Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have emerged as one of the most complex and lethal asymmetric threats confronting police and security forces in India and around the world. Designed to be inexpensive yet destructive, IEDs have been widely used by insurgent groups, terrorists, and criminal elements to target law enforcement, military personnel, and civilians. The effectiveness of such devices stems not only from their explosive power but from the tactical mistakes that security personnel sometimes make while detecting, handling, and disposing of them.
We will examine the common mistakes committed by police and security personnel in dealing with IEDs, illustrated through case studies from West Bengal and other Indian states. These case studies highlight operational errors, procedural lapses, training deficiencies, and strategic oversights that have resulted in loss of life, injuries, property destruction, and operational setbacks.
Understanding the IED Threat
An Improvised Explosive Device is a bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than conventional military action. IEDs can range from simple pressure-activated devices to sophisticated remote-detonated or anti-handling devices. The asymmetry and unpredictability of IEDs make them especially dangerous to security forces.
Security personnel typically deal with IED threats under the following contexts:
- Routine police operations triggered by intelligence inputs.
- Bomb threats received via calls or emails.
- Discovery of suspicious objects in public places.
- Counter-insurgency operations in Maoist, terrorist-affected regions.
- Urban public security scenarios such as markets, transit hubs, or administrative buildings.
A high level of caution, rigid adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and specialized training are essential for safe IED handling. However, mistakes often arise due to a combination of human error, inadequate training, technological limitations, and operational pressure.
Common Categories of Mistakes
Before diving into specific cases, it’s useful to categorize the typical mistakes made in IED encounters:
- a) Inadequate Recognition of Threats
- Misidentifying a suspicious package or failing to recognize all triggering mechanisms.
- Underestimating the possibility of secondary or anti-handling devices deliberately set to target responders.
- b) Lapses in Standard Procedures
- Deviating from established bomb disposal protocols.
- Improper approach paths, lack of standoff distance, and exposing personnel unnecessarily.
- c) Insufficient Use of Technology and Tools
- Failure to deploy robots, remote detonators, X-ray imaging devices, and protective gear.
- Lack of layered sensor systems resulting in mechanical or superficial searches.
- d) Poor Training and Preparedness
- Training that is too theoretical and not threat-centric.
- Low frequency of realistic drills and lack of multi-agency integration.
- e) Operational Pressures and Misjudgement
- Urgency to resolve scenes quickly due to public pressure.
- Overconfidence due to past success, leading to complacency.
Case Studies from West Bengal
Case Study 1: Alipurduar IED Defusal Incident (2013)
One of the most tragic IED mishaps in West Bengal occurred in Alipurduar in 2013. Police bomb disposal experts attempted to defuse an IED planted by suspected insurgents on the ground of a local club. Unfortunately, the device exploded during defusal, killing one bomb disposal expert and critically injuring two others.
Mistakes and Contributing Factors
- Misreading the Device Mechanism: The bomb squad failed to identify or anticipate the timer mechanism and possibly multiple trigger mechanisms packed into the IED. Experts later surmised that the IED contained a timer set to detonate at a specific time — knowledge that was missed during the preliminary assessment.
- Casual Handling: Units on the ground may have handled the suspicious package without maintaining adequate standoff distance, potentially due to a lack of protective gear or remote tools.
- Lack of Proper SOP Application: Due to poor recognition of the threat and inadequate use of detection tech, the team exposed themselves to an avoidable risk.
This incident underlines the dire consequences when IED detection and assessment are superficial rather than methodically analytical.
Case Study 2: Swasthya Bhawan Bomb Threat (2025)
In May 2025, two bomb threats claiming the presence of IEDs at Swasthya Bhawan in Kolkata prompted extensive search and response operations by the police and a bomb squad. Despite hours of search, no IEDs were found.
Mistakes and Issues Observed
- Improper Threat Assessment: Police lacked a structured threat assessment strategy and prematurely launched full-scale searches based solely on emailed threats without rigorous verification.
- Operational Disruption and Waste of Resources: Multiple hours were spent searching without finding any device, creating unnecessary panic and diverting resources from other priorities.
- Civil Security Impact: The threat escalated public anxiety and showed how psychological disorientation can occur when operational teams jump into reaction mode without proper evaluation.
This case illustrates the importance of threat validation, measured escalation, and coordination with cyber/intelligence units before deploying field resources.
Case Studies from Other States
West Bengal is not alone in facing IED mishaps. Multiple incidents nationwide highlight critical mistakes in handling explosive threats.
