Supreme Court Verdict on Assent to Bills: No Timelines, No Deemed Assent – A Deep Dive

In re: Presidential Reference on Powers of the Governor and President

(Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and President of India), 2025 INSC 1333

On 20 November 2025, the Supreme Court of India (SC) delivered its opinion in the presidential reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India concerning the timelines for assent to Bills under Article 200 of the Constitution of India and Article 201 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that courts cannot prescribe rigid timelines for the President or Governors to act on Bills, and the notion of “deemed assent” is constitutionally alien. At the same time, the Court said that Governors cannot sit on Bills indefinitely; limited judicial review is available in cases of unexplained delay. This commentary will unpack the background, the Court’s reasoning, arguments in favour, and criticisms, and explore the practical consequences for state legislation, federalism and the role of Governors.

Background and Context

The journey to this judgment began earlier in 2025. In April, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (8 April 2025) had laid down that a Governor’s inaction or excessive delay in giving assent to Bills may be “illegal” and “erroneous”, implicitly suggesting that timelines (such as one or three months) may be appropriate. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

In response to the issues raised by that judgment (and the broader questions of gubernatorial assent and federal-state relations), the President of India, Droupadi Murmu, invoked Article 143 in May 2025, seeking the advice of the Supreme Court on specific questions—fourteen in all—regarding the power of Governors and the President under Articles 200/201, including whether courts could impose timelines, and whether “deemed assent” was constitutionally valid. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}

Accordingly, a five-judge Constitution Bench (led by Chief Justice B. R. Gavai, and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P. S. Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar) heard the matter over ten days and reserved judgment on 11 September 2025. :contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}

The Court’s Core Findings

The Court’s opinion addressed key questions seized by the reference. Its main findings can be summarised as follows:

• No judicially imposed timelines. The Court held that neither the President under Article 201 nor the Governors under Article 200 may be bound by rigid deadlines laid down by courts for the exercise of assent powers. To do so would infringe the constitutional scheme and upset the separation of powers. :contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}
• No concept of “deemed assent”. The Court ruled that the idea that a Bill should be treated as assented to automatically if a timeline expires is constitutionally untenable. The function of assent cannot be delegated or circumvented through inaction becoming assent. :contentReference[oaicite:11]{index=11}
• Governor’s (and President’s) discretion and options reaffirmed. Under Article 200 the Governor has three permissible courses when a state legislature passes a Bill (that is not a Money Bill): (i) grant assent; (ii) withhold assent and return the Bill under the first proviso for reconsideration; (iii) reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration. The Court reaffirmed that the Governor cannot simply withhold without returning. :contentReference[oaicite:12]{index=12} Similarly the President under Article 201 when a Bill is reserved by the Governor has corresponding discretionary power. :contentReference[oaicite:13]{index=13}
• Limited judicial review for prolonged inaction. While the Court emphasised that decisions under Articles 200/201 are non-justiciable on merits (i.e., you cannot challenge the Governor’s or President’s substantive decision in Court simply because you disagree), it held that in cases of *prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction* by a Governor (or the President) that stalls the legislative process, constitutional courts may issue **directions** to act within a “reasonable time” (without specifying what decision to take). :contentReference[oaicite:14]{index=14}
• Not revisiting prior division-bench decision on timelines. The Court clarified that this reference is advisory in nature, and the Bench will confine itself to the 14 questions posed; it is not reopening or reversing the earlier two-judge judgment. :contentReference[oaicite:15]{index=15}

Arguments in Favour of the Judgment

There are several strong arguments supporting the Court’s opinion:

