment has to pass the test of basic structures that means if it contravenes
the basic structure the amendment is not valid though an exhaustive list stating
what all is there in basic structure was not given.
Supreme Court Approach To The Right To Property
The Supreme Courts approach to the right to property can be divided into two
Pre 1978 the Fundamental Right to Property
- Pre 1978 the Fundamental Right to Property
- Post 1978 the Constitutional Right to Property
The Ninth Schedule was inserted in the constitution by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951 along with two new Articles 31 a & 31 B so as to make laws
acquiring zamindari unchallengeable in the courts. These steps were felt
necessary to carry out land reforms in accordance with the economic philosophy
of the state to distribute the land among the land workers, after taking away
such land from the land lords.
By the Fourth Amendment Act, 1955, Art 31 relating to right to property was
amended in several respects. The purpose of these amendments related to the
power of the state to compulsory acquisition and requisitioning of private
property. The amount of compensation payable for this purpose was made
unjustifiable to overcome the effect of the Supreme Court judgement in the
decision of State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee
. By the constitution
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, article 31 A was amended with respect to
meaning of expression estate and the Ninth Schedule was amended by including
therein certain state enactments.
During this period the Supreme Court was generally of the view that land reforms
need to be upheld even if they did strictly clash against the right to
property, though the Supreme Court was itself skeptical about the way the
government went about exercising its administrative power in this regard. The
Supreme Court was insistent that the administrative discretion appropriate or
infringe property rights should be in accordance with law and cannot be by mere
fact. The court however really clashed with the socialist executive during
the period of nationalization, when the court admirably stood up for the right
to property in however a limited manner against the over reaches of the
In Bank Nationalisation case has clearly pointed out the following two
Post 1978 the Constitutional Right to Property
- The constitution guarantees the right to compensation which is equivalent
in money to the value of the property has been compulsorily acquired. This
is the basic guarantee. The law must therefore provide compensation and for
determining compensation relevant principles must be specified if the
principles are not relevant the ultimate value determined is not
- The constitution guarantees that the expropriate owner must be given the
value of his property (the reasonable compensation for the loss of the
property). That reasonable compensation must not be illusionary and not
reached by the application of an undertaking as a unit after awarding
compensation for some items which go to make up the undertaking and omitting
important items amounts to adopting an irrelevant principle in the
determination of the value of the undertaking and does not furnish
compensation to the expropriated owner.
It was at this period the Supreme Court had gone out of its way to hold against
the right to property and the right to accumulate wealth and also held that with
regard to Article 39, the distribution of material resources to better serve the
common good and the restriction on the concentration of wealth.
however is also responsible in toning down the excesses on the right to property
and wealth by the socialist state. During the period of Liberalisation, the
Supreme Court has attempted to get back to reinterpret the provisions which give
protection to the right to property so as to make the protection real and not
illusory and dilute the claim of distribution of wealth. However, this has
been an incremental approach and much more needs to be done to shift the balance
back to the original in the constitution.
This means that the acquisition of
property is not merely temporal but to be accepted as valid it must conform to
spiritual guidelines as well as the Indian conceptions recognize quite clearly
that though property can be enjoyed which has not been acquired strictly in
terms of the law, it cannot be called real property of the person concerned.
Property therefore is not merely an individual right but a construction and part
of social and spiritual order.
The basis of conception of property in the
societies of India is not a rigid and clear demarcation of claims belonging to
an individual but is a sum total of societal and individual claims all of which
need not be based on clear individual legal demarcation.
Article 31 in its first two clauses deals with the deprivation of property and
acquisition of property. The Supreme Court held in a series of decisions viz.
State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bella Banerjee
, State of W.B v. Subodh
, State of Madras v. Namasivaya Muralidar
, that Article 31, clauses
(1) and (2) provided for the doctrine of eminent domain and under clause (2) a
person must be deemed to be deprived of his property if he was substantially
dispossessed or his right to use and enjoy the property was seriously impaired
by the impugned law.
According to this interpretation, the two clauses of
Article 31 dealt only with acquisition of property in the sense explained by the
court, and that under Article 31(1) the state could not make a law depriving a
person of his property without complying with the provisions of Article 31(2).
It is worth mentioning in this context that it was the decision in the Bella Banerjees case that actually induced the government to resort to the Fourth
Then came the Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964 by which the state extended the
scope of Article 31-A and Ninth Schedule to protect certain agrarian reforms
enacted by the Kerala and Madras states. The word estate in Article 31-A now
included anyjagir or inam, mauf, or any other grant and janmam right in state of
Kerala, Madras and also Ryotwari lands.
