No Appeal Maintainable Against Rejection of Review: A Comprehensive Legal Analysis with Judicial Excerpts

The legal principle that no appeal lies against the rejection of a review petition stands as a cornerstone of Indian civil procedure, designed to uphold the sanctity of judicial finality and deter endless litigation. Rooted in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), this doctrine prevents the abuse of court processes by ensuring that once a matter is decided, it cannot be indefinitely challenged through repetitive mechanisms. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly reinforced this rule, emphasizing its role in maintaining judicial efficiency, preventing harassment of litigants, and promoting the public interest in concluding disputes. This principle not only streamlines the judicial system but also discourages dilatory tactics that could otherwise clog the courts with frivolous reapplications.

In the landmark judgment of Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd. (2025 INSC 1140), the Supreme Court has once again affirmed this doctrine with unequivocal clarity. Delivered on September 23, 2025, this ruling builds upon a rich tapestry of precedents, articulating the rationale behind the bar on appeals and underscoring the need for procedural discipline. By examining this case alongside historical jurisprudence, this analysis aims to provide a thorough understanding of the doctrine, its exceptions (if any), and its practical implications for litigants and legal practitioners.

At the heart of this doctrine is Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the CPC, which explicitly prohibits appeals against orders rejecting review applications. This provision states: “An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable.” The rule is not merely procedural but embodies a deeper policy objective: to ensure that judicial decisions achieve closure, thereby fostering confidence in the legal system and conserving judicial resources.

“That no appeal lies from an order rejecting a petition for review is clear from the plain language of Order XLVII Rule 7(1), CPC… Whenever a party aggrieved by a decree or order seeks a review thereof and the application fails, the decree or order under review does not suffer any change. It remains intact. There is no merger of the decree or order under review in the order of rejection of the review because such rejection does not bring about any alteration or modification of the decree or order; rather, it results in an affirmance of the decree or order.” [2025 INSC 1140, paras 23-24]

This affirmation prevents the review process from morphing into a de facto appeal, which could undermine the hierarchy of judicial remedies. The rationale extends beyond mere statutory interpretation; it is grounded in the principle of res judicata and the public policy against protracted litigation. As the Court notes, allowing appeals against review rejections would open the floodgates to endless challenges, defeating the purpose of review as a limited remedy for correcting apparent errors, discovering new evidence, or addressing other sufficient reasons under Order XLVII Rule 1.

Furthermore, the doctrine aligns with the constitutional framework, where extraordinary remedies like those under Article 136 are exercised sparingly to avoid circumventing statutory bars. This provision thus serves as a safeguard against judicial overload, ensuring that only meritorious cases progress through the appellate ladder.

The factual matrix in Satheesh V.K. v. The Federal Bank Ltd. exemplifies how litigants may attempt to exploit procedural loopholes, only to be rebuffed by the courts. The appellant, Satheesh V.K., had availed financial assistance from the respondent, Federal Bank, by mortgaging properties in Kozhikode. Upon defaulting on repayments, the bank classified the account as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) and initiated enforcement actions under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act).

Challenging these measures, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 before the Kerala High Court. The High Court, in its order dated October 1, 2024, directed the appellant to pay ₹2,00,00,000 by October 30, 2024, followed by the balance in 12 equal monthly installments starting November 15, 2024. Failure to comply would allow the bank to proceed under SARFAESI. The appellant then filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court but withdrew it on November 28, 2024, without seeking liberty to refile.

Subsequently, the appellant sought review of the High Court’s order, which was dismissed on December 5, 2024. Undeterred, the appellant filed two appeals before the Supreme Court on December 12, 2024—one against the original High Court order and another against the review dismissal.

The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, highlighting the appellant’s tactics:

“The alacrity with which the appellant moved from court to court… without showing semblance of inclination to repay the dues… to buy time by resorting to technicalities are certainly factors which we propose to bear in mind.” [para 6]

“No liberty having been sought or granted by this Court to present a fresh special leave petition… the appellant has no right in law to approach this Court once again after withdrawing the initial challenge.” [para 7]

This case illustrates the Court’s intolerance for procedural abuse, particularly in debt recovery matters where timely enforcement is crucial.

