Section 10A Of The IBC: A Constitutional Aberration Or Economic Necessity?

Introduction

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 2016 (IBC) was enacted to address a problem that has long plagued India’s financial ecosystem, namely delays and inefficiencies in resolving business difficulties. It created a single, streamlined framework that empowered creditors, promoted business certainty, and aimed to revive or liquidate troubled companies within a limited period of time.

At the heart of this system are Sections 7 and 9, which give financial and operational creditors the right to appeal to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) when a debtor company defaults. Over the years, these provisions have become key entry points to trigger the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), and they have shaped the way debt resolution is conducted in practice.

Impact of Covid-19 on Insolvency Law

Then came 2020, a year of global upheaval. As the COVID-19 pandemic spread through economies, businesses across all sectors struggled to stay afloat. In response to the financial shock, the Government of India through Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) introduced Section 10A in the IBC. It’s goal? To avoid a flood of insolvency proceedings against companies that have been hit hard by pandemic induced payment defaults.

Section 10A and Its Implications

But what was presented as a temporary relief measure quickly raised eyebrows in the legal sphere. Section 10A did not merely suspend insolvency applications for a few months, it went further. By declaring that no default claims “shall ever be filed” during the specified period, it effectively closed the door to creditors for good, even long after the crisis had subsided.

Constitutional and Legal Concerns

This raises important questions. Was such a wide and permanent bar really necessary? Does it strike the right balance between protecting companies in difficulty and respecting the rights of creditors? More importantly, does it stand the test of constitutional review under Articles 14 and 21, particularly when it removes access to a legal remedy that the Code otherwise provides?

Scope and Objective of the Paper

This paper explores these questions head-on. It explains how Section 10A interacts with Sections 7 and 9, what challenges have emerged in its application and whether it crosses the line of legislative excess. We will also look at how Indian courts have addressed it so far, and how India’s response compares to other jurisdictions that have faced the same pandemic pressures but adopted different legal tools. Finally, this paper offers suggestions on how the provision could have been better designed and why an overhaul may still be needed to align the IBC with constitutional principles and practical justice.

Key Provisions at a Glance

Provision	Purpose	Effect
Section 7	Allows financial creditors to initiate CIRP	Triggers insolvency proceedings on default
Section 9	Allows operational creditors to initiate CIRP	Provides remedy for unpaid operational debt
Section 10A	Suspends insolvency filings for pandemic period	Permanently bars claims for defaults during that time

Central Issues Raised

• Whether Section 10A was proportionate to the economic crisis.
• Whether permanent exclusion of claims is justified.
• Whether creditor rights are unfairly restricted.
• Whether the provision violates Articles 14 and 21.
• Whether alternative legislative tools could have achieved the same objective.

Legislative Framework and Developments

To understand the controversy surrounding Section 10A, it is important to first look at how the IBC operates, particularly through Sections 7 and 9, and how pandemic era changes, including a significant change in the default threshold, have reshaped the insolvency landscape.

A. Sections 7 and 9: Basic Mechanisms for CIRP Initiation

Under normal circumstances, the IBC allows creditors to initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) when a debtor company does not default on a payment. Section 7 empowers financial creditors, generally banks and financial institutions, to initiate the CIRP without having to demonstrate that the debt is in dispute. Section 9 grants a similar right to operational creditors, such as suppliers, vendors or service providers, but with an additional mandatory procedural step whereby they must first issue a notice of demand under Section 8, and the CIRP can only be initiated if no dispute is raised within 10 days.

Originally, the threshold for triggering the CIRP under Sections 7, 9 and 10 was set at Rs. 1 lakh. This has made the IBC a widely accessible tool for creditors, including small sellers and MSMEs. However, in response to concerns about the misuse and potential overload of the insolvency system, especially during the pandemic, the Government of India, through the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, issued a notification,[1] on 24th March, 2020, increasing the minimum default threshold to Rs. 1 crore in a bid to initiate CIRP. This change took effect immediately in a prospective manner.

