Union Of India vs Parashotam Dass (2023) SCC Online SC 31

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass (2023) revisits one of the most contested questions in Indian constitutional law: the relationship between specialised tribunals and the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts.

The case arose against the backdrop of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, which created a specialised forum for adjudicating service disputes of armed forces personnel, while providing only a limited appellate path to the Supreme Court under Section 31.

This statutory design soon generated a constitutional controversy—whether the existence of the Tribunal ousts or restricts the High Courts’ power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227.

Conflicting Precedents

• L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) had categorically held that judicial review by High Courts is part of the Constitution’s basic structure and cannot be ousted.
• Major General Shri Kant Sharma v. Union of India (2015) appeared to narrow that position in the specific context of armed forces service disputes.

The resulting uncertainty left both litigants and courts divided on the maintainability of writ petitions arising out of AFT orders.

Significance of Parashotam Dass

Against this backdrop, Parashotam Dass became the lead matter in a batch of cases that compelled the Supreme Court to address the tension between tribunalisation and constitutional remedies.

The dispute itself arose from an individual service claim where the AFT had denied relief, but the High Court intervened under Article 226 to grant it, prompting the Union to challenge the maintainability of such writ proceedings.

More than the individual grievance, the case thus symbolised a systemic issue: the proper constitutional placement of the Armed Forces Tribunal within India’s judicial architecture.

The judgment consequently holds significance not only for military personnel seeking redress but also for, the integrity of the basic structure, and the functioning of tribunals across India.

2. Legal Background

The legal trajectory culminating in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass is best understood against the backdrop of India’s experiment with establishment of tribunals and the tension between specialised tribunals and constitutional courts.

The Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 was enacted pursuant to the long-felt need for a dedicated judicial forum for service matters of personnel in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This need had been consistently underscored in judicial dicta such as Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi v. Union of India (1982)[1], where the Supreme Court lamented the absence of an appellate body in military justice, and in successive Law Commission reports recommending a specialised tribunal[2].

The AFT Act created a forum with:

• Original jurisdiction over “service matters” (defined broadly under Section 3(o))
• Appellate jurisdiction over court-martial decisions

It also provided a restricted appellate path to the Supreme Court under Section 31—permitting appeal only on a “point of law of general public importance” or upon certification. By design, the Act did not confer any appellate role on the High Courts, raising the constitutional question whether recourse to Articles 226 could survive this exclusion.

Here the earlier jurisprudence on tribunals becomes vital. In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987)[3], the Court had upheld tribunalisation in principle but subjected it to the condition that the tribunal must be an effective alternative institutional mechanism for the High Courts.

However, the Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)[4] altered the terrain fundamentally by holding that judicial review under Articles 226 by the High Courts and under Article 32 by the Supreme Court is part of the basic structure, and hence cannot be ousted by legislation. While L. Chandra Kumar arose in the context of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, its logic was equally applicable to the AFT regime.

In addition, Article 227(4)[5] of the Constitution provided that nothing in that article shall be deemed to confer on the High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. This provision complicated matters: did it extinguish writ powers in service disputes of armed forces personnel, or did it merely restrict administrative superintendence while leaving Article 226 untouched?

Parallel strands of jurisprudence on military justice added further complexity. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990), the Supreme Court had held that court-martial decisions were subject to judicial review[6], and that reasons must be recorded in such proceedings to facilitate that review.

Thus, by the time of the AFT’s creation, there was already a firmly entrenched principle that while military discipline warranted deference, constitutional courts could intervene in cases of jurisdictional error, violation of natural justice, or breach of fundamental rights.

Subsequent rulings reflected the unease in reconciling these principles with the statutory scheme of the AFT. For instance, in Major General Shri Kant Sharma v. Union of India (2015)[7], a two-judge bench appeared to suggest that High Court writ jurisdiction stood substantially curtailed in service matters once the AFT was established. This reading created confusion, as it seemingly diluted the sweep of L. Chandra Kumar and gave rise to conflicting High Court practices across the country.

Meanwhile, broader jurisprudence on tribunals—such as the Supreme Court’s analysis in Union of India v. R. Gandhi[8] (2010) concerning the National Company Law Tribunal—kept reiterating that while tribunals could validly exercise judicial functions, the power of constitutional courts under Articles 226 and 32 remained unassailable.

It is in this unsettled and contested doctrinal context—shaped by the 2007 AFT Act, Article 227(4)’s specific exclusion, L. Chandra Kumar’s insistence on the primacy of writ review, and inconsistent judicial pronouncements like Shri Kant Sharma—that the dispute in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass arose, making it necessary to revisit the scope of High Court writ jurisdiction over matters decided by the Armed Forces Tribunal.

