Lens of Justice: Perspective Theory and its Impact on Indian Legal Jurisprudence

Literature Review

Perspective Theory, while not traditionally associated with legal scholarship, has a rich intellectual lineage in other fields.

In philosophy, Immanuel Kant’s concept of the phenomenal world highlighted how reality is filtered through individual perception. Similarly, phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty emphasized that our understanding of the world is rooted in lived experience—an idea echoed in psychology by thinkers such as Jean Piaget, who argued that cognitive development affects how we perceive and interpret the world around us.

In literary theory, narratologists have long explored the influence of point of view on storytelling, suggesting that narrative meaning changes with the narrator’s identity, position, or experience. These interdisciplinary foundations make it clear: perspective is not a decorative concept; it is central to how humans make meaning.

Legal interpretation, however, has been slower to engage with this idea in any systematic way. Most mainstream jurisprudence continues to lean heavily on the notion of objectivity, viewing the judge as a neutral arbiter and law as a static, coherent system. Nevertheless, critical legal scholars have chipped away at this assumption.

The Legal Realism movement in the United States, for example, emphasized that judges are influenced by their personal experiences, values, and social conditions. Later, Critical Race Theory and Feminist Jurisprudence further advanced the idea that law is neither neutral nor universal but deeply influenced by the standpoint of those interpreting and applying it.

Indian scholarship, too, has addressed interpretive diversity, albeit under different names. Scholars such as Upendra Baxi, Amita Dhanda, and Kalpana Kannabiran have challenged the supposed neutrality of law by highlighting how caste, gender, and religion influence legal practice and access to justice.

Gopika Solanki’s work on legal pluralism in India explores how community-based and state-based legal systems overlap and compete, giving rise to multiple “legalities.” Marc Galanter’s research on the “haves” and “have-nots” in Indian courts also points to how structural location shapes legal outcomes.

However, these discussions often remain focused on structural inequality or institutional plurality, rather than the subtler question of how legal actors see the world, and how that shapes their judgments.

What remains relatively unexplored in Indian legal discourse is a structured, interdisciplinary framework that identifies perspective itself as a formal category of legal reasoning. While we have recognized the existence of different lenses based on religion, caste, gender, or class, we haven’t systematically studied how these lenses influence legal interpretation at the cognitive or philosophical level.

This is where my research intervenes. By introducing Perspective Theory as a conscious interpretive tool, this paper seeks to shift the discussion from diversity of laws or communities to the diversity of vision.

It asks: What does it mean to see the law not as fixed text, but as something filtered through human subjectivity? And how can recognizing this shift lead us closer to justice—not only as an outcome, but as a process grounded in self-awareness, plurality, and empathy?

In doing so, this paper attempts to fill a crucial gap: the absence of a theoretical language in Indian legal studies that brings together cognitive, cultural, and jurisprudential perspectives under one unified interpretive lens.

Theoretical Framework

At its heart, Perspective Theory is about acknowledging that we never see the world in a vacuum. We see it through lenses, shaped by who we are, where we come from, what we’ve experienced, and what we believe. These lenses influence how we interpret stories, events, people, and even legal texts.

While this idea might sound intuitive in daily life (“put yourself in their shoes”), it is rarely applied systematically within legal theory, especially in India, where diversity is vast and legal interpretation is deeply complex.

In its simplest form, Perspective Theory argues that perception is never neutral. Whether it is a judge reading a statute, a lawyer framing an argument, or a litigant understanding a verdict, interpretation is always filtered through cultural, emotional, social, and cognitive perspectives.

The theory draws from various disciplines: in philosophy, it relates to the subject-object divide; in psychology, it connects to schema theory and cognitive bias; and in literature, it is central to how narratives are constructed and deconstructed. The foundational concept here is that meaning is not just in the text—it is also in the interpreter.

Key terms in this framework include:

• Perspective: The personal or cultural lens through which a subject interprets reality or text.
• Positionality: The social and historical context that shapes one’s perspective (e.g., caste, gender, class, religion).
• Subjectivity: The internal, emotional, and cognitive world of the interpreter, which influences perception and judgment.
• Interpretive Pluralism: The idea that multiple, equally valid interpretations can exist depending on the interpreter’s standpoint.
• Cognitive Framing: The subconscious structure that shapes how we prioritize information and understand problems.

When applied to legal interpretation, Perspective Theory encourages us to move beyond the myth of total objectivity. Judges are human; so are lawmakers, lawyers, and litigants. They bring with them their own worldviews that is shaped by their education, upbringing, language, and personal histories.

