Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. and Another
Crl. Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 482 BNSS No. 2375 of 2025
WITH
Shiv Prakash Singh v. State of U.P. and Another
Crl. Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 482 BNSS No. 2551 of 2025
Decided: March 24, 2026 | 2026:AHC:62958
Key Takeaway
An advocate who submits a false illness slip to one Bench while simultaneously appearing in another court on the same day commits a serious fraud upon the court amounting to interference with the administration of justice. Compounding this, his failure to apprise the Court of material developments — namely, that interim protection against arrest had already been secured from a co-ordinate Bench — independently violated the advocate’s duty of candour. The Allahabad High Court imposed exemplary costs of Rs. 20,000/- on the delinquent advocate payable to the High Court Legal Services Committee, with a referral to the Bar Council of U.P. in event of default.
I. Introduction
In an adversarial legal system, the smooth functioning of courts depends upon the good faith of all participants. Advocates hold the unique dual status of officers of the court and representatives of their clients. The Supreme Court, in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106, sounded a grave warning against the erosion of ethical and professional standards among lawyers. In that landmark case, the Court held that advocates are not “hired guns” for their clients but integral parts of the justice system, and that the soul of advocacy is integrity. This foundational principle acquires fresh salience in the Allahabad High Court’s order of March 24, 2026 in Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P., where two distinct acts of professional dishonesty — a false illness slip and suppression of a material development — attracted exemplary costs of Rs. 20,000/- upon the advocate personally.
The case also resonates with the Supreme Court’s observation in Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, 2024 INSC 46 (2024) 4 SCC 432 that in the last four decades, the values of litigants and their lawyers have deteriorated sharply: those who attempt to pollute the stream of justice or touch the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands are not entitled to any relief, interim or final.
II. Factual Background
A. The Criminal Case
Case Crime No. 411 of 2020 was registered at Police Station Cantt., District Varanasi, under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC. The dispute arose out of a long-running family conflict over management of Jay Prakash Degree College, Umraha, Varanasi, established by a society called Jay Prakash Smarak Sewa Samiti. The informant (opposite party no. 2) had attempted to transfer college management to a trust he created (Narayan Foundation Trust, formed 17.12.2012). This was set aside through institutional and judicial processes, including orders of the Vice-Chancellor and writ proceedings before the Allahabad High Court.
B. The Anticipatory Bail Applications
Two connected anticipatory bail applications under Section 482 BNSS — NABAIL No. 2375 of 2025 (Arun Kumar Yadav) and NABAIL No. 2551 of 2025 (Shiv Prakash Singh) — were filed before Court No. 71 and were represented by the same advocate, Sri Jitendra Kumar Srivastava. During their pendency, the same advocate filed Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 5350 of 2025 before a co-ordinate Bench, which by order dated 18.09.2025 stayed all further proceedings against the applicants — effectively granting interim protection against arrest and rendering the anticipatory bail applications functionally infructuous. This development was never disclosed to Court No. 71.
Case Summary Table
| Particulars | Details |
|---|---|
| Case Names | Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. and Another; Shiv Prakash Singh v. State of U.P. and Another |
| Case Numbers | 2375 of 2025; 2551 of 2025 |
| Court | Allahabad High Court |
| Date of Decision | March 24, 2026 |
| Key Issue | Professional misconduct by advocate (false illness slip and suppression of material facts) |
| Outcome | Exemplary costs of Rs. 20,000/- imposed |
Key Legal Issues Highlighted
- Submission of false illness slip to mislead the court
- Simultaneous appearance before another court
- Suppression of material facts from the court
- Violation of advocate’s duty of candour
- Interference with administration of justice
III. The Conduct: Two Independent Lapses
A. First Lapse: The False Illness Slip
On the date of hearing, Sri Srivastava submitted an illness slip to Court No. 71 representing that he was indisposed. However, the learned counsel for the informant produced before the Court the appearance slip of Special Appeal Defective No. 66 of 2026 (Committee of Management, Jai Prakash Degree College v. State of U.P. and 4 others) — a matter listed before the Court of the Hon’ble Chief Justice — demonstrating that Sri Srivastava was present and assisting Sri Gajendra Pratap, Senior Counsel, in that very case on the same day. The Court took the appearance slip on record. The contrast was stark: illness before one Bench; active appearance before another.
