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Introduction
Canons of statutory construction are rules of construction for the
interpretation of statute law Canons give common sense guidance to
courts in interpreting the meaning of statutes. Proponents of the
use of
canons argue that the canons constrain judges and limit the
ability of
the courts to legislate from the bench in US. Rules of construction or statutory construction is the process of
determining how the provisions of the general law relate to a
specific
legal case, and distinguishes the rules of statutory
interpretation from
other rules or aids for the interpretation of law in common law
jurisdictions. Rules of construction has also been defined as "the
drawing in inference by the act of reason, as to the intent of an
instrument, from given circumstances, upon principles deduced from
men's
general motives, conduct and action.
There are are certain general principles of interpretation which
has
been applied by the courts from time to time. And one of them viz.
Construction Ejusdem Generis has been explained herein below. Ejusdem Generis is a Latin term which means "of the same kind," it
is
used to interpret loosely written statutes. Where a law lists
specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in
general, the
general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or
things
specifically listed. Example: if a law refers to automobiles,
trucks,
tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles"
would
not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based
transportation.
The term Ejusdem Generis in other words means words of a similar
class.
The rule is that where particular words have a common
characteristic
(i.e. of a class) any general words that follow should be
construed as
referring generally to that class; no wider construction should be
afforded.
Construction Ejusdem Generis
According to the Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the
principle of Ejusdem Generis is where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the
same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. it is
a
canon of statutory construction, where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words
will be
construed as applying only to things of the same general class as
those
enumerated.
The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally,
general
words should be given their natural meaning like all other words
unless
the context requires otherwise. But when a general word follows
specific
words of a distinct category, the general word may be given a
restricted
meaning of the same category. The general expression takes it's
meaning
from the preceding particular expressions because the legislature
by
using the particular words of a distinct genus has shown its
intention
to that effect. This principle is limited in its application to
general
word following less general word only. If the specific words do
not
belong to a distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable.
Consequently, if
a general word follows only one particular word, that single
particular
word does not constitute a distinct genus and, therefore, Ejusdem
Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case. Exceptional stray
instances are, however, available where one word genus has been
created
by the courts and the general word following such a genus given a
restricted meaning. If the particular words exhaust the whole
genus, the
general word following these particular words is construed as
embracing
a larger genus. The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a
universal
application. If the context of legislation rules out the
applicability
of this rule, it has no part to play in the interpretation of
general
words. The basis of the principle of Ejusdem Generis is that if
the
legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted
sense, it
would not have bothered to use particular words at all.
It is an ancient doctrine, commonly called Lord Tenterden's Rule,
dating
back to
Archbishop of Canterbury's
Case in
1596. Singer 47:17, at 272-73. It provides that when general words
follow specific words in a statute, the general words are read to
embrace only objects similar to those objects of the specific
words. The rule recognizes and gives effect to both the specific
and general words by using the class indicated by the specific
words to extend the scope of the statute with the general words to
include additional terms or objects within the class. In using the
doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is important to keep in mind
that it is not applied in a vacuum, and disputes cannot be
resolved by merely tying the issue
to the procrustean bed of Ejusdem
Generis. In fact, there are several conditions that have been
identified for the doctrine to apply, but none more important than
the
identification of the class. There are five conditions that have
been
identified:
(1) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words;
(2) The members of the enumeration suggest a class;
(3) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(4) A general reference supplementing the enumeration, usually
following
it; and
(5) There is not clearly manifested an intent that the general
term be
given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires.
Classes can be defined in a vast number of ways, but the key to
unlocking the true value of the doctrine is to ensure that the
identified class has some objective relationship to the aim of the
statute. In other words, the
basis for
determining, which among various semantically correct definitions
of the class should be given effect
is found in the purpose and subject of the statute as revealed in
the legislative intent.
The rule of Ejusdem Generis must be applied with great caution,
because,
it implies a departure from the natural meaning of words, in order
to
give them a meaning on a supposed intention of the legislature.
The rule
must be controlled by the fundamental rule that statutes must be
construed so as to carry out the object sought to be accomplished.
