Introduction
With the rapid advancement of technology, the legal landscape is witnessing a paradigm shift in how justice is delivered, especially in the realm of evidence collection and presentation. Courts across the globe are gradually moving from traditional in-person hearings to digital platforms, particularly in the aftermath of the pandemic, which accelerated the adoption of video conferencing and virtual proceedings.
In this evolving judicial ecosystem, the relevance and reliability of electronic evidence, especially those recorded remotely, have become central to legal debates. As the judiciary seeks to balance procedural fairness with technological convenience, a critical examination of the compatibility of these digital practices with existing legal statutes becomes essential. The current legal frameworks are lagging behind and can no longer support modern ways of communication and how evidence could be presented.
In this context, a pertinent question is whether admissibility of evidence recorded through video conferencing is prescribed under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872[1] (now Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023[2]) and if these recorded evidences meet the requirement of presence as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[3] (now Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023[4]).
It is thus recognized by the judiciary that the essentiality of Section 273 Cr.P.C. would be securing to the accused his right to confront the witnesses, which can be established at the farthest through virtual appearance. It has been held over the years by the Supreme Court that justice is not deterred by procedural rigidities and that the law must keep up with changes in society.
It has reaffirmed the proposition that technology can improve efficiency in running the judicial system without impairing the basic concepts of a fair trial and due process by determining that video conferencing is a valid route to recording evidence. Therefore, State of Maharashtra v. Prafulla B. Desai (Dr.)[5] plays a significant role in shaping the interpretation of these provisions by addressing whether virtual presence can be equated with physical presence in judicial proceedings.
Factual Matrix
The present case arises out of a medical incident that led to the death of the complainant’s wife due to terminal cancer[6]. According to the complainant, she sought advice from Dr. Ernest Greenberg, a famous oncologist working with the Sloan Kettering Memorial Hospital, New York, USA, in pursuit of expert medical advice.
Dr. Greenberg conducted a comprehensive medical examination on the complainant’s wife, which resulted in the finding that her condition was not operable and did not require surgery. However, he stated that the appropriate treatment for her condition would be medication alone.
Subsequently, when the complainant and his wife were informed of the expert opinion of Dr. Greenberg, they consulted the Respondent, a consulting surgeon with about 40 years of professional experience. Dr. Greenberg’s prognosis was the opposite of what the Respondent recommended for the complainant’s wife: uterine removal surgery.
It is deplorable to note that the Respondent agreed to perform the surgical operation on the condition that the complainant’s wife bear the financial cost. The operation was performed on 22nd December 1987 by Dr. A.K. Mukherjee as per the medical records. When the complainant’s wife’s abdomen was opened in the course of the surgical procedure, ascitic fluid—a fluid buildup in the abdominal cavity which accompanies serious disease—was discovered.
Immediately upon learning this, Dr. Mukherjee contacted the Respondent for further instructions. Dr. Mukherjee was advised by the Respondent to close the abdomen without continuing with the operation. However, through surgical intervention, an intestinal fistula—an abnormal connection between the intestine and the skin—was caused, resulting in serious complications.
After the operation, every time the complainant’s wife ate or drank, the food and liquids would exit through the wound in her body. This not only worsened her medical condition but also caused prolonged intense physical suffering. She remained hospitalized for more than three and a half months, undergoing approximately 20 to 25 dressings per day. The condition persisted even after her discharge, necessitating continued dressings until her unfortunate demise.
The Respondent subsequently disowned any responsibility toward the complainant, stating that the complainant’s wife was not his patient. However, the Respondent’s records from Bombay Hospital showed otherwise, as they had charged fees for the treatment of the complainant’s wife. This contradicted the Respondent’s claim.
Upon further investigation into the discrepancy, the Maharashtra Medical Council began an inquiry. After the necessary proceedings, the Council found the Respondent guilty of medical negligence and strictly warned him for the same.
Issues Involved
The core of the present case is raised as a legal issue regarding the admissibility and procedural manner of obtaining evidence through electronic means. The key question is whether a court in a criminal trial is legally permitted to allow examination and recording of witness testimony by video conference instead of in-person proceedings.
This raises further questions concerning the admissibility of expert evidence in cases where national identity cards are used for violence, particularly under Section 273 (now Section 308 of BSA) and related provisions of the CrPC. Key issues include the accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses and balancing fair trial rights with the use of technological tools in the justice system. The case also highlights how the judiciary is adapting to changing methods of evidence recording, especially where physical presence is impractical or impossible.
Law Involved
The case involves interpretation of Section 273 (now Section 308 of BSA) of the CrPC, which ensures the accused’s right to a fair trial by enabling direct examination of witnesses. The term “presence” is argued to include virtual appearance, reflecting technological developments.