This conduct falls squarely within the mischief identified by the Supreme Court in N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shivde, AIR 2001 SC 2028, where it was held that seeking adjournments — without justification and to the inconvenience of the Court — amounts to misconduct and is a dereliction of the duty an advocate owes the Court. Submitting a false illness slip to secure an adjournment compounds that misconduct into a positive misrepresentation of fact.
B. Second Lapse: Non-Disclosure of Material Development
The second and equally important dereliction was the advocate’s failure to inform Court No. 71 that interim protection against arrest had already been obtained from a co-ordinate Bench on 18.09.2025 in Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 5350 of 2025. The anticipatory bail applications were therefore being pursued on a false premise — that the applicants faced a live apprehension of arrest — when in fact they did not.
The Supreme Court has consistently condemned suppression of parallel proceedings. In K. Jayaram v. Bangalore Development Authority, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1194, the Court held that a litigant is bound to state all facts relevant to the litigation and that withholding vital or relevant material to gain advantage amounts to playing fraud with the court, which cannot be countenanced. The High Court’s jurisdiction being extraordinary and discretionary, the Court stressed that a petitioner must come with clean hands and put forward all facts without concealing or suppressing anything.
In Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, 2024 INSC 46, the Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- for concealment of the first bail application’s rejection in the second bail application, citing the principle of suppressio veri, expressio falsi — suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood. The Court observed that a litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of justice is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.
More recently, a Supreme Court Bench in early 2026 laid down a comprehensive disclosure framework for bail applications, holding that every applicant seeking bail is under an obligation to disclose all material particulars — including the existence of any coercive or protective processes — so as to promote uniformity, transparency and integrity in bail adjudication. The non-disclosure of the Section 528 BNSS order was a clear breach of this obligation.
IV. Judicial Reasoning
A. Rejection of the Applications
The applications were rejected on the ground that since interim protection against arrest had already been granted by a co-ordinate Bench, the substratum of anticipatory bail — a reasonable apprehension of imminent arrest — was absent. In Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249, the Supreme Court cautioned that courts must ensure that wrongdoers are denied profit or undue benefit from frivolous or dishonest litigation. Maintaining a bail application on court records when interim protection has already been secured elsewhere is precisely such an abuse.
B. Pattern of Dilatory Conduct
The order records that since the date of filing, the cases had either been adjourned on the request of the applicants’ counsel or the counsel had remained absent, except on a few dates. The Supreme Court, in N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shivde, AIR 2001 SC 2028, recognised that seeking repeated adjournments amounts to misconduct, and an advocate may be punished therefor. This pattern, combined with the false illness slip, painted a picture of deliberate manipulation of the court process.
C. The Court’s Findings on Counsel’s Conduct
The Court held that the conduct of Sri Srivastava demonstrated an attempt to deceive the Court — an act amounting to interference with the administration of justice. It emphasised that courts are overburdened and every act of deception wastes precious judicial time. As an officer of the court, the advocate was under a duty to assist the Court with true facts.
This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, 2024 INSC 46, where the Court, citing Dalip Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 2 SCC 114, emphasised that a litigant or advocate who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, through falsehood or suppression, is entitled to no relief whatsoever.
V. The Order: Costs Of Rs. 20,000/-
The Court imposed costs of Rs. 20,000/- personally upon Sri Jitendra Kumar Srivastava (Advocate Roll No. A/J-0185 of 2012). The mechanism chosen echoes the Supreme Court’s observation in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249, that imposition of actual, realistic costs goes a long way in controlling the tendency to file false pleadings and seek unnecessary adjournments, and that courts must not act out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not benefit from dishonest litigation.