For instance, two judges reading the same constitutional provision on freedom of religion might interpret it very differently based on their beliefs about secularism, minority rights, or national identity. Perspective Theory doesn’t claim that these differences are flaws but it says they’re inevitable. What matters is whether we acknowledge them and learn to work with them, rather than pretending they don’t exist.

Bringing this theory into the Indian legal context is both natural and necessary. India is not a homogenous society governed by a single legal tradition. Its legal system incorporates colonial legal codes, religious personal laws, tribal customary practices, and a powerful constitutional framework, all interacting, sometimes clashing. In such a pluralistic landscape, interpreting the law is not just a technical act but a deeply human one. A Dalit woman judge in Tamil Nadu and a male upper-caste judge in Delhi may interpret the same domestic violence case very differently, not out of bias, but from lived experience.

This paper adapts Perspective Theory to Indian law by offering a framework to identify, examine, and even embrace interpretive subjectivity. It doesn’t argue that anything goes but rather that a more conscious awareness of perspective can lead to fairer, more empathetic, and culturally grounded legal reasoning. In a system as layered and emotionally charged as India’s, justice cannot be seen only through black-letter law. It must also be seen through the eyes of those who interpret and live under it.

Analysis

Legal interpretation is often presented as a rational, clinical process—it’s an exercise in decoding language, applying rules, and reaching conclusions. But when we take a closer look, especially in constitutional and statutory interpretation, what emerges is something far more textured and human.

In this section, we examine how perspective, not just logic or precedent, shapes how law is understood and applied in India. Through constitutional interpretations, key Supreme Court cases, and comparative insights, we reveal how judicial thinking is never entirely separate from the thinker.

Let’s begin with constitutional interpretation, which is where the Indian judiciary most visibly expresses its philosophical leanings. Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s decisions on Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty). In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the Court famously expanded the meaning of personal liberty to include dignity, due process, and fairness. Contrast this with earlier rulings like A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), where a narrower, more procedural view was taken.

What changed? The Constitution didn’t. The words didn’t. What changed was the perspective—from a more textual, state-centric interpretation in the 1950s to a rights-conscious, liberal vision in the 1970s. Judges in Maneka Gandhi saw the Constitution as a living document. Their social, political, and generational context influenced how they read the same words differently.

Case studies further illustrate how perspectives shape legal outcomes. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), which struck down the practice of instant triple talaq, we see a convergence of constitutional morality and gender justice. The majority viewed the issue through a lens of individual dignity and equality, while the dissenting judge, Justice Kureishi, emphasized religious freedom and personal law autonomy.

Both were interpreting the Constitution, but from different vantage points—one foregrounding secular liberalism, the other respecting religious pluralism. Perspective didn’t just influence the reasoning; it defined the stakes of justice.

Statutory interpretation is no less affected. Judges often confront vague, outdated, or ambiguous laws, especially in areas like criminal law or family law. For example, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), the Court read down Section 377 IPC to decriminalize homosexuality. The law had remained unchanged since colonial times. What changed was the interpretive lens: the Court moved from a moralistic, majoritarian view to one of individual autonomy, dignity, and global human rights discourse.

This shift wasn’t automatic; it reflected a deeper cultural and generational transformation in how the judiciary perceives identity and freedom. Judges, after all, are not machines. Their personal, educational, and cultural backgrounds inevitably shape how they see law. A judge with a background in human rights law may interpret a case differently from one trained in commercial law. A first-generation female judge may be more attuned to power imbalances than someone from an elite legal family. These differences don’t discredit judgments, but they humanize them.

But we must be aware of them if we want to hold the system accountable and inclusive. Comparing this with common law traditions, particularly British jurisprudence, which heavily influenced Indian law, we see both continuities and departures. British common law acknowledges precedent and logical consistency but is increasingly open to purposive interpretation.

In India, purposivism is even more pronounced due to our Constitution’s moral vision and our socio-cultural diversity. What this means is that India’s legal system was never purely objective to begin with—it was always interpretive, always perspectival. What we need now is to name this reality, study it, and engage with it responsibly.

Ultimately, recognizing the role of perspective doesn’t weaken the law—it strengthens it. It reminds us that law, like life, is not just about rules, but about meaning. And meaning always depends on where you’re standing.