It also added consequentially, the
second proviso to clause (1) to protect a person of being deprived of land less
than the relevant land ceiling limits held by him for personal cultivation, 4
except on payment of full market value thereof by way of compensation. It also
added 44 more Acts to the Ninth Schedule. The Supreme Court by various judgments
considered the said amendments and restricted their scope within reasonable
The Supreme Court in Kocchuni vs State of Madras
, did not accept
the plea of the state that Article 31(1) after amendments gave an unrestricted
power to the state to deprive a person of his property. It held that Article
31(1) and (2) are different fundamental rights and that the expression ʺlawʺ in
Article 31(1) shall be valid law and that it cannot be valid law unless it
amounts to a reasonable restriction in public interest within the meaning of
While this decision conceded to the state the power to deprive a
person of his property by law in an appropriate case, it was made subject to the
condition that the said law should operate as reasonable restriction in public
interest and be justiciable. The Court construed the amended provision
reasonably in such a way as to salvage to some extent the philosophy of the
Constitution. This became necessary as the definition of estate was
simultaneously expanded to cover Ryotwari settlements in order to make agrarian
reforms more effective.
The Supreme Court in P Vajravelu Mudalier v. Special Deputy Collector
also in the Union of India v. Metal Corporation of India considered Article
31(2) in the context of compensation and held that if the compensation fixed was
illusory or the principles prescribed were irrelevant to the value of the
property at or about the time of acquisition, it could be said that the
Legislature had committed a fraud on power and therefore the law was inadequate.
The Supreme Court in three other decisions confined the bar of Article 31-An
only to agrarian reforms. In Kochunni case the Court held that requirement of
Article 31-A bars and attack on the ground of infringement of fundamental right
only in the case of agrarian reforms, pertaining to an estate.
In Ranjith Singh v. State of Punjab
, it was held that the expression
ʺagrarian reformʺ was wide enough to take in consolidation of holdings as it was
nothing more than a proper planning of rural areas. In Vajravelu decision the
Supreme Court explained that there is no conflict between the said two decisions
and pointed out that the latter decision includes in the expression of agrarian
reforms, the slum clearance and other beneficial utilisation of vacant and waste
In a Ghulabhai v. Union of India
, the Supreme Court did not accept the
contention of the state that the expression ʺEstateʺ takes in all waste lands,
forest lands, lands for pastures or sites of buildings in a village whether they
were connected with agriculture or not but ruled that the said enumerated lands
would come under the said definition only if they were used for the purpose of
agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto.
The result of the brief survey of
the provisions of the Constitution and the case law thereon as it stood then may
be stated in the form of the following propositions:
- Every citizen has a fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of the
- The state can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right in
- The said restrictions, under certain circumstances, may amount to deprivation of
the said right.
- Whether a restriction imposed by law on a fundamental right is reasonable and in
public interest or not, is a justiciable issue.
- The state can by law, deprive a person of his property if the said law of
deprivation amounts to reasonable restriction in public interest within the
meaning of Article 19(5).
- The state can acquire or requisition the property of a person for a public
purpose after paying compensation.
- The adequacy of the compensation is not justiciable.
- If the compensation fixed by law is illusory or is contrary to the principles
relevant to the fixation of compensation, it would be a fraud on power and
therefore the validity of such a law becomes justiciable.
Laws of agrarian reform depriving or restricting the rights in anʺestateʺthe
said expression has been defined to include practically every agricultural land
in a village cannot be questioned on the ground that they have infringed
It all began when the question whether fundamental rights can be amended under
Article 368 came for consideration of the Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad v.
Union of India
. In this case the validity of the Constitution (1st
Amendment) Act, 1951, which inserted inter alia, Articles 31-A and 31-B of the
Constitution was challenged.
The Amendment was challenged on the ground that it
purported to take away or abridge the rights conferred by Part III, which fell
within the prohibition of Article 13 (2) and hence was void. It was argued that
the state in Article 12 included parliament and the word law in Article 13 (2),
therefore, must include Constitution amendment.
The Supreme Court, however,
rejected the above argument and held that the power to amend the Constitution
including the fundamental rights is contained in Article 368, and that the word
law in Article 13 (8) includes only an ordinary law made in exercise of the
legislative powers and does not include Constitutional amendment which is made
in exercise of constituent power. Therefore, a Constitutional amendment will be
valid even if it abridges or takes any of the fundamental rights.