3. Facts of the Case

The dispute in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass[9] arose from service-related grievances of Parashotam Dass, who had served in the armed forces and, upon retirement, became embroiled in a conflict over his pensionary and service benefits. Dass approached the AFT challenging the Union’s determination of his entitlements, asserting that the calculation of his qualifying service and fixation of pension was erroneous and contrary to the applicable regulations.

The AFT, however, declined to grant him the relief sought, upholding the Union’s position and dismissing his plea. Aggrieved, Dass invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 226, filing a writ petition against the AFT’s decision.

The High Court:

• Entertained the petition
• Examined the merits
• Granted relief and set aside the adverse determination
• Directed the Union to extend pensionary benefits

The Union of India then appealed to the Supreme Court contending that the High Court lacked jurisdiction due to the limited appellate framework under Sections 30–31 of the AFT Act.

4. Appellants’ Arguments

The appellants, Union of India, argued that Section 30[12] and Section 31 of the Act provided a well-defined appellate mechanism, allowing appeals to the Supreme Court only in cases involving “a point of law of general public importance.”[13] This, they claimed, struck a deliberate balance between ensuring judicial oversight in significant matters and preserving the specialized nature of AFT decisions in routine service matters.

They further emphasized:

• Article 227(4)[14] excludes High Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over military tribunals
• Permitting Article 226 writs would dilute finality of AFT decisions
• Major General Shri Kant Sharma[15] supports exclusivity of AFT adjudication

They asserted that armed forces discipline required a distinct adjudicatory mechanism insulated from civilian judicial interference, to safeguard national security and efficiency[16].

The appellants also argued that:

• The exclusion of High Court jurisdiction does not violate the Constitution’s basic structure
• Judicial review still exists—through the Supreme Court under Section 31
• Allowing writs would encourage forum shopping and inconsistent rulings

They urged the Supreme Court to uphold the AFT framework as a complete and exclusive system for adjudicating armed forces matters, barring writ petitions under Article 226[17][18][19].

5. Respondent’s Arguments

The respondents, represented by Parashotam Dass, argued that Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 could not, by implication or design, oust the High Courts’ constitutional power of judicial review under Article 226, and that any construing of the Act to that effect would offend the Constitution’s basic structure.

Key Constitutional Principles Cited

• Judicial review under Articles 226/32 is an essential feature of the constitutional scheme and cannot be removed by statute (L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India^[20]).
• High Courts retain the power to grant relief in service/courts-martial matters where there is:
  • Denial of fundamental rights
  • Jurisdictional error
  • Error of law apparent on the face of the record

  (S.N. Mukherjee^[21])

Criticism of Major General Shri Kant Sharma Reasoning

• Inconsistent with the authority of the Constitution
• Practical injustice caused by leaving many litigants without remedy
• Section 31 leaves recourse to Supreme Court only on “points of law of general public importance”

Interpretation of Article 227(4)

They submitted that Article 227(4) merely protects the Armed Forces from administrative superintendence; it does not, and constitutionally cannot, extinguish writ review.

Statutory Interpretation

• Sections 30–31 show a legislative policy of confining appeals to questions of general public importance
• Therefore cannot deny meaningful judicial redress to individual claimants

Judicial Self-Restraint of High Courts

They pressed that High Courts routinely exercise institutional self-restraint and will not convert Article 226 petitions into second appeals; hence the Court should not foreclose the High Courts’ corrective jurisdiction on the speculative ground of multiplicity or re-appreciation of evidence.

Support from Precedent

The respondents emphasised precedent in Rojer Mathew^[24] which treated Article 227(4) as limited to supervision and reaffirmed the survivability of Article 226 against tribunal regimes.

Core Legal Thrust Summarised

In sum, their core legal thrust was that tribunalisation must be read in a manner that preserves constitutional remedies i.e., the AFT supplies the first independent judicial scrutiny but cannot be permitted to operate as an absolute bar to High Court judicial review of jurisdictional or fundamental-rights defects, particularly where the statutory appellate route to the Supreme Court is confined to questions of general public importance and thus offers no pragmatic remedy to many service litigants.^[25]

6. The Judgement

In Union of India v. Parashotam Dass the Supreme Court, comprising a bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul, B.V. Nagarathna, and Abhay S. Oka, delivered a unanimous judgment affirming that the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be barred or ousted in matters arising from decisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT).

Judicial Review as Part of Basic Structure

The Court held that judicial review under Article 226 is an integral part of the Constitution’s basic structure, as laid down in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala^[26] and further elaborated in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India^[27], and no statutory framework, including the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, can curtail this jurisdiction.

