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Introduction
RES JUDICATA means
"a thing decided" in Latin. It is a common law
doctrine meant to bar re-litigation of cases between the same
parties in Court. Once a final judgment has been handed down in a
lawsuit subsequent judges who are confronted with a suit that is
identical to or substantially the same as the earlier one will
apply res judicata to preserve the effect of the first judgment.
This is to prevent injustice to the parties of a case supposedly
finished, but perhaps mostly to avoid unnecessary waste of
resources in the court system. Res judicata does not merely
prevent future judgments from contradicting earlier ones, but also
prevents them from multiplying judgments, so a prevailing
plaintiff could not recover damages from the defendant twice for
the same injury.
Res judicata
includes two related concepts: claim preclusion, and issue
preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), though sometimes res
judicata is used more narrowly to mean only claim preclusion.
Claim preclusion focuses on barring a suit from being brought
again on a legal cause of action that has already been finally
decided between the parties. Issue preclusion bars the
re-litigation of factual issues that have already been necessarily
determined by a judge or jury as part of an earlier claim. It is
often difficult to determine which, if either, of these apply to
later lawsuits that are seemingly related, because
many causes of action can apply to the same factual situation and
vice versa. The scope of an earlier judgment is probably the most
difficult question that judges must resolve in applying res
judicata. Sometimes merely part of a subsequent lawsuit will be
affected, such as a single claim being struck from a complaint, or
a single factual issue being removed from reconsideration in the
new trial.
Res judicata
does not restrict the appeals process, which is considered a
linear extension of the same lawsuit as it travels up (and back
down) the appellate court ladder. Appeals are considered the
appropriate manner by which to challenge a judgment rather than
trying to start a new trial, and once the appeals process is
exhausted or waived, res judicata will apply even to a judgment
that is contrary to law.
However, there
are limited exceptions to res judicata that allow a party to
attack the validity of the original judgment, even outside of
appeals. These exceptions--usually called collateral attacks--are
typically based on procedural or jurisdictional issues, based not
on the wisdom of the earlier court's decision but its authority or
competence to issue it. A collateral attack is more likely to be
available (and to succeed) in judicial systems with multiple
jurisdictions, such as under federal governments, or when a
domestic court is asked to enforce or recognize the judgment of a
foreign court.
When a
subsequent court fails to apply res judicata and renders a
contradictory verdict on the same claim or issue, if a third court
is faced with the same case, it will likely apply a "last in time"
rule, giving effect only to the later judgment, even though the
result came out differently the second time. This situation is not
unheard of, as it is typically the responsibility of the parties
to the suit to bring the earlier case to the judge's attention,
and the judge must decide how broadly to apply it, or whether to
recognize it in the first place.
Public
Interest Litigation, in
simple words, means, litigation filed in a court of law, for the
protection of "Public Interest", such as pollution, Terrorism,
Road safety, constructional hazards etc.Public Interest Litigation
is not defined in any statute or in any act. It has been
interpreted by judges to consider the intent of public at large.
Although, the main and only focus of such litigation is only
"Public Interest" there are various areas where a Public Interest
Litigation can be filed. For e.g.
# Violation of
basic human rights of the poor
# Content or conduct of government policy
# Compel municipal authorities to perform a public duty.
# Violation of religious rights or other basic fundamental rights.
Res Judicata
As Defined Under Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure embodies the doctrine of
res judicata or the rule of conclusiveness of a judgement,
as to the points decided either of fact, or of law, or of fact and
law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. It enacts
that once a matter is finally decided by a competent court, no
party can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. In
the absence of such a rule there will be no end to litigation and
the parties would be put to constant trouble, harassment and
expenses. The doctrine has been explained in the simplest possible
manner by Das Gupta, J., ? the
principle of Res Judicata is based on the need of giving a
finality to the judicial decisions. What it says is that once a
res judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies
as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter-
whether on a question of fact or a question of law
has been
decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the
decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher
court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies,
neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding
between the same parties to canvas the matter again.
