Flags of Convenience in the Age of Autonomy: Flag State Obligations and the Accountability Gap for Unmanned Ships under UNCLOS - Legal Service India

Introduction

For more than four centuries, the legal status of a ship on the high seas has been inextricably linked to the human beings who commanded and manned those ships.

Table of Contents

The captain of a ship, who was granted very broad powers and, in turn, bore very broad responsibility, has been the fulcrum around which the entire system of maritime jurisdiction has turned.

The flag state, in granting nationality to a ship, assumed an obligation to exercise effective jurisdiction over that ship and, through it, over the human beings on board.

The UNCLOS, which came into force in 1994, articulated this relationship with a high degree of specificity.

Articles 91, 92, and 94 – Flag State Exclusivity

Articles 91, 92, and 94 of the Convention together delineate a system of flag state exclusivity, based on the assumption that the jurisdiction over a ship necessarily includes, at the very least, jurisdiction over specific human beings responsible for the ship’s navigation and operation.

Rise Of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (Mass)

This premise is now under attack.

Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships – ships that, to varying extents, operate without the presence of human crew on board – are progressing from proof-of-concept trials to operational use at a rate of speed that has not been kept up with by international law.

IMO Regulatory Response And Gaps

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) finished its Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE) on MASS in 2021, finding that there were substantial gaps and uncertainties in every major IMO instrument[i].
The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) has been working on a non-mandatory, goal-based MASS Code, with adoption scheduled for May 2025 and a mandatory version likely no earlier than 2028[ii].
Meanwhile, for years to come, and indeed for years beyond, MASS will be regulated by a patchwork of inadequate instruments that were drafted with crewed ships in mind.

Structural Challenge To The Flag State System

The issue this article tackles is not a technical one.

It is a structural issue.

The flag state system, long faulted for facilitating regulatory arbitrage via open registries, is structurally unsuited to regulate autonomous shipping.

Flags Of Convenience (FOC) And Economic Motives

The flags of convenience (FOC) states, Panama, Liberia, and the Marshall Islands, which combined comprised more than 46% of the world’s merchant fleet by deadweight tonnage as of 1 January 2024[iii], have constructed their registries on the premise of deliberately minimizing compliance costs.

State	Registry Model	Economic Incentive
Panama	Open Registry	Minimised Compliance Costs
Liberia	Open Registry	Minimised Compliance Costs
Marshall Islands	Open Registry	Minimised Compliance Costs

They have economic motives to flag MASS precisely because it abolishes the only kind of flag state obligation they have traditionally been most strongly urged to honour: seafarer welfare and crew certification.

Without a crew, much of the regulatory friction that has driven reform efforts simply becomes moot, leaving in its wake an accountability gap of a different and more perilous kind.

Flag State Obligations Under UNCLOS And The Humanist Premise Of Article 94

A. The Nationality Nexus: Articles 91 And 92

The legal personality of a ship as international law is derived from its nationality, and nationality is derived from the registration of the ship with a state. Article 91(1) of UNCLOS states that “Every state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for their registration in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. The grant of nationality shall be subject to the requirement established in paragraph 1 that there shall be a genuine link between the state and the ship.[iv]” Article 92 further emphasizes this with the principle of single nationality and exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the high seas.

The History Of The Genuine Link Requirement

The history of the genuine link requirement is rather tortuous. In the course of negotiations leading to the adoption of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, a more stringent standard was proposed, which would have given other states a right to deny recognition of the nationality of a ship if there was no genuine link to be found. This standard was not adopted, and what was left in the 1958 Convention and later in the UNCLOS was a requirement with no content.

This issue was directly confronted by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the famous case of the M/V ‘Saiga’ (No.2) in 1999, where it was held that the genuine link requirement is mainly concerned with ensuring the effective implementation of the flag state’s obligations under Article 94, and that it does not grant other states a right to impugn the nationality of a vessel on the basis of the insufficiency of the link.[v]

In effect, the genuine link requirement was thus stripped of its independent significance, becoming an obligation that assumed compliance with Article 94, rather than conditioning it.

Implications For MASS

In the case of MASS, the ITLOS formula raises a grave issue. If the requirement of the genuine link is, in essence, no more than the effective exercise of jurisdiction and control under Article 94, and if Article 94 is, as will be argued below, inherently incapable of application to unmanned ships, then the genuineness of any link between the state and the fully autonomous ship becomes a matter of legal indeterminacy.

