Introduction

It is the conviction of most of the Lawyers & Litigants that the Courts have authority in all enactments to condone delay beyond the statutory period as per the mandate of Section 5 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which has an overriding effect on all enactments.

Before deliberating on the subject, it would be trite to reproduce section 5 and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which read as under:

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. – Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

“29. Savings.- 
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the Provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”

The Limitation Act, 1963 governs the period within which legal proceedings must be initiated. However, it is not applicable to all laws and proceedings in respect to enactments and areas where the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable, either wholly or in part:

1. Special or Local Laws with Express Exclusion

If a special or local law explicitly excludes the application of the Limitation Act, then it will not apply. (Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act)

Examples:

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RDDBFI Act) – Now subsumed under IBC and DRT laws.

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Has its own limitation periods; Limitation Act applies only residually.

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Proceedings under this Act are governed by its own specific timelines.

Central Excise Act, 1944, and Customs Act, 1962 – Have their own limitation provisions for appeals, refunds, etc.

2. Proceedings before Tribunals / Quasi-Judicial Bodies

The Limitation Act generally applies to civil courts. It does not apply to:

Administrative Tribunals (like CAT) unless explicitly stated.

Revenue authorities and land revenue proceedings.

Election petitions under Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Arbitration proceedings under older laws (prior to 1996 Act). However, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, limitation is generally applicable as per Section 43.

3. Criminal Law Proceedings

The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to criminal proceedings. Criminal law has its own limitation regime under Chapter XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973.

4. Constitutional Remedies under Articles 32 and 226

The Limitation Act does not apply to writ petitions filed under Article 32 (Supreme Court) or Article 226 (High Courts).
However, courts may refuse relief if there is inordinate delay (principle of laches, not limitation).

5. Proceedings under some Personal Laws

In certain personal laws (like Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Muslim Personal Law), the Limitation Act is not strictly applicable unless specifically provided.

6. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC)

The Limitation Act applies to IBC proceedings before NCLT and NCLAT (as held in B.K Educational Services Pvt Ltd vs Parag Gupta And Associates 2019 (11) SCC 633).

However, some procedural timelines under IBC are governed by its own rules and not by the Limitation Act.

7. Armed Forces Tribunal Act

Specific limitation provisions are laid down under this Act. The Limitation Act does not automatically apply.

8. Proceedings under Customs and GST Laws

We shall first deal with Central Excise Act wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings under the Central Excise Act. 

i. Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur [(2008) 3 SCC 70]

This is a landmark case under the Central Excise Act, wherein thehe Apex Court held that when the statute prescribes that delay up to a particular period can be condoned, it implies that beyond that period, the authority has no power to entertain the appeal. The Court categorically observed thus:

“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of Statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the Statute. The period upto which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the Limitation Act) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days period.”

ii. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791

The question for consideration in these appeals before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in  presentation of the reference application under unamended Section 35 H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court categorically held that the High Court cannot condone the delay beyond the statutory period. The Court held thus:

“Except providing a period of 180 days for filing reference application to the High Court, there is no other clause for condoning the delay if reference is made beyond the said prescribed period. We have already pointed out that in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, Section 35 provides 60 days time and in addition to the same, Commissioner has power to condone the delay up to 30 days, if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35B provides 90 days time for filing appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (5) therein enables the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the number of days, if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35EE which provides 90 days time for filing revision by the Central Government and, proviso to the same enables the revisional authority to condone the delay for a further period of 90 days, if sufficient cause is shown, whereas in the case of appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference to the High Court under Section 35H of the Act, total period of 180 days has been provided for availing the remedy of appeal and the reference. However, there is no further clause empowering the High Court to condone the delay after the period of 180 days.”

The Apex Court also dealt with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act

“20) Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to High Court. It was contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.

21) In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the “reference application” filed by the Commissioner under unamended Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period of 180 days and rightly dismissed the reference on the ground of limitation.”

iii. Commnr. of Customs, Central Excise, Noida vs M/S Punjab Fibres Ltd., Noida 2008 (3) SCC 73

The Apex Court in the said case categorically reiterated that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in presentation of the reference under Section 35- H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (in short the ‘Act’).

Delay in filing Appeal u/s 107 of the CGST Act- Condonation

We shall now try to focus on the The Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) and see whether the Appellate Authority has powers to condone delays in filing Appeal u/s 107 of the CGST Act. 

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) regime has brought sweeping changes to India’s indirect tax landscape, with a detailed statutory framework for dispute resolution and appellate remedies. Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) provides for the right to appeal against orders passed by adjudicating authorities. However, it is a settled legal position that delay beyond the statutorily prescribed period under Section 107 cannot be condoned, even under the Limitation Act, 1963. The appellate authority does not have inherent or plenary powers to condone delays beyond the outer statutory limit.

We shall examine the legal position surrounding the issue of condonation of delay under Section 107 of the CGST Act, with reference to judicial pronouncements and principles of statutory interpretation.

Statutory Scheme of Section 107 of the CGST Act:

It would be trite to reproduce relevant Sections 107(1) & 107(4) which read as under:

Section 107(1) of the CGST Act permits any person aggrieved by a decision or order passed under the Act to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority within three months from the date of communication of such decision or order.