This decision was important and controversial. On the one hand, it considerably reduced the field of those who could turn to the NCLT. Many operational creditors, especially small businesses and MSMEs, which often process invoices well below Rs. 1 crore, have been effectively excluded from the CIRP mechanism. The timing is also revealing; the threshold was raised just one day before the government imposed the first nationwide lockdown on 25th March, 2020, indicating an intention to protect the insolvency system from being overloaded during the crisis.

Aspect	Position Before March 2020	Position After March 2020
Minimum default threshold	Rs. 1 lakh	Rs. 1 crore
Access for MSMEs	Widely accessible	Significantly restricted
Impact on filings	High volume	Substantially reduced

B. The Emergence of Section 10A: Legislative Response to COVID-19

Shortly after raising the threshold, the government took a more direct step to end new insolvency filings. On 5th June 2020, it promulgated the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, introducing Section 10A with retrospective effect from 25th March 2020 as part of its Atma Nirbhar economic reforms.[2] This provision prohibited any claim under Sections 7, 9 or 10 in the event of a default occurring during the suspension period.

Initially, the suspension was supposed to last six months, but it was later extended to a maximum of one year, until 25th March, 2021. The most controversial aspect of Section 10A is the clause stating that no claim “shall ever be filed” for such defects, essentially making the ban permanent, not temporary.

This permanent extinction of the right to initiate the CIRP, even after the end of the suspension period, was unprecedented. It tipped the scales too much in favour of debtors, leaving many creditors, especially those below the Rs. 1 crore mark, without effective recourse under the IBC. And unlike typical stays, which are procedural in nature, Section 10A arguably extinguished legal rights substantially, raising serious constitutional and political questions.

• Section 10A applied retrospectively from 25th March 2020.
• The suspension initially lasted six months.
• The maximum extension was up to 25th March 2021.
• The phrase “shall ever be filed” made the prohibition permanent.

C. Legal Ambiguities and Practical Implications

Now, several legal and practical questions subsequently emerged;

• Could the ICRP be incurred for a continuing default that began before 25th March, 2020 but persisted during the suspension period?
• Would the claims arising during the suspension period resume after 25th March 2021 or would these rights have been definitively lost?
• Was there an alternative forum or remedy for operational creditors with claims of less than Rs. 1 crore, who were now doubly excluded first by the increase in the threshold and then by the prohibition in Section 10A?

In the absence of legislative clarification, these issues have ended up before the Hon’ble courts and tribunals, resulting in a patchwork of interpretations and inconsistent results. The next section will look at how the Hon’ble Supreme Court, NCLAT, and NCLTs have interpreted Section 10A and whether these interpretations align with the broader purpose and structure of the IBC.

Judicial Interpretations and Doctrinal Contours

The judiciary has had to navigate the difficult terrain set by Section 10A, in particular its general restriction on the opening of insolvency proceedings for defaults that occurred between 25th March 2020 and 25th March 2021. While Parliament’s intention was to provide temporary relief during the pandemic, the provision’s rigid wording has led to complexities of interpretation or forced the courts and tribunals to develop nuanced jurisprudence that both respects Parliament’s intent and protects the financial and operational rights of creditors.

A. Interpretation of Section 10A in Relation to Default

One of the main interpretive issues before the Honourable courts was whether the prohibition in Section 10A had the effect of extinguishing a debt or simply imposing a procedural prohibition. This distinction was crucial in determining whether applications under Section 7 or 9 were eligible after the suspension period.

In Bikram Bhadur v. Union Bank of India,[3] the debtor company argued that the default occurred during the period of Section 10A, as the account was declared NPA on 31.03.2021. However, the NCLAT confirmed the NCLT’s admission of the application under Section 7 on the grounds that the default on 31.03.2021 was beyond window 10A and there had been continued non-payment thereafter.

The Hon’ble Tribunal also relied on the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India[4] and Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal[5] to reaffirm that the classification of NPAs may indicate the date of default, but is not determinative unless it corresponds to non-payment as defined in Section 3(12) of the IBC.