The ship may be registered.
Documents may be issued.
A flag may be flown.

But whether any real state authority is being exercised in respect of the operation of the ship becomes a question that cannot be answered within the current framework[vi].

B. The Duties Of The Flag State: Article 94 And Its Anthropocentric Architecture

Article 94 is the operational core of the flag state system. The general rule – that every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical, and social matters over ships flying its flag[vii] – is fleshed out by a number of specific rules set out in Articles 94(3) and 94(4).

Specific Obligations Under Articles 94(3) And 94(4)

These include, inter alia:

The requirement to ensure that each ship is under the command of a master and officers who have the appropriate qualifications in seamanship, navigation, communications, and marine engineering.
The requirement to ensure that the crew is appropriate in qualification and number for the type, size, machinery, and equipment of the ship.
The requirement to investigate marine casualties or incidents of navigation.

The use of the word ‘master’ in Article 94(4)(b) is no coincidence. It is constitutively definitional. The master’s powers in international maritime law are very old and far-reaching: the master is charged with the safety of the ship, the welfare of persons on board, adherence to rules of the road under COLREGS, and in emergencies.

The IMO’s RSE identified the redefinition of ‘master’ as a high priority issue, observing that the ‘role and responsibilities of the master and a notional remote operator would have to be clarified as a pre-requisite issue before any further regulatory development could take place.’[viii] This is because the current wording of Article 94(4)(b) cannot be complied with by a ship that does not have a master on board.

The social aspect of Article 94 is also very telling. Article 94(3)(b) states that the flag state must ensure the manning of ships, working and living conditions, and training of crews, having regard to relevant international instruments.

The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC) is directly relevant to this article, even though it is not an IMO convention. Its entire regulatory framework, from minimum age standards to seafarer employment agreements, rest hours, medical care, and repatriation, is based on the presence of seafarers on board the ship[ix].

For a completely autonomous ship, none of these are applicable. The social responsibilities of the flag state, which have been the main means by which international pressure has been brought to bear on FOC registries, will no longer be relevant.

This is not a small omission. It is the erasure of one of the only places where accountability was beginning to make its presence felt.

Investigation Of Marine Casualties Under Autonomous Circumstances

Article 94(7) obliges flag states to investigate marine casualties involving their ships, especially those resulting in loss of life or serious injury.

The investigation of casualties under autonomous circumstances will pose completely new challenges: if an AI-based navigation system has made a series of decisions leading to a collision, the approach to error investigation developed for human error will be unsuitable.

The obligation to investigate will formally remain, but its substance will be hollowed out[x].

The Institutional Lacuna Between UNCLOS And The IMO RSE

It must be noted that UNCLOS was not taken into account in the IMO’s own Regulatory Scoping Exercise, since it is not an IMO regime[xi]. The RSE observed that MASS would have to function within the UNCLOS framework, but deliberately passed the question of how that framework should be addressed to another organization.

The consequence is a strange institutional lacuna: the regime that establishes the basic terms of flag state authority has been subject to no systematic examination in light of MASS technology, and the organization best placed to do so has disclaimed responsibility for the task.

Flags Of Convenience And The Mass Registration Incentive

A. The FOC Regime: Structure And Systemic Pathologies

The flag of convenience system is one of the most important and least controlled aspects of international maritime transport. Open registries, as they are called because they do not require any nationality of shipowners, function in a deliberate competition with each other and with the traditional maritime registries, enticing ships with a package of low registration costs, low taxes, lenient regulatory conditions, and ease of administration[xii].

The three largest FOC countries are listed below:

Country	Number Of Vessels (As Of 1 January 2024)
Panama	5,215
Liberia	8,338
Marshall Islands	3,048

These three registries together account for more than 46% of the world’s carrying capacity in terms of combined deadweight tonnage, according to the UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2024.

The economic rationale of the FOC system is simple: registration fees are an important source of national revenue for these countries. Liberia’s registry is run not in West Africa but from Dulles, Virginia, USA, by a private company, the Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry (LISCR, LLC), under a statutory arrangement approved by the Liberian parliament[xiii].