The
rule requires that the specific words are all of one genus, in
which
case, the general words may be presumed to be restricted to that
genus.
For example, the words 'or
otherwise'
are generally used as ancillary to the specific proposition which
precedes them.
In
Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan , the validity of the
Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 was
impugned.
One of the tenures was known as Bhomichar tenure and it was
contended
that its holders were not jagirdars. It was held: We agree with
the
petitioners that a jagir can be created only by a grant, and that
if it
is established that Bhomichara tenure is not held under a grant,
it
cannot be classed as a jagir. We do not base this conclusion on
the
ground put forward that the word 'Jagir' in Article 31-A of the
Constitution should be read Ejusdem Generis with 'other
similar grants',
because, the true scope of the rule of 'Ejusdem Generis' is that
words
of a general nature following specific and particular words should
be
construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as
those
specified and not its reverse, that specific words which precede
are
controlled by the general words which follow.
In
State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan
, the question was whether the appellant was entitled under
Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, to
requisition, as for a public purpose, premises for housing a
member of a foreign consulate. The sub-section provided that the
State Government may requisition for the purpose of a State or any
other public purpose . . .. The High Court held that the words 'any
other purpose'
should be read'
Ejusdem Generis' with the purpose
of the
State that accommodation for a member of the foreign consulate
staff is
a 'purpose of the Union' and hence the State Government was not
entitled
to requisition. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held: With
great
respect, we are constrained to say that the 'Ejusdem Generis' rule
of
construction, which found favour in the court below for reaching
the
result that the words 'any other public purpose' are restricted to
a
public purpose which is also a purpose of the State, has scarcely
any
application. Apart from the fact that the rule must be confined
within narrow limits, and general or comprehensive words should receive
their
full and natural meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in
their
intendment, it is requisite that there must be a distinct genus,
which
must comprise more than one species, before the rule can be
applied.
In
Lilavati Bai v. Bombay State , the petitioner was the widow of
a
tenant of certain premises and she had vacated from such premises.
Finding the premises vacant, the respondent requisitioned the
premises
under Section 6(4)(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948,
for the
public purpose of housing a government servant. One of the
contentions
of the petitioner was that under the Explanation to the
sub-section
there would be deemed to be a vacancy when the tenant 'ceases to
be in
occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction or assignment
or
transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or
otherwise', and that the words 'or otherwise' should be construed
as Ejusdem Generis with the words immediately preceding them. It was
held:
the rule Ejusdem Generis sought to be expressed in aid of the
petitioner
can possibly have no application. The legislature, when it used
the
words 'or otherwise', apparently intended to cover other cases
which may
not come within the meaning of the preceding clauses, for example,
a
case where the tenant's occupation has ceased as a result of
trespass by
a third party. The legislature intended to cover all possible
cases of
vacancy occurring due to any reasons whatsoever. Hence, far from
using
those words Ejusdem Generis with the preceding clauses of the
explanation, the legislature used those words in an all-inclusive
sense.
The rule of Ejusdem Generis is intended to be applied where
general
words have been used following particular and specific words of
the same
nature on the established rule of construction that the
legislature
presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense that is to
say,
as belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific
words.
Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general
import
only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires
it.
But where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment
do
not require such restricted meaning be attached to words of
general
import, it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words
their
plain and ordinary meaning.
In
Western India Theatres v. Municipal Corporation, Poona , the
respondent levied a tax of Rs. 2 per day as license fee on the
appellants, who were lessees of a cinema house. The levy was under
Section 59(1)(xi) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901,
which
provides that the municipality could levy 'any other tax to the
nature
and object of which the approval of the Governor shall have been
obtained'. It was contended that Section 59(1)(xi) is
unconstitutional
in that the legislature had completely abdicated its-functions and
delegated the power to the municipality to determine the nature of
the
tax to be imposed. The contention was rejected by the Supreme
Court and
one of the reasons given for the decision is: Although the rule of
construction based on the principle of Ejusdem Generis cannot be
invoked
in this case, for items (i) to (x) do not, strictly speaking,
belong to
the same genus, they do indicate, to our mind, the kind and nature
of
tax which the municipalities are authorized to impose.
