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Introduction
Section 300 (3) of The Indian Penal Code has been a very
interesting provision of the Indian Criminal Law. It is very
fascinating to see the development of the reasoning behind
application of this section in murder cases. Especially after
Virsa Singh's case in 1958, the law was more or less cleared on
this point and it became a landmark judgment, which was followed
in many subsequent similar cases. This paper is an attempt to find
out the condition before Virsa Singh's case, to analyse it and to
look at the condition and the approach of courts applying the
ratio of this case in future judgments. Attention has also been
paid to the intent requirement by this section.
Section 300 (3): A General Overview
The section provides that, culpable homicide is murder if the act
by which death is caused:
Is done with an intention of causing bodily injury to any person
and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. For cases to fall
within Clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended
to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional
bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature.
Situation before 1958
Situation before 1958 and attitude of courts in application of s.
300(3) was somewhat uncertain. In the case of
Chamru Budhwa Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh after an exchange of abuse accused dealt a
blow on the head of the deceased with the lathi. After that 2nd
appellant dealt another blow to the deceased, the injury inflicted
proved fatal and both the Courts below came to the conclusion that
the Appellant was guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC. As
per the doctor the injury inflicted on the head was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Supreme Court
was of the view that it appears that the crime was committed
without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion
upon a sudden quarrel thus bringing the case within Exception 4
thereto with the result that the offence committed was culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. In another case of Willie
(William) Slaney vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh , William was on
terms of intimacy with sister of deceased. The brother did not
like their intimacy. On the evening of the day of the occurrence,
there was a heated exchange of words. The accused gave one blow on
his head with a hockey stick with the result that his skull was
fractured. He died in the hospital ten days later. The doctor
thought that injury was only likely to cause death. In the opinion
of court, the appellant could hardly be presumed to have had this
special knowledge that the blow was sufficient to cause death at
the time he struck the blow. So the offence falls under the second
part of section 304 of IPC. While it has been made clear in
Virsa
Singh's case that such knowledge is not necessary.
The approach of the court in
the above mentioned cases seems, that more reliance was placed on
the nature and seriousness of injury rather than the intention to
cause such injury. It is very evident when judge in
Slaney's case says that,
All blows on the head do not necessarily cause death.
The approach has been to find out whether the ingredient namely
the intention to cause the particular injury is present or not and
it is held that circumstances like sudden quarrel in a fight or
when the deceased intervenes in such a fight, would create a doubt
about the ingredient of intention as it cannot definitely be said
in such circumstances that the accused aimed the blow at a
particular part of the body.
It could be concluded safely,
that earlier the courts first searched the intention to kill and
in its absence the act can be murder only if that injury would be
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The Landmark
Judgment Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465
Facts: The appellant was allegedly guilty of the murder of one Khem Singh. There was only one injury on his person, which was a
result of a spear thrust. The doctor said that the injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Medical Report:
The injury was a punctured wound 2- x transverse in direction on the left
side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region
just above the inguinal canal. Three coils of intestine were also
coming out.
The appellant was convicted by
the first court under section 302 IPC and his conviction was
upheld by the High Court. He was granted special leave to the
Supreme Court on the following:
Issue:
On the finding of High Court what offence is made out
as having been committed by the petitioner
Arguments advanced:
It was
argued with much circumlocution that the facts set out above do
not disclose an offence of murder because the prosecution has not
proved that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that
was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
Reasoning and decision: The
court said that actual reading of this section infers that it is
not enough to prove that the injury found to be present is
sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature but it must
be in addition shown that the injury found to be present was the
same injury that was intended to be inflicted. Whether it was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a
matter of inference or deduction from the proved facts about the
nature of the injury and has nothing to do with the question of
intention.
The court gave a four-point
test which prosecution must observe and prove in order tobring the
case under this section:
i) First, it must establish,
quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;
ii) Secondly, the nature of
the injury must be proved; These are purely objective
investigations.
iii) Thirdly, it must be
proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular
bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or
unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry
proceeds further and,
iv) Fourthly, it must be
proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the
three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely
objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention
of the offender.
Once these four elements are
established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on
the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300,
thirdly.