The effect is that the country of nominal flag state responsibility is subject to the obligations imposed by UNCLOS, while the registry is run for profit by a private company that is physically and organizationally distant from the activity of the registry.

The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), which has been campaigning against FOC registries since 1948, defines a flag of convenience ship as one “flying the flag of a country other than the country of ownership,” observing that “the FOC system flourishes in conditions of poor regulation, allowing rogue operators to take advantage of seafarers and avoid responsibility.”[xiv]

As of 2025, the ITF lists 48 countries as FOC registries.
Ships registered under FOC flags are over-represented in detention statistics under Port State Control.

The Deepwater Horizon tragedy in 2010 provided a grim example of this. The USCG/BOEMRE Joint Investigation Team, in its Volume I Report, found that “the control and regulation of the ship by the flag State, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, proved to be ineffective in preventing the incident, particularly in that the RMI had delegated all inspection activity to Recognised Organisations, and had not conducted any onboard oversight surveys itself, thus effectively delegating its responsibility for inspecting its vessels.[xv]”

B. Why MASS Will Amplify FOC Incentives

Contrary to what might be expected to ameliorate the FOC problem, autonomous shipping is likely to exacerbate it. This can be articulated with a certain degree of specificity.

The FOC regime has always been subject to three kinds of compliance obligation, which retained a degree of coercive power despite the lack of effective flag state enforcement:

Crew certification obligations under the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW);
Seafarer welfare obligations under the MLC;
The functional requirement to ensure the presence of a certificated master who is personally liable under a variety of legal regimes.

MASS removes all three of these limitations for fully autonomous and remotely operated ships.

There are no seafarers on board who require STCW certification or MLC protection.
There is no master on board whose personal liability provides a motive for prudent sailing.

The IMO Joint Working Group on MASS has itself identified the definitional ambiguity surrounding the ‘remote operator’, whether or not such an individual is a ‘seafarer’, what their qualifications should be, and whose law is applicable to their terms of employment—among its high-priority list of unresolved issues[xvi].

Until these questions are resolved, the long-distance operator finds itself in a legal twilight zone that the FOC registries will find highly beneficial to exploit.

The incentive structure can be articulated more precisely. A FOC state considering the registration of a fully autonomous cargo ship faces far lower administrative and reputational costs than it would for a crewed ship of comparable tonnage:

No labour disputes to be settled;
No seafarer complaints to be handled;
No ITF pressures to be dealt with.

The only remaining compliance requirement of any real import; ensuring the vessel’s technical seaworthiness and compliance; is one that FOC states have always been weakest at enforcing, and one delegated in practice to private classification societies whose authority rests not on public law accountability but on contractual relations.

There is also a voting power aspect of the issue that should be considered. Within the IMO, voting power over technical and legal issues is allocated in part according to fleet size. Countries whose registries contain large numbers of the world’s ships wield great power over the formulation of international rules[xvii].

If FOC countries become the main registries of MASS, they will bring to the IMO rule-making process on the MASS Code a structural interest in preserving the flexibility that has characterized their registries for conventional ships. The establishment of obligatory MASS rules will encounter an institutional barrier just from those countries that are likely to be the main MASS registries.

C. The Remote Operations Centre Problem

For remotely controlled ships — those operating at IMO Degree 3 of autonomy — a further jurisdictional complication arises that the FOC context makes acute.

A vessel registered under the Liberian flag and operated remotely from a control centre located in, say, the Republic of Korea poses the question: which state exercises effective jurisdiction and control over the ship?

Scholars have raised the possibility that the location of the Remote Operations Centre (ROC) effectively creates a concurrent or competing jurisdictional claim by the state in whose territory the ROC is situated.[xviii]

Article 94, as drafted, assigns jurisdiction to the flag state. But Article 94 presupposes that the flag state can in fact control the persons responsible for the vessel’s navigation. Where those persons are geographically located in another state’s territory and subject to that state’s law, the flag state’s capacity to exercise effective jurisdiction is compromised in a structurally significant way.

This is not simply a theoretical problem. It is a problem of legal attribution – of how to attribute responsibility to a state when a remotely controlled autonomous ship, registered with a classic FOC flag and operating from a control centre in a third country, causes environmental damage or a collision in the exclusive economic zone of yet a fourth state.