Principal Directions
- Costs of Rs. 20,000/- are to be deposited before the High Court Legal Services Committee, Allahabad, within one month (i.e., by April 24, 2026).
- In the event of default in payment, the Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee, shall refer the matter to the Bar Council of U.P. for appropriate disciplinary action against the advocate.
- A copy of the order is to be communicated to Sri Srivastava and the concerned court below forthwith.
Purpose Of Costs And Systemic Impact
| Aspect | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Restorative Purpose | The costs flow to the cause of access to justice through the Legal Services Committee. |
| Deterrence | Discourages false pleadings and unnecessary adjournments. |
| Accountability | Provision for Bar Council referral ensures disciplinary oversight. |
The channelling of costs to the Legal Services Committee serves an additional salutary purpose — the costs flow to the cause of access to justice, ensuring that a punitive order also has a restorative dimension. The disciplinary referral mechanism underscores that the Court’s response is not merely punitive but designed to ensure systemic accountability.
VI. Legal Principles Fortified By Precedent
A. The Advocate as Officer of the Court
In K. Anjinappa v. K.C. Krishna Reddy, (2021) (SC), the Supreme Court reiterated that advocates are officers of the court and their duty to the court supersedes any personal interest or client pressure. Rule 11 of the Bar Council of India Rules mandates that an advocate shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law. An illness slip submitted to seek an adjournment when the advocate is not genuinely ill is a false statement of fact — a misrepresentation designed to obtain a procedural benefit to which the advocate is not entitled.
The Supreme Court in Dhanraj Singh Choudhary v. Nathulal Vishwakarma (2012) 2 SCC 92 stated: the legal profession is a noble profession, not a business or trade; a person practising law has to do so in the spirit of honesty and not in the spirit of mischief-making. The overriding duty of a lawyer as officer of the court is to the court itself.
In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106, the Supreme Court expressed grave concern and dismay at the decline of ethical and professional standards among lawyers and erosion of the highest traditions of the Bar. The Court held that advocates must never subvert justice and that even a successful outcome for the client cannot justify unethical conduct in achieving it.
- Advocates are officers of the court
- Duty to court overrides client interest
- False statements (e.g., fake illness slips) amount to misconduct
- Ethical conduct cannot be compromised for client success
B. The Power to Impose Costs: Inherent Jurisdiction
The power of a High Court to impose costs for misconduct is inherent and does not require invocation of contempt jurisdiction. In Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249, the Supreme Court held in terms that imposition of actual and realistic costs would go a long way in controlling unnecessary adjournments, the introduction of false pleadings, and dishonest litigation. The Court cautioned that courts must be pragmatic and impose costs that reflect ground realities, not nominal figures that have no deterrent effect.
The Court further observed:
Imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties — Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249, para 52(C)
In Narain Pandey v. Pannalal Pandey, (2013) 11 SCC 435, the Supreme Court held that punishment for misconduct must meet two objectives — deterrence and correction — and must be proportionate to the degree of misconduct. The costs imposed in the present case satisfy both.
| Case | Principle Established |
|---|---|
| Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi | Realistic costs deter false pleadings and delays |
| Narain Pandey v. Pannalal Pandey | Punishment must ensure deterrence and correction |
C. Contempt Power and the Alternative of Costs
The Allahabad High Court elected to impose costs rather than initiate suo motu contempt proceedings — a course equally available. In Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, the Constitution Bench affirmed that High Courts have inherent jurisdiction to prohibit contemnor advocates from appearing before them. However, the present Court adopted a proportionate approach, imposing costs — a measured and appropriate response given the circumstances, while preserving the threat of Bar Council disciplinary action as a backstop.
