The Indian Penal Code (IPC) is a comprehensive criminal code that applies to
all of India and provides the legal framework for prosecuting crimes and
offenses in the country. The IPC contains provisions for a wide range of
criminal offenses, including violations related to physical harm, property
offenses, financial crimes, and offenses against the state.
It is important to note that the IPC does not discriminate based on gender, and
both men and women are subject to the same criminal provisions. However,
specific requirements in the IPC recognize and address crimes specifically
targeted at women, such as sexual assault and harassment, dowry-related
offenses, and female genital mutilation.
Additionally, there are provisions in the IPC that provide enhanced penalties
for offenses committed against vulnerable groups, including women and children.
For example, rape carries a severer maximum punishment if the victim is a woman
under the age of 16 or if the victim is a woman with a physical or mental
India is a democratic nation that is controlled by several laws and regulations.
The British administration created some of the rules that are still in effect in
India. IPC is one such statute (Indian Penal Code,1860). Even though it has
occasionally undergone numerous modifications. 511 sections in the 23 chapters
make up the IPC. The changes made to the offense's punishment reflect the nature
and intensity of the crime.
The Indian Penal Code provides the substantive elements that would direct the
nation's criminal legislation. It offers an overall criminal code for India.
Looking back, society was substantially different from what it is now. This was
My paper will deal with the section related to women and how the laws are being
misused in today's times. The belief that "all violence originates from males"
not only perpetuates gender inequalities but also serves as a deterrent to the
crimes committed by women.
It is impossible to determine a woman's will when a guy has consensual
intercourse with her. Despite having consensual relations with a guy, a woman
may hold him responsible for rape. A man cannot break up with a lady after
making an engagement vow and having sex.
When a woman does the same, she is protected under "women's empowerment." There
is no age of consent for guys. A teenage male will face rape charges if he
engages in consenting sexual activity with a girl.
The provisions pertaining to obscenity, sexual assault, the flesh trade,
kidnapping and abduction, and custodial relations have been included to this
section. Legal perspectives on the sexuality of married women have been covered
under the section on marital-related offences.
The patriarchal ideals and Victorian morals that underlie these regulations are
revealed in the debate that follows. 8 It demonstrates unequivocally that as
long as people maintain heterosexual consenting relationships within marital
constraints in the private realms of their life, the criminal law does not
interfere with their lives. However, the law forbids the development of any kind
of sexuality, even inside the private domain, that is antithetical to the
heterosexual norm Obscenity.
Pornography and obscenity have grown to be synonymous in Indian culture. Any
depiction that is "lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its
impact... is, when regarded as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt
individuals who are likely to read, see, or hear the content contained or
incorporated in it" is considered obscene under the IPC. 9 This clause contains
the Hicklin test10, which was developed based on the then-dominant, constrained
moral considerations, and is not representative of the most recent developments
in the field.
Liberal, morally correct, anti-porn, and feminists against censorship are just a
few of the feminist stances on obscenity that have emerged. 11 According to the
liberal viewpoint, pornography is "sexually explicit material intended to arouse
the sexual urge" and that "there is no scientific proof that pornography harms
society and there are no good justifications for banning it or taking any other
action against it," 12 The moral right holds the view that pornography is an
obsession with sex that has nothing to do with the intended outcome of sex. They
see pornography as a threat to traditional family values that prohibit sex
outside of marriage and procreation.
Similar to the antiporn feminists, who see porn as "the material which
represents violence against women and is actually violence against women," 14
Feminists who oppose banning hold the position that it is not pictures that lead
men to rape, but rather the fact that the pornographic subgenre is increasingly
used to portray women. The experience of Denmark shows that when pornography is
exposed to the open air, it loses its influence, but censorship or the
concealment of such pictures creates pornography, gives it power, and encourages
The space for alternative erotica and other types of representation is reduced
by censorship. Feminists who oppose censorship claim that there should be a
variety of pictures and that there should be room for alternative images.