The solution to this problem, under current UNCLOS rules, is at best unclear and at worst simply non-existent[xix]. Dong, Bautista, and Zhu, in Marine Policy, have accordingly suggested that flag states exercise prudence in registering MASS when the ROC is outside their territorial jurisdiction until the MASS Code and relevant conventions are adopted[xx].

Port State Control as a Substitute Accountability Mechanism: Promise and Limits

A. The Architecture of Port State Control

Port State Control is the inspection of foreign vessels in national ports to check for compliance with international conventions. It is organized through a series of regional Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), with the Paris MoU (founded 1982, covering Europe and the North Atlantic) and Tokyo MoU (founded 1994, covering Asia and the Pacific) being the most advanced. The PSC regime was specifically intended as a safety net; a backstop for flag state implementation[xxi]. PSC officers (PSCOs) have the authority to inspect for compliance with SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, the ISPS Code, and the MLC, and can issue deficiency notices or, in extreme cases, detain the vessel until compliance is gained.

Key Functions of PSC

Inspection of foreign vessels in national ports
Verification of compliance with international conventions
Issuance of deficiency notices
Detention of vessels in extreme cases

Major Conventions Covered by PSC

Convention / Code	Subject Matter
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea
MARPOL	Marine Pollution Prevention
STCW	Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
ISPS Code	Ship and Port Facility Security
MLC	Maritime Labour Convention

The Paris MoU introduced a risk-targeting approach, known as the New Inspection Regime (NIR), in January 2011, which was later adopted by the Tokyo MoU in 2014[xxii]. Under the NIR, each ship is allocated a Ship Risk Profile according to flag state performance, classification society, ship type, age, deficiency history, and other criteria. Ships registered under flags of states that are placed on the ‘black list’ by the Paris MoU because of above-average detention rates are inspected more regularly. This provides, in theory, a reputational and operational incentive for flag states to enhance their performance.

Flag State Performance Lists

White List
Grey List
Black List

The Paris MoU and Tokyo MoU annually publish White, Grey, and Black lists of flag states according to their inspection and detention records. FOC states regularly appear in these lists, which indicate the persistent gap between registration numbers and performance. The reputational system is not very effective, as states on the black list still receive more registrations because of the higher registration revenues than reputational costs, but it is not completely ineffective either.

B. The Structural Limitations of PSC in Relation to MASS

When PSC officers come aboard an autonomous ship – if one makes it to port in the first place – they will be faced with a series of compliance issues that have no framework within their existing inspection processes. The first of these is the STCW issue. PSCOs are tasked with examining the certificates of the master and officers, ensuring that the watchkeeping standards are in place, and ensuring that the minimum safe manning certificate is in line with the actual crew on board. None of these apply to an autonomous ship that has no crew.

The STCW and Manning Problem

No master on board
No officers to certify
No watchkeeping standards to verify
No minimum safe manning compliance possible

The SOLAS Convention’s requirement that a ship must be under the command of a ‘master’ who can exercise ‘overriding authority’ remains also unclear for MASS. The Joint Working Group of IMO decided in its third session (MSC 108, May 2024) that a master must be on board whenever persons are on board, but left the question of fully crewless operation unresolved[xxiii]. In the absence of a master on board and a clear legal equivalent, the PSCO is left with a ship that is technically in violation of SOLAS Chapter V regulation 34-1 regarding the safety of navigation but with no mechanism for correction, since there is no crew to be certified, no watchkeeping arrangement to be checked, and no master to be told to correct the deficiencies before sailing.

Software and AI Integrity Challenges

The question of software and AI integrity introduces a further and completely new set of challenges for PSC. Traditional PSC inspections are well-suited to detecting physical issues – faulty fire protection systems, improper storage of hazardous materials, non-compliant life-saving appliances. They are not equipped to audit navigation software, machine learning decision trees, or cybersecurity procedures. However, for a MASS, the navigation software is the functional equivalent of the officer of the watch. Ensuring that it honours COLREGS, especially the duty to use every precaution to avoid a collision, is a task that requires analytical capability beyond the scope of any current PSC framework[xxiv].