In Noratanmal Chaurasia v. M.R. Murli, (2004) 5 SCC 689, the Supreme Court clarified that misconduct, though incapable of precise definition, envisages any breach of discipline — including deliberate wrongdoing or intentional violation of a rule or standard of behaviour. Submitting a false illness slip while simultaneously appearing elsewhere falls squarely within this broad definition.
- Courts may choose costs over contempt proceedings
- Proportionate response is preferred
- Misconduct includes deliberate violations of ethical standards
D. Duty of Candour: Disclosure of Parallel Proceedings
In K. Jayaram v. Bangalore Development Authority, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1194, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner approaching a discretionary jurisdiction must come with clean hands and put forward all facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything. If the court is misled by withholding vital information, the petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering its merits.
The Supreme Court articulated the principle with precision:
A litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or relevant material in order to gain advantage over the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with the court as well as with the opposite parties which cannot be countenanced. — K. Jayaram v. Bangalore Development Authority, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1194
In Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash @ Pappu, (2013) 9 SCC 199, the Court held that suppression of facts amounts to playing fraud with the court, and the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi is directly attracted. In Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, 2024 INSC 46, the Court extended this principle to bail proceedings, mandating full disclosure of all previous bail applications and coercive or protective processes in every successive application.
- Full disclosure of facts is mandatory
- Suppression amounts to fraud on the court
- Applies across proceedings including bail matters
E. Adjournment Abuse as Misconduct
In N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shivde, AIR 2001 SC 2028, the Supreme Court held that seeking repeated adjournments for postponing the examination of witnesses present in the Court, without making alternative arrangements, is a dereliction of duty amounting to misconduct. The conduct in the present case was more egregious — adjournments sought on the fictitious ground of illness while simultaneously appearing in another court.
In Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249, the Supreme Court directed that undue adjournments must be avoided and that ex parte injunction applications should be disposed of on merits as expeditiously as possible. The framework of avoiding dilatory tactics applies with equal force to criminal proceedings in the High Court.
- Repeated adjournments without valid cause = misconduct
- Fake grounds (e.g., illness) aggravate seriousness
- Courts must prevent delay tactics
VII. Implications For The Profession
This order, read with the precedents discussed above, carries several binding and advisory consequences for practising advocates:
- A false illness slip is a false statement of fact to the court, violating Rule 11 of the BCI Rules, and exposing the advocate to costs and disciplinary proceedings before the Bar Council.
- Simultaneous appearance in another court on a day when illness is claimed to one court is not merely embarrassing — it constitutes a positive misrepresentation and fraud upon the court, punishable under inherent supervisory jurisdiction.
- When a parallel proceeding achieves the same relief sought in a pending application, the advocate is duty-bound to immediately disclose this to the court entertaining the earlier application and seek its closure. Continued maintenance of a redundant proceeding without disclosure is an independent violation of the duty of candour.
- Costs imposed for professional misconduct are personal to the advocate and may not be transferred to the client or recovered as a disbursement.
- Default in payment of court-imposed costs triggers a disciplinary referral, with potentially career-defining consequences before the Bar Council. The threat is not cosmetic — the Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa has, as recently as November 2025 (reported in Supreme Court proceedings), removed an advocate from its rolls in consequence of court-initiated proceedings.
The pattern of seeking repeated adjournments with no substantive progress, followed by a false illness claim, is itself actionable as misconduct under N.G. Dastane (supra), independent of the illness slip episode.