Suppressing current images will have the unintended consequence of also
suppressing alternate interpretations and portrayals that can support feminist,
anti-racist, or egalitarian principles. This method highlights the risk of using
legal means to combat pornography. According to them, this approach always
subsumes feminists' worries about objectification and degrading sex into the
debate over how sex depraves and/or how violent depictions fuel actual violence.
Indian law continues to be constrained to specific moral considerations and does
not take any of these recent changes into account. The legal 4 system disregards
pictures that denigrate women's equality, reinforce sexism, gender
discrimination, and misogyny, as well as the understanding of depravity as being
restricted to sexual depravity. While other images' sexist, gender-based, or
misogynistic themes are not viewed as having the same potential to deprave or
corrupt people, sexually explicit photographs do. As a result, they are
outlawed. There are no legal repercussions for the sexism in depictions that are
not sexually explicit..
Even the relatively recent Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act of
1986 placed a strong emphasis on the "depiction... of the figure of a woman...
as to have the impression of being indecent." 16 Conceptions of morality also
play a big role in "Indecency." The attention is deflected from offensive
statements and other offensive but not obviously indecent pictures of women due
to its concentration on what is openly offensive. Such offensive words and
pictures are significantly more damaging to women and are to blame for the rise
in violence against them, yet they are nonetheless exempt from legal
restrictions. The Indecent Representation of Women Act includes the following
criterion of decency proposed17 for inclusion:
Conflicting views on what constitutes obscenity can be seen in recent censorship
and the litigation that followed in relation to the movie Bandit Queen18. It's
time for Indian law to acknowledge, at the very least, that the terms "deprave
and corrupt" clearly have the capacity to have a broader meaning. Other nations
have claimed that depravity and corruption are not just limited to sexual
depravity and corruption. 19 Miller v. Califomia2O has expanded the test laid
down in Hicklin.
You can find out what's offensive by asking:
- Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law;
- Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value; and
- Whether the average person, applying contemporary standards, would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest.
Rape And Sexual Assault
Numerous sexuality-related rules in the IPC support Victorian morality and
women's non-agency. The usual practice in rape cases is that a man commits rape
if, with or without the victim's agreement, he engages in sexual activity with a
female under sixteen. However, the act is not rape if the lady is his wife and
over the age of fifteen. A minimal penalty is given if the wife is between the
ages of twelve and fifteen or living apart from him according to an order of
separation or under any use or custom.
The obvious conclusion is that even if
there is no presumption of consent for any other reason, including the marriage
itself, a woman is considered to have granted irreversible assent to have sex
with her husband. The option of puberty provided by Hindu and Muslim marriage
laws permits women to annul weddings before adulthood.
However, there are no
penalties against a husband starting a sexual connection in such a marriage.
Only if the woman is physically incapable of engaging in sexual activity is the
husband subject to the same punishment as other rapists. Her mental maturity or
her evident departure from the marriage by choosing to live apart offers little
protection to the woman from her husband's aggressive sexual advances.
When a man knew that he was not the woman's husband and that she had given her
consent thinking he was someone else to whom she was or believed herself to be
legally married, the woman may successfully prosecute the man for rape. 25 Even
if the man is aware that the woman agreed to the sexual activity, thinking the
accused was someone else, she is not protected if she makes a similar error
about the identity of the accused and is single, widower, or divorced.
is well-made. Marriage and sexuality are inextricably linked. The law safeguards
chaste married women and virgins. A woman who isn't married decides to engage in
sexual activity; she does so at her own risk. A man can take advantage of her
promiscuity without putting himself in danger.
The law does not protect sexual
conduct outside the private domain of marriage. Because the prosecutrix's
previous sexual activity is admissible in evidence, her promiscuity may be used
to harm her reputation and undermine her credibility during cross-examination.