Port-Dependent Jurisdiction Limits

PSC can inspect vessels only if they visit a port
An autonomous vessel may operate exclusively in international waters
No crew provisioning, rest, or repatriation needs
Operational design may deliberately avoid port calls

Moreover, PSC can inspect vessels only if they visit a port. An autonomous vessel may never choose to visit a port if it is operating in international waters, whether it is gathering oceanographic data, inspecting pipelines, or sailing between fixed offshore platforms. The port-dependent reach of PSC jurisdiction may be structured so as to avoid port calls by a MASS precisely because there are no crew members to provision, rest, and repatriate, which are operational necessities for crewed vessels.

C. Can PSC Bridge the Gap? A Qualified Assessment

However, despite its shortcomings, PSC still has considerable remaining value in a MASS scenario as long as its mandate is properly adjusted. There are three ways to do this.

1. Expanding Documentary Inspection

First, the procedures for inspecting ships under PSC need to be expanded to include the documentary aspects that will be mandated by the MASS Code. If the MASS Code mandates flag state certification of the ROC, ship-specific risk assessments, type approval for autonomous navigation systems, and human-machine interface documentation, PSCOs can be required to check these documents in the same way they are required to check SOLAS certificates and STCW qualifications today. This is practicable and consistent with the current IMO agenda.

2. Enhancing Flag Black List Deterrence

Secondly, the flag black list system has a potential deterrent effect that must be enhanced. If MASS incidents – navigational errors, collisions, environmental offenses traceable to autonomous systems – are systematically traceable to the flag state’s registry and reflected in the flag state’s PSC performance record, the costs of maintaining a lenient MASS registry will rise. This requires a deliberate policy choice by the Paris and Tokyo MoU secretariats to establish protocols for attributing MASS incidents to a flag state’s registry – a process that should commence immediately, before autonomous ships become common.

3. Assertion of Coastal State Rights Under UNCLOS

Third, and most significantly, coastal states must assert their rights under existing UNCLOS provisions. Under Article 25(2) of UNCLOS, the right of a coastal state to prescribe conditions for the entry of foreign ships into its ports is maintained. Under Article 211(3), states are free to impose additional pollution prevention measures for ships calling at their ports[xxv]. Such provisions could also support the requirement for MASS operators to make advance certification of the type approval of navigation systems, ROC certification, and cybersecurity audits a prerequisite for port entry. This would provide a market incentive for MASS operators to register with flag states that have a credible and internationally recognized MASS certification process, thus indirectly challenging the standards of FOC registries.

The key proviso is this: Port State Control was intended as a secondary, not primary, mechanism. The IMO has repeatedly characterized PSC as a ‘safety net to catch substandard ships’, not a substitute for flag state authority[xxvi]. To make PSC the primary mechanism for governing MASS would be to effectively declare the failure of flag state authority without offering a structural solution – a kind of institutional displacement that would result in accountability being diffuse, contested, and ultimately insufficient. If the net is the only net, it must be a much tougher net than the one that exists.

Conclusion

Structural Flaws in the Maritime Jurisdiction Framework

The conclusions drawn in this article all point to the same result: the international legal regime on maritime jurisdiction is not only imperfectly applied to autonomous ships, but is in fact founded on a set of assumptions that Mass calls into question.

The requirement of effective jurisdiction and control in Article 94 was predicated on the human factor. The genuine link requirement, as articulated in the M/V ‘Saiga’ (No.2) decision of ITLOS, is functionally tied to the content of Article 94.

And the content of Article 94, when applied to a fully autonomous ship, either becomes nugatory or presents a set of interpretive difficulties that cannot be reconciled with the ordinary meaning of the treaty text.

The FOC regime is merely an exacerbation of this problem. The existence of open registries is founded on a commercial rationale that favors minimizing the number of obligations with which a ship must comply. The one category of obligation they have been most successfully pressured to address is the one that Mass obviates.

Limits of Port State Control

However, Port State Control, even in the most extensive and fanciful interpretation, cannot bridge this gap.

It can examine paperwork.
It can check compliance.
It can impose detentions where the breach is patent.

But it cannot:

Examine navigation software.
Assess the qualifications of operators in a foreign country’s territory.
Hold operators accountable in real-time for a ship operating in international waters that never arrives at a port.
Fulfil the flag state’s duty to exercise effective jurisdiction.

A duty that lacks any substance when applied to crewless autonomous vessels under the current treaty text.

IMO Strategy And the Regulatory Gap

What is required is not a non-mandatory goal-based code.