The doctrine has been fortified through a series of Supreme Court judgments, each contributing to its evolution. Below, we examine key precedents, including additional authoritative cases, with relevant excerpts.

This case established the bar on successive challenges post-unconditional withdrawal, rooted in public policy:

“It is not a permissible practice to challenge the same order over again after withdrawing the special leave petition without obtaining permission of the court for withdrawing it with liberty to move for special leave again subsequently… The withdrawal of a writ petition without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies, but the remedy under Article 226… should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner.” [(1999) 1 SCC 81, paras 9-15]

Clarifying the non-application of merger doctrine to SLP refusals:

“An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking or speaking order. It does not attract the doctrine of merger… the order refusing leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge.” [(2000) 6 SCC 359, para 44(iv)]

This allows reviews post-SLP dismissal but reinforces no appeal against review rejection.

A three-Judge Bench reiterated:

“From a cumulative reading of the various judgments… the review petition filed by the appellant in the High Court would be maintainable and should have been decided on merits… An order refusing special leave to appeal does not attract the doctrine of merger.” [(2019) 4 SCC 376, para 26]

Emphasizing the limited scope of review:

“It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC… The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise.” [(1979) 4 SCC 389, para 3]

This underscores that review rejections do not create new appealable orders.

On the nature of review:

“A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not think that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice to say that the mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review.” [(1975) 1 SCC 674, para 1]

This reinforces the non-appealable status under Rule 7(1).

Directly addressing the bar:

“Against an order rejecting a review application, no appeal lies (See Order XLVII, Rule 7(1) of the CPC).” [2023 LiveLaw (SC) 825, para 31]

The Court held that revision under Section 115 CPC might be available in limited cases, but appeal is barred.

Quoting the rule explicitly:

“Order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application. (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable…” [(2023) 7 SCC 384, para 28]

This case reiterates that no SLP lies against review orders without explicit liberty.

On successive SLPs:

“Once the special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn without obtaining appropriate permission to file a special leave petition once over again after exhausting the remedy of review petition before the High Court, the same is not maintainable.” [(2012) 12 SCC 378, para 13]

This complements the withdrawal principles in Satheesh V.K.

Affirmation Without Alteration: Rejection of a review affirms the original order without creating a new appealable decree (Order XLVII Rule 7(1)).

Bar on Successive Challenges: Unconditional withdrawal of an appeal or SLP precludes refiling without liberty, preventing process abuse (Upadhyay, Vinod Kapoor).

Non-Application of Merger: Refusal of SLP does not merge with the impugned order, allowing reviews but not appeals against their rejection (Kunhayammed, Khoday).

Limited Review Scope: Review is confined to errors apparent on record, not a rehearing (Aribam, Sow Chandra Kante).

Extraordinary powers are invoked only in exceptional cases of injustice, not to bypass finality (Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1955 SC 65, para 8: “It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations…”).

These principles collectively ensure procedural integrity and judicial economy.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Satheesh V.K. (2025) solidifies the bar against appealing review dismissals, promoting finality and curbing frivolous litigation. By integrating additional precedents like Aribam, Sow Chandra Kante, Rahimal Bathu, S. Narahari, and Vinod Kapoor, the jurisprudence gains further authority, demonstrating consistent judicial adherence to Order XLVII Rule 7(1).

Litigants must approach withdrawals cautiously, always seeking liberty to refile, and recognize reviews as narrow remedies. Practitioners should advise clients on these limits to avoid sanctions for abuse. Ultimately, this doctrine upholds the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium—it is in the public interest that litigation should end—ensuring justice is swift and conclusive.

Written By: Inder Chand Jain
Ph no: 8279945021 Email: inderjain2007@rediffmail.com