• The bar of Section 10A cannot be stretched to protect recurring or new defaults after the suspension period.
• Even if part of the claim relates to the protected period, a post-10A default can independently sustain a CIRP.
• The threshold of Rs. 1 crore must be satisfied excluding the protected period.

In Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Pvt. Ltd.[6], the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that no application under Sections 7, 9 or 10 of the IBC can ever be filed for a default that occurred between March 25, 2020 and March 25, 2021, even after the suspension period has expired. The judgment reaffirmed that Section 10A is absolute in nature, leaving no scope for retrospective applications. This approach, however, has been criticized for lacking flexibility where the default continues beyond the protected window.

B. Continuing Defaults and Novel Causes of Action

Another important dimension emerging from judicial decisions is the recognition that each missed payment constitutes a new and independent default.

In SIDBI v. Sambandh Finserve Pvt. Ltd.[7], the debtor company had defaulted in 2020, but SIDBI filed a new application based on defaults that occurred after the Section 10A period, specifically on 10.07.2021. The Hon’ble NCLAT held that each EMI not paid after the suspension constituted a fresh cause of action and was therefore not barred by Section 10A.

• Earlier applications may be dismissed as premature.
• Subsequent defaults revive the creditor’s right to initiate CIRP.
• Post-10A defaults must independently cross the statutory threshold.

This approach preserves the deterrent purpose of the Code and ensures operational clarity for creditors by recognizing that Section 10A does not grant permanent immunity for future breaches.

C. The Problem of the General Ban: Legal and Practical Consequences

Although Section 10A was enacted to protect companies during the COVID-19 crisis, its structure as a total ban has produced serious legal and practical consequences.

Issue	Consequence
Absence of discretion	NCLTs cannot intervene even in cases of fraud or bad faith.
No revival mechanism	Statute-barred claims cannot be resurrected.
Rigid exclusion	Even valid claims partly arising during 10A are rejected.
Procedural imbalance	Access to CIRP is denied while post-admission withdrawal is allowed.

In Manish Mukim v. Rakhi[8], the Hon’ble Court reiterated that defaults occurring within the protected period must be excluded even if the remainder of the claim is valid. However, no mechanism exists to restructure claims unless a new default occurs, revealing a structural limitation in the design of Section 10A.

This has been contrasted with Section 12A, which allows withdrawal of CIRP after admission with 90% CoC approval. While Section 12A promotes resolution, Section 10A prevents even preliminary access to justice, creating procedural arbitrariness.

These concerns echo earlier constitutional warnings issued in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India[9] and Manish Kumar v. Union of India[10], where excessive legislative interference in adjudicatory functions was criticized.

D. Observations on the Procedural Versus Substantive Prohibition

A central doctrinal question is whether Section 10A merely bars procedure or extinguishes substantive rights. Judicial consensus favours the procedural interpretation.

In Vinod Kumar v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd.[11], the principal default occurred on 11.02.2021, within the protected window, but interest remained unpaid after 26.03.2021. The Hon’ble Court held that while the principal default was protected, continued interest liability after 10A was sufficient to sustain a claim under Section 7.

• Liability is not extinguished.
• Protected period amounts must be excluded from computation.
• Post-10A defaults preserve the right to sue.

The Court clarified that allowing CIRP for post-10A defaults does not circumvent the statutory bar but respects the temporal demarcation set by Parliament.

Overall, the emerging jurisprudence reflects cautious evolution. Courts have avoided extreme interpretations and developed a balanced framework that respects legislative intent while ensuring the functional effectiveness of the IBC. The ban is procedural, new defaults are actionable, thresholds are strictly enforced, and any default arising directly within the Section 10A window remains permanently excluded.

Constitutional and Doctrinal Criticism

The introduction of Section 10A in the IBC was a legislative response to an unprecedented economic crisis. Yet, while its intention was to provide temporary protection, its interpretation and consequences raise fundamental constitutional and doctrinal concerns, particularly with respect to arbitrariness, proportionality and access to justice.