The law appears to assume that if she has a history of immorality or sexual
promiscuity, her cry of rape must be a lie.
The underlying presumptions behind Sections 155(4) and 146 of the Evidence Act
have been summarised as I women lie about rape, (ii) women deserve to be raped,
and (iii) women provoke rape. These presumptions support the idea that women are
accountable for both inappropriate male sexual behaviour and for the
inappropriate sexual behaviour of other men. The denial of women's sexual
liberty and dignity is the outcome of the connection between chastity and the
demand of permission.
Additionally, the term of rape does not accurately describe a woman's
experience. The current law demands documentation of penile invasion of the
vagina. The need for penetration is related to traditional ideas of chastity and
the worry that someone other than the legal father would become pregnant. This
means that traditionally, the necessity to protect the rights of the woman's
legal father has taken precedence over her integrity, with penetration by the
penis being given preference over all other types of penetration or sexual
assault.The criteria eliminates a wide range of additional, no less humiliating
forms of sexual assault or violence against women, such as inserting the penis
into the woman's mouth, anus, or vagina, or inserting fingers or other objects
into her vagina.
Sexual behaviour may be protected by the law regardless of whether it takes
place in secret or in public as long as it adheres to conventional moral norms.
Whether homosexual relationships take place in the public or private domain,
they are deemed "unnatural" and "offences." Such a statement outright enforces a
heterosexual married sexuality code.
It may be noted that the provisions relating to rape assume that women alone may
be raped and that it is only a man who can rape a woman and not vice versa.But
she cannot rape a guy, just seduce him. New Sections 376-B through 376-D28,
however, hold someone in a position of power accountable for enticing or
seducing a woman for sex rather than a male. These rules obviously do not
acknowledge the sexual initiative and autonomy of women. These laws imply that
either women in positions of power do not or cannot exploit men who are in their
care or who report to them, or even if they do, males can handle it without the
need for legal protection whereas women in comparable positions are weak and in
need of it.
Assault, the use of illegal force, and words or gestures that offend a woman's
modesty are all punishable under Sections 354 and 509 of the IPC. These
paragraphs acknowledge the gender-based presumptions about male and female
sexuality. Any overt sexual behaviour made against women is offensive to their
modesty, whereas comparable acts made toward males are not subject to the law.
The law tends to assume that either males have no sense of modesty, that their
modesty cannot be offended, or that even when it is, they are capable of taking
care of themselves without the need for legal protection.
Prostitution, Trafficking And Illicit Intercourse
The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act of 1986 and the IPC both view prostitution as
a necessary evil that should be controlled but not entirely outlawed. Although
prostitution itself is not illegal, the laws do criminalise its external
manifestations, such as solicitation, running brothels, and trafficking in women
for prostitution. In this way, prostitution exposes women to pimp and customer
exploitation, as well as police harassment. The law has yet to acknowledge that
women who engage in prostitution have made the best financial decision feasible
given the circumstances and that prostitution should be decriminalised in order
to safeguard their legal rights. 30 It still sees prostitution as a necessary
societal evil that is fostered by vice and shady connections.
The IPC's Sections 372 and 373 define the sale or purchase of a minor for
prostitution as a crime. Males and girls under the age of eighteen are covered
by these clauses, however women are given additional protection. Explanations to
these clauses establish a presumption that a prostitute or a brothel owner is in
possession of a female with the intent to engage in prostitution. These
provisions also apply if the minor is sold or bought with the intention that
they would be utilised at any age for illicit sexual activity or for any other
illegal or immoral activity. Illicit sexual activity is defined for the purposes
of these parts as heterosexual activity between two individuals who are not
It should be noted that while Sections 372 and 373 acknowledge that a minor,
whether male or female, may be sold or purchased for the purpose of illicit
intercourse or for any unlawful and immoral purpose, Sections 366, 366-A, and
366-B of the IPC only apply when such actions are directed against women. These
sections deal with kidnapping, abduction, inducing, procuring, and importing for
the purpose of illicit intercourse. Section 366 is applicable to females of all
ages, despite Sections 366-A and 366-B applying to girls under the age of
eighteen and twenty-one years, respectively.
