On May 2, 2025, the Calcutta High Court, deeply concerned about an unspecified "untoward incident" at the Howrah Sadar Court, took decisive action. A division bench, Justices Debangsu Basak and Arindam Mukherjee presiding, initiated criminal contempt proceedings against seven police officers (identified as respondent nos. 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20).

This move, documented in WPA 9313 of 2019 ("The Court On Its Own Motion Versus Registrar General, Calcutta High Court & Ors."), rests on the High Court's inherent authority under Article 215 of the Indian Constitution, the scope of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and the contentious issue of limitation. This analysis delves into the High Court's order, examining its justification and potential consequences.

This order merely initiates contempt proceedings and does not adjudicate guilt Article 215 of the Indian Constitution declares that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. While Article 215 explicitly empowers High Courts to punish for contempt of themselves, the power to punish for contempt of subordinate courts is derived from Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, not directly from Article 215.

The catalyst for this action was the "untoward incident" at the Howrah Sadar Court. While specific details remain undisclosed in the provided text of the order, the High Court, acting on its own initiative and driven by a need to protect the integrity of subordinate courts, launched a writ petition (WPA 9313 of 2019). The immediate focus is the court's decision to formally accuse the named police officers of contempt.

A key point is the High Court's invocation of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The court is exercising its power to address criminal contempt, which, according to Section 2(c) of the Act, includes actions that undermine a court's authority, obstruct judicial proceedings, or interfere with the administration of justice. The High Court is implying that the police officers' conduct - specifically, their unauthorized entry into the court - falls into this category, disrupting the proper functioning of the judiciary.

Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, defines key terms used within the Act. Unless the context indicates otherwise, "contempt of court" refers to either civil contempt or criminal contempt. "Civil contempt" is defined as the willful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ, or other process of a court, or the willful breach of an undertaking given to a court.

"Criminal contempt" involves the publication (whether by spoken or written words, signs, visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter, or the commission of any act, that scandalizes or tends to scandalize, lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court, prejudices or interferes with the due course of any judicial proceeding, or otherwise interferes with or obstructs the administration of justice. The term "High Court" refers to the High Court for a State or Union Territory and includes the court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory.

The police officers likely raised a defence based on the statute of limitations. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, generally sets a one-year limit for initiating contempt proceedings. The officers probably argued that because the Howrah Sadar Court incident occurred more than a year prior, any contempt action was time-barred. However, the High Court forcefully rejected this argument.

The court distinguished between contempt cases brought to its attention by individuals and situations where the court itself takes action (suo moto). It asserted that the one-year limitation applies primarily to cases initiated by outside parties. When the High Court acts on its own, especially in response to an event threatening the administration of justice, it invokes its inherent powers under Article 215 of the Constitution, which empowers every High Court to punish contempt. The court maintains that this constitutional power cannot be restricted by the limitation period in the Contempt of Courts Act, particularly when the court is acting to defend the judicial process.

To support its position, the High Court cited the precedent set in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian [(2001) 7 SCC 549], which established exceptions to Section 20 of the 1971 Act. The Calcutta High Court explicitly affirmed that its view on the inapplicability of Section 20 is consistent with the findings in Pallav Sheth.

Having addressed the limitation issue, the court outlined the reasons for initiating contempt proceedings against the seven police officers.

The court order specifies the following reasons for beginning criminal contempt proceedings:

• Obstructing the administration of justice: The court determined that the conduct of the police, acting on the orders of the respondent police officials, interfered with or obstructed the administration of justice.
   
• Unauthorized entry onto court property: Police personnel entered the Howrah Sadar Court premises without the invitation of either the District Judge or the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
  The court believes these actions are covered by Section 2(c)(ii) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which defines criminal contempt.

The Calcutta High Court launched criminal contempt proceedings against seven police officers (respondents 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20) after determining that, based on the One-Man Enquiry Commission's report, they were responsible for unauthorized police personnel entering the Howrah Sadar Court premises, an action that interfered with and obstructed the administration of justice.

The issuance of a "rule" is the formal commencement of legal action. The officers must now appear before the High Court and explain why they should not be held in contempt for their actions at the Howrah Sadar Court. The deadline for their response is June 25, 2025. This is a pivotal moment where the accused officers can present their defense.

This order from the Calcutta High Court reinforces the principle of judicial independence and the need to protect the sanctity of the courts. The suo moto action underscores the High Court's dedication to defending the administration of justice in subordinate courts and ensuring accountability for interference. The reliance on Article 215 emphasizes the constitutional responsibility of High Courts to safeguard their authority and that of the courts below them.

The order carries significant implications. It serves as a warning that unauthorized intrusions or actions that disrupt court operations will be taken seriously and may result in contempt charges. The court's interpretation of the Limitation Act clarifies its position on its inherent powers to address contempt, even beyond the usual time limits.

However, the proceedings are ongoing. The seven police officers must now defend themselves against the contempt charges. The June 25, 2025, hearing and subsequent proceedings will be crucial to determining their guilt or innocence. They will have the opportunity to present evidence and arguments to refute the allegations.

In summary, the Calcutta High Court's decision to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against the seven police officers stems from an "untoward incident" at the Howrah Sadar Court. The court's use of its inherent powers under Article 215 to sidestep the standard limitation period in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, demonstrates its commitment to upholding the integrity of the judicial process. The grounds for contempt - mainly unauthorized entry and interference with justice - highlight the importance of respecting the autonomy and proper functioning of courts. The coming proceedings will be critical in determining the final outcome and broader implications for police-judiciary relations.