Clarification on Article 227(4)

The Court emphasized that Article 227(4)^[28], which restricts the High Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over military tribunals, does not affect the independent jurisdiction conferred on High Courts under Article 226. The Court clarified that the restriction under Article 227(4) applies only to administrative supervision in context of the AFT and not to the High Courts’ power to exercise judicial review.

Deficiency in Appellate Architecture

It rejected the Union of India’s argument that the Act’s appellate mechanism under Sections 30 and 31—which permits appeals to the Supreme Court only on “points of law of general public importance”—provides an adequate remedy. The Court observed that this restrictive appellate framework leaves many litigants, particularly those with personal service grievances such as pension disputes, promotions, or disciplinary actions, without effective recourse to justice.

Overruling Prior Precedent

The Court overturned its earlier decision in Major General Shri Kant Sharma v. Union of India^[29], which had suggested a complete bar on High Court jurisdiction over AFT decisions. It held that this decision was inconsistent with the constitutional principles laid down in L. Chandra Kumar and subsequent cases, which affirm that tribunal decisions must remain subject to judicial review by the High Courts.^[30]

Scope of Judicial Review

The Court reaffirmed that judicial review ensures accountability, prevents errors, and safeguards the fundamental rights of individuals, including armed forces personnel, who might otherwise be left without a remedy. Addressing the Union of India’s concerns about military discipline and the operational efficiency of the armed forces, the Court noted that High Courts exercise judicial review with great restraint in military matters, fully aware of the special considerations involved.

It emphasized that judicial review does not involve reappreciation of evidence or second appeals but is limited to examining jurisdictional errors, violations of fundamental rights, and legal questions.

Statutory Preservation of HC Jurisdiction

The Court also observed that the Act itself, through Section 14(1),^[31] explicitly preserves the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226.

Protection of Effective Remedy

This indicates that Parliament did not intend to create a completely self-contained mechanism that excludes judicial review. The Court concluded that denying High Court jurisdiction would leave many service members remediless, particularly in cases where their grievances do not raise questions of public importance required for appeal under Section 31^[32].

Final Holding

In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that High Courts retain the power to exercise judicial review under Article 226 over decisions of the Armed Forces Tribunal, and this jurisdiction cannot be curtailed or ousted.^[33]

It remanded several matters back to the respective High Courts for adjudication on merits, emphasizing that the principles of judicial review remain a cornerstone of the constitutional framework, ensuring fairness, accountability, and justice for all, including members of the armed forces. This decision reaffirmed the essential role of judicial review in maintaining the rule of law and safeguarding constitutional rights.

Analysis

The judgment in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass represents a significant reaffirmation of the primacy of judicial review under Article 226, strengthening the constitutional guarantee of remedies for service personnel. Legally, its most important contribution is the clarification that Article 227(4) only excludes administrative superintendence over Armed Forces Tribunals, but does not abrogate the writ jurisdiction of High Courts. This precision resolves longstanding ambiguities caused by earlier rulings such as Major General Shri Kant Sharma,[34] which had cast doubt on the survivability of writ remedies, and harmonises the AFT regime with the larger constitutional scheme laid down in L. Chandra Kumar.[35]

Positive Features of the Judgment

• Reaffirms that writ remedies survive despite Article 227(4)
• Ensures High Courts can intervene in cases of:
  • Jurisdictional error
  • Violation of fundamental rights
• Prevents excessive judicial intrusion into specialized tribunals while protecting fairness
• Recognizes access-to-justice concerns for service members

Further, the judgment’s insistence that service members should not be left remediless when their disputes involve personal rather than “general public importance”[36] issues underscores the Court’s sensitivity to access-to-justice concerns.

Drawbacks from a Military Justice Perspective

The armed forces operate on principles of discipline, hierarchy, and operational readiness, which often demand speed and finality in adjudication of disputes. Key concerns include:

• Possibility of personnel bypassing AFT and directly approaching High Courts
• Undermines rationale behind establishing a specialised tribunal in 2007
• No distinct limits for military litigation — general doctrine of L. Chandra Kumar simply transplanted
• Potential disruption in:
  • Promotions
  • Postings
  • Pensionary disputes
• Risk of inconsistent rulings across different High Courts
• Protracted litigation affecting efficiency and morale within the forces

Another concern is that greater judicial oversight could lead to fragmented standards across states, with different High Courts granting different remedies, creating confusion in the centralised military structure. The judgment leaves the armed forces vulnerable to protracted litigation, diluting the efficiency and cohesion that are indispensable to their functioning.