The morality, virginity, and
chastity ideals that are appropriate to women are the justification for
excluding males from these laws. However, because of the social and
psychological effects of engaging in unlawful 8 sexual activity with them, women
who are persuaded into such circumstances may end up becoming prostitutes. That
also explains why prostitution and criminal sexual activity are included in the
Miscarriage, harm to unborn children, newborn exposure, and birth concealment
are all covered under Sections 312 to 318 of the IPC. Abortion (other than when
done to save the woman's life)39, killing the woman while trying to have an
abortion, stopping a live birth or causing the death of a child after birth,
causing the death of an unborn child quickly, exposing and abandoning a child
younger than twelve years of age, and causing the death of an unborn child
quickly are all offences under the IPC. Except in cases where Sections 312 and
318 apply, the sentences stipulated range from seven to 10 years in length and
All offences, with the exception of those covered by Section 312, are punishable
by law and are not subject to a bail requirement, another sign of how seriously
the law's creators regarded them. These parts treat men and women equally and
are written in language that is gender-neutral and sameness-oriented. Since they
stipulate a harsher penalty if the offence is done without the woman's
permission, they really are protecting women. The gender prejudices ingrained in
these provisions become apparent when the operations and underlying presumptions
of the legislation are examined in greater detail.
These laws regarding the gender of the aborted foetus or newborn prohibited or
murdered assure their equal applicability regardless of whether the foetus or
kid victim in issue is male or female thanks to their gender-neutral language.
Infanticide and male foeticide, however, are extremely rare in India.
Infanticide and female foeticide are the issue. Due to their gender neutrality,
these measures conceal the true issue. In reality, it was discovered that there
were far too many cases of female infanticide and foeticide to be dealt with by
a gender-neutral statute and special criminal It was necessary to adopt 9 laws,
including the Female Infanticide Act 1864 and the Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques
(Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act 1994, to address both of these immoral
Prior to 1983, crimes involving marriage were covered by Chapter XX of the IPC.
Offenses including cohabitation and sexual access by individuals via deceptively
inducing a belief of marriage, bigamous marriage, adultery, and luring or
removing a married woman were included. A new Chapter XX-A, "Of Cruelty by
Husband or Relatives," with just one Section 498-A, was introduced to the IPC in
1983. The IPC's Section 304-B, which addresses dowry deaths, was added in 1986.
Offences Relating To Marriage
Three of the six parts in this chapter, which are solely permissible for males
to commit, deal with sexual relationships and marriage. 44 Stereotyping and the
socialization of male and female sexual roles directly impact how women are
exempt from criminal punishment for these offences. The terms "he" and "his" are
used in the sections on bigamous marriage offenses45 and falsely performing a
marriage ceremony without a valid marriage46. In contrast, the word "man" is
used in the passages discussing the instigation of a false sense of marriage to
cohabit or engage in sexual activity.47
The earlier set of offences may be committed by either a man or a woman, but
only the man is responsible for the later offence since the IPC alters its
definition when the word "he" is used in place of the term "man." Women being
excluded from this crime has two tenable justifications. Either women cannot, in
the eyes of the law, persuade a man to think that they are married in order for
them to cohabitate or engage in sexual activity, or even if they can, males will
not incur any negative repercussions as a result. In these circumstances, men
can care for themselves.