The current IMO strategy — a non-mandatory Mass Code in 2025, followed by an experience-building phase, with mandatory regulation starting no earlier than 2028[xxvii], provides for an extended period during which autonomously operating vessels will be operating in governance structures developed for their crewed counterparts.

During this period, the abuse of the flag state system for Mass registration is not a risk; it is an expected behaviour.

The Threefold Reform Needed

The reform that is needed is threefold.

1. Clarification of UNCLOS Article 94

Firstly, UNCLOS Article 94 needs to be authoritatively clarified.

2. Genuine Link Requirement and MASS Registration

Secondly, the Mass Code needs to address the requirement of a genuine link.

It should provide that the registration of a Mass is only valid if the flag state has the ability to certify, audit, and, if necessary, investigate the autonomous navigation system, the ROC, and the operational chain of responsibility.

Small island states that run fully outsourced commercial registries need to either have that ability or not register a Mass.

3. MASS-Specific Inspection Procedures Under the MoUs

Thirdly, the Paris and Tokyo MoUs need to introduce Mass-specific inspection procedures as a matter of urgency, well before the adoption of the Mass Code.

This should include arrangements for:

Verification of type-approved autonomous navigation systems.
ROC certification equivalent documents.
Cybersecurity audit records.

A joint Mass inspection procedure, coordinated by the secretariats of both MoUs, would ensure that autonomous ships crossing both regions are subject to consistent and enforceable minimum standards.

Future Governance and Path Dependency

The regulation of autonomous shipping is not a problem that can be put off until the technology is ready.

The choices that are made now, regarding which regime is applicable, which states will be allowed to register Mass, and what PSC officers are entitled to inspect, will establish path dependencies that will be very hard to reverse once the commercial interests have solidified around them.

The flag of convenience system had survived over a hundred years of criticism because it had created vested interests that were too strong to be removed.

The era of autonomous shipping must not start with such a failure. End Notes:

IMO Maritime Safety Committee, ‘Outcome of the Regulatory Scoping Exercise for the Use of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS)’ MSC.1/Circ.1638 (14 May 2021). The RSE for safety-related IMO treaties was completed at MSC 103rd Session (5–14 May 2021); the RSE for legal instruments was completed at LEG 108th Session (July 2021).
IMO Maritime Safety Committee, 108th Session (MSC 108, 15–24 May 2024): The Committee adopted a revised MASS Code Roadmap providing for finalisation and adoption of the non-mandatory goal-based MASS Code at MSC 110 (May 2025), an experience-building phase framework by the first half of 2026, and commencement of mandatory MASS Code development in 2028.
UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2024 (United Nations, Geneva, 2024), Chapter 2, Table II.5: ‘Leading flags of registration by dead weight tons, as of 1 January 2024 — Source: UNCTAD calculations, based on data provided by Clarksons Research Services.’ Liberia registered 408,369 thousand DWT (17.3%), Panama 379,833 thousand DWT (16.1%), Marshall Islands approximately 309,000 thousand DWT (13.1%), combined exceeding 46% of global fleet capacity.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 397 (UNCLOS), art 91(1).
The M/V ‘Saiga’ (No.2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) [1999] ITLOS Case No.2, Judgment of 1 July 1999, para 83. ITLOS held that ‘the purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a genuine link between a ship and its flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other States.’
Bingying Dong, Lowell Bautista and Ling Zhu, ‘Navigating Uncharted Waters: Challenges and Regulatory Solutions for Flag State Jurisdiction of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships under UNCLOS’ (2024) 161 Marine Policy 106039. DOI (plain text): https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106039 Mirko Coric and others, ‘Remotely Controlled Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), the Genuine Link Requirement, and the Effectiveness of Flag State Jurisdiction’ (2025) Ocean Development & International Law.
UNCLOS (n 4) art 94(1).
IMO Maritime Safety Committee, Joint MSC-LEG-FAL Working Group on MASS (MASS-JWG), 1st Session Summary (September 2022): The group identified the definition and responsibilities of the ‘master’ and the role, competency standards, and seafarer status of the remote operator as high-priority foundational issues. See also IMO, ‘Outcome of the Regulatory Scoping Exercise’ (n 1).
Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) (adopted 23 February 2006 at the 94th Session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva; entered into force 20 August 2013). The MLC 2006 applies to all ‘seafarers,’ defined in Regulation 1.1 as persons employed or engaged or working in any capacity on board a ship. For vessels with no crew on board, the MLC’s normative framework — including Title 2 (conditions of employment) and Title 3 (accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering) — has no direct operational application.
UNCLOS (n 4) art 94(7). IMO, ‘Casualty Investigation Code’ (Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident) Resolution MSC.255(84) (May 2008). The Code’s framework for establishing causation through analysis of human acts and omissions will require substantial rethinking for AI-navigated MASS casualties.
IMO, ‘Autonomous Shipping’ (n 1): ‘The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), was not considered as part of the LEG RSE, as it is not an IMO Convention. MASS will need to operate within the legal framework of UNCLOS and, thus, UNCLOS will need to be considered.’
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), ‘Flags of Convenience’: ‘An FOC registry offers shipowners cheap registration fees, and low or no taxes… FOCs offer countries without their own shipping industry a way to make easy money.’ As of 2025, the ITF lists 48 countries as FOC registries. See also UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport 2024 (n 3) ch 2 on the structure of open registry systems.
The Liberian International Ship and Corporate Registry (LISCR, LLC), ‘About Us’: ‘The Liberian Registry is administered by the Liberian International Ship & Corporate Registry (LISCR, LLC), a private U.S. owned and globally operated company.’ LISCR is headquartered in Dulles, Virginia, USA. ‘LISCR, U.S.–Liberian Legal Systems’: ‘The contract between the Republic of Liberia and LISCR, LLC is in fact a statutory agreement, approved by the full and democratically elected legislature of Liberia.’
ITF, ‘US Authorities Right to Examine Flags of Convenience System — But Action Must Follow’ (ITF Press Release, 2025).
United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, April 20–22, 2010, Volume I (USCG, 22 April 2011). ‘The oversight and regulation of DEEPWATER HORIZON by its flag state, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), was ineffective… effectively abdicated its vessel inspection responsibilities.’ Confirmed by the Homeland Security Digital Library.
Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd edn, Manchester University Press 1999) 260–261. ITF, ‘US Authorities Right to Examine Flags of Convenience System’ (n 14): ‘the FMC has warned that this regulatory race to the bottom directly undermines efficiency, reliability and safety.’
Dong, Bautista and Zhu (n 6): The location of the Remote Control Centre raises ‘both technical and legal aspects and questions of liability’ and notes that ‘the jurisdictional chain of control is severed at the most critical point.’
Coric and others (n 6): The article analyses the tripartite jurisdictional problem — flag state, ROC state, and coastal/incident state — and concludes that none of the relevant UNCLOS provisions, as presently drafted, unambiguously resolve attribution for MASS incidents.
Dong, Bautista and Zhu (n 6): ‘Flag states should exercise caution in registering MASS particularly when the Remote-Control Centre (ROC) is located outside their territorial jurisdiction, pending adoption of the MASS Code and amendments to relevant conventions.’
IMO, ‘Port State Control’ Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU) (adopted 26 January 1982, entered into force 1 July 1982).
Paris MoU Secretariat, ‘New Inspection: the NIR entered into force on 1 January 2011 for Paris MoU member states.’ X Liu and others, ‘The Effectiveness of the New Inspection Regime for Port State Control: Application of the Tokyo MoU’ (2020) 184 Ocean & Coastal Management 105015 (Elsevier): confirming Tokyo MoU adoption of the NIR in 2014.
IMO MSC 108 (n 2): ‘The Group agreed that a master needs to be on board whenever persons are on board — for the exercise of the Master’s overriding authority.’ The status and requirements for the master in fully crewless operations remained deferred.
UK Parliament, Written Evidence submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping, ‘UNCLOS and Autonomous Shipping’ (2021): Compliance verification of autonomous navigation systems against COLREGS standards presents challenges for which existing PSC inspection frameworks have no established methodology.
UNCLOS (n 4) arts 25(2), 211(3). Article 25(2) preserves a coastal state’s right to lay down conditions for entry of foreign ships into internal waters or ports. Article 211(3) permits port states to establish pollution prevention requirements as a condition of entry.
IMO MSC 108 MASS Code Roadmap (n 2): The revised roadmap confirms mandatory MASS Code development will commence in 2028, with implementation timelines to be determined during the experience-building phase.

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