Section 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines Res Judicata as:
No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly
and
substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in
issue in a
former suit between the same parties, or between parties under
whom they
or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court
competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such
issue
has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally
decided by
such Court.
Explanation I: The
expression
"former suit"
shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in
question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
Explanation II. For the purposes of this section, the competence
of a
Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a
right
of appeal from the decision of such Court.
Explanation III.
The matter above referred to must in the former
suit
have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted,
expressly
or impliedly, by the other.
Explanation IV. Any matter which might and ought to have been made
ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to
have
been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
Explanation V. Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not
expressly
granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be
deemed to have been refused.
Explanation VI. Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of
public
right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and
others,
all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of
this
section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
Explanation VII. The provisions of this section shall apply to a
proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this
section
to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as
references,
respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree,
question
arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the
execution of
that decree.
Explanation VIII. An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of
limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall
operate as
res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such
Court of
limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit
or
the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.
The doctrine of res judicata
is based on three maxims
(a) Nemo debet lis vaxari pro eadem causa (no man should be vexed
twice
for the same cause)
(b) Interest republicae ut sit finis litium ( it is in the
interest of
the state that there should be an end to a litigation); and
(c) Re judicata pro veritate occipitur (a judicial decision must
be
accepted as correct)
As observed by
Sir Lawrence Jenkins,
the rule of res
judicata, while founded on account of precedent, is dictated by a
wisdom is for all times
Referring to the opinion of the Judges expressed in 1776 in the
Duches of Kingston's Case (2 Smith's L.C. 13th edn. 644, 645.) to
which
reference has been invariably made in most of the cases by the
Indian
courts. It was said in that case:
"From the
variety of cases relative to judgments being given in evidence in
civil suits, these two deductions seem to follow as generally true
: first the judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction,
directly upon the points, is as a plea, a bar, or as evidence
conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter,
directly in question in another Court; secondly that the judgment
of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is,
in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same
parties, coming incidentally in question in another Court, for a
different purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent or
exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came
collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of
any matter incidentally cognizable, nor of any matter to be
inferred by argument from the judgment."
Section 11 contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment
which is based partly on the maxim of Roman Jurisprudence
"Interest reipublicaeut sit finish litium" (it concerns the State that there
be an
end to law suits) and partly on the maxim "Nemo debet lis vexari
pro una
at eadem causa" (no man should be vexed twice over for the same
cause).
The section does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court but
operates
as a par to the trial of the suit or issue, if the matter in the
suit
was directly and substantially in issue (and finally decided) in
the
previous suit between the same parties litigating under the same
title
in a Court, competent to try the subsequent suit in which such
issue has
been raised.
In CORPUS JURIS
(vol. 34, p. 743), it has been stated:
Res
Judicata is a rule of universal law pervading every well regulated
system of jurisprudence and is put upon two grounds, embodied in
various
maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity,
which
makes it to the interest of the state that there should be an end
to
litigation; the other, the hardship to the individual that he
should not
be vexed twice for the same cause.
Thus, this doctrine of res judicata is a fundamental concept
based on public policy and private interest. It is conceived in
the
larger public interest, which requires that every litigation must
come
to an end. It therefor, applies to civil suits, execution
proceedings,
arbitration proceedings, taxation matters, writ petitions,
administrative orders, interim orders, criminal proceedings, etc.
An ordinary
litigation being a party or claiming under a party of a former
suit cannot avoid the applicability of section 11 of CPC as it is
mandatory except on the ground of fraud or collusion as the case
may be.
Res Judicata in fact means
Thing which had been
adjudged the
essential ingredients of which are to be considered while deciding
whether a particular judgment operated as res judicata or not be
postulated as follows:
# Matter which was directly and substantially in issue in former
suit
must be directly and substantially issue in the subsequent suit
also.
# Both the former and subsequent suit should have been between the
parties or between the parties litigating under some titles.