Fourthly, a comparison of Section 375 and Section 493 reveals another
inconsistency. Both provisions penalise a man who lives with a woman to whom he
knows he is not married and who has given her agreement to cohabitation while
believing that she is his wife. When the woman was not misinformed about the
guy's identity, but the man tricked her into believing they were married,
Section 493 comes into play. 52
But even if he did not cause her to believe that he was someone else, he may
still be held accountable for rape if she believed she knew who he was. 53 The
guy convicted under Section 493 may get significantly less punishment now that
rape has a required minimum sentence of seven years in prison, even though the
substance of the offence under both sections is the identical. In reality, the
guy who is accountable under Section 493 is more cunning since, in order to
satisfy the section's requirements, he not only takes advantage of the woman's
false belief but also purposefully instils it in her. Furthermore, it is stated
that no court may take notice of this offence unless the offended party,54 or
the woman who was misled, files a complaint. In contrast, anybody may invoke the
court's jurisdiction in rape cases by reporting the offence.
If the wife is treated cruelly, Section 498-A holds the husband and his family
members criminally responsible for up to three years in prison. The two types of
actions that fall under the category of cruelty are (a) any wilful behaviour
that has the potential to seriously harm a woman's mental or physical health or
put her life, limb, or safety in danger; and (b) harassing behaviour that is
performed in response to an unlawful demand for property or valuable security or
as punishment for refusing to comply with such a demand.
It should be recognised right away that this chapter has been added between the
chapter covering crimes involving marriage and the one covering defamation.
Thematically, its location shows that the offence included within is not a
significant offence and is more closely related to offences involving marriage
than offences harming the human body.
This impression is strengthened further by the similarities between the
restrictions on prosecution initiation under this chapter and those offered for
offences related to marriage. According to Section 198-A of the CRPC, only the
woman, her closest relatives, or another person with the court's permission who
is connected to her by blood, marriage, or adoption may file a police report or
complaint alleging this offence.
By including this clause, the state continues
to demonstrate its reluctance to interfere in matters of family and marriage,
even when doing so is likely to result in the woman's death.If she or her family
members do not object, the state apparatus starts working on its own initiative
after she passes away rather than based on a plausible likelihood that such an
occurrence would occur.
The scope of Section 498-A itself is further constrained, and it makes no
allowance for a woman's ongoing experience of domestic abuse. The clause solely
addresses abuse by spouses and their families, disallowing the imposition of any
obligation in the event that a woman who is single, widowed, or separated
experiences abuse from her birth family. It has been reported that brothers have
cruelly treated their sisters in order to get them to sign over their portion of
Additionally, it only considers actions that pose a "grave" risk
of harm or life-threatening situations for women or that are likely to compel a
woman to consider suicide. Many women experience this kind of brutality, but
practically all women experience domestic cruelty to some degree.A woman who
experiences random beatings that don't result in "grave" harm is not entitled to
any kind of official protection. Even if a woman decides to make a complaint
before a magistrate, the family ideology and stereotyping of women's roles and
behaviour are further obstacles to getting any action begun for a non-cognizable
violation like harm caused by a spouse.
When a married lady passes away within seven years of marriage owing to
accidents, illnesses, or other unusual circumstances, Section 304-B of the IPC,
when read with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, addresses the matter.
According to these rules, if a woman's husband or 13 of his relatives harassed
her for dowry just before she passed away, her death would be judged to be a
dowry death, and the harasser would be held responsible.
The minimum mandatory
sentence for the offence is seven years in jail, but it can go up to lifeThe
section's underlying assumptions and phrasing are likewise not without flaws. It
is based on the supposition that dowry is the only reason a woman is harassed
during a marriage and that this type of harassment merits legal protection. In
India, a woman may experience harassment because of her dark skin tone, because
a tragedy struck the home after she moved in, because she is infertile, because
she was unable to have a son, and other reasons.
If she is discovered dead under
the conditions outlined in Section 304-B, it would be extremely difficult to
convict her husband or any of his family members of murder or aiding suicide in
the absence of solid evidence. The prosecution lacks evidence of the harassment
or how the death truly happened because it happened in the husband's home.
presumption of harassment was established in the event of dowry death since the
same issue was encountered in cases of dowry harassment. However, the
legislature hasn't taken notice of a woman's death under unusual circumstances
that was preceded by harassment for any cause other than dowry. It should be emphasised that if a lady who was harassed for dowry passes away "within seven
years of her marriage," Section 304-B is applicable.