Case Study 3: Barikul Police Station Incident – West Bengal (2005)
Although older, the Barikul incident in Bankura district remains a classic example of procedural missteps. An Officer-in-Charge (OC) responded to a suspected booby-trap bag left after a Maoist attack. Instead of establishing standoff distances and waiting for EOD backup, he personally examined the bag, triggering its explosion.
Key Takeaways
- Fatal Hero Syndrome: A seasoned officer’s instinct to inspect manually led to his death and injuries among colleagues.
- Failure to Follow Bomb Awareness Protocols: Lack of adherence to bomb scene isolation and clearance principles exposed lives unnecessarily.
Case Study 4: Gadchiroli IED Triggering in Maharashtra (2019)
In central India’s Naxalite-affected Gadchiroli district, 15 elite Quick Action Team (QAT) commandos were killed when Maoists triggered IEDs during a combing operation.
Mistakes Identified
- Poor Reconnaissance and Terrain Familiarity: Units advancing on foot through hostile terrain missed secondary trigger pressure plates extending to escape routes.
- Complacency from Past Successes: Prior successful operations led to overconfidence, reducing the level of caution in detecting novel trigger methods.
Case Study 5: Jammu & Kashmir IED Partial Defusal (2023)
An IED was thought to be neutralized after partial defusal near the Line of Control. Later, during routine movement, the device exploded, killing three personnel.
Errors and Lessons
- Incomplete Clearance Verification: A superficial “done and dusted” mindset proved fatal. Protocols dictate multiple rounds of checks with X-ray and remote assessment to ensure no residual danger.
Case Study 6: Chhattisgarh DRG Vehicle Blast (2025)
In January 2025, in Bijapur district, Maoists detonated a massive 60–70 kg IED, blowing up a vehicle carrying District Reserve Guard personnel and a civilian driver, killing all nine on board.
Contributing Mistakes
- Route Clearance Oversights: The security convoy failed to clear the route fully ahead of travel, leaving them vulnerable to command-detonated IEDs.
- Pattern Predictability: Using the same route repeatedly without variation made convoys predictable targets.
Underlying Causes of Mistakes
Across these cases, several recurring themes explain why mistakes occur:
- a) Human Factors and Training Deficiencies: Human errors — whether overconfidence, fatigue, or lack of threat awareness — contribute significantly. Many police and paramilitary units receive equipment-centric training, not threat-centric training, leading to superficial use of tools and improper response under stress.
- b) Technical and Equipment Limitations: Lack of integrated sensor systems, inadequate robot units, absence of proper X-ray scanners, and insufficient standoff protective gear undermine safe IED handling. Detection tools perform poorly in certain terrains, and operators often lack the nuanced understanding to interpret complex signals.
- c) Institutional Gaps: Lack of unified Standard Operating Procedures, weak intelligence sharing, and insufficient coordination between units — such as cybercrime, intelligence, and bomb squads — increase the likelihood of mistakes.
- d) Psychological and Social Pressures: Responders often face pressure to quickly resolve bomb scares, leading to rushed decisions without full threat analysis. Alarm fatigue — where frequent false alarms desensitize personnel — also risks complacency in future genuine threats.
Lessons Learned and Best Practices
To mitigate these mistakes and enhance counter-IED operations, the following recommendations are critical:
- Enhanced, Realistic Training
- Threat-centric and multi-agency drills that simulate real IED scenarios.
- Regular refresher courses, including field practice, robot operation, and intelligence interpretation.
- Strict SOP Adherence
- Enforce standoff distances, controlled access, and layered checks for all suspicious objects.
- Zero tolerance for “hero syndrome” where individual recklessness trumps procedure.
- Technology Integration
- Invest in multi-sensor detection suites.
- Equip all police units with access to remote robots, portable X-ray devices, and protective gear.
- Intelligence-Led Operations
- Analyze past IED patterns and community inputs to anticipate tactics.
- Share intelligence across departments to avoid blind spots.
- Psychological Preparedness
- Stress-management training to counter alarm fatigue.
- Incentivize adherence to protocols, not just successful outcomes.
Conclusion
IEDs will likely continue to pose significant threats in India and globally. While the technical sophistication of devices evolves, it is the human and procedural response that determines whether an encounter ends in tragedy or successful neutralization. The cases from West Bengal — such as the fatal 2013 Alipurduar defusal and the Swasthya Bhawan bomb threat — along with other national incidents, starkly remind us that mistakes often derive from a deadly combination of inadequate training, poor threat assessment, and operational pressures.
Mitigating these risks requires sustained investment in training, equipment, inter-agency cooperation, and a culture that values protocol discipline over individual bravado. Only then can police and security personnel safely and effectively confront the complex menace of IEDs.
