Case Analysis
Case Name: A.K. Kraipak Vs. Union of India
Citation: AIR 1970 SC 150
Year: 1969
Petitioner: AK. Kraipak & other officers
Respondent: Union of India
Bench: Hon’ble C.J., JM Shelat, KS Hedge, AN Grover, Vashishtha Bhargava, JJ and Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Hidayatullah
Facts and Arguments of the Case
The Indian Forest Service came into being under the All India Services Act, 1951, with recruitment being governed by the 1966 Rules and Regulations. Regulation 5 required that a Special Selection Board was formed to prepare the names of the eligible officers of the State Forest Service and submit them for the approval of the UPSC.
For Jammu & Kashmir, the Board consisted of Naqishbund, Acting Chief Conservator of Forests, who was also a candidate. The Board excluded the senior officers G.H. Basu, M.I. Baig, and A.N. Kaul and ranked Naqishbund as first. Even though he abstained while being considered, he went ahead to consider his rivals and finalise the list.
The appointments were made in accordance with the list approved by the UPSC, leading to the filing of petitions under Article 32 alleging bias and uneven application of the principles embodied under Articles 14 and 16.
The petitioners argued that since the Board enjoyed a quasi-judicial character, having Naqishbund occupy both roles violated the maxim nemo judex in causa sua. On the other hand, the respondents contended that the process was merely administrative and recommendatory and thus free from bias since Naqishbund did not decide his own case.
Issues
The conflict at hand raised many questions for the Hon’ble Court: –
- Whether the Selection Board’s role was purely administrative or quasi-judicial, attracting natural justice.
- Do principles of natural justice apply even to purely administrative functions?
- Did Naqishbund’s participation create reasonable likelihood of bias despite abstaining on his own case?
- If the Board’s process was biased, does it invalidate UPSC approval and Central Government appointments?
Rules
The following rules are applicable in the given case:
| Rule/Principle | Key Provision/Idea |
|---|---|
| All India Services Act, 1951 | Section 3(1)- Central Gov. to make rules for recruitment |
| Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966 | Rule 4(1)- Permits recruitment from the State Forest Service |
| Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966 |
|
| Doctrines |
|
Analysis
The Blurring of the Line Between Administrative and Quasi Judicial Functions
An administrative body is “a a government agency authorised to implement legislative directives by developing more precise and technical rules than legislative setting. Many administrative agencies also have law enforcement responsibilities”[1]. Such bodies act through discretion guided by policy and may affect individual rights, but they do not conclusively determine those rights with finality or binding force..[2]
By contrast, when an authority frames its own procedure yet ensures Natural justice compliance, it becomes quasi-judicial. As held in “Board of High School & Intermediate Education, UP v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta”[3]- “when an administrative body is entrusted with its own procedure so long as the principles of natural justice are followed and adequate opportunity of presenting his case is given to the examinee, such body becomes a quasi judicial body”. Such authorities, though not courts, may decide disputes, need not follow strict rules of evidence and are not bound by precedents.[4]
| Administrative Bodies | Quasi-Judicial Bodies |
|---|---|
| Guided by policy and discretion | Must follow Natural Justice |
| Do not give binding final decisions | Can determine disputes affecting rights |
| No strict rules of evidence | Still not bound by precedents like courts |
Court’s opinion in the case: Court viewed the Board as administrative since it merely recommended names for appointment. Yet, as these recommendations directly impacted candidate’s careers, the Court expressed need for objectivity, face-evaluation and application of standards similar to judicial functions. This overlap shows that natural justice is not confined to judicial/quasi-judicial actions. Later judgements reaffirmed that whenever administrative decisions entail civil consequences, fairness and natural justice are implied duties[5]. Thus eroding the earlierStrict division between administrative and quasi-judicial functions.
Court’s View on the Nature of the Selection Process
The Court next considered whether the selection process violated those principles of natural justice. As we can understand from “Sahara India (1) v. CIT”[6]- “Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights”. Traditionally, natural justice rests on two principles:
- Nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet- which means that “no one can be a judge in his own case”. In short this is also called the rule against bias.
- Audi alteram partem- which means hearing the other party, that is no one should be condemned unheard.
- Recently to these 2 principles, the concept of transparency and good governance are also added, which opens the dimensions for the duty to pass a speaking order.[7]
For our case the first doctrine of natural justice stands the most relevant. Bias means “an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious, in relation to a party or issue”[8]. This rule is essential not merely for impartial adjudication but also to ensure public confidence in the impartiality of the administrative process, as “justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”. [9] A biased decision is void, open to court appeal, and the trial is “coram non judice.”[10].