If she endured the torment
and harassment for seven long years, but died afterward under unusual
circumstances, her passing would be treated on par with previous deaths that
occurred under similar conditions. The legal presumption is that once the
allotted seven years of marriage have passed, either the abuse/torture stops, it
was not present in the family for the woman to have endured it for that long, or
it was not severe enough for her to have borne it. Primarily, even if there is
evidence that a woman was being harassed for one reason or another before to her
death, no presumptions may be made if she passes away unexpectedly or from other
The part also presents fresh problems with interpretation. When is it
appropriate to refer to a death as occurring "other than under usual
circumstances"? Sudden heart failure and suicide may be dismissed, but what
about a lady who passes away without receiving the necessary medical attention?
What does that imply, furthermore, "short before her death"? When would a case
of harassment count as recent enough to support this dowry requirement? Will
earlier harassment constitute "soon before her death" if a lady was harassed for
dowry for three years but not for the final one, two, or six months before to
her unexplained death?
Comparing the criminal, procedural, and evidential elements of Sections 498-A
and 304-B reveals that the state has adopted a policy of symbolic interference
in the family's private domain at the request of the woman who has been injured
by her husband's or his relatives' very harmful behaviour. In order for the
state to implement Article 14 of the Constitution, a married woman must pass
away. Even while the state revised the laws pertaining to rape, marital rape,
and dowry harassment in response to the early and mid-1980s women's movement's
demands, the measures fell short of what women had hoped for.
It is also important to keep in mind that, despite the fact that some of the
offences carry a maximum sentence of seven or ten years in prison, all Chapter
XX offences involving marriage, including marital rape and rape of the separated
wife, are non cognizable and subject to bail. 56 The non-cognizability of these
offences not only necessitates a magistrate's order before an investigation can
begin, but it also sends a signal to the investigating agency that the offence
is not taken seriously enough.
Additionally, it gives the magistrate the option
to order the start of an inquiry at their discretion. Given the widely
acknowledged and entrenched patriarchal traditions, it seems improbable that the
order is determined by such factors rather than by a dispassionate evaluation of
whether a case is made out prima facie.
If the people listed there submit the complaint, the offence of cruelty to
married women is cognizable. The marital offence is only deemed serious enough
to be completely cognizable once a married lady loses her life due to dowry..
Additionally, it gives the magistrate the option to order the start of an
inquiry at their discretion. Given the widely acknowledged and entrenched
patriarchal traditions, it seems improbable that the order is determined by such
factors rather than by a dispassionate evaluation of whether a case is made out
prima facie. If the people listed there submit the complaint, the offence of
cruelty to married women is cognizable. The marital offence is only deemed
serious enough to be completely cognizable once a married lady loses her life as
a result of dowry.
The above analyses show the latent and patent gender biases operating in the
conceptualisation, formulation and operation of criminal law. In its present
form it excludes perspectives, interests, and experiences of women to a large
extent by maintaining the private-public dichotomy and incorporation of
patriarchal values. It also reinforces the stereotypical image of women as weak
and needing protection. With its current patriarchal nature and gender biases,
it is not surprising that the law enforcement officers have negative attitudes
towards offences against women, resulting thereby in their refusal to register
complaints, or in frivolous and delayed investigations or acquittal or
imposition of nominal punishments in case of conviction.
Women who seek legal redress consequently perceive the system to be more
burdensome than helpful. This causes people to hesitate when applying the
criminal law in difficult situations. The patriarchal character of the law and
the gender inequity it causes have sparked lively discussions about rethinking
and rewriting the law. A complete code of criminal laws related to women has
been presented by the National Commission for Women, and its viability has been
discussed nationally. The idea was put out "to secure justice for women in the
real sense of the word."