In
Kochunni v. State of Madras , it was observed: The rule of Ejusdem
Generis is that when general words follow particular and specific
words
of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the
things of
the same kind as those specified. But it is clearly laid down by
decided
cases that the specific words must form a distinct genus or
category. It
is not an inviolable rule of law, but is only a permissible
inference in
the absence of an indication to the contrary.
In
Jage Ram v. State of Haryana , the respondent issued a
notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the
acquisition
of the appellant's land. The notification directed that action
under
Section 17(2)(c) of the Act shall be taken on the ground of
urgency and
that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply in regard to
the
acquisition. The appellant contended that though Section 17(2)(c)
read
by itself covers a very large field, that provision should be
given a
narrower meaning because of the provisions of Section 17(2)(a) and
(b).
It was held: The Ejusdem Generis rule is not a rule of law but is
merely
a rule of construction to aid the courts to find out the true
intention
of the legislature. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous
and
the legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call in
aid
that rule. Ejusdem Generis rule is explained in HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND thus: 'As a rule, where in a statute there are general
words
following particular and specific words, the general words must be
confined to things of the same kind as those specified, although
this,
as a rule of construction, must be applied with caution, and
subject to
the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in accordance
with
the intention of Parliament. For the Ejusdem Generis rule to
apply, the
specific words must constitute a category, class or genus, then
only
things which belong to that category, class or genus fall within
the
general words'.
The Supreme Court in
Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Harishanker, has laid down the following five essential elements
of
this rule:
(1) the statute contains an enumeration of specific
words;
(2) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
(3) that
class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(4) the
general
terms follow the enumeration; and
(5) there is no indication of a
different legislative intent. If the legislative purpose of a
statute is
such that a statutory series should be read Ejusdem Generis, so be
it,
the rule is helpful.
But if not, the rule is more likely to defeat
than
to fulfill the purpose of the statute. The rule like many other
rules of
statutory interpretation is a useful servant but a bad master.
In
State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, the interpretation of Section 6
(4)
(a) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 which said: 'State
Government may requisition for the purpose of State or any other
public
purpose , was' involved. It was contended that under the
provision the
appellant was entitled to requisition premises for housing a
member of
the foreign consulate. The High Court held that the expression any
other
public purpose should be read Ejusdem Generis with purpose of
state, and
providing accommodation to a member of the foreign consulate being
a
purpose of the Union and not of the State, the State Government
had no
authority to requisition. The Supreme Court held that the High
Court was
in error in applying the principle of Ejusdem Generis. The general
expression any other public purpose follows only a single
expression for
the purpose of a State which is not a distinct genus. In the
absence of
a genus the rule has no application. Further, the intention of the
legislature is quite clear by the words used in the enactment. By
giving
the words their natural meaning it is apparent that the expression
any
other public purpose includes providing accommodation to a member
of a
foreign consulate.
In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan La1 , the respondent
raised a question of his seniority in service and filed a petition
under
Article 226 of the Constitution praying that suitable directions
may be
given to the appellant Board. The appellant contended that it was
not
'State' as defined in Article 12 and that therefore no direction
could
be given to it. The High Court rejected the appellant's
contention. In
the Supreme Court the appellant relied on certain decisions46 in
which
'other authorities' in the Article were read Ejusdem Generis with
'State'. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held:
In our
opinion
the High Court [in these cases] fell into an error in applying the
principle of Ejusdem Generis when interpreting the expression
'other
authorities' in Article 12 of the Constitution, as they overlooked
the
basic principle of interpretation that, to invoke the application
of Ejusdem Generis rule, there must be a distinct genus or category
running through the bodies already named. Craies summarizes the
principle as
follows: 'The Ejusdem Generis rule is one to be applied with
caution and
not pushed too far.. .. To invoke the application of the Ejusdem
Generis
rule there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific
words must
apply not to different objects of a widely differing character but
to
something, which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where
this is
lacking, the rule cannot apply, but the mention of a single
species does
not constitute a genus'. Maxwell explained the principles by
saying,
'But the general word which follows particular and specific words
of the
same nature as itself takes its meaning from them, and is presumed
to be restricted to the same genus as those words . . .. Unless
there is a genus or category, there is no room for the application
of the Ejusdem
Generis doctrine.'