Ambiguities and Contentious Aspects in the Calcutta HC Order:
Here's a detailed examination of potential ambiguities and contentious aspects within the court order, structured into ten distinct points:

• Interpretation of Section 15, Contempt of Courts Act: The court's interpretation of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, specifically its assertion of suo moto cognizance over criminal contempt of subordinate courts without explicit reference or motion from the Advocate General, might face challenges. A more restrictive reading of the section, emphasizing its specified conditions, could be argued by legal scholars.
• Applicability of Section 20 (Limitation): The court's decision to waive Section 20's limitation period in this suo moto action is open to scrutiny. Despite the justification based on inherent powers under Article 215, arguments may arise that established limitation provisions should generally be upheld unless exceptionally compelling reasons dictate otherwise.
• Balancing Inherent Powers and Statutory Provisions: The order's navigation of the High Court's inherent powers under Article 215 versus the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, presents a potential point of contention. The court's chosen balance, favouring inherent powers, may be debated from perspectives of judicial philosophy and statutory interpretation doctrines.
• Definition of "Cognizance": Ambiguity exists in pinpointing the precise moment the court "takes cognizance" of the contempt. The order suggests this is at the initiation of the suo moto writ petition, but alternative interpretations could be proposed and defended.
• Causation and Responsibility: While the One-Man Enquiry Commission's report identified interference with justice administration, the order's direct link between the respondent police personnel's actions and the contempt needs further examination. The degree to which each respondent is responsible for the overall situation warrants careful assessment.
• Reliance on the One-Man Enquiry Commission Report: The court's substantial reliance on the One-Man Enquiry Commission Report could be contested. While the report offers evidence, the conclusive nature of its findings in determining contempt, prior to full proceedings, may be questioned.
• "Untoward Incident" as Trigger: The "untoward incident" that prompted the court's intervention is subject to scrutiny. Defining this incident's scope and the threshold it must meet to warrant initiating suo moto contempt proceedings could be debated.
• Precedence and Distinguishing Cases: The order distinguishes the presented case from precedents cited by the respondents, but the strength of these distinctions requires rigorous evaluation. Furthermore, assessing whether all relevant case law was adequately considered is critical.
• Proportionality: A critical evaluation of the decision to initiate criminal contempt proceedings should consider proportionality. Whether alternative remedies or actions might have been more appropriate under the specific circumstances invites discussion.
• Potential for Broad Application: The order's emphasis on the court's inherent powers to initiate suo moto contempt proceedings, potentially bypassing some procedural limitations, may set a precedent with far-reaching implications. This raises concerns about possible judicial overreach or inconsistent application of contempt law.

Can respondents 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 immediately appeal the Calcutta High Court's criminal contempt rule against them [17]?
The Calcutta High Court has initiated suo motu criminal contempt proceedings under Article 215 of the Constitution and Section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. At present, the matter is at the stage of issuance of a rule nisi, wherein the respondents have been called upon to show cause as to why they should not be held guilty of contempt. This order does not constitute a final adjudication of guilt or imposition of punishment.

Under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court only against an order or decision that finally finds a person guilty of contempt and imposes a sentence or penalty. As the current order is interlocutory in nature and merely initiates proceedings without reaching any conclusive finding, no statutory appeal under Section 19 is maintainable at this stage. Therefore, the contemnors do not have a right to appeal the present order.

Their immediate course of action is to respond to the contempt rule and participate in the ongoing proceedings before the High Court. A right of appeal would arise only upon the issuance of a final order holding them guilty of contempt. Until then, a direct intra-court appeal within the Calcutta High Court is generally not permissible in contempt matters.

However, if the respondents wish to challenge the proceedings at this interlocutory stage, their only potential recourse would be to approach the Supreme Court of India by way of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) under Article 136 of the Constitution, though such relief is discretionary and granted only in exceptional circumstances.

This case raises important questions concerning the procedural safeguards under the contempt jurisdiction, the limits of judicial authority, and the accountability of executive officers before the judiciary.

Did the Calcutta High Court's order violate the Limitations Act?

The Calcutta High Court's order did not violate the Limitations Act. The court held that the one-year limitation period in the Contempt of Courts Act (1971) doesn't apply to cases the High Court initiates itself (suo moto) under Article 215 of the Constitution. This limitation only affects cases brought by individuals, while the High Court has inherent power to address criminal contempt of lower courts, regardless of the time elapsed. Counter Arguments against the order of the Calcutta High Court:

• The Supreme Court in V.K. Yadav v. U.P. State Medical Facility & Faculty held that courts must initiate contempt proceedings within one year of the alleged contempt, regardless of whether the action is suo motu or otherwise.
• Pallav Seth v. Custodian & Others further affirmed the mandatory nature of the one-year limitation period under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, applying it equally to both suo motu and other contempt proceedings.
• The Supreme Court in Maheshwari Peri v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad reiterated that the one-year limitation under Section 20 is also applicable in suo motu contempt cases.
• Recently, in Court on its own motion v. Karam Chand & Ors, the Himachal Pradesh High Court ruled that suo motu contempt proceedings initiated after four years were time-barred by Section 20. The court clarified that while Article 215 grants High Courts the power to punish for contempt, this power must be exercised in accordance with the Contempt of Courts Act, including its limitation clauses.