# The former suit should have been decided by competent court
which can
try subsequent suit also.
# Any matter, which might and ought to have been made a ground of
defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been
a
matter directly and substantially in issue in each suit.
The onus of proof lies on the party relying on the theory of res
judicata.
SECTION 11 OF CPC IS MANDATORY
The provisions of section 11 of CPC are not directory but
mandatory. The judgment in a former suit can be avoided only by
taking
recourse to section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act on the ground of
fraud
or collusion. Where several defendants are there, in a suit the
collusion of one of them alone is not enough to avoid the
operation of
rule of res judicata. Gross negligence is different from fraud and
collusion.
The provisions of section 11 of the Code are mandatory and the
ordinary litigant who claims under one of the parties to the
former suit
can only avoid its provisions by taking advantage of section 44 of
the
Indian Evidence Act which defines with precision the grounds of
such
evidence as fraud or collusion. It is not for the court to treat
negligence or gross negligence as fraud or collusion unless fraud
or
collusion is the proper inference from facts. Other factors in
exception
to section 11 being present must be litigating bona fide and the
fulfillment of this is necessary for the applicability of the
section.
The above ratio decidendi was laid down in
Jallur Venkata Seshayya
v.
Thadviconda Koteswara Rao and Others . This representative suit
was
brought by some persons on behalf of public interest for declaring
certain temples public temples and for setting aside alienation of
endowed property by the manager thereof. A similar suit was
brought some
years ago by two persons and the suit was dismissed on the grounds
that
the temples were private temples and the property endowed to the
temple
being private endowment, the alienation thereof were valid. The
plaintiffs admitted that they could be deemed to be persons
claiming
under the plaintiffs in prior suit and the issue in both the suits
was
same.
It was contended however by them that finding in the prior suit
could not be res judicata as against them in as much as there was
gross
negligence on the part of the plaintiffs in that suit in not
producing
the documents necessary for the decision of the suit in their
favour
and in not placing their evidence before the Court and Privy
Council
held that no case of fraud apart from collusion being suggested,
the
plaintiffs, were bound to establish either that the decree in
prior suit
was obtained by collusion between the parties or that the
litigation by
the plaintiffs in prior suit was not bona fide. The plaintiffs
based
their case entirely on inferences to be drawn from alleged gross
negligence on the part of the plaintiffs in the prior suit. The
finding
of gross negligence by the Trial Court was far from a finding of
intentional suppression of the documents which would amount to
want of
bona fide or collusion on the part of the plaintiffs in prior
suit.
There being no evidence in the suit establishing either want of
bona
fide of collusion on the part of plaintiffs as res judicata.
In
Beliram & Brothers and Others v. Chaudari Mohammed Afzal and
Others it was held that where it is established that the minors
suit
was not brought by the guardian of the minors bona fide but was
brought
in collusion with the defendants and the suit was a fictitious
suit, a
decree obtained therein is one obtained by fraud and collusion
within
the meaning of section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, and does not
operate res judicata. The principle of res judicata in section 11
CPC is
modified by section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the
principles
will not apply if any of the three grounds mentioned in Section 44
exists.
General principles cannot be applied in a way making section 11
CPC nugatory. In
Sarla Bala Devi v. Shyam Prasad Chatterjee, thee
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held:
It is undoubtedly true that the principles of res judicata apply
to proceedings other than suits including proceedings in
execution. It
must be taken as held by the Supreme Court that the principles of
constructive res judicata are also applicable to execution
proceedings.
But the conditions of applicability of the principles of res
judicata actual or constructive contained in section 11 CPC must
be complied
within such cases as far as possible. It is not the law that when
a
court applies the principles analogous to res judicata that court
can
override the conditions specified in section 11 CPC.
The Calcutta High Court in fact followed an earlier decision of
the same court in
Abinash Chandra v. Madhusudan Majumdar and
another,
section 11 does not codify or crystallize the entire law regarding
the
doctrine res judicata. It deals with some of the circumstances
under
which a previous decision will operate as res judicata but not
with all.