A. Article 14 and the Doctrine of Arbitrariness

The most immediate concern with Section 10A is its blanket prohibition approach that applies uniformly to all breaches that occurred between March 25, 2020, and March 25, 2021, regardless of their seriousness, nature, or consequences. This total exclusion, without any jurisdictional leeway, is arguably a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As the historic Maneka Gandhi case has shown, arbitrariness is the antithesis of equality. Section 10A treats unequal cases in the same way by placing solvent companies, companies in real difficulty and voluntary defaulters on the same pedestal.

In Manish Kumar (supra), although the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the IBC amendments regarding threshold requirements, it emphasized that classification under economic legislation must be rationally connected to the subject matter. In the present scenario, the absence of nuance in Section 10A does not meet this test.

• Creditors whose debt defaulted on March 24, 2020 can initiate CIRP.
• Creditors whose debt defaulted on March 25, 2020 are forever barred.

Such discrimination based on exclusion, in particular with irreversible consequences, lacks any justifiable rationality and introduces legal uncertainty.

B. Violation of the Right to a Remedy and Access to Justice

While Parliament is free to regulate procedural remedies, the denial of remedy in its entirety, even if temporary, raises issues under Section 21 and the constitutional guarantee of access to justice. The IBC is a remedial law designed to balance the interests of creditors and debtors. By prohibiting any claims, even after the stay period, Section 10A erases a key remedy for financial and operational creditors.

In Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan,[12] the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed that access to adjudicative mechanisms is a fundamental right, implicit in Article 21. Section 10A, read literally, deprives creditors of this access even when the debt is admitted, the default is acknowledged and the contributions remain unpaid. This amounts to a denial of judicial review, which is a cornerstone of constitutional governance.

C. Overbreadth of Economic Legislation

Economic law is usually entitled to deference under the doctrine of legislative wisdom. However, even such deference has limits. In Pioneer Urban Land (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such laws must always meet the criteria of proportionality, fairness and non-arbitrariness.

In the present circumstances, Section 10A was intended to mitigate the impact of COVID-19. Yet, it did not distinguish between companies that genuinely needed a remedy and those that took unfair advantage of the stay. Nor did it incorporate a retrospective review or sunset clause to revive claims based on subsequent defects. This makes the law disproportionate to creditors, while allowing dishonest debtors to play with the system.

In addition, the phrase “no application shall ever be filed” introduces a perpetual prohibition, which is rare in economic law. Even the limitation provisions of the Statute of Limitations Act allow for an extension in specific circumstances. However, Section 10A is distinguished by the absolute extinction of a creditor’s right to request a rescission, probably even violating the principle of legitimate expectations.

D. Comparative Jurisprudence and Global Practices

In comparison, other jurisdictions that have imposed similar moratoriums on insolvency during the pandemic, such as the UK Insolvency and Corporate Governance Act 2020, have included flexible frameworks. For example, they allowed the courts to assess whether COVID-19 was actually the cause of the non-performance. Even in the United States, although some bankruptcy relief has been extended under the CARES Act, the right to file for insolvency has never been fully repealed.

India’s Section 10A, on the other hand, has not been subject to such a calibration. It was a blanket prohibition with no judicial variance, exceptions, or review mechanisms. The result has been an erosion of creditor confidence and a disruption of the balance of the insolvency regime. The judiciary, while commendably receptive, remains limited by the overly broad language of the law.

Concluding Observations

In few words, Section 10A may have been a legislative necessity in times of crisis, but its wording has opened it up to a valid constitutional critique. So far, the courts have refrained from declaring it unconstitutional, probably because of the doctrine of deference in economic policymaking. However, from a doctrinal and structural point of view, the provision reflects an excess of procedure and a flawed framework for appeals.

