Introduction
Left Wing Extremism (LWE) remains one of the most persistent internal security challenges faced by India. Despite notable progress over the past decade in reducing violence and geographical spread, large pockets of LWE-affected regions continue to suffer from a critical lack of police and security infrastructure. This deficiency is not merely an operational weakness; it is a structural vulnerability that affects governance, development delivery, rule of law, and public confidence in the state.
LWE-affected areas—often referred to as the “Red Corridor”—span remote, forested, and underdeveloped districts across multiple states. These regions are characterised by difficult terrain, sparse population density, poor connectivity, and deep socio-economic deprivation. In such an environment, the absence or inadequacy of police infrastructure significantly constrains the state’s ability to establish effective control and protect civilians.
Understanding the LWE Landscape
LWE is primarily driven by the ideology and armed actions of groups such as the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which seek to overthrow the Indian state through protracted people’s war. Their influence has historically extended across parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, Maharashtra, Telangana, and parts of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.
These regions are typically marked by weak state presence. Police stations are few and far between, often located at great distances from villages, and many operate with skeletal manpower and outdated equipment. For extremist groups, this vacuum becomes an opportunity to establish parallel authority structures, enforce their own “justice,” and intimidate local populations.
The State of Police Infrastructure in LWE Areas
- Inadequate Physical Infrastructure
One of the most visible problems in LWE areas is the shortage of basic police infrastructure. Police stations, outposts, and camps are often insufficient in number and poorly distributed. In many districts, a single police station may cover hundreds of square kilometres, making rapid response to incidents nearly impossible.
Existing police buildings frequently lack:
- Fortification against armed attacks or IED blasts
- Secure accommodation for personnel
- Reliable power, water, and sanitation facilities
- Storage for weapons, ammunition, and sensitive records
Such vulnerabilities have repeatedly been exploited by LWE groups, who target poorly defended police stations to loot arms, destroy infrastructure, and demonstrate the state’s weakness.
- Poor Connectivity and Mobility
Road infrastructure in LWE areas is often underdeveloped or deliberately sabotaged. Poor road networks, damaged bridges, and lack of all-weather connectivity severely restrict police mobility. During the monsoon season, entire areas can become inaccessible for weeks.
This lack of mobility has direct operational consequences:
- Delayed reinforcement during ambushes
- Limited area domination and patrolling
- Reduced frequency of community outreach
- Over-reliance on foot patrols in hostile terrain
Without adequate roads, helipads, and forward operating bases, police forces remain reactive rather than proactive.
Human Resource Constraints
- Manpower Shortages
Police forces deployed in LWE-affected districts often face acute manpower deficits. Vacancies in state police cadres, combined with the reluctance of personnel to serve in remote and high-risk postings, result in overworked and fatigued units.
Low police-population ratios in these areas mean:
- Long duty hours with minimal rest
- Reduced training opportunities
- Decline in morale and motivation
The pressure is compounded when personnel are assigned both law-and-order duties and counter-insurgency operations without adequate backup.
- Limited Specialised Training
Counter-LWE operations require specialised skills in jungle warfare, IED detection, intelligence gathering, and small-team tactics. However, many police personnel posted to these areas receive limited pre-deployment training.
Inadequate training leads to:
- Higher casualties during ambushes
- Poor situational awareness
- Tactical errors in cordon-and-search operations
While central forces often have better training standards, state police—who are the first responders—remain comparatively underprepared.
Technology and Equipment Gaps
Modern counter-insurgency relies heavily on technology. Yet, LWE-affected areas often suffer from outdated or insufficient equipment.
Key gaps include:
- Lack of modern assault rifles and protective gear
- Inadequate night-vision devices and thermal imagers
- Poor radio and satellite communication coverage
- Limited access to drones and surveillance tools
Communication blackouts are common in forested interiors, leaving patrols isolated and vulnerable. In contrast, LWE groups increasingly use improvised but effective communication and intelligence networks, narrowing the asymmetry in their favour.
