As the historical cradle of the Naxalite movement since the 1967 uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal witnessed a dramatic 21st-century resurgence characterized by a sharp, geographically concentrated spike in violence, followed by an equally rapid rollback through administrative revival, political mobilization, and targeted security operations. This resurgence was largely confined to the Jangalmahal region—spanning parts of Paschim Medinipur (now Jhargram), Bankura, and Purulia districts—where socio-economic grievances, tribal marginalization, and land disputes fuelled the insurgency. Unlike several other LWE-affected states, West Bengal’s resurgence proved shallow, reversible, and ultimately unsustainable.
At the national peak in 2010, India recorded approximately 1,936 LWE-related incidents and 1,005 fatalities—the highest in the conflict’s history. West Bengal ranked among the four most affected states during 2009–2010, with intense activity in Jangalmahal, including landmine attacks, ambushes, and parallel governance by Maoist-backed fronts like the People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA). This article examines key socio-legal triggers in this region, the symbiotic interplay between mass civil mobilization and armed cadres, and the multi-pronged state-led strategies—including calibrated security actions, governance extension, employment creation, infrastructure development, and political mainstreaming—that dismantled the insurgency by 2012–2013.
Today, as India approaches complete LWE eradication by March 31, 2026—with affected districts reduced to just 8–11 nationwide (none in West Bengal, which was progressively delisted, including Jhargram in early 2025)—West Bengal’s experience offers a compelling case study in reversing entrenched extremism within a democratic framework through decisive, context-specific interventions.
The Jangalmahal Flashpoint and the Lalgarh Movement (2008–2011)
The resurgence of Maoist influence in West Bengal crystallized around the Jangalmahal region—a forested, tribal-dominated belt spanning parts of Paschim Medinipur (now largely Jhargram), Bankura, and Purulia districts—where long-simmering grievances intersected with a catalytic trigger event.
The immediate spark was a landmine attack on November 2, 2008, targeting the convoy of then Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee near Salboni in Paschim Medinipur. While the Chief Minister escaped unharmed, the blast killed several policemen and civilians, prompting a large-scale police crackdown across Lalgarh and surrounding villages. Local Adivasi (tribal) communities perceived these operations—marked by cordon-and-search missions, alleged beatings, arbitrary arrests, and disruption of daily life—as heavy-handed and indiscriminate state repression.
This perception of police “atrocities” galvanized widespread anger, leading to the spontaneous formation of the People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCPA) in late 2008. Initially a genuine, rights-based civil mobilization led by local tribal leaders, the PCPA organized peaceful protests, road blockades, and demands for withdrawal of forces, withdrawal of false cases, and an end to harassment.
However, by early 2009, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) systematically infiltrated and co-opted the movement. Maoist cadres, under the strategic direction of leaders like Mallojula Koteswara Rao (Kishenji), provided armed protection to PCPA activists, supplied ideological training, and gradually transformed the committee into a front organization. What began as legitimate grievance redress evolved into a broader anti-state campaign, with Maoists using the PCPA to recruit, extort, and enforce parallel authority.
By mid-2009, the insurgents had effectively declared Lalgarh and adjacent areas a “liberated zone,” establishing people’s courts, banning CPI(M) activities, collecting “revolutionary taxes,” and restricting state access. This mirrored the classic Maoist protracted people’s war doctrine: building secure rural guerrilla bases in remote, forested terrain to encircle and eventually overwhelm urban centres. The Lalgarh movement thus became the epicentre of West Bengal’s Maoist resurgence, blending genuine tribal discontent with revolutionary armed struggle and setting the stage for the intense violence and consolidation that peaked in 2009–2010.
Escalation of Violence and Maoist Consolidation (2009–2010)
By mid-2009, Maoist influence in West Bengal had expanded rapidly across the Jangalmahal region, extending from roughly 21 police-station jurisdictions to nearly 28 by early 2010. Remote tribal areas of Paschim Medinipur (largely corresponding to present-day Jhargram), Bankura, and Purulia witnessed the emergence of Maoist-controlled pockets marked by restricted state access, intimidation of political opponents, and the assertion of parallel authority.
This phase coincided with the national peak of Left-Wing Extremist violence. In 2010, India recorded its highest-ever level of LWE fatalities, and West Bengal ranked among the four most affected states. The state experienced intense, localized violence, including landmine attacks, ambushes, targeted killings, and raids that significantly eroded state authority in affected blocks and reinforced the perception of Maoist dominance.
Under the leadership of Mallojula Koteswara Rao (alias Kishenji), a senior leader of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), the insurgency consolidated through a dual civil-military strategy. The People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCPA) functioned as a mass front that mobilized local tribal grievances against alleged police excesses and administrative neglect, while armed actions were executed by the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army. Together, these elements enabled the Maoists to blend coercion with consent, suppress rival political activity, and establish rudimentary systems of enforcement and taxation.