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, modernizes the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Under Section 2(e), evidence includes:
- Oral evidence: Statements, including electronic ones, given before the court.
- Documentary evidence: Documents and electronic records that the court inspects.
Thus, digital records are valid evidence, supporting technological integration in legal proceedings. Trial procedures must align with Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, ensuring judicial efficiency while preserving the rights of the accused.
Judicial Hierarchy
Trial Court (Metropolitan Court)
- Prosecution requested examination of a witness located in the U.S. via video conferencing.
- The application was allowed, acknowledging the need and practicality of using technology for evidence.
High Court (Bombay High Court)
- The decision was challenged on grounds of Section 273 CrPC, requiring physical presence of the accused.
- The High Court quashed the Trial Court’s order, holding video conferencing inadmissible under CrPC.
Supreme Court of India
- Set aside the High Court judgment.
- Held that “in the presence of the accused” includes virtual presence via video conferencing.
- Upheld the use of technology in judicial proceedings, stating that procedural law must evolve.
Major Contentions
Petitioner’s Contention
The petitioner argued that the respondent’s claim—that video conferencing violates Article 21—was based on a misunderstanding of “virtual reality.”
- Video conferencing allows real-time audio-visual communication and does not create a simulated environment like virtual reality.
- It allows both the accused and legal counsel to see and hear the witness clearly, satisfying Section 273 CrPC.
- The ability to record and replay testimony improves assessment of credibility.
- Use of such technology supports, rather than hinders, the principles of natural justice and fair trial.
Respondent’s Contention
- Argued that proper legal procedures must be followed to uphold rights under Articles 14 and 21.
- CrPC provides a legislated procedure and deviation without statutory backing would be unconstitutional.
- Only the legislature is competent to amend procedural laws.
- Relied on precedents like K. Gopalan, Nazir Ahmad, and Sivakumar Chadha to stress strict adherence to procedural law.
- Asserted that Section 273 mandates physical presence unless there’s an express statutory exception.
Judgment
- Supreme Court allowed recording of evidence via video conferencing.
- Held that Section 273 does not require physical presence of witness and accused.
- Constructive presence via video conferencing satisfies statutory requirements.
- Not violative of Article 21; reflects procedural evolution.
- Presence of pleader may be treated as presence of accused under Section 273.
- Video conferencing is recognized under Indian Evidence Act and BSA.
- U.S. precedent (Maryland v. Santra Aun Craig) supports admissibility of video testimony.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court analyzed Section 273 in conjunction with other sections (284–290, 295, 296, 299, 317) of CrPC, concluding:
- The phrase “in the presence of the accused” includes constructive, not just physical presence.
- Legislative intent and evolving technology permit video-based evidence.
- Presence can be of the pleader and does not necessarily mean the corporeal presence of the accused.
- Courts must interpret statutes in light of technological and societal advancements.
Obiter Dicta
The Court observed that the goal of the judiciary is to dispense justice. Citing Sri Krishna Gobe v. State of Maharashtra, it emphasized:
- The truth must be ascertained, and justice must not be denied due to lack of evidence.
- Both rights of the accused and the victims must be safeguarded.
- Technological tools like video conferencing do not compromise fair trial rights.
- In Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka, it was held that even the term “personally” under Section 313 CrPC could include remote appearance.
Concluding Remarks
This judgment marked a landmark in criminal procedure, especially in interpreting Section 273 of the CrPC. It recognized that ‘presence’ need not be physical and affirmed the adaptability of legal procedures to technology.
By aligning fair trial guarantees with technological innovation, the Supreme Court provided clarity on the admissibility of electronic testimony and encouraged a more modern, flexible approach to procedural law. It set a significant precedent for future cross-border and remote testimony cases, showcasing the evolving nature of judicial processes in the digital age.
References:
- The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1 of 1872, Acts of Parliament, 1872 (India).
- The Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, No. 47 of 2023, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
- The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, No. 2 of 1974, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
- The Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 47 of 2023, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
- (2003) 4 SCC 601.
- State of Maharashtra and P.C. Singh V/S Dr. Prafulla B. Desai and Anr., (2003) SCC 601, 606 (India).
- The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 273.
- The Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 1872, § 308.
- Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, § 2(e).
- Id at 2(e)(1).
- Id at 2(e)(2).
- India Const. art. 21.
- Id at art. 22.
- State of Maharashtra and P.C. Singh V/S Dr. Prafulla B. Desai and Anr., (2003) SCC 601, 612 (India).
- Id at 608 (India).
- 497 US 836.
- supra note 16.
- supra note 15 at 609.
- 497 US 836.
- Id at 610.
- Id at 603.
- (1973) 4 SCC 23.
- supra note 20.
- supra note 21 at 604.
- (2000) 8 SCC 740.