This four point test is
applied in many such subsequent cases . It is mainly after this
judgment that clear guidelines were provided for the application
of this section. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become
locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh's case for the
applicability of clause "Thirdly"
is now ingrained in our legal
system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause
thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both
the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act
which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or
is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b)
that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that
there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury
which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause
death, viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury
that was intended to be inflicted.
Also the court observed that
accused can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced
that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. A case
in which such a defence was uphleld and accused was exonerated of
the charge of murder was Khuman Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2004). The facts were that the villagers from different villages
were assembled in connection of the flag ceremony of a temple. The
stick of Khuman Singh, appellant struck the one who was beating
the drum. An altercation took place and parties were pacified by
intervention of the deceased. After ceremony was over, the
complainant party was chased by the appellants. The deceased was
overpowered and was assaulted with lathi blows and stones. Some
accused also trampled on his body and he died on the spot.
According to the medical report none of the injuries was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The
death had actually resulted due injury to the liver caused by
fracture of rib bone, which punctured the liver.
Decision: The court observed
that what happened was not premeditated and appellants were not
prepared for the incident. The injuries were inflicted by lathies
and stones. Medical report showed that it was the ribs that had
entered the liver and if liver was not damaged death would not
have resulted. This injury was not one which was intended by the
court and it was at best accidental and therefore s. 300 (3) is
not attracted.
In Rajwant Singh v. State of
Kerala , the appellants had conspired together to burgle the safe
of Base Supply Office where a large amount of money was usually
kept for distribution on pay-day. In the night they caught hold of
the deceased who was the Lt. Commander. They covered his mouth
with adhesive plaster and tied a handkercheif over it and plugged
his nostrils with cotton soaked in chloroform. They has tied his
hands and legs with rope and deposited him in a shallow drain.
They were unable to burgle the safe and were recognised but they
were succesful in runnig away. Next morning the dead body was
recovered. The cause of death was asphysxiation. It was argued
that the act did not constitute murder because the accused must
have known that what they were doing was likely to kill. The
intention was not to kill but to make them unconcious while they
took away the money.
Decision: The court held that
the case is covered by third clause of s. 300. All the acts were
deliberate acts which were pre-planned and they thus satisfied the
subjective test involved in the clause. Also the act considered
objectively were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of
nature. The ordinary course of nature was not interrupted with any
intervening act of another and whatever happened was the result of
the acts of assailants and nothing else. It was hardly necessary
to prove more than the acts themselves and the causal connection
between the acts and the end result. The sufficiency of the injury
was objectively established by the nature and quality of the acts
taken with the consequence which was intimately related to the
acts.
The
intent requirement
The ingredient 'intention' in that Clause is very important and
that gives a clue in a given case whether offence involved is
murder or not . Supreme Court also discussed the intent element
required for this section in great detail. The argument that
prosecution must prove an intention to inflict only that kind of
injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature was found to be fallacious by the court. It was argued
that the intention that the section requires must be related, not
only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and
the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.? Court totally disagreed
with such an argument calling it to be a fallacious argument.
According to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even if the
intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily
injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature,
and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence
would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly
brings out this point.
The court read the clause 3 of
section 300 of IPC disjunctively and separating intention being
read as linked to the second part in the following way:
If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the
intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be
unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the
section, namely - "If the act by which the death is caused is done
with the intention of causing death."
In our opinion, the two
clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to
the offender : "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily
injury to any person." It must, of course, first be found that
bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be
established. These are purely objective facts and leave no room
for inference or deduction and to that extent the enquiry is
objective; but when it comes to the question of intention, that is
subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an
intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present.
Once that is found, the
enquiry shifts to the next clause - "and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death." The first part of this is
descriptive of the earlier part of the section.
So the crux is that what needs
to be proved is not that the accused had an intention to inflict
the injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course
of nature but that he had an intention to cause the same bodily
injury that is found to be present on the body of the deceased.
Then it is the later part of the enquiry which is objective in
nature to find out that whether the injury was sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death or not. Thus, intention
is only linked up and is restricted to the causing of the bodily
injury and not to the knowledge or intention of causing such
bodily injury that is sufficient to cause bodily injury that is
sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. What needs
to be proved is that the accused had an intention to cause the
same bodily injury found to be present on the person of deceased
which was later found to be sufficient to cause death. Such a
principle is based on broad lines of common sense because if
intention is considered to be of causing an injury which is
sufficient to cause death; then any person could always plead that
he never had an intention to cause such a injury and it would have
been very difficult to prove him wrong.