Applications and Implications

Recognizing the role of perspective in legal interpretation is not just an academic exercise but it has powerful real-world applications. Law isn’t practiced in a vacuum; it’s lived, taught, debated, and enforced by people with lived experiences. If we begin to consciously incorporate perspective theory into the way we teach, appoint, and legislate, the Indian legal system could become not only more just, but more human. This section explores how perspective awareness can reshape legal education, judicial appointments, policy-making, and broader systemic reform.

First, let’s begin with legal education. Most Indian law schools still teach law as if it exists in a sterile vacuum, where rules reign supreme and human experience is an afterthought. But if we teach students to recognize that interpretation is shaped by one’s identity, values, and worldview, we can create more self-aware and empathetic legal professionals.

Imagine a classroom where students are not only taught what Article 14 says but also invited to explore how a Dalit woman might understand equality differently from an urban upper-caste man. Or how colonial laws continue to affect tribal communities. By integrating perspective theory into curricula through case analysis, moot court debriefs, and interdisciplinary coursework we foster critical thinking that extends beyond technical proficiency into moral and social understanding.

This naturally leads us to judicial appointments. If we accept that perspective influences how laws are interpreted, then diversity on the bench becomes not a token gesture, but a constitutional necessity. For too long, the higher judiciary in India has been dominated by a relatively narrow class, mostly upper-caste, male, urban, and English-speaking. While competence and integrity are non-negotiable, lived experience should also be seen as a legitimate form of judicial wisdom. A bench that includes voices from marginalized communities can bring new lenses to entrenched legal questions. These diverse perspectives don’t dilute justice; they deepen it by making it more reflective of the society it claims to serve.

From a broader lens, perspective theory also impacts legal reform and policy development. Legislators and policymakers often draft laws with a ‘one-size-fits-all’ mentality. But society is not monolithic; what feels fair or effective in one region or community may feel oppressive or irrelevant in another. Perspective-aware policymaking would mean greater consultation with diverse stakeholders, more culturally grounded legislative drafting, and better anticipation of how laws will be experienced differently across social contexts.

For example, gender-neutral rape laws may appear progressive on paper, but could ignore the specific vulnerabilities of cisgender women or trans persons unless informed by varied lived perspectives.

Recommendations for the Indian Legal System

• Integrate perspective analysis in legal training, through clinical legal education, ethics modules, and intersectional case studies.
• Revamp criteria for judicial appointments to emphasize not only merit and seniority, but experiential diversity.
• Institutionalize impact assessments for new laws, measuring how they may be perceived or experienced by different groups.
• Promote judicial empathy, not as sentimentality, but as a disciplined awareness of one’s positionality.

In short, building a legal system that sees through multiple lenses does not fragment justice, it completes it. Perspective isn’t a threat to objectivity; it is a reminder that objectivity without awareness is often just invisible bias. The more we embrace our human complexity in law, the closer we move to justice that is not only rule-bound, but real.

Conclusion
At its core, this paper has explored a simple yet powerful idea: the law is seen through human eyes. And those eyes are never neutral. By bringing Perspective Theory into conversation with Indian legal jurisprudence, we’ve highlighted how interpretation is shaped by lived experience whether in classrooms, courtrooms, or legislative halls.

We began by tracing the roots of Perspective Theory in philosophy, psychology, and literary studies, and then extended it into legal interpretation. We showed how constitutional and statutory interpretation in India is deeply influenced by the personal and social perspectives of judges, as seen in key Supreme Court decisions. We also examined how background caste, class, gender, training shapes legal vision, and how India’s plural legal landscape makes this interpretive diversity even more significant.

This work contributes a fresh theoretical lens to Indian legal scholarship. While much has been written about legal pluralism, critical legal studies, and social justice, this paper offers a unifying idea: perspective as a tool to better understand why law plays out differently in different hands. It invites scholars and students alike to recognize that legal reasoning isn’t detached from identity, but it is deeply embedded in it.

Future research can build on this by studying how perspective shapes specific domains like environmental law, corporate law, or personal laws. Empirical studies on how judges’ backgrounds influence verdicts, or how clients experience the law differently, would ground this theory in lived data.

For legal practitioners, the message is practical: be aware of your lens and learn to recognize others’. Lawyers who understand multiple perspectives argue better; judges who are self-aware interpret more justly. Law becomes less rigid, and more responsive.

In the end, this is a call for a more honest legal culture, one that doesn’t pretend to be impersonal, but instead strives to be consciously human. Because justice isn’t blind. It sees through the lens of those who deliver it. Our task is to make that lens as inclusive, aware, and compassionate as possible.

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