Intelligence Infrastructure Deficit
Effective policing in insurgency-affected areas depends on actionable intelligence. However, intelligence infrastructure in LWE regions remains weak.
Factors contributing to this deficit include:
- Insufficient local intelligence units
- Limited linguistic and cultural familiarity among personnel
- Fear-induced reluctance of civilians to share information
- Weak coordination between state police and central agencies
The absence of sustained police presence in villages further erodes trust, allowing extremist groups to monopolise information flows.
Impact on Civilian Policing and Governance
The lack of police infrastructure has consequences far beyond counter-insurgency operations.
- Erosion of Rule of Law
In many remote villages, police are seen as distant or absent. This creates space for LWE groups to enforce their own parallel justice systems, including kangaroo courts and violent punishments. Ordinary crimes—assault, extortion, land disputes—often go unreported or unresolved.
- Disruption of Development Activities
Security weaknesses directly affect development. Contractors are reluctant to work in insecure areas, and government officials hesitate to conduct field visits without adequate protection. Schools, health centres, and welfare schemes suffer as a result.
Thus, poor police infrastructure perpetuates the very underdevelopment that fuels LWE recruitment.
Psychological and Moral Impact on Police Personnel
Serving in poorly equipped and isolated locations takes a heavy psychological toll on police personnel. Constant threat of ambush, lack of basic amenities, and prolonged separation from families contribute to stress and burnout.
This environment can lead to:
- Declining operational effectiveness
- Increased instances of indiscipline
- Difficulty in retaining experienced personnel
A demoralised force cannot effectively counter a motivated and ideologically driven adversary.
Role of Central Armed Police Forces
To compensate for weak state police capacity, the Union government has deployed Central Armed Police Forces, particularly the Central Reserve Police Force, in large numbers. Specialised units like CoBRA battalions have improved operational outcomes.
However, central forces are not a substitute for robust local policing. Their deployment is often temporary and operation-centric. Without parallel strengthening of state police infrastructure, gains remain fragile and reversible.
Structural and Administrative Causes
The persistence of infrastructure gaps is rooted in deeper systemic issues:
- Delayed land acquisition and forest clearances
- Poor inter-departmental coordination
- Inadequate budget utilisation at the district level
- Corruption and weak project monitoring
Security infrastructure projects in LWE areas often face cost overruns and long gestation periods, diluting their impact.
Strategic Implications
Inadequate police and security infrastructure in LWE areas has long-term strategic implications for internal security. It prolongs conflict, increases financial and human costs, and undermines public faith in the state’s ability to govern its peripheries.
From a national security perspective, such vulnerabilities can also be exploited by external hostile actors seeking to destabilise the country through proxy means.
The Way Forward
Addressing the infrastructure deficit in LWE areas requires a comprehensive and sustained approach:
- Expansion and Fortification of Police Stations: Establish more police stations and forward operating bases with proper fortification, living facilities, and logistics support.
- Improved Connectivity: Prioritise road construction, bridges, and helipads with security-linked clearances to enhance mobility and response time.
- Human Resource Strengthening: Fill vacancies, incentivise hard-area postings, and ensure regular rotation and welfare support for personnel.
- Training and Technology Upgradation: Invest in specialised counter-insurgency training, modern weapons, surveillance tools, and secure communication networks.
- Community-Centric Policing: Increase sustained police presence in villages, recruit local youth, and rebuild trust through lawful and humane policing.
- Integrated Security and Development Planning: Align police infrastructure development with welfare delivery to address both security and root causes simultaneously.
Conclusion
The lack of police and security infrastructure in LWE-affected areas is not merely a logistical problem—it is a governance challenge with deep social, economic, and strategic dimensions. While significant progress has been made in curbing Left Wing Extremism, the sustainability of these gains depends on the state’s ability to establish credible, permanent, and humane policing in its most remote regions.
Strengthening police infrastructure is therefore not just about countering armed insurgents; it is about restoring the social contract between the state and its citizens. Only when people see the police as accessible protectors rather than distant or absent entities can lasting peace and development take root in LWE-affected areas.
