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Author: Ashish Kumar Singh
Ashish Kumar Singh
Ashish Kumar Singh is pursuing his LLB from Faculty of Law, Delhi University & completed his master's in Modern Indian History at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His research interests include nationalism, constitution, politics, colonial and postcolonial state formation, and the intersections of religion and politics in South Asia. He has written on themes such as constitutional debates, colonial governance, and social movements, with articles published in platforms like Legal Service India.
This article critically examines the SC’s intervention in the ongoing Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Bihar’s voter list and its implications for Indian democracy. It highlights how the EC’s new requirements demand extensive documentation to reapply, even for long registered voters, shift the burden of proof of citizenship onto individuals, disproportionately affecting marginalized groups such as rural women and migrant workers. The piece argues that such measures risk undermining universal suffrage, constitutional guarantees, and the inclusiveness of India’s democratic process.
Judicial transformation: from Gopalan to Maneka Gandhi The Indian judiciary’s transformation into a truly rights-protective institution can be traced to the landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597). Prior to this, in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court had rejected the American style “due process” protection. Instead, it adopted the narrower “procedure established by law” standard under Article 21, meaning that personal liberty could be curtailed if there was a law in place, regardless of how unreasonable or unjust that law might be. Judicial review at this stage was largely…