Section 107(4) provides:

“The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month.”

Thus, the maximum period available for filing an appeal is four months (three months + one month of condonable delay). The language is crystal clear and the phrase in Section 107(4) “not exceeding one month” places a cap on the discretion of the appellate authority. Beyond this statutory period the Appellate Authority is powerless to condone any further delay and looking to the clear mandate of this section, there appears no ambiguity in this regard. 

Judicial Precedents: No Power to Condone Beyond Statutory Period

The Courts have consistently held that the appellate authority under Section 107 does not possess jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the one-month additional window provided under the statute. A few key rulings of the High Court are:

A. M/s Addichem Speciallity LLP v. Special Commissioner I, Department of Trade and Taxes Anr. (Delhi High Court DB) 2025 SCC OnLine Del 646 

There were two issues before the Court : 

i) Whether the Appellate Authority under Section 107(4) of the CGST Act is authorized to condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond one month after the expiration of the three-month period specified in Subsection (1) of Section 107 for filing an appeal against a decision or order issued by an adjudicating authority under the CGST Act? and

ii) Whether the appellate authority is empowered to condone a delay beyond the thirty-day period prescribed under Subsection (4) of Section 107 of the Act of 2017 or not, this Court, in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may direct the condonation of such delay. This can be done if the Court is satisfied that an exceptional case has been made out for such condonation or if the interest of justice demands it.

The Delhi High Court in the said case has held that delay cannot be condoned in an appeal under section 107 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, (CGST ), 2017. The Court categorically held that Limitation Act is not applicable to these proceedings:

“60. It is well settled that once a statute prescribes a specific period of limitation, the Appellate Authority does not inherently hold any power to condone the delay in filing the appeal by invoking the provisions of Section 5 or 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
…… 
64. A careful reading of the aforesaid decision would bring to the fore that the legislative intention to provide a specific period of limitation, thereby excluding the general applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be respected. The Supreme Court has observed that the plenary powers of the High Court cannot in any case exceed the jurisdictional powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, 1950, and even the Supreme Court cannot extend the period of limitation de hors the provisions contained in any statutory enactment.

65. Section 107(4) firstly prescribes a general time frame within which an appeal may be preferred. Once that period has elapsed, it stipulates that the appeal may be instituted within a further period of one month. The provision thus prescribes an additional period of one month within which an appeal may be instituted. That section however stops at that and does not allude to aspects such as sufficient cause or other similar factors which may have prevailed and led to the appeal not being lodged within the time prescribed. The provision thus clearly excludes the general principles which the law recognises as relevant for the purposes of condonation of delay. It is this facet of Section 107(4) which appears to have weighed upon various High Courts to hold that the said provision excludes the principles underlying Section 5 and other provisions concerned with condonation contained in the Limitation Act. It is this facet which triggers Section 29 of the Limitation Act and results in the exclusion of the other provisions governing condonation contained in that statute.” 

It is pertinent that a review petition against the said judgment was dismissed recently by a detailed speaking order on May 23, 2025.

B. Garg Enterprises vs. State of U. P. And others in Writ Tax No. 291 of 2002 decided on Jan 19, 2024 (Allahabad High Court). The Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to Appeal u/s 107 of thr CGST Act. The Court held thus:

“7. The Central Goods and Services Act is a special statute and a self-contained code by itself. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the application of the Limitation Act. It is trite law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply only if it is extended to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act specifically provides for the limitation and in the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, one cannot apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the aforesaid provision.”

C. Nandan Steels and Power Limited Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others 2022 SCC Online Chh 1428

D. Ms Mohit Enterprises vs Commissioner Of State Gst And Vat Delhi on 4 March, 2025 (Delhi High Court) 

E. M/S Yadav Steels Having Office vs Additional Commissioner And Another 2024 SCC OnLine All 2396  (Allahabad High Court) 

F. M/s Geosence Granite and Marble vs. The State of Bihar & Others Patna in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.18204 of 2024 decided on 11-02-2025 (Patna High Court) 

Interpretation: Legislative Intent and Finality

The language of Section 107(4) clearly indicates legislative intent to cap the delay condonable by the appellate authority. When a statute prescribes both a limitation period and a limited extension period, it becomes a mandatory provision.This reasoning squarely applies to appeals under Section 107 of the CGST Act.

Position of the Limitation Act, 1963

The Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the CGST Act unless expressly provided. Since Section 107 specifically mentions a maximum condonable delay of one month, Section 5 of the Limitation Act (which permits condonation for sufficient cause) has no application.

Conclusion

It is now well settled that delay beyond four months (three months plus one month of condonable delay) in filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act cannot be condoned by the Appellate Authority. The provision is mandatory in nature and admits of no elasticity. Taxpayers and professionals must be vigilant and ensure that appeals are filed within the prescribed timeline. Courts have consistently upheld the sanctity of limitation, recognizing that equity cannot override express statutory mandate.

Practical Takeaway

Ensure appeals are filed within three months from the date of order.

If delay is unavoidable, provide proper justification to seek condonation within one month thereafter.

Beyond this period, the right to appeal stands extinguished.

Inder Chand Jain
M: 8279945021
Email: [email protected]