I. Introduction
Article 227 of the Constitution of India vests every High Court with superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This power — rooted in the colonial heritage of supervisory authority — has been the subject of extensive judicial exegesis.
The central and oft-litigated question is, how far may the High Court go? May it examine whether the subordinate court reached the right factual conclusion, or is its gaze confined to whether that court stayed within the boundaries of its jurisdiction?
The Supreme Court’s judgement in Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 INSC 416, decided on April 24, 2026, by a bench of J.K. Maheshwari and Atul S. Chandurkar JJ., provides a timely restatement of the settled principle: the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 does not sit as a court of appeal.
It cannot review, reassess, or reappreciate the evidence and material considered by the subordinate court or tribunal. The moment it does so, it transgresses the limits of supervisory jurisdiction, and its order becomes vulnerable to challenge before the Supreme Court.
This article traces the origin, constitutional text, and judicial evolution of Article 227, surveys the landmark precedents that define its boundaries, and examines how Deshmukh crystallises the doctrine against the backdrop of amendment jurisprudence under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
II. The Constitutional Text and Its Architecture
Article 227 provides, in its material part, that every High Court shall have “superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”.
This superintendence, unlike the appellate jurisdiction conferred by Articles 136, 132 or 133, is administrative and supervisory in character, not corrective of judicial error on merits.
Difference Between Article 226 and Article 227
The distinction between Article 226 (writ jurisdiction) and Article 227 (superintendence) is fundamental.
| Aspect | Article 226 | Article 227 |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of Jurisdiction | Original and discretionary | Supervisory and administrative |
| Primary Purpose | Enforcement of fundamental and legal rights | Keeping subordinate courts within jurisdictional limits |
| Scope | Broader constitutional remedy | Limited supervisory review |
| Power Over Facts | Can intervene in appropriate cases | Cannot reappreciate evidence like an appellate court |
Under Article 226, the High Court’s jurisdiction is original and discretionary, aimed at enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal rights.
Under Article 227, by contrast, the jurisdiction is inherently supervisory — its purpose is to keep subordinate courts within the limits of their jurisdiction, not to substitute the High Court’s judgement on facts for that of the court below.
The Principle in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath
This architectural distinction was lucidly articulated by the Supreme Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, where it was held that the power of superintendence under Article 227 is to be used to keep subordinate courts “within the bounds of their authority” and not to correct mere errors of fact or law which do not amount to jurisdictional excess.
Key Takeaways on Article 227
- Article 227 grants supervisory jurisdiction to High Courts.
- The power is not equivalent to appellate jurisdiction.
- High Courts cannot reassess or reappreciate evidence under Article 227.
- The jurisdiction is meant to correct jurisdictional errors and procedural irregularities.
- The doctrine was reaffirmed in Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada.
III. The Foundational Principle: Supervisory, Not Appellate
The bedrock principle governing Article 227 jurisdiction is that the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It cannot review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal has passed an order. The scope of interference is narrow and is confined to cases of jurisdictional excess, patent perversity or violation of principles of natural justice.
Core Principles Under Article 227
| Principle | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Supervisory Jurisdiction | The High Court supervises subordinate courts to ensure they act within jurisdiction. |
| Not an Appellate Power | The High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute factual findings. |
| Limited Interference | Interference is restricted to jurisdictional errors, perversity, or miscarriage of justice. |
| Discretionary Power | The jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised sparingly and cautiously. |
A. Waryam Singh v. Amarnath (AIR 1954 SC 215)
This is the locus classicus on the scope of Article 227. The Supreme Court laid down that the power of superintendence under Article 227 extends only to seeing that the subordinate court functions within the limits of its jurisdiction and acts in accordance with law. The High Court cannot, under the guise of superintendence, convert itself into a court of appeal.
- Article 227 is supervisory in nature.
- The High Court cannot function as an appellate authority.
- The jurisdiction is confined to ensuring legality and jurisdictional discipline.
B. Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Company Ltd. (2003) 3 SCC 524
The Supreme Court reiterated that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction. It is not open to the High Court, in the exercise of such jurisdiction, to review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal has passed an order.
“The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal, and it is not open to it to review or reassess the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal has passed an order.”
C. Raj Kumar Bhatia v. Subhash Chander Bhatia (2017 INSC 1240)
A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court specifically addressed the question of whether a High Court, under Article 227, could examine the merits of the case sought to be introduced by way of amendment. The Court held emphatically in the negative. It observed that “whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case which is proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial.” In enquiring into the merits of the proposed amendment, the High Court transgressed the limitations on its jurisdiction under Article 227. This decision is directly cited and applied in Deshmukh.
- The merits of the proposed amendment cannot be examined under Article 227.