Conclusion

The decision in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass is a landmark reaffirmation of the constitutional principle that judicial review under Article 226 cannot be ousted, even in the face of a specialised statutory regime like the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. The Court’s ruling settles the confusion generated by Major General Shri Kant Sharma and restores doctrinal clarity by holding that while Article 227(4) limits supervisory powers, it does not extinguish the writ jurisdiction of High Courts. In this sense, the judgment upholds the central ruling of L. Chandra Kumar and fortifies the basic structure of the Constitution, ensuring that service personnel remain entitled to constitutional remedies.

Judicial Restraint and Balance

• High Courts should avoid acting as appellate forums
• Intervention limited to:
  • Jurisdictional error
  • Violation of fundamental rights
  • Manifest illegality
• Maintains AFT as primary specialized forum

Nonetheless, the judgment also highlights the persisting structural limitations of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act. By not addressing the restrictive scope of Section 31, which allows appeals to the Supreme Court only on questions of general public importance, the Court has left unresolved the systemic issue that many personal service grievances remain without a clear appellate path.

As a result, the burden of providing relief continues to fall on the High Courts, which could strain their dockets and undermine the efficiency objectives of tribunals. The absence of a legislative rethink on this appellate design means that judicial intervention alone cannot completely resolve the tensions between efficiency and constitutionalism.

Parashotam Dass strengthens the constitutional promise of judicial review, affirms the High Courts’ vital role in safeguarding individual rights, and reasserts the boundaries within which tribunals must operate. It simultaneously preserves the legitimacy of the AFT as a specialised forum while ensuring that no service member is left remediless. Yet, the decision also points to the urgent need for legislative reform of the AFT’s appellate structure to harmonise efficiency with fairness. The case thus stands as both a vindication of constitutional fundamentals and a reminder of the unfinished project of building a just and workable system of military justice in India.

References:

1. Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi Etc v Union Of India (1982) 3 SCC 140
2. Law Commission Of India, Amendment Of Army, Navy And Air Force Acts (Law Comm No 15, 1999)
3. S.P. Sampath Kumar v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 124
4. L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261
5. Constitution of India 1950, art 227(4)
6. S.N. Mukherjee v Union Of India (1990) 4 SCC 594
7. Major General Shri Kant Sharma v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 773
8. Union of India v R. Gandhi (2010) Civil Appeal No. 3067 of 2004
9. Union Of India v Parashotam Dass (2023) SCC OnLine SC 31
10. Ibid
11. Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, s 31
12. Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, s 30
13. Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, s 31
14. Constitution of India 1950, art 227(4)
15. Major General Shri Kant Sharma v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 773
16. Union Of India v Parashotam Dass (2023) SCC OnLine SC 31
17. Constitution of India 1950, art 226
18. Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, s 3(o)
19. ‘High Courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the Orders passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Supreme Court overrules its 2015 judgement’ (SCC OnLine, 28 March 2023) https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2023/03/28/high-courts-have-jurisdiction-to-adjudicate-upon-orders-passed-by-armed-forces-tribunal-supreme-court-overrules-its-judgement-legal-news-legal-research-updates/ accessed 01 September 2025
20. L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261
21. S.N. Mukherjee v Union Of India (1990) 4 SCC 594
22. Major General Shri Kant Sharma v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 773
23. Ashok Kini, ‘Leave To Appeal Against AFT Orders Only When There Is A Point Of Law Of General Importance: SC’ (Live Law, 09 January 2019) https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/no-appeal-to-sc-from-aft-if-there-is-no-point-of-law-of-general-importance-141980?fromIpLogin=46554.917766042934 accessed 02 September 2025
24. Rojer Mathew v South Indian Bank Ltd And Ors (2019) 15 SCALE 615
25. Union Of India v Parashotam Dass (2023) SCC OnLine SC 31
26. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
27. L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261
28. Constitution of India 1950, art 227(4)
29. Major General Shri Kant Sharma v Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 773
30. Union Of India v Parashotam Dass (2023) SCC OnLine SC 31
31. Armed Forces Tribunal Act 20007, s 14(1)
32. Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, s 31
33. Union Of India v Parashotam Dass (2023) SCC OnLine SC 31
34. Kini (n 23)
35. L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261
36. Shagun Suryam, ‘Supreme Court overrules 2015 judgment which held High Courts cannot entertain Article 226 petitions against Armed Forces Tribunal orders’ (Bar and Bench, 22 March 2023) https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/supreme-court-overrules-2015-judgment-which-held-high-courts-cannot-entertain-article-226-petitions-armed-forces-tribunal-orders accessed 03 September 2025