Where circumstances other than provided for in section 11 exists
the
general principle underlying the rule of res judicata may be
invoked in
proper cases without recourse to the provision to the provisions
of that
section. But obviously it does not follow that the provision of
section
11 may be flouted or overridden or that the prohibitions or
reservation
express or implied in that section may be ignored by reference to
general principles of res judicata in a case to which section 11
applies.
The general principles of res judicata cannot be invoked in a
case when the court which tried the first suit had no jurisdiction
to
try the subsequent suit in as much as section 11 is explicit on
this
point and hence a former decision by court of small causes will
not
operate res juducata. The decision on an issue by a court of
inferior
jurisdiction does not operate as a bar to the trial of the issue
by a
court of superior jurisdiction in a subsequent suit but the
correctness
of this view is doubtful now in view of the Amending Act of 1976.
In this case the majority of their Lordships of the supreme Court
held
that the provisions of section 11 CPC are not exhaustive with
respect to
an earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same
parties
on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent suit and on
general
principles of res judicata, any previous decision on a matter of
controversy decided after full contest or after affording fair
opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a court
competent to
decide it will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular
suit. The
general provisions of res judicata are wider than the provisions
of
section 11 CPC and also apply to cases not coming within the four
corners of the section but if the case fails within the terms of
section
11 CPC conditions of the section must be strictly complied with.
The
general principles of res judicata are applicable where the
previous
decisions has not been given in a civil suit though a plea of res
judicata is raised in a subsequent civil suit but where both the
proceedings are civil suits the general principles of res judicata
have
no application and the case must be confined to the four corners
of
section 11 CPC.
Where the court is dealing with a suit the only ground on which
res judicata can be urged against such a suit would be the
provisions of
Section 11 CPC and no other. Scope of the principle of res
judicata is
not confined to what is contained in Section 11 but of more
general
application. The rule of res judicata as contained in Section 11
of the
CPC has no doubt some technical aspects for instance the rule of
constructive res judicata may be said to be technical but the
basis on
which the said rule rests is founded on consideration of public
policy.
The doctrine of res judicata is a doctrine of wide import and
Section 11
of CPC is not exhaustive of it and there is high authority for the
view
that the principle of res judicata may apply apart from the
limited
provisions of CPC. Section 11 is not exhaustive of the general
principles of res judicata. It is however exhaustive in respect of
the
cases which directly come within its ambit in those cases if
Section 11
does not strictly apply the court cannot invoke the general
principles
of res judicata. The principle of conclusiveness of judgment is
much
wider and is a part of the general principles of res judicata and
those
principles have been held by authorities to be good principles
apart
from the provisions of CPC. Section 11 is not exhaustive of the
circumstances in which an issue may be res judicata. A decision in
order
to constitute res judicata need not necessarily have been given in
a
prior suit. The principle which prevents the same cause being
twice
litigated is of general application and is not limited by the
specific
words of Section 11 CPC in this respect though a proceeding for
scaling
down a debt under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is an
original
proceeding and not a suit the decision of the Court scaling down
the
decree as regards the amount payable under it would be res
judicata
between the parties in subsequent proceedings. Section 11 is not
exhaustive of the circumstances in which the principles of res
judicata
may be applied but when a case falls within the purview of Section
11
CPC all the requirements are to be satisfied.
The principle of Res judicata has been held to be of wider
application on the basis of the wider principle of the finality of
decision by Courts of law and a decision under Section 12 of the
U.P.
