Background: LWE Insurgency and IED Tactics
The Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) movement, primarily driven by Maoist insurgents (CPI-Maoist), remains a significant internal security challenge in India’s central and eastern “Red Corridor.” Originating from the 1967 Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal, it has persisted in forested, rural areas of states including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and others.
IEDs serve as a key asymmetric weapon for LWE cadres. Buried along roads, paths, and fields, they target security forces, government patrols, and infrastructure projects with minimal direct engagement, inflicting high casualties while limiting insurgent exposure. Recent years have seen hundreds of IEDs recovered in regions like Bastar, with blasts causing casualties among security personnel and civilians. These hidden, unpredictable devices require specialized detection equipment, rendering roads and adjacent areas hazardous.
IEDs as a Direct Obstacle to Road Infrastructure
a. Physical Damage and Risk to Construction IED explosions damage unpaved (kutcha) roads, destroy machinery, and halt work. Preliminary surveys and construction in forests face constant threats, endangering workers and engineers. Insurgents have occasionally used tunnels under roads for IED placement, complicating security and planning.
b. Strategic Disruption of Connectivity
LWE groups target roads to:
- Impede security force mobility into remote areas.
- Block economic integration of tribal/rural communities with markets and services.
- Foster perceptions of government weakness.
This isolation sustains insurgent influence. IED threats have deterred contractors, inflated costs, and delayed projects in high-risk zones like Gadchiroli, Bastar, and Malkangiri, often leading to sabotage or stalled machinery.
- Government Response: RCPLWEA & Infrastructure Policy
Recognizing that isolation fuels insurgent sympathy, the government has prioritized connectivity as both developmental and counter-insurgency strategy.
a. Road Connectivity Project for LWE Affected Areas (RCPLWEA)
Launched in 2016 as a PMGSY vertical, RCPLWEA targets all-weather connectivity (metalled roads, culverts, cross-drainage) in 44 worst-affected LWE districts and adjoining areas across nine states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh). Objectives include:
- Enabling seamless security force movement for anti-LWE operations.
- Promoting socio-economic development by linking habitations to markets, schools, health centres, and administrative services.
Under RCPLWEA, approximately 12,162 km of roads and 705 bridges have been sanctioned. Combined with the Road Requirement Plan (RRP), over 15,000 km of roads have been constructed in LWE areas. Progress continues, with extensions and funding support.
b. Funding and Strategic Implementation Central funding has accelerated work; e.g., Rs. 195 crores sanctioned to Chhattisgarh for 2025–26 (Rs. 190.61 crore programme fund + Rs. 4.39 crore administrative). Parliamentary reviews note delays from terrain, forest clearances, and security risks, recommending greater coordination (e.g., Border Roads Organisation involvement).
4. Strategic Impact of Metalled Road Construction
a. Facilitating Security Operations All-weather roads mitigate IED threats by enabling planned and secured patrol movements, route sanitization, surveillance, quick response, and fortified camps. This disrupts insurgent logistics and movement.
b. Development as a Counter-Insurgency Tool
Roads support winning hearts and minds by:
- Improving access to services.
- Boosting economic participation and livelihoods.
- Enhancing governance and welfare delivery.
This reduces marginalization that fuels extremism.
- Socio-Economic Outcomes and Future Prospects
IED threats inadvertently accelerated infrastructure focus, transforming roads into a strategic imperative. Outcomes include better market/healthcare access, education, government outreach, economic opportunities, and reduced IED emplacement on vulnerable kutcha roads.
LWE violence has declined sharply, with incidents falling by approximately 89%~89% from 1,936 (2010) to 222–234 (2025); deaths ~91% from 1,005 to 95–100. Affected districts dropped from 126 (2018) to 8–11 (late 2025), with only 3 “most affected.” Record 2,337 surrenders, 364 neutralizations, and 1,022 arrests occurred in 2025. The government targets near-eradication by March 2026.
- Drawbacks of Kutcha Roads in LWE-Affected Areas
Kutcha roads limit load-bearing, succumb to monsoons, disrupt security logistics, and facilitate easy IED concealment due to poor visibility and surveillance. Unreliable access hampers services, economy, and integration, perpetuating isolation exploited by extremists.
- Conclusion
At LWE’s peak in West Bengal (Purulia, Bankura, Jhargram), metalled road construction countered landmine/IED threats against security forces. Similar efforts under RCPLWEA nationwide have enhanced mobility, safety, and development. By addressing structural drivers like isolation, infrastructure has proven vital to counter-insurgency, integrating remote regions and supporting long-term peace, growth, and inclusion.
References
- Ministry of Home Affairs. (2026). Lok Sabha Starred Question No. 58 (February 3, 2026) and related releases. Government of India.
- Ministry of Rural Development & Press Information Bureau. (2025–2026). RCPLWEA sanctions and progress under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) (e.g., August 2025 Chhattisgarh release; December 2025 year-end review). Government of India.
- Ministry of Rural Development. (2025). Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana: Progress reports. Government of India.
- Parliamentary Standing Committee on Rural Development. (n.d.). Reports on implementation of PMGSY and RCPLWEA. Lok Sabha Secretariat.
- South Asia Terrorism Portal. (2025–2026). Maoist insurgency and IED trends in India. Institute for Conflict Management.
- National Crime Records Bureau. (2025). Violence and related statistics. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.