That is
why the court observed that:
Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the
offence is murder under s. 300, thirdly. It does not matter that
there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that
there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It
does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of
that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to
cause the bodily injury actually found to be proved, the rest of
the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether,
as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one
has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and
claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries
of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only
escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury
was accidental or otherwise unintentional.
It is not a correct approach
that intent required is linked up with the seriousness of the
injury and that is not what the section requires. The two matters
are quite separate an distinct. The question is not whether the
prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but
whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be
present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the
circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the
intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is
nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant
inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to
inflict it. Whether he know of its seriousness, or intended
serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so
far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to
kill, or to inflict and injury of particular degree of
seriousness, but where he intended or inflict the injury in the
question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the
intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the
circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the
intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law.
Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how
serious, is a totally separate and distant question and has
nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to
inflict the injury in question.
Again the Supreme court in the
the case of Dhupa Chamar vs. State of Bihar dealt in great detail
on the requirement of intention and applicability of this section.
In this case, lordships had discussed almost all apt authorities
and above-mentioned cases in this regard. They mainly threw light
on the question that infliction of single blow, which proved fatal
should not be equated with the intention to cause death or an
injury sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.
In this case, there was an
incident of assault by fists and slaps between Ramu Chamar and
appellant No. 2-Tokha Chamar and due to this reason next day,
appellants and their men armed with bhalas, lathies and with
brickbats came near the house of Ramu Chamar and started abusing
his family members whereupon, villagers arrived there. One of
them, a lady, made a protest whereupon appellant No. 1-Dhupa
Chamar gave a bhala blow on the left side of her neck and the same
was pulled out forcibly from the neck as a result of which she
fell down and died instantaneously. Appellant No.2-Tokha Chamar
assaulted one other person in the abdomen with bhala as a result
of which he died in the hospital.
Decision and reasoning: Under
Clause Thirdly the intention to cause that particular injury is a
subjective inquiry and when once such intention is established and
if the intended injury is found objectively to be sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death, Clause Thirdly is
attracted and it would be murder unless one of the exceptions to
Section 300 is attracted. If on the other hand this ingredient of
'intention' is not established or if a reasonable doubt arises in
this regard then only it would be reasonable to infer that Clause
Thirdly is not attracted and that the accused must be attributed
knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was likely to cause
death in which case it will be culpable homicide punishable under
Section 304 Part II IPC." Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles
it appearred to court that the accused persons came armed with
deadly weapons and there was an altercation and exchange of hot
words whereafter appellant No. 1 assaulted victim with a bhala
causing injury on the chest rupturing important blood vessels
resulting in her instantaneous death. The above circumstance would
show that accused intentionally inflicted the injury and the same
would indicate such a state of mind of the appellant-Dhupa Chamar
that he aimed and inflicted the injury with deadly weapon. In the
absence of evidence or reasonable explanation to show that this
appellant did not intend to inflict injury by bhala in the chest
with that degree of force sufficient to rupture important blood
vessel and cutting of aorta and other artery, it would be perverse
to conclude that he did not intend to inflict that injury that he
did. When once the ingredient 'intention' is established then the
offence would be murder as the intended injury was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Therefore,
inevitable conclusion would be that appellant committed the
offence of murder u/s 300 (3).
Cases
at a glance
In Harjindar Singh v. Delhi Administration , appellant was beating
one person and the deceased intervened to rescue. When the three
were grappling with each other appellant took out the knife and
stabbed the deceased once. Cause of death was shock and haemorrhage from injury to femoral vessels in the thigh. The
appellant did not use the knief when he was engaged in the fight.
The deceased came intervening in a crouching position to separate
the two. Therefore it can?t be said with any definiteness that the
appellant aimed a blow at this particular part knowing that it
would cut the artery. He was convicted under 304 I of IPC.