Agriculturists Relief Act of 1934 was held to operate as Res
judicata
Section 11 CPC which embodies the principle of Res judicata has
been
held to be not exhaustive and even though a matter may not be
directly
covered by the provisions of that section the matter may still be
Res
Judicata on general principles. Section 11 is not exhaustive
statement of doctrine of
Res Judicata and the principle has a wider
application
than in warranted by strict language of the section. The Division
Bench
of the Madras High Court in
Arikapudi Balakotayya v. Yadlapalli
Nagayyaheld as follows :
# It is undoubtedly the law that the Doctrine of Res Judicata is
not
confined to decisions in a suit and that the doctrine applies even
to
decisions rendered in proceedings which are not suits but how far
the
decision which is rendered in an original proceedings will bind
the
parties depends upon the considerations. A decision given in a
proceedings other than a suit may still operate as Res Judicata
substantial rights of the parties are determined. But if the
decision is
given in a summary proceeding it does not operate as Res Judicata.
Proceedings under section 84(2) Madras Hindu Religious Endowments
Act,
cannot be said to be summary proceedings even though there may be
no
right of appeal. The question of res judicata does not depend on
the
applicability of the decision, which is put forward as
constituting res
judicata. That question comes in incidentally to see if
proceedings under section 84(2) is of a summary nature.
The decision of the District Judge therefore, operates as Res
Judicata in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties.
Though Section 11 of CPC is largely modified even then it is not
exhaustive. The plea of res judicata still remains apart from the
separate provisions of CPC. The statement of doctrine of res
judicata
contained in Section 11 of CPC is not exhaustive and there fore
recourse
may properly be had to the decisions of the English Courts for the
purpose of ascertaining the general principles governing the
application
of the doctrine. The terms of section 11 are not to be regarded as
exhaustive. The binding force of a judgement in probate
proceedings
depends upon the section 11 but upon the general principles of
law. The
rule of Res Judicata though may be traced to an English source it
embodies a doctrine in no way opposed commentators. The
application of
the rule of res judicata therefore by the Courts in India should
be
included by no technical consideration of form but by matter of
substance within the limit allowed by law.
Res
Judicata And Public Interest Litigation
Even in a public interest litigation procedural law is
applicable though not strictly. Hence, the principle of res
judicata is
also applicable. Where the prior public interest litigation
relates tom
illegal mining, subsequent public interest litigation to protect
environment is not barred. In
Rural Litigation And Entitlement
Kendra v.
State of U.P. it was held on this aspect:
The writ petitions before us are not inter-party disputes and
have been raised by way of public interest litigation and the
controversy before the court is as to whether for social safety
and for
creating a hazardless environment for the people to live in,
mining in
the area should be permitted or stopped. We may not be taken to
have
said that for public interest litigations, procedural laws do not
apply.
At the same time it has to be remembered that every technicality
in the
procedural law is not available as a defense when a matter of
grave
public importance is for consideration before the court. Even if
it is
said that there was a final order, in a dispute of this type it
would be
difficult to entertain the plea of res judicata. As we have
already pointed out when the order of 12th march, 1985 (reported
in AIR 1985 SC 652), was made, no reference to the Forest
(Conservation) Act of 1980 had been done. We are of the view that
leaving the question open for examination in future would lead to
unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings and would be against the
interests of the society. It is mete and proper as also in the
interest of the parties that the entire question is taken into
account at this stage.
Undoubtedly, the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 has come
into force with effect from 19tyh November, 1986. Under this Act
power
is vested in the Central Government to take measures to protect
and
improve the environment. These writ petitions were filed as early
as
1983 more than three years before the Act came into force. This
Court
appointed several expert committees, received there their reports
and on
the basis of materials placed before it, made directions, partly
final
and partly interlocutory, in regard to certain mines in the area.
Several directions from time to time have been made by this court.
As many as four reportable orders have been given. The several
parties and their counsel have been heard for days together on
different issues during the three and a quarter years of the
pendency of the proceedings. This Act does not purport to
and perhaps
could not
take
away the jurisdiction of this court to deal with a case of this
type. In consideration of these facts, we do not think there is
any justification to decline the exercise of jurisdiction at this
stage. Ordinarily the
court would not entertain a dispute for the adjudication of which
a special provision has been made by law but that rule is not
attracted in the present in the present situation in these cases.
