Introduction
Whether it is Israel-Hamas, Israel-Iran, Russia-Ukraine, or China-Taiwan, we have witnessed several conflicts in the global arena within just a few years.
Today’s conflicts are fought with weapons beyond drones and missiles — they are fought with law. Warfare and lawfare co-exist, creating layered and complex struggles.
International law, once seen mainly as a tool for post-war reconciliation, now plays a role during active conflicts. It has become an extension of armed contestation.
Legal institutions are increasingly influencing the dynamics of modern warfare. They are used to advance political and military agendas through instruments such as:
- Arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC),
- Orders of interim measures by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and
- Resolutions passed in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
At times, these institutions offer a refuge for the powerless; at other times, they reinforce the powerful.
In this blog, we examine how legal institutions are invoked, challenged, and strategically deployed in active conflicts.
Through case studies — including Israel-Palestine, Russia-Ukraine, and the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict — we analyze how law functions in international conflict and explore its limitations.
What is the role of international law in de-escalating tensions or preventing violence? Does it have the practical force to stop aggression — or has it become merely a tool for states to justify their actions, shape outcomes, or influence public opinion?
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Russia-Ukraine: A Courtroom Without a Sheriff
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to a series of legal interventions besides the armed conflict. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was quick to act. The following month, it issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Children’s Commissioner for illegally deporting Ukrainian children, committing a war crime. Additionally, arrest warrants were issued for senior Russian military leaders, accusing them of deliberately attacking civilian infrastructure.
Simultaneously, Ukraine approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ), using the Genocide Convention, challenging Russia’s justification for the invasion. The Court ex parte ordered the suspension of the said Russian military operation. Despite the court order being a hard law or binding in nature, it lacked teeth. The ICJ has no independent enforcement mechanism of its own and relies on the UNSC for the same. And Russia, being a permanent member of the UNSC, conveniently ignored the series of “binding” judicial decisions against it. This reveals an elemental weakness even in what is considered the most authoritative forum for international adjudication.
Besides the hard law measures, soft law played its part. Diplomatic pressure was imposed on Russia through various resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Firstly, one where the overwhelming majority of 141 countries voted in condemnation and “deplored” the Russian invasion. Secondly, Russia was suspended from the Human Rights Council. Thirdly, the demand for reparations for the war from Russia. Even though non-binding, such use of soft law exercises pressure by causing damage to global reputation and stature. It caused mobilization and the revelation of the moral high ground of Ukraine as a victim.
However, the measures went in vain. Russia used its veto power in the UNSC to block any actions to its adversity and effectively eluded accountability. Hard law guarantees action will be taken but lacks the means to do so; soft law builds consensus but is powerless to enforce. An unpleasant reality is thus brought to the forefront. It throws light on how international legal institutions function in a setup that they are inevitably subject to geopolitical power and influence.
The Russia-Ukraine war exposes the basic vulnerability of international legal institutions. Even though they appear strong, such strength is symbolic. In reality, their ability to bring about peace or seek responsibility is futile and limited.
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Israel-Palestine: Using Law by Convenience, Not Consistency
The October 7 attack by Hamas in 2023 on Israel led it to an assertive counterattack and a prompt declaration of being in a state of war. The war shows how international legal institutions are not only a toothless tiger but also employed selectively, depending on political alignment and geopolitical convenience.
Acting upon the voice of the Global South, South Africa filed a case against Israel at the ICJ, accusing it of the crime of genocide. The Court indicated provisional measures, binding Israel to prevent genocidal acts and provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Despite the legal sanction behind the order, Israel remained largely indifferent and continued its armed operations. Failing to take the bare minimum steps, it can hardly be said to have complied.
Israel’s defiance can be linked to its powerful ally, the USA, which is a permanent UNSC member. The USA shields Israel by vetoing UNGA resolutions and canceling enforcement. In May 2024, ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan filed applications for the arrest of both Israeli and Hamas’ top leaders. Washington called the move “outrageous” and later rejected the arrest warrant for Israeli leaders. This was in contradiction to the support that the USA showed for arrest warrants against Russia the previous year.
The differing responses highlight the selective application of international law based on geopolitical alliances. The USA vehemently condemned Russia by supporting ICC and ICJ actions, but it staunchly sided with Israel by blocking or discrediting the same legal measures. This paradigm illustrates how international legal institutions have become instruments of diplomacy for sectoral interests rather than means to achieve justice.