A potential future challenge by a concerned creditor whose recourse is blocked despite the debtor’s post-COVID creditworthiness may well prompt further constitutional scrutiny. This paves the way for a reassessment of how protective legislation like Section 10A can be designed to balance the intent of the legislature, the interests of creditors, and constitutional guarantees without causing permanent damage to the collection architecture of the Indian insolvency law.

Comparative Perspective and General Policy

To truly assess the validity of Section 10A in the global context, it is necessary to examine how other jurisdictions have responded to insolvency challenges during the COVID-19 crisis. Countries around the world have adopted extraordinary but nuanced mechanisms to deal with the unprecedented economic fallout. India’s approach, while aiming to provide a protective buffer, must be analysed in the light of international standards such as the UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law and the World Bank’s Insolvency Index, which emphasize predictability, time-limited procedures, and fair treatment of creditors.

A. Global Responses to COVID-Related Insolvency

1. United Kingdom – Insolvency and Corporate Governance Act 2020

The UK introduced temporary reforms through the Insolvency and Corporate Governance Act 2020, which suspended provisions on unlawful transactions, imposed temporary restrictions on winding-up applications, and introduced a stand-alone moratorium process. In particular, creditors were required to prove that the default was not COVID induced. This approach has preserved the adjudicator’s discretion while protecting debtors. It is important to note that the law was time-limited and included review mechanisms, unlike India’s Section 10A, which offered a general and irrevocable prohibition.

2. United States – Flexibility in Chapter 11

The U.S. took advantage of the existing Chapter 11 bankruptcy framework, but introduced additional relief under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. These included raising the debt threshold for small businesses under Subchapter V, prioritizing pandemic-related spending, and encouraging restructuring over liquidation. Unlike Section 10A, there is no absolute prohibition on filing bankruptcy applications. Instead, procedural measures and expedited hearings were the tools of choice. This has made it possible to preserve the balance between debtors and creditors.

3. Singapore – COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act 2020

The Singapore model is widely appreciated for its calibrated relief. The COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act of 2020 temporarily increased debt thresholds and imposed moratoriums, but was also associated with judicial discretion. The Act allowed the courts to assess whether the inability to pay was truly induced by the pandemic. In addition, Singapore has introduced a simplified insolvency program to make it easier for micro and small enterprises to resolve issues. These innovations are an example of how emergency law can be both protective and procedurally fair.

4. India’s Approach – A Comparative Critique

While India has increased the threshold from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 1 crore and suspended sections 7, 9 and 10 via Section 10A, it has not provided:

• Any possibility of case wise assessment.
• A mechanism for reviving or taking over receivables after 10A.
• Flexibility through parallel restructuring pathways (except for the late introduction of a pre-pack for MSMEs).
• Statutory guidance to distinguish between deliberate and crisis-driven defaults.

This comprehensive approach contrasts with UNCITRAL’s emphasis on predictable, transparent and fair insolvency systems. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2020 report also highlights the importance of creditor participation and time bound processes, both of which have been compromised under Section 10A.

B. Criticism of the Policy: Was Section 10A the Best Tool?

1. Would a Limited Discretionary Power of the Judges Have Been Sufficient?

Rather than a drastic bar, a more balanced option could have been to give NCLTs the authority to assess causality to find out if the defect was truly due to COVID-related stress. This would have been in line with the approach taken by the United Kingdom and Singapore and would have avoided the unintended consequence of blocking even legitimate claims that arose outside the protected period.

In Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power (P) Ltd.,[13] the Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreted Section 10A strictly, holding that even claims filed after the stay for default during the protected period were inadmissible. This rigid interpretation could have been avoided if the arbitrator’s discretion had been preserved by legislation.

2. Other Remedies – Restructuring and Pre-Packaging Mechanisms

Instead of the general prohibition of Section 10A, other policy instruments could have been deployed, such as:

• Pre-pack insolvency, now available only to MSMEs, which could have been extended.
• Temporary settlement facilitation platforms under the IBBI, which could have allowed for negotiation windows.
• Out of court restructuring encouraged via the RBI guidelines.
• Standstill clauses mandated by the SEBI.