- The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by analysing the likelihood of success.
- Article 227 cannot be used to conduct a mini-trial.
D. Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329
The Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive survey of Article 227 jurisprudence and consolidated the principles. It held that interference under Article 227 is permissible only in cases of:
- Grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law.
- A decision that shocks the conscience of the High Court.
- A refusal by the court below to exercise jurisdiction vested in it.
Mere errors of fact or law, even if apparent on the face of the record, do not invite superintendence.
“Normally the High Court should not interfere with an interlocutory order passed by the courts below unless the order is perverse or patently erroneous and has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The High Court should not interfere with the factual findings recorded by the courts below without any exceptional and compelling reasons.”
E. Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai (1986 Supp SCC 401)
The Supreme Court clarified that Articles 226 and 227, while appearing in the same constitutional location, serve distinct functions. Article 226 is a constitutional remedy of wider amplitude encompassing judicial review of administrative action. Article 227, by contrast, is purely supervisory — aimed at ensuring that subordinate courts do not exceed or refuse to exercise their jurisdiction. The two cannot be used interchangeably when the challenge is to a judicial order inter partes.
| Article 226 | Article 227 |
|---|---|
| Wider constitutional remedy | Supervisory jurisdiction |
| Judicial review of administrative action | Control over subordinate courts and tribunals |
| Broader scope | Narrow and restricted scope |
| Can address public law issues | Concerned with jurisdictional discipline |
F. Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675
The Supreme Court drew a sharp distinction between the High Court’s power under Articles 226 and 227 when exercised against judicial orders. It emphasised that the power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be exercised to examine the correctness of a finding of fact or law recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction. Article 227 is not a substitute for revision or appeal.
- Article 227 cannot replace appellate or revisional remedies.
- The High Court cannot reassess findings of fact.
- The jurisdiction is supervisory and corrective only in exceptional cases.
G. Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. (2023) 11 SCC 147
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that Article 227 jurisdiction is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise. It cannot be used to re-evaluate facts, re-appreciate evidence, or substitute a different finding merely because the High Court would have reached a different conclusion. The jurisdiction is discretionary and should be exercised sparingly.
- Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise.
- Re-evaluation of evidence is impermissible.
- The jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and cautiously.
Summary of Key Legal Principles
| Case | Key Principle |
|---|---|
| Waryam Singh v. Amarnath | Article 227 is supervisory, not appellate. |
| Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Company Ltd. | No reassessment of evidence under Article 227. |
| Raj Kumar Bhatia v. Subhash Chander Bhatia | Merits of proposed amendments cannot be examined. |
| Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil | Interference only in exceptional cases. |
| Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai | Articles 226 and 227 serve distinct constitutional functions. |
| Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai | Article 227 is not a substitute for appeal or revision. |
| Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. | High Courts cannot re-appreciate evidence under Article 227. |
IV. Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh: Facts, Issue And Decision
A. Factual Matrix
The landlord’s father filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide need in 2005 in respect of a shop in Mumbai. The Trial Court dismissed the suit in 2016, finding the bonafide need unproven.
During the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, the landlord expired in 2022. His legal heirs were impleaded. They filed an application for amendment of the plaint to incorporate their own bonafide need — specifically:
- The son’s wife’s legal practice
- The son’s intention to start medical practice
The Appellate Bench allowed the amendment, noting that the original plaint itself had pleaded the bonafide need of the landlord and his family members.
It directed the remand of the bonafide need issue to the Trial Court with liberty to both parties to adduce evidence. The tenant challenged this order before the Bombay High Court under Article 227.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. It found that the original landlord had only deposed about his own need and not that of his family members, and that the proposed amendment introduced a new case inconsistent with the evidence led.
It held that with the death of the landlord, his bonafide need eclipsed.
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court, speaking through Chandurkar J., set aside the High Court’s order on two independent grounds, both grounded in the doctrine of Article 227 limits.
First Ground — Misconstruction Of Pleadings
The High Court misconstrued the pleadings. Paragraph 4 of the original plaint expressly pleaded the bonafide need of the landlord and his family members.
Issue No. 3 framed by the Trial Court also reflected this. The High Court’s observation that only the landlord’s personal need was pleaded was “factually incorrect”.
By proceeding on this misconception, it vitiated the impugned order.
Second Ground — Impermissible Examination Of Merits
The High Court impermissibly entered upon the merits of the amendment. The question of whether the landlord’s deposition supported or undermined the family members’ claim was a matter for trial, not for determination at the stage of allowing or refusing an amendment.
The Court cited Raj Kumar Bhatia to hold that in enquiring into the merits of the amendment, the High Court transgressed the limitations of its jurisdiction under Article 227.