Palestinians have undeniably garnered global support; however, the intergovernmental and legal institutions, while reinforcing those sentiments, remain symbolic. The said limitation arises due to global power dynamics, allowing powerful states to use legal institutions to advance their political agendas.
The Israel-Palestine conflict thus demonstrates how states invoke legal measures selectively. And when the law is tweaked according to whom it is being applied, a question mark is placed on the credibility of such institutions.
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Iran-Israel: Precedents Without a Playbook
On June 13, 2025, long-standing tensions between Iran and Israel turned into open escalations when Israel launched targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. This event caught global apprehension and raised humanitarian concerns around the world.
The legal justification provided by Israel for its acts of aggression was cited to be “anticipatory” self-defense. Though supported by the G7 leaders, the reasoning remains legally contentious. International law allows self-defense only in cases of imminent and inevitable attacks, where there remains no choice or means for any deliberation. However, to substantiate its claims, Israel would need to prove through adequate evidence that such attacks rendered by it were reasonably needed at the time. In the absence of such proof, claims of “anticipatory” self-defense and such preemptive strikes may fall.
Further, unlike previous interstate conflicts, the Iran-Israel war has seen almost minimal to no international intervention. Although the UNSC convened an emergency meeting and various nations issued a joint statement of condemnation, no such binding or enforceable measure was adopted. The ceasefire brokered in mid-June was also facilitated by third-party allied states rather than an international institution. This limited intervention of both hard and soft law shows the diminishing relevance and effectiveness of formal international bodies, even in situations of high-stakes interstate warfare.
In the current war, even the medical facilities and other civic amenities, which form the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the law of war, were also at risk of erosion, with little to no formal inquiry or intervention by third-party international institutions or non-governmental organizations in place to prevent it.
Thus, the Iran-Israel conflict presents us with a shift from a rule-based to a power-based international order, where international law frequently functions more as a rhetorical justification than as an obligatory constraint on state behavior.
Law Without Teeth? Soft & Hard International Law
There is a significant distinction between soft law and hard law in the realm of international law. Although they differ in enforceability, both influence state behavior during armed conflict.
Soft law includes instruments that lack legal force and are not enforceable—such as political pledges, resolutions, declarations, and non-binding agreements. These tools are often used to signal support or distrust, shape opinions, and foster consensus. While they lack the power to compel action, soft law contributes to setting international standards of conduct.
Hard law, in contrast, consists of treaties, binding legal obligations, judicial rulings, and enforcement mechanisms undertaken by states. For example, ICJ rulings or ICC arrest warrants are legally binding. States are also obligated under conventions like the Geneva Convention to protect civilians during armed conflict. However, like soft law, hard law’s enforcement is often limited by global political dynamics and depends largely on state cooperation rather than legal authority alone.
These limitations become particularly evident when examining recent conflicts—such as Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, and Iran-Israel. These cases reveal the stark limitations of international law during crises. Despite widespread condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by over 140 UN member states, political vetoes rendered the response ineffective. A similar fate befell ceasefire resolutions in the Israel-Palestine conflict. These examples underscore that while soft law can generate global pressure, it lacks the structural power to prevent violence or protect civilians effectively.
Thus, despite their formal authority, both soft and hard international law struggle to deter war due to their dependence on international diplomacy. For instance, the ICC requires state cooperation to enforce its decisions, and UNSC referrals are often stalled by political deadlock, reducing their impact to symbolism.
Nevertheless, these legal tools still hold value. When there is political will and international consensus, soft and hard law together can exert significant pressure. Tactics such as public condemnation, diplomatic isolation, and trade sanctions—while rooted in soft law—can meaningfully influence state behavior, as seen during the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Conclusion
In today’s world—where defiance of international norms is increasingly common—it is essential to re-evaluate the international legal system. From Ukraine to Gaza and Iran, international law is often invoked but inconsistently enforced, reflecting a crisis of credibility and effectiveness.
What the world needs is a hybrid model—one that combines legal authority with pragmatic enforcement. This means strengthening central international institutions with independent investigatory and sanctioning powers, while also empowering regional and civil society actors to serve as parallel enforcement and accountability channels.
Moreover, the international legal system must shift from being reactive to preventive. Currently, action is taken only after violence erupts—by which time irreparable damage has often occurred.
Ultimately, the strength of international law lies not in immediate enforcement, but in its enduring presence. Even when it fails to prevent crises, it preserves truth and upholds shared norms—laying the groundwork for a more just and peaceful future.