The latter would have provided avenues for resolution while maintaining the rights of creditors.

3. Cost-Benefits of the General Prohibition

Although Section 10A has provided temporary leeway for debtor companies, the costs are obvious, such as:

• Blocking CIRPs even in the event of a strategic default or pre COVID distress.
• Judicial inconsistency on what constitutes a continuing default.
• Confusion about the interaction with the Rs. 1 crore threshold, especially for operational creditors.
• The erosion of creditor confidence.
• The potential deterrent effect on loans.

Thus, while the intent behind Section 10A may have been noble, its execution lacked the flexibility, foresight and safeguards seen in other jurisdictions. In hindsight, a calibrated and principled response would have been much more aligned with India’s broader insolvency reform agenda.

Conclusion: Towards Future Insolvency Frameworks

This comparative and political lens makes it very clear that while emergency measures were needed on a global scale, India’s Section 10A was an exception in terms of rigidity and irrevocability. Reform must now look not only to the past to correct injustices, but also to the future, in order to build resilient and responsive insolvency frameworks for the future.

Policy Recommendations And The Way Forward

While judicial interpretations have introduced some level of doctrinal balance and constitutional criticisms offer a compelling ground for reconsideration, the real question is where we go from here? Section 10A was a response to an emergency situation, but emergency laws often leave residual distortions in legal ecosystems. To restore balance in the context of insolvency in India, legislative and procedural adjustments are urgently needed.

A. Restoration Of The Adjudicator’s Discretion

One of the most practical reforms would be to reintroduce limited discretion in adjudication. Even under exceptional economic legislation, courts should not be limited by absolute prohibitions. Instead, NCLTs should be empowered to assess whether the default is actually due to the COVID-19 disruption or whether it is a long-standing obligation disguised as a pandemic induced crisis.

This reflects global best practices. The UK Insolvency and Corporate Governance Act 2020, for example, placed the burden of proof on the creditor to demonstrate that COVID-19 did not cause the default. While this tilts in favour of debtors, it still preserves fact based arbitration rather than a legal embargo. India needs to develop equally nuanced frameworks.

• Reintroduce limited judicial discretion.
• Allow factual inquiry into the cause of default.
• Avoid absolute legal prohibitions.

B. Mechanisms For Rebuilding Claims

Legislative reform must also address the absence of any revival mechanism for applications prohibited under Section 10A. Currently, there is no provision for creditors to revive the CIRP on the basis of the same underlying debt, even if the debtor company becomes solvent after the pandemic. This is contrary to IBC’s broader objective of fair and timely collection.

The solution lies in the introduction of a legal window for recovery. For example, the legislator could amend the IBC to indicate that claims prohibited under Section 10A may be revived upon evidence of default after suspension or an acknowledgement of debt. Such an approach would restore the dynamic nature of the IBC and allow the courts to act on substantive justice.

Current Position	Suggested Reform
No revival of barred claims	Legal window for revival after suspension
Permanent extinguishment of remedies	Revival on fresh default or acknowledgement

C. Integrating The Pandemic Response Into Resolution Plans

Another forward-looking measure is to institutionalize pandemic related contingencies in the resolution process itself. While Section 10A addressed breaches at the entry level (pre-admission), it did nothing for those already enrolled in CIRP or for future economic shocks.

Future amendments may require resolution plans to include force majeure assessments, with creditors and resolution applicants required to model pandemic level disruptions and incorporate repayment deferral mechanisms. This would make the IBC not only responsive, but also resilient.

• Incorporate force majeure clauses.
• Model pandemic level disruptions.
• Allow structured repayment deferrals.

D. Improving Regulatory Clarity Of Thresholds

The sharp increase in the threshold from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 1 crore, although necessary to filter out frivolous deposits during the pandemic, has created a regulatory shock. Although the notification of 24.03.2020 clarified its forward-looking nature, its interaction with Section 10A was misunderstood, which led to hesitation among creditors.

