In 1950, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the uniting for peace resolution, which authorized the general assembly to maintain peace of the United Nations if the Security Council failed to do so, pursuant to their resolution, the general assembly established the united nations emergency force (UNEF) to oversee the decision of Israel, Great Britain and France to terminate a conflict in Egypt.

The UNEF consisted of troops from various United Nations members countries; certain countries regarded the UNEF as the violation of the United Nations charter and refused to pay for the cost of the UNEF. The General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the international court of justice on whether the expenses for the UNEF were legal.

In the certain expenses cases the legality of the uniting for peace resolution was tested, to a degree. In early 1960's some members refused to pay their contribution to the expenses of two peace keeping operations.

In light of refusal to pay the assembly sought an advisory opinion from the court, as to whether the expenditure authorized by the assembly was expenses of the organization within the meaning of Article 17(e) of the charter.

The majority divided by nine of five that they were such expenses and that UN members did have as obligation to pay.

In the course of the judgment, the majority discusses the respective roles and powers of the Security Council and the general assembly with respect of international peace and security.
However that of the nine majority judges four published separate opinions expressing disagreement with that part of the judgment. Only 5 out of 14 judges positively ruled that the general assembly had the power to recommend peacekeeping.
 
The court gives the following advisory opinion.
It has been argued before the Court that a category of expenditures, in particular those arising from operations in the maintenance of international peace and security, are not expenditures of the organization within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2. of the charter, to the extent they are subject to be resolved exclusively by the Security Council and more specifically through arguments negotiated under article 43 of the charter.

The reasoning is based in part on the view that when it comes to maintaining international peace and security, only the Security Council has the authority to decide on action in this regard. Since the powers of the General Assembly are limited to discussions, reflections, studies and recommendations, it is further argued that it cannot impose any obligation to pay the costs resulting from the implementation of its recommendation.

This reasoning leads to an examination of the respective tasks of the General Assembly and the Security Council within the framework of the Charter, in particular with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The court in its advisory opinion of 20 July 1962 replied in the affirmative that this expenditure were expenses of the Unites Nations. The court pointed out that under Article 17 Para of the charter, the expenses of the organization are the amounts paid out to defray the cost of carrying out the purpose of the organizations.

After reviewing the cost authorization decisions in question, the court concluded that they were made. The Court also analyzed the main argument made against the conclusion that these costs should be treated as "organizational costs".

Relevance of the decision analyzing UN charter
The United Nations editions of the 1962 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice address a relatively limited legal question. The court was asked to decide whether the expenses approved by the United Nations General Assembly in relation to peacekeeping missions are "organizational expenses" within the meaning of Article 17 (2) of the United Nations Charter.

In solving your question, the tribunal addresses some important issues of international law and the law of international organizations, including the doctrine of implied powers, the interpretation of the treaty to challenge the UN Charter, the ultravirus doctrine and the relationship of the courts with other UN-Bodies.

The declaration also has implications for the UN General Assembly, including its role in the collective security system, its budgetary powers, and its relations with the UN Security Council. The chapter not only examines the court's reasoning, but also looks at the broader implications of the case for international law.