Introduction
India’s Election Commission stands at a critical juncture. Established under Article 324 of the Constitution to conduct free and fair elections, this constitutional body has long been regarded as the guardian of India’s democratic processes. Yet in recent years, it has faced unprecedented criticism from opposition parties, civil society organizations, and sections of the media. Allegations of partisan behavior, procedural opacity, and selective enforcement have sparked a nationwide debate about the institution’s independence and credibility.
This article examines the constitutional foundations of the Election Commission, analyzes the allegations against it, evaluates the evidence, and proposes reforms necessary to restore public confidence in India’s electoral machinery.
Constitutional Foundations: Powers and Responsibilities
The Election Commission of India derives its authority from Part XV of the Constitution, specifically Articles 324 to 329. Article 324 vests the Commission with “superintendence, direction, and control” over the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of all elections to Parliament, state legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice President.
The Supreme Court has interpreted these powers expansively. In the landmark case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978), the Court described Article 324 as conferring “plenary” powers on the Commission—broad authority designed to ensure free and fair elections. The Court clarified that the Commission can act independently in areas where legislation is silent, provided it does not contravene existing law.
The Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners enjoy constitutional protections similar to Supreme Court judges, including security of tenure and removal only through quasi-judicial procedures. They serve until age 65 or for six years, whichever comes first.
Legislative Framework: The Representation of the People Act, 1951
The Representation of the People Act, 1951, provides the detailed legal scaffolding for electoral administration. This statute empowers the Commission to:
- Determine voter qualifications and candidate eligibility
- Register and regulate political parties
- Appoint electoral officers and observers
- Monitor campaign expenditure and enforce financial transparency
- Adjudicate disputes over election symbols
- Respond to electoral irregularities, including postponing or canceling polls
- Prosecute corrupt practices and electoral offenses
The Act places the Commission at the center of India’s electoral ecosystem, tasking it with maintaining not just procedural compliance but substantive fairness.
Judicial Interpretation: Expanding the Commission’s Mandate
Over decades, the Supreme Court has reinforced and refined the Commission’s role. In N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (1952), the Court established the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over electoral matters, insulating ongoing election processes from judicial interference. Later, in Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002), the Court mandated disclosure of candidates’ criminal, financial, and educational backgrounds, expanding the Commission’s mandate to include substantive democratic values beyond mere logistical management.
However, the judiciary has also set boundaries. In A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984), the Court clarified that while the Commission enjoys broad residuary powers under Article 324, it cannot override statutory law. The Commission supplements legislation but does not supplant it.
The 2023 judgment in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India represented a watershed moment. Recognizing that executive monopoly over appointments threatened the Commission’s independence, the Supreme Court mandated a three-member selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, and Chief Justice of India. This decision aimed to insulate appointments from partisan influence and strengthen institutional autonomy.
The Allegations: A Catalogue of Concerns
Since 2014, the Election Commission has faced sustained criticism across multiple dimensions. These allegations fall into several categories:
Political Bias and Selective Enforcement
Opposition leaders have accused the Commission of favoring the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, particularly in enforcing the Model Code of Conduct. During the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi alleged that the Commission issued “clean chits” to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and BJP President Amit Shah for code violations while penalizing opposition leaders more severely.
The Commission responded with statistical data showing it had received approximately 200 complaints during the first month of the 2019 election period:
| Political Party | Complaints Received | Actions Taken |
|---|---|---|
| Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) | 51 | 38 |
| Indian National Congress | 59 | 51 |
| Other Parties | 90 | 80 |
According to the Commission, these figures demonstrated impartial enforcement regardless of political affiliation.
However, critics pointed to internal dissent within the Commission itself, with reports suggesting disagreement among Commissioners regarding decisions to exonerate senior BJP leaders.
Electoral Roll Manipulation
In the 2024-25 election cycle, allegations escalated dramatically. Gandhi accused the Commission of colluding with the BJP to manipulate electoral rolls, citing the unexplained addition of nearly ten million voters in Maharashtra.