Court’s opinion in the case: The Court held that the presence of Naqishbund on the Selection Board, while he was himself a candidate, created a reasonable likelihood of bias. Although he abstained when his own name was under consideration, he actively participated in deliberations concerning his rivals and helped prepare the preference list that eventually included his name. This compromised the fairness of the process and violated the rule of nemo judex in causa sua.
The Court clarified that proving actual bias was unnecessary; a reasonable apprehension of bias was sufficient. His continuous involvement meant that other members could not have remained entirely uninfluenced by his presence. Court further answered the issue stating that the preference list prepared by the Board, which he helped shape, was submitted to the UPSC, which then made the final recommendations. Since the initial preparation was tainted with bias, the entire process was vitiated, even if UPSC had the final say.
Case Laws Relied Upon by the Court
- Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices (1926) AC 586: A decision maker is disqualified from participating if there is even a reasonable suspicion of bias.
- R. V. Hendon Rural District Council, ex parte Chorley (1933) 2 KB 696: Administrative actions are also invalid if there is a real likelihood of bias in the decision making process.
- Reg. V, Camborne Justices, ex parte Pearce (1955) 1 QB 41: Even the slightest pecuniary or personal interest can disqualify a decision maker.
Importance of Fairness in Administrative Decisions
Dr. Hassan Al Imran, in “Procedural Fairness in Administrative Decisions and Rights of Non-Citizens in Australia”[11] tell that fairness is the guiding principle of natural justice and integral to administrative power. It operates as a check against arbitrariness and ensures that discretion is exercised in a manner consistent with the rule of law. Natural Justice applies to administrative enquiries affected rights[12] and when they have civil consequences[13]. Wade & Forsyth note[14] that the duty to act fairly is now a general requirement in the exercise of administrative functions. Linked to this is the Wednesbury principle[15], which allows striking down decisions so unreasonable that no authority could have made them.
Fairness is thus, not limited to courts and extends to administrative discretion to ensure transparency and accountability, thereby embedding the principles of natural justice.
Comparative Case References
- Krishandatt Awasthy vs State of Madhya Pradesh[16]: In teacher appointments, some selectors had relatives among candidates. The Court, applying Kraipak, held that even reasonable suspicion of bias invalidates the process, and expanded the principle by requiring fair hearing at every stage and reasoned orders for transparency.
- Porter v Magill[17]: In this landmark UK case, the House of Lords held that apparent bias should be assessed by whether a fair-minded and informed observer would perceive a real possibility of bias. This UK test aligns with Kraipak for preventing bias, but focuses on appearance of bias rather than actual bias
- Goldberg v Kelly[18]: Here, the US Supreme Court ruled welfare benefits cannot be terminated without notice and hearing. Unlike Kraipak’s focus on bias, it highlighted procedural due process, requiring prior notice and opportunity to challenge decisions.
Conclusion
Impact
This judgement established that administrative bodies cannot claim immunity from principles of fairness merely because they are not courts and that procedural improprieties, without evidence of actual prejudice can vitiate decisions. This case also reinforced judicial oversight over administrative processes[19], ensuring impartiality and integrity in public appointments.
Significance
Blurred distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions, asserted focus on rights, rather than nature of authority.
Conclusion
Thus, this is a landmark judgement when it comes to natural justice in administrative law. It continues to guide administrative practices, promoting accountability, impartiality, and adherence to ethical standards in public service.
End Notes:
- Cornell Law School, Administrative Agency, Legal Information Institute (last visited Sept 10, 2025), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_agency
- U.P.D. Kesari, Administrative Law (22nd ed. 2016)
- Board of High School & Intermediate Education, UP v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, 1962 SCC Online SC 94
- U.P.D. Kesari, Administrative Law (22nd ed. 2016)
- Garima Nagpal & Peeyush Agarwal, Cement Cartel Case: A Step Towards Fairer Procedural Structure for Competition Watchdog?, 2016 PL (Comp. L.) 73
- Sahara India (1) v. CIT, (2008) 14 SCC 151
- Haryana Financial Corpn v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, (2008) 9 SCC 31
- I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (9th ed. 2019)
- R. v. Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy, (1924) 1 KB 256, 259
- Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611
- Hassan Al Imran, Procedural Fairness in Administrative Decisions and Rights of Non-Citizens in Australia, 10 Journal of Indian Research (2022)
- Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66
- State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269
- H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (11th ed. 2014)
- Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1 KB 223
- Krishandatt Awasthy vs State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 INSC 126
- Porter v. Magill, 2 AC 357
- Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254 (1970)
- Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664: “Judicial review acts as a safeguard against arbitrary action, requiring fairness in procedure and empowering courts to correct administrative misconduct, ensuring accountability and adherence to legal standards.”