In the future, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) are expected to jointly issue detailed guidance notes on thresholds, including scenario-based FAQs on:

• How to calculate the default in a hybrid period (partially in a 10A window)?
• Can the lack of interest alone reach the threshold?
• How do I process payments and installments post COVID?

This will reduce forum shopping and judicial inconsistency while strengthening creditor confidence.

E. Sunset Or Revision Of Exceptional Provisions

Laws such as Section 10A are temporary by design, but their interpretive impact may persist. Parliament should consider amending the IBC to include a mandatory legislative review clause for any future amendments based on urgency. This will ensure that the extraordinary provisions do not become permanent structural bottlenecks.

In addition, the experience of Section 10A should guide drafters in the design of future crisis intervention laws with built-in flexibility, review, and retrospective calibration mechanisms.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, while Section 10A has addressed a crisis era need, its side effects continue to shape creditor’s strategies, debtor’s defenses, and confusion in arbitration. The policy path forward must strike a balance between flexibility and predictability, and legislative restraint and restorative fairness. If insolvency law is to remain the backbone of India’s credit culture, it must evolve not only through case law, but also through targeted legislative provision.

Conclusion

The introduction of Section 10A in Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 arose out of necessity, a well-intentioned response to protect indebted companies from the negative economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, as the dust settles on this extraordinary phase, the true cost of this emergency measure is now being highlighted. While Section 10A provided a temporary measure, its blanket prohibition on initiating CIRP proceedings for defaults during the protected window (March 25, 2020 to March 25, 2021) resulted in long-term legal ambiguities, procedural rigidity, and interference with creditor rights.

Impact on Judicial Balance

In this article, we explored how Section 10A has upset the balance contemplated by the IBC, in particular by stripping the courts of their discretion, introducing procedural arbitrariness, and permanently barring remedies, even in legitimate cases of continuing or acknowledged default. A review of recent NCLAT and NCLT decisions shows that while the courts have attempted to interpret the law on purpose, they remain bound by its overly prohibitive language. As the decisions underline, it is clear that there is a need for doctrinal clarity, the revival of mechanisms and the proportional application of economic laws.

Constitutional and Comparative Perspective

From a constitutional perspective, the provision also faces challenges under Articles 14 and 21, with concerns about access to justice, equal treatment of creditors, and overly broad legislative action. Global benchmarking also highlights that India’s response, unlike more flexible regimes, has been too rigid, lacking procedural nuances or stimulus guarantees.

Need for Legislative Reforms

Therefore, as India continues to evolve its insolvency framework post-pandemic, it is imperative that future legislative interventions, particularly those aimed at stabilizing the economy, do not undermine the fundamental objectives of the Code, including but not limited to early resolution, creditor protection, and maximizing asset value. Reforms that introduce decision making discretion, a revival of legislated claims, clear guidance on thresholds, and built-in review mechanisms are not only achievable, but necessary.

Final Reflection

Conclusively, Section 10A is a reminder of the delicate balance that insolvency law must strike between protection and liability. It is now up to the legislature, regulators and the judiciary to ensure that this balance is not only restored, but strengthened for future crises. End Notes:

1. Notification No. MCA S.O. 1205(E), dated March 24, 2020, under Section 4 of the IBC.
2. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, Gazette Notification dated 5th June 2020.
3. Bikram Bhadur v. Union Bank of India, 2024 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1425.
4. Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India, (2021) 8 SCC 481.
5. Asset Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal, (2021) 6 SCC 366.
6. Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 781.
7. SIDBI v. Sambandh Finserve Pvt. Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine NCLAT 777.
8. Manish Mukim v. Rakhi, 2025 SCC OnLine NCLAT 457.
9. Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416.
10. Manish Kumar v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 1.
11. Vinod Kumar v. Omkara Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 2265 of 2024.
12. Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Soudan, (2016) 8 SCC 509.
13. Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power (P) Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 224.