The concept of Public Interest Litigation, an innovation of the
judicial activism of India during that has indeed proved to be a
boon to
the downtrodden, oppressed and exploited sections of society for
providing them with easy access to justice.
Conclusion
The principle of Res Judicata does not apply strictly to public
interest litigations. The procedural laws are not fully applicable
to
PIL cases. Where the prior public interest relates to illegal
mining,
subsequent public interest litigation to protect environment is
not
barred. Though, the provisions of section 11 of the Code are
mandatory
and the ordinary litigant who claims under one of the parties to
the
former suit can only avoid its provisions by taking advantage of
section
44 of the Indian Evidence Act which defines with precision the
grounds
of such evidence as fraud or collusion. It is not for the court to
treat
negligence or gross negligence as fraud or collusion unless fraud
or
collusion is the proper inference from facts. Other factors in
exception
to section 11 being present must be litigating bona fide and the
fulfillment of this is necessary for the applicability of the
section.
Since the primary object of Res Judicata is to bring an end to
litigation, there is no reason not to extend the doctrine to
public
interest litigation. In Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal
, the
Supreme Court was directly called upon to decide the question. The
apex
court held that the principle would apply to public interest
litigation
provided it was a bona fide litigation.
In another case of
Ramdas Nayak v. Union of India
, the court
observed:
It is a repetitive litigation on the very same issue coming up
before the courts again and again in the grab of public interest
litigation. It is high time to put an end to the same.
***************
End Notes:-
1. Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941
2. Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 at p. 943
3. Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh, AIR 1916 PC 78
4. Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay (now Gujrat),
AIR 1965
SC 1153
5. Manzurul Haq v. Hakim Mohsin Ali AIR 1970 All. 604 at 605;
Sheodan
Singh v. Daryao Kunwar AIR 1966 SC 1332
6. Laxmi Gauda v. DAndari Gaura AIR 1992 Ori. 5
7. Venkata Seshayya v. Koteswara Rao 1937 Mad. 263
8. Baboo v. Mt. Kirpa 1950 A.A 488
9. 1937 P.C. 1
10. Venkata Seshayya v. Koteswara Rao 1937 Mad. 263
11. AIR 1948 P.C. 168 at 171
12. Kunheema Amma v. Bala Krishna Nair AIR 1967 Ker. 97
13. Anantamoi DAsi v. Bhola Nath AIR 1941 Calcutta 104
14. Kottama v. Simachalam AIR 1969 AP 76
15. Radha Shyam v. Mool Chand AIR 1967 All. 28
16. AIR 1981 SC 2199
17. AIR 1965 SC 1153
18. AIR 1961 SC 1457, Daryao v. State
19. AIR 1959 SC 276, Narayana Chettiar v. Annamalai Chettiar
20. AIR 1957 Patna 319, Bansidhar Estate Collieries and Induatries
Ltd.
Vs. The State.
21. AIR 1957 A.P. 842, Seshamma vs. Gangaraju.
22. AIR 1954 Rajasthan 4, Shah Premchand vs. Dhanmal. AIR 19054
Bombay
140, Kelavadappa vs. Vasun
23. Gauda.
24. AIR 1956 All. 238. Munshi vs. Chiranji Singh.
25. Air 1959 Patna 319, Bensidhar Estate Collieries and Induatries
Ltd.
Vs. The State. AIR 1948 Lah. 196,
26. Bachint Kaur vs. Kram Chand.
27. AIR 1952 Mad 384, Sarangapani Ayyangar vs. Venkata Narsimha
Acharyulu.
28. AIR 1946 Mad. 509
29. AIR 1947 Nagpur 247, Manohar Vinayak vs. Laxman Anand Rao. AIR
1926
Cal 563
30. AIR 121 PC 11, Hok vs. A.G. of Bengal
31. AIR 1932 PC 161, Maung Sein Done vs. Mapan Nyun.
32. AIR 1930 PC 22, Kalipada De vs. Durjapada Das.
33. AIR 1988 SC 2187
34. AIR 1986 SC 391
35. AIR 1995 Bom 235
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