1. Preservation of separation of powers. The executive functions of the Governor and President in granting assent fall within the constitutional scheme of governance. By refusing to allow courts to dictate timelines, the Court preserves the demarcation between the judiciary and the executive – important in a system designed to resist judicial micromanagement of everyday governance.
2. Respect for constitutional discretion and flexibility. The Constitution deliberately uses phrases such as “as soon as possible” (in the first proviso to Article 200) and does not rigidly define timeline for gubernatorial assent. By upholding this, the Court underscores that flexibility was built into the design so that different states, different Bills, and differing contexts may be accommodated.
3. Protection of federal-state balance via Governor’s role. Governors occupy a hybrid constitutional role—they represent the Centre yet act in their own constitutional capacity for states. The judgment reiterates that Governors are not mere rubber-stamps of state legislatures, which is important for preserving the federal design. If automatic assent or fixed deadlines dictated by courts became the norm, the oversight role of the Governor would risk being diluted.
4. Avoidance of judicial oversight turning into governance. If courts were to prescribe exact timelines and outcomes, the judiciary would risk stepping into a policy-making or executive domain. By restraining itself and limiting review to inaction only, the Court ensures that judicial review remains constitutional guard rather than an everyday managerial function.
5. Providing guardrails for inaction. The judgment does not leave the assent process entirely unmonitored. By allowing limited judicial review in cases of excessive and unexplained delay, it achieves a pragmatic compromise: governors cannot indefinitely ignore Bills, yet courts do not take over the decision-making role.
6. Clarity for practitioners and states. The Court provides clearer guidance on what is permissible under Articles 200/201. Practitioners in state governments, legislatures and courts will find useful benchmarks: the three options for Governors, the non-justiciability on merits, the “reasonable time” standard for inaction, and the rejection of “deemed assent.”

Arguments Criticising the Judgment

Nonetheless, there are compelling criticisms and practical concerns:

1. Potential for undue delay and legislative paralysis. The refusal to impose fixed timelines means that Governors (or the President) could drag their feet, thereby frustrating legislative intent. The “reasonable time” standard is vague and may lead to protracted uncertainty and litigation. Legislatures may find themselves in limbo if assent is withheld or delayed indefinitely.
2. Weak enforcement mechanism. The remedy for inaction is “limited directions” by courts, but this is potentially toothless—it does not guarantee decision within a specific deadline, nor specify outcome. Delay in seeking judicial review may undermine urgency. A clear deadline (say 30-90 days) would have provided stronger certainty.
3. Frustration of legislative will. In a democratic system, a legislature passes a Bill, expecting it to be considered without undue political delay. If assent remains pending for extended periods, democratic intent can be thwarted. The earlier two-judge decision attempted to align with legislative efficiency; this ruling arguably steps back from that urgency.
4. Ambiguity in “reasonable time”. The Court has not defined what constitutes a “reasonable period” for a Governor’s action. Without numeric or descriptive benchmarks, each state may see variable usage—and litigants may have to run to courts for interpretation, thereby increasing uncertainty rather than reducing it.
5. Possible expansion of executive obstructionism. In practice, Governors sometimes act at the behest of or under influence of the Centre. By insulating the assent process from strictly enforceable timelines or automatic consequences, the ruling may inadvertently widen room for political obstruction—especially in states where Centre-state relations are strained.
6. Mismatch with legislative urgency in modern governance. In a fast-moving governance environment, law-making needs timely completion. The two-judge bench’s attempt to impose timelines recognised that urgency; this judgment arguably erodes the momentum for time-bound legislative enactments.

Practical Implications for States, Legislatures and the Executive

For professionals engaged in legislative drafting, state government, legal practice, and academic commentary—this judgment has multiple concrete implications:

• State governments and legislatures: They must ensure that Bills presented to the Governor (or for President’s assent) are well-prepared and free of avoidable defects, so as not to invite delay. Ministers and secretariats should track dates of presentation, communicate with the Governor’s secretariat, and maintain transparency on reasons for delay.
• Governors / Raj Bhavans: Should set internal systems to act on Bills within a “reasonable time” (even if not fixed by court), maintain records of correspondence, the advice of Council of Ministers (where applicable), and reasons for any reservations or withholding. Such documentation may become relevant if a petition challenges inaction.
• Judicial practitioners: For those contemplating writ petitions or constitutional challenges, the strategy must shift: rather than arguing for a fixed deadline or “deemed assent”, petitions must focus on demonstrating “prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction” by the Governor/President, thereby inviting judicial direction. On the other hand, when representing the Governor/President, practitioners must show that any delay was reasonably explained and in light of valid considerations.
• Legislative strategy: Legislatures may adopt internal deadlines or monitoring mechanisms (e.g., standing committees, oversight forums) to ensure that Bills do not stagnate at the assent stage. While the Court has not mandated deadlines, best practice suggests tracking and escalation of delays through institutional channels.
• Federalism and Centre-State Relations: The judgment reinforces that the Governor’s role remains constitutionally distinct and that the Centre cannot easily bypass state assent by relying on automatic mechanisms. States must therefore engage with Governors in a spirit of cooperation rather than resorting to adversarial strategies. Governors too must act in a cooperative, non-obstructive spirit, respecting the elected Legislature’s mandate.