This endeavour is an experimental one since many crimes against women today do
not have good legal protection under any current legislation. 68 The Commission
aims to: examine the inadequacies and adequacy of criminal laws relating to
women and the effectiveness of their administration; develop a separate
comprehensive code or a separate chapter in the IPC relating to crimes against
women; emphasise the payment of compensation to women who have suffered
atrocities; develop sentencing guidelines; and emphasise the establishment of
special courts to deal with atrocities against women.
At the conference the National Commission for Women organised in Delhi, there
were several discussions on whether the proposal was for the codification,
consolidation, or compilation of all applicable current laws dealing to women.
The proposal in its current form neither includes an exhaustive list of all
criminal laws relating to women nor any concrete amendments to such provisions
or suggestions of new sections. It has also received little support from
participants in either Delhi or Hyderabad, despite the National Commission for
Women having stated that its ultimate goal is codification.
The Law Commission of India is now putting the finishing touches on its report
on the IPC. It has already delivered to Parliament its report on the CRPC. For
further protection of female victims and offenders, the Commission has offered a
number of recommendations. The major goal of the recommendations is to include
as many and as frequently as feasible women in the various phases of the
procedures. The recommendations continue upon the premise that the inclusion of
women throughout the investigation and prosecution will inevitably lead to
feminization of the processes.
It ignores the fact that socialisation processes for men and women are
comparable. Their societal background, not just their sex, is what determines
their value systems. Once they are in a position of authority, women may be just
as paternalistic as males. It is necessary to alter the criminal justice system
so that its subjects, rather than its enforcers, become more democratic and
The primary points of feminist criticism of the legal system have been
paternalism and the exclusion of women. Through its recommendations, the Law
Commission seldom ever affects that. Women who have been given life sentences in
jail may not be subject to Section 433-A of the CRPC, according to a Law
Commission recommendation. The idea exposes the sexist and stereotyped views
about women that lie behind.
Juveniles found guilty under the Andhra Pradesh-specific Borstal Schools Act are
said to be exempt from the application of Section 433-A. As a result, the
Commission had advocated for the adoption of a similar strategy in the case of
female inmates, particularly given the possibility that the long-term and
continuous imprisonment of female convicts may negatively impact the welfare and
well-being of other family members.
In essence, the idea compares women to infants. It further solidifies their
function as housewives. Not the proposition itself, but its reasoning, is the
subject of the criticism. Another type of exclusion from the legal
system-exclusion from the legal mainstream-will result from the emphasis on
using exclusively women as investigators and judges, to the greatest extent
Instead than providing women with soft and divided justice, the legal system
needs to take into account women's concerns and experiences. The future of the
Law Commission's current and upcoming suggestions cannot be foreseen at this
time. However, there is little doubt that the criminal code need a thorough
In India, laws have been changed multiple times as a result of social movements
and pressure from elitist groups, according to the history of the country's
legislation. These adjustments, nevertheless, have been haphazard and have not
been intended to be fundamental. To really assure that women have equal
protection under the law, the criminal code must be gender sensitive in its
inception, development, and implementation. Criminal law, like any other
legislation, is not a panacea for all the issues affecting women, but it is
possible that it will play a significant role in establishing new standards.
The fundamental tenet of civil society has come to be acknowledged as equality.
Though conceptual analysis is necessary for all laws, it is especially critical
for criminal law. For far too long, India's criminal code has preserved the
status quo among diverse factions in the state, ensuring law and order. In
India, like in other civilizations, males have historically had a higher social
and political position than women.
Without causing any fundamental changes to the law, patchwork adjustments and
creative interpretations provide women a sense of equality. The sameness
approach ignores the differences in the social realities for men and women,
while the protective approach becomes entangled in paternalism. The difficulty
is in ensuring equality while acknowledging the distinctions between men and