Power Of Remand Under Order XLI Rule 25 CPC
The Court also upheld the Appellate Bench’s power to remand the issue under Order XLI Rule 25 CPC to enable the Trial Court to record evidence on the amended pleadings – a power not foreclosed merely because the Trial Court had once framed and decided the issue of bonafide need on the original pleadings.
Key Legal Principles
| Legal Principle | Supreme Court’s Observation |
|---|---|
| Scope of Article 227 | High Courts cannot re-evaluate merits while exercising supervisory jurisdiction. |
| Amendment of Pleadings | Merits of the proposed amendment are not to be conclusively examined at the amendment stage. |
| Bonafide Need | Need of family members can survive and continue even after the landlord’s death if originally pleaded. |
| Order XLI Rule 25 CPC | Appellate courts retain the power to remand issues for fresh evidence on amended pleadings. |
V. The Doctrine of Subsequent Events and Moulding of Relief
Deshmukh also reinforces the principle, drawn from Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, 1975 INSC 75, that courts are not blind to events occurring after the institution of a proceeding.
Where a fact, arising after the lis is before the court, has a fundamental bearing on the right to relief or the moulding of it, the court cannot ignore it. This principle applies throughout the pendency of litigation — not merely at the trial court stage.
Supreme Court View in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Case
The Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu had held the following:
“If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy.”
The legal heirs in Deshmukh sought to bring on record the subsequent events arising from their own need for the premises.
The appellate bench correctly treated this as a permissible amendment introducing subsequent facts. The High Court’s error lay in treating it as a fundamentally new case rather than a continuation of the existing lis with updated facts.
VI. Principles Crystallised: The Article 227 Checklist
From the foregoing survey of authority, culminating in Deshmukh, the following principles may be crystallised for the practitioner:
- The High Court under Article 227 exercises supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction.
- It cannot review, reassess or reappreciate the material or evidence on which the inferior court or tribunal passed its order.
- Interference is warranted only where the inferior court has exceeded or refused to exercise its jurisdiction or has committed a jurisdictional error, a patent perversity, or a manifest violation of natural justice.
- The merits of an amendment application — including whether the proposed case will ultimately succeed — cannot be examined at the stage of Article 227 review of an order allowing or refusing an amendment.
- Where the subordinate court has exercised a discretion that was available to it and there is no error of jurisdiction, the High Court under Article 227 has no warrant to substitute its own view for that of the subordinate court.
- The High Court, acting on a factually incorrect premise — as occurred in Deshmukh — vitiates its order, rendering interference by the Supreme Court both appropriate and necessary.
- Subsequent events having a material bearing on the right to relief may be incorporated by amendment at any stage of the litigation, and the High Court cannot refuse such amendment on the ground of merits under Article 227.
Article 227 Principles at a Glance
| Principle | Legal Position |
|---|---|
| Nature of Jurisdiction | Supervisory and not appellate |
| Scope of Review | No reassessment or reappreciation of evidence |
| Grounds for Interference | Jurisdictional error, perversity, or violation of natural justice |
| Amendment Applications | Merits cannot be examined under Article 227 |
| Discretion of Subordinate Court | High Court cannot substitute its own view if jurisdiction was properly exercised |
| Subsequent Events | Can be brought on record through amendment at any stage |
VII. Distinguishing Article 226 and Article 227 in Practice
A recurrent confusion in practice is the use of Articles 226 and 227 interchangeably or cumulatively when challenging orders of civil courts.
Deshmukh is a reminder that Article 227, when invoked specifically against a judicial order of a competent subordinate court, carries a more constrained scope of review than Article 226.
Difference Between Article 226 and Article 227
| Aspect | Article 226 | Article 227 |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of Power | Writ Jurisdiction | Supervisory Jurisdiction |
| Scope | Broader judicial review | Limited supervisory review |
| Error of Law | May justify interference | Not sufficient unless jurisdictional |
| Review of Facts | Possible in limited cases | Generally impermissible |
| Interference Standard | Error apparent on face of record | Jurisdictional excess, perversity, or natural justice violation |
Under Article 226, the High Court’s writ jurisdiction — particularly certiorari — may extend to errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Under Article 227, even an error of law does not necessarily justify interference unless it goes to jurisdiction.
A party who invokes Article 227 to challenge an interlocutory order — such as an order on amendment — must demonstrate something more than a disagreement with the reasoning of the court below. It must demonstrate jurisdictional excess, perversity or a failure of natural justice.
Bombay High Court Error in Deshmukh Case
This was the error committed by the Bombay High Court in Deshmukh: it treated an Article 227 petition as if it were a regular appeal, entered upon the pleadings, assessed the evidence led by the original landlord, evaluated the tenability of the proposed amendment on merits, and reached a conclusion on facts.