VIII. Table Of Cases Cited
| Case Name | Citation | Principle |
|---|---|---|
| R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court | (2009) 8 SCC 106 | Advocate as officer of court; integrity paramount; court’s power to debar for misconduct |
| Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi | (2011) 8 SCC 249 | Imposition of realistic costs; deterring adjournment abuse and dishonest litigation |
| N.G. Dastane v. Shrikant S. Shivde | AIR 2001 SC 2028 | Repeated adjournments amount to misconduct; dereliction of advocate’s duty to court |
| K. Jayaram v. Bangalore Development Authority | 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1194 | Duty to disclose all material facts; concealment amounts to fraud upon court |
| Moti Lal Songara v. Prem Prakash @ Pappu | (2013) 9 SCC 199 | Suppression of facts before court attracts suppressio veri, expressio falsi |
| Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. | (2010) 2 SCC 114 | Those who touch the stream of justice with tainted hands disentitled to relief |
| Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India | (1998) 4 SCC 409 | High Courts’ inherent power to deal with advocate contempt |
| Noratanmal Chaurasia v. M.R. Murli | (2004) 5 SCC 689 | Wide definition of misconduct includes deliberate violation of professional standards |
| Narain Pandey v. Pannalal Pandey | (2013) 11 SCC 435 | Punishment for misconduct must achieve deterrence and correction |
| K. Anjinappa v. K.C. Krishna Reddy | (2021) 9 SCC 1034 | Advocates are officers of court; duty to court supersedes personal interest |
Important Observations
Dhanraj Singh Choudhary v. Nathulal Vishwakarma (2012) 2 SCC 92 — The Apex Court observed thus:
“23. The legal profession is a noble profession. It is not a business or a trade. A person practising law has to practise in the spirit of honesty and not in the spirit of mischief-making or money-getting. An advocate’s attitude towards and dealings with his client have to be scrupulously honest and fair.
24. In V.C Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan (1979) 1 SCC 308, AIR 1979 SC 281 Krishna Iyer, J. stated:
“5. Law’s nobility as a profession lasts only so long as the members maintain their commitment to integrity and service to the community.”
25. Any compromise with the law’s nobility as a profession is bound to affect the faith of the people in the rule of law and, therefore, unprofessional conduct by an advocate has to be viewed seriously. A person practising law has an obligation to maintain probity and high standard of professional ethics and morality.”
Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 INSC 144 ; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 (Decided on February 11, 2026)
- Core Principle: An applicant seeking bail has a “solemn obligation” to make a full, fair, and candid disclosure of all material facts, specifically criminal antecedents. Suppression of these facts is deemed a “fraud on the court” (suppressio veri, expressio falsi).
- Mandatory Disclosure Areas: The court issued directions for an illustrative framework requiring disclosure of Case Details (FIR number, sections, max punishment), Custody Status (Arrest date, total incarceration), Status of Trial (Stage, witnesses examined), Criminal Antecedents (Full list of pending/acquitted/convicted cases).
Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432
- Full disclosure in bail proceedings mandatory; protective processes must be disclosed
IX. Conclusion
The order of Hon’ble Dr. Gautam Chowdhary, J., dated March 24, 2026, is a measured yet firm assertion of the court’s supervisory authority over the conduct of its officers. It identifies two independent grounds for reproach — the false illness slip and the suppression of the interim protection already obtained — and visits them with proportionate consequences: costs of Rs. 20,000/- payable to a body committed to access to justice, with disciplinary accountability as the default sanction.
Read together with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in R.K. Anand, Ramrameshwari Devi, N.G. Dastane, Kusha Duruka, and K. Jayaram, the order provides a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for evaluating advocate conduct. The duty of an advocate towards the court — embracing candour, honesty, and non-deception — is not a platitude inscribed in rule books. It is a live, enforceable obligation, and courts across India have shown increasing willingness to enforce it with both civil costs and the threat of disciplinary action.
As the Supreme Court reminded the profession in Dhanraj Singh Choudhary v. Nathulal Vishwakarma: the legal profession is a noble one, not a business or trade. The credibility and reputation of the profession depends upon the manner in which its members conduct themselves. The order in Arun Kumar Yadav v. State of U.P. is a timely reminder that this nobility must be earned afresh, in every court, on every date, through every communication with the Bench — including, most fundamentally, through the unadorned truthfulness of something as mundane as an illness slip.