Comparative and Academic Perspectives

From an academic standpoint, the judgment invites reflection on how constitutional systems balance discretion, oversight and timeliness. Many jurisdictions grapple with the tension between giving executive officers adequate time for review and ensuring legislative efficiency. The Indian model, as reaffirmed here, leans toward preserving executive-review discretion, but with guardrails against arbitrary stalling.

In comparative perspective, some parliamentary systems adopt fixed deadlines for royal assent or gubernatorial assent (or even “deemed assent” after a certain period). The Indian Constitution, by contrast, deliberately refrains from providing numeric deadlines, hence the Court’s emphasis on flexibility and contextual calibration.

Scholars will note the interplay of key constitutional doctrines in this judgment: separation of powers, federalism, non-justiciability of certain constitutional functions, and the role of oversight in cases of inaction. The judgment can be seen as a refinement of the doctrine of “constitutional discretion” — that the Constitution entrusts certain decisions to functionaries who may not be micromanaged by courts, yet must not sit idle.

Recommendations for Practitioners and Legislatures

Given the contours of the judgment, the following recommendations may serve as practical guidelines:

• Ensure that legislation is introduced, passed and transmitted to the Governor promptly, and track the date of transmission rigorously.
• At the time of presenting Bills, plan for the entire assent process: anticipate potential reservations or referrals and budget accordingly for time and revisions.
• Maintain detailed records of communication between the legislature/secretariat and the Governor’s office (or President’s Secretariat) to show due process and avoid claims of unexplained delay.
• State secretariats may adopt internal benchmarks (even if not prescriptive by court) that e.g., Bills should ideally receive assent or a decision within 30-60 days, subject to complexity, and monitor outliers.
• Where a Bill is reserved for the President’s assent, keep ministries informed; plan for possible delay and in the case of urgency, consider alternative legislative avenues (e.g., Ordinance, if legally permissible) or re-introduction after reconsideration.
• In litigation strategy, focus on factual proof of inaction: date of presentation, follow-up correspondence, lack of response, and thereby build a narrative of “prolonged, unexplained and indefinite inaction.”
• Governors/Raj Bhavans should coordinate with their legal and secretariat teams to review incoming Bills, ensure clarity of advice, and engage with the Council of Ministers/reporting apparatus to avoid avoidable delays; establishing internal standard operating procedures may help avoid the need for judicial reminders.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s 20 November 2025 opinion on the presidential reference concerning assent to Bills under Articles 200/201 of the Constitution represents a thoughtful re-calibration of Indian constitutional law. On the one hand, it emphatically rejects fixed judicial timelines and the notion of “deemed assent”, thereby protecting executive discretion, federal balance and separation of powers. On the other hand, it reaffirms that Governors (and the President) cannot adopt an approach of indefinite inaction — the legislative process cannot be indefinitely thwarted. The result is a balanced middle path: no rigid deadlines, but no unchecked dormancy either.

For the legal community, for state governments, for legislators and for academic commentators, the judgment offers both guidance and challenge. Guidance in terms of clearer contours of constitutional function under Articles 200/201; challenge in terms of operationalising the “reasonable time” standard, guarding against delay, and preserving the rhythm of law-making in modern governance. In a democracy where timely laws matter, the absence of numeric deadlines places the onus on institutional maturity: states must self-monitor; Governors must act with dispatch; courts will step in only when delay becomes indefensible.

In your capacity at LegalServiceIndia.com, this judgment is a valuable case-study: it illuminates how constitutional review, federalism, executive discretion and legislative efficiency intersect. As states adapt to the ruling, this decision may shape how legislatures work, how Governors engage, and how courts calibrate oversight in the years ahead.