All of these steps were impermissible in the supervisory jurisdiction.
VIII. Implications for Practitioners
For the practitioner appearing on behalf of a party aggrieved by a High Court order under Article 227 that has entered upon facts, Deshmukh provides a clear line of attack before the Supreme Court. The argument that the High Court acted as an appellate court — reassessing evidence and reappreciating the material — is well-grounded and has consistently found favour with the Supreme Court.
Equally, for the practitioner resisting an Article 227 petition in the High Court, the counter-argument must be front-loaded: the power of superintendence is not an appeal by another name. The moment the petitioner invites the court to examine whether the decision below was factually correct, that invitation must be resisted as exceeding the scope of Article 227.
Amendment Applications Under Article 227
In amendment applications specifically, the principle in Raj Kumar Bhatia and Deshmukh is settled: the merits of the proposed amendment — whether the cause of action disclosed is legally tenable or factually supportable — cannot be examined while deciding whether to allow the amendment. That determination belongs to the trial, not the amendment stage, and certainly not the Article 227 stage.
- Article 227 jurisdiction is supervisory, not appellate.
- High Courts cannot reassess evidence or reappreciate facts.
- Merits of proposed amendments must be decided during trial.
- Jurisdictional overreach under Article 227 is consistently corrected by the Supreme Court.
IX. Conclusion
The power of superintendence under Article 227 is a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional shortcut to appellate review. Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 INSC 416, reaffirms what a long line of Supreme Court authority has consistently declared: the High Court, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, supervises; it does not substitute. It ensures that subordinate courts function within their jurisdiction — it does not function as a superior court of fact or law in disguise.
The factual error committed by the Bombay High Court — its failure to notice that the original plaint had itself pleaded the bona fide need of the landlord and his family members — was an error that went to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction. Built upon a misconceived factual premise, the entire Article 227 intervention was rendered unsustainable.
The principles of Sadhna Lodh, Raj Kumar Bhatia, Shalini Shyam Shetty, and Surya Dev Rai, now reinforced by Deshmukh, constitute a cohesive doctrinal framework that must guide High Courts in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is austere by design. Any departure from that austerity – any drift towards appellate indulgence – represents a constitutional overreach that the Supreme Court has consistently corrected and will continue to correct.
Key Legal Principles Reaffirmed
| Principle | Position Reaffirmed by Supreme Court |
|---|---|
| Nature of Article 227 | Supervisory and not appellate |
| Reappreciation of Evidence | Impermissible under Article 227 |
| Amendment Applications | Merits cannot be examined at amendment stage |
| Jurisdictional Errors | High Courts may intervene only for jurisdictional defects |
| Factual Findings | Competent courts’ findings generally immune from interference |
Table of Cases
| Case Name | Citation | Key Principle |
|---|---|---|
| Waryam Singh v. Amarnath | AIR 1954 SC 215 | Foundational case on Article 227 scope; superintendence confined to keeping courts within jurisdiction. |
| Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. | (2003) 3 SCC 524 | High Court under Art. 227 cannot review or reassess evidence; scope limited to jurisdictional parameters. |
| Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai | (2003) 6 SCC 675 | Article 227 not a substitute for revision or appeal; factual findings of competent courts are immune. |
| Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai | 1986 Supp SCC 401 | Articles 226 and 227 serve distinct functions; Art. 227 is purely supervisory. |
| Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil | (2010) 8 SCC 329 | Comprehensive restatement; interference only for grave dereliction, patent perversity or abdication of jurisdiction. |
| Raj Kumar Bhatia v. Subhash Chander Bhatia | 2017 INSC 1240 | Three-Judge Bench: Examining the merits of an amendment under Art. 227 is an impermissible transgression. |
| Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. | (2023) 11 SCC 147 | Recent reaffirmation; Art. 227 jurisdiction exercised sparingly and not to re-evaluate facts. |
| Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders | 1975 INSC 75 | Subsequent events may be taken cognisance of to mould relief; courts must not be blind to post-institution facts. |
| Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada | 2026 INSC 416 | Leading case; High Court cannot enter upon merits of amendment application under Art. 227; factual error in premise vitiates order. |
Relevant Legal Topics
- Article 227 of the Constitution of India
- Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Courts
- Scope of Article 227
- Amendment Applications in Civil Procedure
- Appellate vs Supervisory Jurisdiction
- Jurisdictional Error under Article 227
- Bombay High Court Article 227 Case
- Supreme Court on Reappreciation of Evidence
- Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh Case Analysis
Written By: Inder Chand Jain
Ph no: 8279945021, Email: [email protected]