The movement drew strength from entrenched local grievances: persistent land alienation and denial of forest rights, chronic poverty and infrastructural neglect, and cadre-centric political control at the grassroots level that bred resentment and governance fatigue. By exploiting these fault lines, the Maoists transformed scattered discontent into fortified strongholds, positioning Jangalmahal as the epicentre of West Bengal’s Maoist resurgence during the 2009–2010 zenith.
Key Steps Taken to Eradicate LWE from West Bengal (Post-2008 Resurgence)
The rapid decline of Maoist influence in West Bengal, particularly after the 2009–2010 peak, resulted from a multi-pronged strategy under successive administrations, from 2011 onward. Key measures included:
- Security Operations and Reoccupation: Launch of Operation Lalgarh (2009–2010) with Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and state police to reoccupy Maoist-held territories in Jangalmahal, dismantle armed camps, and restore administrative access.
- Targeted Elimination of Leadership: Intensified operations leading to the elimination of senior CPI (Maoist) leader Kishenji (Mallojula Koteswara Rao) in November 2011, decapitating local command and disrupting networks.
- Legal and Front Dismantling: Arrest of People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA) founder Chhatradhar Mahato, breaking the civil-armed symbiosis and eroding the insurgency’s mass facade.
- Developmental Outreach and Welfare Saturation: Aggressive implementation of schemes like subsidized ration distribution (e.g., low-cost rice), infrastructure projects (roads, schools, healthcare), and basic service delivery in remote Jangalmahal areas to address poverty, alienation, and governance vacuums.
- Rehabilitation and Economic Mainstreaming: Enhanced surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy offering monthly stipends, fixed deposits, skill training, and sustainable livelihood pathways; prioritized recruitment of youth from LWE-affected areas as junior constables, home guards, and auxiliary police roles.
- Job Creation and Community Integration: Special drives absorbed thousands of local tribal youths into security forces and related positions; surrendered cadres and families received government jobs, entrepreneurial aid, and vocational opportunities to prevent recidivism and build local stakeholding.
- Political Mobilization and Grassroots Consensus: Robust expansion of party structures into rural/tribal areas, filling ideological and governance gaps; clear political consensus treating armed Maoism as a security threat, with zero ambiguity.
- Intelligence-Led and Containment Measures: Strengthened local intelligence networks, informant systems, and coordination to block cross-border spillover from Jharkhand/Odisha.
- Selective Central Support and Governance Restoration: Central forces supported state police without supplanting them; rapid re-establishment of police stations, administration, and services in affected blocks.
- Community Engagement: Efforts to win public trust isolated extremists, drying up local support through inclusive outreach.
This balanced “carrot and stick” approach—decisive force, legal action, welfare, economic integration, and political mainstreaming—led to near-total collapse of Maoist operations by 2012–2013, establishing West Bengal as a democratic counter-insurgency model.
Current Status (2025–2026)
West Bengal, the birthplace of the Naxalite movement in 1967, saw a sharp resurgence of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) in the Jangalmahal region (encompassing parts of Paschim Medinipur—now Jhargram—Bankura, and Purulia) during 2008–2010. Triggered by a landmine attack on Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee’s convoy in 2008, heavy police crackdowns sparked tribal anger, leading to the formation of the People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA). Maoists, led by Kishenji, infiltrated this civil movement, turning Lalgarh into a “liberated zone” with parallel governance, extortion, and violence peaking nationally in 2010.
The insurgency collapsed rapidly after 2011 through a multi-pronged strategy combining security operations (including Operation Lalgarh and Kishenji’s elimination in 2011), arrests of front leaders, and aggressive developmental interventions like infrastructure projects, subsidized welfare, job creation for tribal youth in security forces, and surrender-rehabilitation schemes. This “carrot and stick” approach—restoring governance, building public trust, and addressing grievances—effectively dismantled Maoist influence by 2012–2013.
Today, West Bengal is fully delisted from LWE-affected areas, with Jhargram removed in early 2025 and no significant incidents remaining. Nationally, LWE-affected districts have shrunk to just eight (mostly in Chhattisgarh), with the government on track to eradicate the menace by March 31, 2026. West Bengal’s reversal exemplifies how decisive, democratic counter-insurgency measures can succeed against entrenched extremism.
Conclusion
West Bengal’s experience demonstrates that the persistence of Left-Wing Extremism is shaped less by ideology alone than by the interaction of terrain, governance reach, and state capacity. The state’s transition—from Maoist “liberated zones” in Lalgarh and Jhargram during 2009–2011 to near-total eradication—was driven by three decisive institutional choices: unambiguous political clarity that treated armed extremism as a security threat rather than a negotiable grievance; the primacy of state police operations, reinforced by calibrated and time-bound central support rather than force substitution; and the early decapitation of insurgent leadership combined with welfare saturation and economic mainstreaming in affected areas. The progressive delisting of districts, culminating in Jhargram’s removal by early 2025, confirms that durable counter-insurgency within a democratic framework depends not on overwhelming force alone, but on reclaiming governance space, public trust, and institutional presence at the grassroots—offering a replicable model for remaining LWE-affected regions.