In the
Old English case of Evans v. Cross the words 'other
devices' had
to be interpreted in Section 48 (9) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930
which
defined a
'traffic sign' to include 'all signals, warning sign
posts,
direction posts, signs, or other devices'. Applying the rule of Ejusdem
Generis the Court held that a painted white line on a road could
not be
called a traffic sign because devices are things, which a painted
line
on road is not. Similarly, in re Latham Deceased, the words 'or
other
person' in the expression 'trustee, guardian, committee or other
person'
in Section 8 (4) of the Finance Act, 1894 was 'interpreted Ejusdem
Generis to mean a person in a similar position to a trustee etc.
and as
such a person who was beneficially interested could not be
included
within it.
Where the preceding words do not belong to a distinct genus, the
rule of
Ejusdem Generis does not apply. For instance, in
N.A.L.G.O. v.
Bolton
Corporation, the words 'or otherwise' had to be interpreted in the
definition of a 'workman' as any person who has entered into a
work
under a contract with an employer whether the contract be by way
of
manual labour, clerical work or otherwise: The court refused to
apply
the principle of Ejusdem Generis saying the preceding words manual
labour' and 'clerical
work'
did not form a distinct category to be called a gems. In
Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay the petitioner,
the
widow of a tenant of a certain premises, was not residing in it at
the
time. The respondent requisitioned the premises under Section 6(4)
(a)
of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 for providing
accommodation to
a government servant. The petitioner challenged the requisition on
the
ground that the premises was not vacant within the meaning of the
explanation attached to the section according to which a vacancy
will
exist when the tenant 'ceases to be in occupation upon termination
of
his tenancy, eviction or assignment or transfer in any other
manner of
his interest in the premises or otherwise: According to her the
expression or otherwise should be construed Ejusdem Generis with
the
expressions preceding it. The Supreme Court held that the rule has
no
application in the present instance because the expressions
preceding
the words or otherwise are not species of the same nature, and
therefore, do not belong to any identifiable genus. Assigning the
natural meaning to the words used in the enactment it is clear
that the
expression or otherwise is intended to include all cases not
covered -by
the preceding expressions. This interpretation is quite consistent
with
the object of the legislation.
In
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India
through the Fruit Products
Order, 1955, issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities
Act,
1955, it was made obligatory that the peonage of fruit juice in
fruit
syrup should be twenty-five. The appellant argued that the order
did not
apply to its product Rooh Afza even though it contained fruit
juices
because clause 2 (d) (v) of the Order includes squashes, crushes,
cordials, barley water, barrelled juice and ready-to-serve
beverages or
any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp and that
the
expression any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit
pulp
should be construed Ejusdem Generis. The Supreme Court rejected
the
contention and held that the rule had no application here because
the
things mentioned before the general expression any other beverages
containing fruit juices or fruit pulp did not fall under a
determinable
genus. Further, the context makes it clear that all beverages
containing
fruit juice are intended to be included.
In
M/s Siddeshwari Cotton Mills Private Limited v. Union of India,
the
Supreme Court observed that the expressions 'bleaching,
mercerizing,
dyeing, printing, water-proofing, rubberising, shrink-proofing,
organdie
processing, which precede the expression 'or any other process'
in Section 2 (f) (v) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
contemplate processes which import a change of a lasting character
to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the
fabric or otherwise. 'Any
other process'
in the section must share one or the other of these incidents. The
expression is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture
in its extended meaning and the expression 'unprocessed'
in the exempting notification draws its meaning from that context.