In Tholan v. St. of Tamil Nadu
, the accused and deceased had no enimity but were remonstrating
with each other on some point. In the course, accused took out a
knife and stabbed deceased on right of side of chest. Deceased
succumbed to the injury and died. Cause of death was stated to be
shock and haemorrhage on account of stab injury and sufficient to
cause death in ordinary course of nature. Court concluded that
there was no dispute, quarrel or malice of accused with deceased
and presence of deceased was wholly accidental. Everything
happened on the spur of the moment and requisite intention cannot
be attributed to the accused. Thus he was held guilty for
committing an offence under 304 II of IPC.
In Jaiprakash v. State (Delhi
Administration) , the appellant was having illicit relations with
wife of the deceased and his visits to her house were resented and
objected by him. On the day of occurrence, the accused visited the
house in absence of deceased armed with a kirpan. When deceased
came and objected to his presence there was only an altercation
and exchange of hot words and not a fight. Thereupon, he took out
the kirpan and stabbed on the chest of the deceased resulting in
his instantaneous death. The above circumstances would show that
the accused intentionally inflicted that injury and though it may
not be premeditated one. All such circumstances certainly
indicated a state of mind namely that he aimed and inflicted the
injury with a deadly weapon. As observed in Virsa
Singh's case, in
the absence of evidence or reasonable expalnation to show that he
did not intend to stab on the chest with the degree of force
sufficient to penetrate the heart, it would be perverse to
conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did.
When once ingredient ?intention? is established then the offence
would be murder if injury is found to be sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.
In case of
Abdul Waheed Khan
and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh , three accused rushed to the
deceased and began stabbing him indiscriminately with their three
knives, while another accused tried to snatch the bag containing
the cash. Further knife blows were given by the three accused
persons till the deceased collapsed. They away the cash bag and
all of them fled. the three appellants had indiscriminately
stabbed the deceased, though their object was to rob him. the
doctor said that the stab wounds as well as the head injury are
individually sufficient to cause death". The stab wounds came
first and then the possible fall. Taking into account the totality
of the circumstances the accused was held guilty for murder.
Where murder is caused by a
single blow
In the case of Jai Prakash, the Court referred to the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981),
Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab (1981),
Gurmail Singh v. State of
Punjab (1982), Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983),
Tholan v.
State of Tamil Nadu (1984), the court observed that :
In all these cases, injury by
a single blow was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. The Supreme Court took into consideration
the circumstances such as sudden quarrel, grappling etc. as
mentioned above only to assess the state of mind namely whether
the accused had the necessary intention to cause that particular
injury i.e. to say that he desired expressly that such injury only
should be the result. It is held in all these cases that there was
no such intention to cause that particular injury as in those
circumstances, the accused could have been barely aware i.e. only
had knowledge of the consequences. These circumstances under which
the appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or at
least a doubt arose that all his mental faculties could not have
been roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular
result.
In the case of
Mahesh Balmiki
alias Munna v. State of M.P. (1999), accused gave a single fatal
blow with knife on the chest on the left side of the sternum
between the costal joint of the 6th and 7th ribs, fracturing both
the ribs and track of the wound going through the sternum,
pericardium, anterior and posterior after passing the ribs and
thereafter entering the liver and perforating a portion of
stomach. There, conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code was
upheld by the High Court and when appeal was brought to Supreme
Court by Special Leave, while confirming the conviction under
Section 302, court observed:
"Adverting to the contention
of a single blow, it may be pointed out that there is no principle
that in all cases of a single blow Section 302 IPC is not
attracted. A single blow may, in some cases, entail conviction
under Section 302 IPC, in some cases under Section 304 IPC and in
some other cases under Section 326 IPC. The question with regard
to the nature of offence has to be determined on the facts and in
the circumstances of each case. The nature of the injury, whether
it is on the vital or non-vital part of the body, the weapon used,
the circumstances in which the injury in caused and the manner in
which the injury is inflicted are all relevant factors which may
go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the
offender and the offence committed by him."
Conclusion
After the judgment in Virsa Singh's case, the situation became
very clear. Determining the intention becomes important in
determining, whether the act is murder or not. Determination of
intention becomes difficult where a single blow has caused murder.
But it is not a rule that, where it is caused by a single blow
there cannot be any intention to cause murder and would fall under
culpable homicide. Courts while determining the required intention
give due caution to the circumstances in which the incident
occurred.
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Analysis
of Section 300 (3) of IPC
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author can be reached at: pratishtha_nliu@legalserviceindia.com /
