Accordingly, the Court placed a partial stay on specific provisions, most notably the requirement that only a person who had practised Islam for at least five years could create a waqf, as well as the provision conferring authority on district collectors to conclusively determine whether land claimed as waqf constituted government property. The interim order thus reflects a judicial effort to balance the State’s objective of reforming waqf administration with the constitutional imperative of safeguarding fundamental rights.

In response, the Union Government enacted the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, presenting it as a measure to strengthen accountability, enhance transparency, and curb misuse of endowed assets. The amendments introduced several significant changes, including the establishment of a centralised registration system through the UMEED digital portal, greater governmental oversight of waqf boards, and the abolition of the doctrine of waqf by user.

At the same time, the Act incorporated highly contested provisions, such as the stipulation that only individuals who had practised Islam for at least five years could create a waqf, and the conferral of authority on district collectors to adjudicate disputes concerning waqf lands with powers extending to the alteration of revenue records. These provisions soon became the subject of constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court, with petitioners contending that they infringed fundamental rights under Articles 14, 25, and 26 of the Constitution.

At the same time, the Court acknowledged that certain provisions, if implemented immediately, could result in irreparable harm by altering rights in ways that would be difficult to reverse should those provisions ultimately be struck down. On this basis, the Court directed a partial stay, suspending three provisions of the Act.

Foremost among these was the clause mandating that only an individual who had practised Islam for a minimum of five years would be eligible to dedicate property as waqf. The Court observed that the provision suffered from a lack of procedural clarity, since no rules had been framed to define or verify the notion of “practising Islam.” The ambiguity surrounding its application, coupled with the potential for discriminatory outcomes, led the Court to hold that the clause could not be permitted to operate during the pendency of the challenge.[2]

The Court also stayed the provision granting district collectors unilateral authority to conclusively determine whether land claimed as waqf was in fact government property, with the consequential power to amend revenue records. Such executive powers, it reasoned, risked undermining the jurisdiction of waqf tribunals and High Courts, and therefore could not be allowed to take effect without judicial oversight. A third connected provision concerning executive authority over disputed lands was likewise suspended.

At the same time, the Court declined to interfere with other provisions of the Amendment Act. In particular, it upheld the validity of reforms such as the requirement for centralised registration of waqf properties through the UMEED portal, noting that such measures were designed to enhance accountability and transparency and did not, on their face, infringe the constitutional guarantee of religious autonomy.[3]

However, the Court simultaneously acknowledged the danger of allowing provisions with far-reaching consequences to take effect before their validity was fully tested. In particular, the unilateral power given to collectors to change revenue records was seen as an infringement upon the role of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies such as waqf tribunals. The Court recognised that permitting such executive action would amount to creating a fait accompli situation, irreversibly altering property rights even before adjudication on merits.

Similarly, the Court noted that the five-year practising requirement raised serious constitutional issues under Articles 14 and 25. Unlike other religious traditions where no such eligibility criteria exist for the creation of charitable or religious endowments, the imposition of a faith-duration test on Muslims could be seen as discriminatory. Furthermore, in the absence of clear rules defining “practice,” the provision left significant scope for arbitrary application. Consequently, the Court found it appropriate to stay its operation until a final determination could be made or until the government framed detailed rules governing its application.