In
Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd.,
il1terpretation of the words 'or
other proceeding'
in the phrase
'a
claim of set off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising
from
contract' appearing in . Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932
was
involved. The Supreme Court did not apply the principle of Ejusdem
Generis because the preceding words /a claim of set off did not
constitute a genus. The court also observed that interpretation
Ejusdem
Generis or Noscitur a Sociis need not always be made when words
showing particular classes are followed by general words. Before the
general
words can be so interpreted there must be a genus constituted or a
category disclosed with reference to which the general words can
and are
intended to be restricted.
In
Jiyajirao Cotton Mills Ltd" v, Madhya Pradesh Electricity
Board interpretation of the words 'any other relevant factors' was
involved. The Electricity Board has been empowered under Section
49 (3)
of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 to fix deposit tariff for the
supply
of electricity to any person having regard to the geographical
position
of any area, the nature of the supply and the purpose for which
the
supply is required and any other relevant factors'. The Supreme
Court
did not apply the Ejusdem Generis principle because the preceding
words
did not belong to a distinct category. In
M. Kumar v. Bharat Earth
Movers Limited, the Supreme court observed that to invoke the
application of the Ejusdem Generis rule there must be' a distinct
genus
or category. The specific words must apply not to different
objects of
the widely different character but to something which can be
called a
class or kind of object; where this is lacking, the rule will not
apply
and mention of single specie will not constitute a genus.
Conclusion
EJUSDEM GENERIS is (a) In an enumeration of different subjects in
an
Act, general words following specific words may be construed with
reference to the antecedent matters, and the construction may be
narrowed down by treating them as applying to things of the same
kind as
those previously mentioned, unless of course, there is something
to show
that a wider sense was intended. (b) If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, then the
general-
words are construed as embracing a larger genus.
This is a rule
of language employed by the courts when a situation arises that
may not have been foreseen when the statute was being drafted. It
will bring within the meaning of the statute things that are of
the
same class
or
genus
as those mentioned within the statute itself. Thus, if specific
items are listed, plus a general term (for example,
houses,
offices, rooms or other places),
the general term of
other places
will include things only of the same class as the specific list,
in this case indoor places.
General words in a statute should be taken ordinarily in their
usual
sense. General words, even when they follow specific words, should
ordinarily be taken in their general sense, unless a more
reasonable
interpretation requires them to be used in a sense limited to
things
Ejusdem Generis with those specifically mentioned. If, however,
the
particular words exhaust the whole genus, the general words must
be
understood to refer to some larger genus.
The doctrine of Ejusdem Generis
is only part of a wider principle of construction, namely, that,
where reasonably possible, some significance and meaning should be
attributed to each and every word and phrase in a written
document. That being the object of the doctrine, it is difficult
to see what difference it can make whether the word 'other'
is or is not used, provided-and this is essential-that the
examples which have been given are referable to a clearly
ascertainable genus.
***********************
End Notes:
1.Messerschmidt v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Iowa
2002)
(citing Shatzer v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 639 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa
2001));
accord Maxim Techs., Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 690 N.W.2d 896, 902
(Iowa
2005); Black?s Law Dictionary 535; Singer § 47:17, at 272-81.
2.Id. at 285
3.United States v. Weadon, 145 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1998)
4.Id. at 287; see Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d 907,
912-13
(doctrine inapplicable when there is no inconsistency between the
general and specific language).
5.Singer § 47:18, at 289
6.[1955] 2 SCR 303
7.AIR 1955 SC 810
8.AIR 1957 SC 521
9.AIR 1959 SC 586
10.AIR 1960 SC 1080
11.AIR 1971 SC 1033
12.3rd Ed., Vol. 36, p. 397, para 599
13.AIR 1979 SC 65
14.Quasi v. Quasi, (1979) 3 All ER
15.AIR 1955 SC 810
16.AIR B1967 SC 1857
17.(1938) 1 KB 694
18.(1961) 3 W.L.R. 1154
19.1943 AC 166
20.AIR 1957 SC 521
21.AIR 1965 SC 1167
22.AIR 1989 SC 1019
23.AIR 1964 SC 1882
24.AIR 1969 SC 788
25.AIR 1999 Karn. 343
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Construction Ejusdem Generis
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