In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan
, the validity of the Constitution
(17th Amendment) Act, 1964 was challenged. The Supreme Court approved the
majority judgement given in Shankari Prasad's case and held that the words
amendment of the Constitution means amendment of all the provisions of the
Constitution. Gajendragadkar, C J said that if the Constitution-makers intended
to exclude the fundamental rights from the scope of the amending power they
would have made a clear provision in that behalf.
Transformation From Fundamental Right To Legal Right
The aftermath of the emergency witnessed not only changes in the political
environment of the country but also in the realm of constitutional law. The
Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 made comprehensive changes in the
Constitution primarily with the objective of removing "the impediments to growth
of the Constitution". The amendments were to spell out high ideas of secularism,
socialism, democracy, to make Directive principles more comprehensive and give
them precedence over fundamental rights.
The Act of 1976 widened the scope of 31(c) so as to cover all the Directive
Principles to be given precedence over the fundamental rights. Further three new
articles 39 A, 43A and 48A were inserted in Part IV. Again it was challenged in
Minerva Mills's case and the Act was declared unconstitutional up to the extent
of it giving precedence to Directives.
Right to property was originally incorporated in Article 19(1) (f) of the Indian
Constitution which declared that all the persons shall have the right 'to
acquire, hold and dispose of property' along with Art.31 which provided certain
safeguards against the compulsory acquisition of individual properties which was
based on English concept of private property and was modelled on basis of Sec
299 of Government of India Act, 1935. As regards the constitutional provision
relating to it Art 19 (1) (f) was subjected to reasonable restrictions under art
After the Janta Government took over the reins at the Centre, it sought to undo
the amendments made under 42nd Amendment Act. It enacted 44th Amendment Act
,1978 which brought about one of the most significant change as it resulted in
the deletion of right to property as a fundamental right and provided for its
reincarnation as art 300-A to recognize it as a legal right.
The scope of Art 300-A was determined by the Supreme Court in Jilubhai Nanbhai
Khachar v. State Of Gujarat and it was held that right to property does not form
the basic structure of the Constitution. And also expression 'property' in
article 300-A has to be understood in the context of the sovereign power of
eminent domain of the State.
Defects of the 44th Amendment Act:
The amendment was brought out without realizing the following draw backs:
- The close relation of property with other fundamental rights,
which the Janata Party was pledged to restore;
- The effect of this change on the legislative power to acquire
and requisition property;
- The correlation of fundamental rights to Directive principles of
- The Right to Property would now be a Constitutional Right and not a
Fundamental Right. A legislation violating the constitutional right to
property could now be challenged only in High Courts and not directly in the
- Due to the deletion of Article 31 the Government was no longer under an
obligation to compensate persons whose land had been acquired as per a law
passed by Parliament.
As of now, it is, beyond the scope of my research and understanding as to
whether Proposition (ii) i.e. deprivation of property without compensation is
still legally tenable especially in light of the Supreme Court's ruling, in the
Maneka Gandhi case, which held that each and every provision of the Constitution
had to be interpreted in a just, fair and reasonable manner. Therefore any law
depriving a person of his property shall have to do so in a reasonable manner.
It could be argued that the only reasonable manner to deprive a person of his
property would be to offer him, reasonable compensation for the same. This
discussion however is not completely relevant for the purpose of this post. The
only relevant point is the fact that under the Constitution no person can be
deprived of their property without the authority of law.
In P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma
, the Supreme Court of India has
held that the right to property is not just a statutory right but is also a
human right. The Supreme Court appears to have approved the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in J.A.Pye (Oxford Ltd).v. UK
the ECHR took the concept of adverse possession very unkindly.
In P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy the Supreme Court held that the right of property is
now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 enunciates
right to property under Article 17:
"Since the right to property is inviolable and sacred, no-one may be deprived
thereof, unless public necessity, legally ascertained, obviously requires it and
just and prior indemnity has been paid. Moreover Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 1948 under Section 17(i) and (ii) also recognizes right to property:
"17(i) everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others, (ii) No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights
such as right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment
etc. But now human rights are gaining a multi-faceted dimension.
In Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. N. Narasimhaiah
, it has
been held that in the absence of any provision either expressly or by necessary
implication depriving a person of his right, the Court shall not construe a
provision leaning in favour of such deprivation, since right to property is also
a human right. Developing further in Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikabhai Khengerbhai
Harijan and looking at the position in other countries, the Supreme Court
held that the law of adverse possession as irrational.
In Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke and Chemicals
the Supreme Court has held that the right to property is now held to be not only
a constitutional right but also a human right. There the Supreme Court has
followed the law laid down in P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy and reiterated that
property rights are also incorporated within the definition of human rights.
In Lachchman Dass v. Jagatram
, the Supreme Court reiterated that
right to property is a human right. India is a signatory to various conventions
on human rights. Article 5 1 (c) of the Constitution requires the state
(including the Judiciary) to foster respect for international law and treats
obligations in the dealings of people with one another. Therefore, it may be
argued that the right to property being a part of human rights as embodied in
Any legislation for depriving such right would require the state to provide for
full compensation in the event of deprivation of property. Furthermore, even if
such law is placed under the IXth Schedule and protected by Article 31 B. For
example Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
In I.R.Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu
 the Apex Court held that even
though an Act is placed under the IXth Schedule by a constitutional amendment,
it would be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or takes away or
abrogates the basic structure of the Constitution.
The Court held that the justification for conferring protection (not blanket
protection) on the IXth Schedule shall be a matter of adjudication, examining
the nature and extent of infraction of fundamental right by a statute and such
statute sought to be constitutionally protected on the touchstone of the basic
structure doctrine as reflected in Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19.
The Court held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are the basic structure of the
Constitution therefore, basic essence of the right cannot be taken away. Essence
of the human right (which according to the recent judgments include property
rights) would necessarily mean full compensation for acquisition of property
right. If the laws affects the basic structure could not be protected even
though included in the IXth Schedule.
The outburst against the Right to Property as a Fundamental Right in Articles 19
(1) (f) and 31 started immediately after the enforcement of the Constitution in
1950. Land reforms, zamindari abolition laws, disputes relating to compensation,
several rounds of constitutional amendments, litigations and adjudications
ultimately culminated first in the insertion of the word socialist in the
Preamble by the 42nd Amendment in 1977 and later in the omission of the Right to
Property as a FR and its reincarnation as a bare constitutional right in Article
300-A by the 44th Amendment in 1978.
Today, the times have changed radically. India is no more seen through the eyes
of only political leaders with a socialist bias. It is India Shining seen
through the corporate lenses of financial giants like the Tata's, Ambanis and
Mahindras, with an unfathomable zeal for capitalism, money and markets. There is
another angle. There is a scramble by industrialists and developers for land all
over the country for establishment of Special Economic Zones. Violent protests
by poor agriculturists have taken place to defend their meager land-holdings
against compulsory acquisition by the State.
In particular, the riots and killings in Singur, Nandigram etc. in a State (of
West Bengal) ruled by communists has turned the wheel full circle. Socialism has
become a bad word and the Right to Property has become a necessity to assure and
assuage the feelings of the poor more than those of the rich. Soon after the
abolition of the Fundamental Right to property, in Bhim Singh v. UOI
the Supreme Court realised the worth of the Right to Property as a Fundamental
In the absence of this Fundamental Right to property, it took recourse to the
other Fundamental Right of Equality which is absolutely the concept of
Reasonableness under Article 14 for invalidating certain aspects of the urban
land ceiling legislation. Today, the need is felt to restore the right to
property as a Fundamental Right for protecting at least the elementary and basic
proprietary rights of the poor Indian citizens against compulsory land
Very recently, the Supreme Court, while disapproving the age-old Doctrine of
Adverse Possession, as against the rights of the real owner, observed that the
right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional right or
statutory right but also a human right.
Thus, the trend is unmistakable. By 2050, if the Constitution of India is to be
credited with a sense of sensibility and flexibility in keeping with the times,
the bad word socialist inserted in the Preamble in 1977 shall stand omitted and
the Right to Property shall stand resurrected to its original position as a
Written By: M.Haritha
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- 1965 AIR 1017, 1965 SCR) 1) 614.
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Singh v. State of UP,AIR 1959 SC 564
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- State of T.N v L.Abu Kavur Bai, (1984)1SCC 515
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- Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd, (2007)8
- J.M.D, Religion Law anf State in India; Oxford university press, New
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- The Tmes Of India,24th September, 2008
B.A.LLB (Hons). ,LLM
Tamil Nadu Dr.Ambedkar Law University