In August 2025, he presented detailed statistics from Karnataka’s Mahadevpura constituency, documenting:
Mahadevpura Voter Irregularities
- 11,965 duplicate voter registrations appearing across different polling booths
- 40,009 voters with fraudulent addresses, including systematic house number mismatches
- 10,452 bulk voter concentrations at single addresses (such as 46 voters registered in a one-bedroom residence)
- 4,132 voters with invalid photographic documentation
- 33,692 instances of Form 6 misuse, with elderly individuals fraudulently registered as first-time voters
Summary Table: Mahadevpura Data
| Type of Irregularity | Number of Cases |
|---|---|
| Duplicate Registrations | 11,965 |
| Fraudulent Addresses | 40,009 |
| Bulk Voter Concentrations | 10,452 |
| Invalid Photo Documentation | 4,132 |
| Form 6 Misuse | 33,692 |
The Commission dismissed these claims as “baseless and irresponsible,” demanding either a sworn affidavit or a public apology and threatening legal action. Critics noted, however, that the Commission declined to provide electronic data for independent verification.
Similar controversies erupted over Special Intensive Revision exercises in Bihar, where opposition parties claimed that 6.5 million voters—8.3% of the state’s electorate—were flagged for potential deletion, disproportionately affecting Scheduled Castes, minorities, and backward communities.
Electronic Voting Machine Controversies
Questions about Evm security and reliability have persisted for years. Following the Haryana Assembly elections, Congress advanced a “battery level conspiracy theory,” alleging that machines displaying 99% battery power disproportionately favored Bjp candidates while those showing 60-70% battery levels correlated with Congress victories.
Party leaders claimed Evms could be hacked, citing vulnerabilities at manufacturing, storage, and servicing stages.
By late 2024, opposition parties planned coordinated litigation against Evm irregularities. However, unity fractured when Trinamool Congress Mp Abhishek Banerjee dismissed Congress’s Evm claims as lacking substance, and Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah criticized Congress for celebrating Evm-based victories while blaming the same machines for subsequent losses.
The Commission has consistently defended Evm integrity, emphasizing that the devices are standalone, non-networked machines featuring mutual authentication between components, self-diagnostic systems, and triple-layered physical security.
Since introducing Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail systems, over 500 million paper slips have been matched with Evm counts without recorded discrepancies, according to Commission data.
In Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India (2024), the Supreme Court dismissed petitions demanding a return to paper ballots, voter self-verification of paper slips, and 100% counting of Vvpat slips.
The bench noted that physical handling of paper slips by voters was impractical and that increasing random Vvpat counts beyond five per assembly segment would prolong counting and reintroduce human error.
Appointment Controversies and Executive Interference
The appointment process for Election Commissioners has generated significant controversy. In 2022, the Supreme Court itself expressed suspicion about Arun Goel’s appointment as Election Commissioner mere hours after his retirement from civil service.
Similarly, in October 2024, the selection of two new Commissioners was finalized within hours of the shortlist being presented to the selection committee, prompting opposition parties to describe the process as a “rubber stamp” for politically favorable appointments.
Despite the Supreme Court’s directive in Anoop Baranwal mandating a selection committee including the Chief Justice of India, Parliament subsequently enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service, and Term of Office) Act, 2023.
This legislation replaced the Chief Justice with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, effectively restoring executive dominance over appointments and, critics argue, nullifying the spirit of judicial reform.
Opposition leaders have repeatedly characterized the Commission as being under pressure from the central government. Congress President Mallikarjun Kharge called the Commission “a puppet of Modi,” a charge echoed by leaders from the Trinamool Congress and other parties.
Structural Vulnerabilities: The Gap Between Constitutional Ideal and Administrative Reality
The persistent allegations highlight deeper structural weaknesses in the Commission’s institutional design. Despite constitutional guarantees of independence, the Commission’s functional and financial autonomy remains dependent on the executive branch.
Budget Dependency
Unlike the Supreme Court or the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Election Commission’s budget is routed through the Law Ministry rather than being charged directly on the Consolidated Fund of India. This arrangement raises legitimate concerns about subtle executive influence on resource allocation and operational priorities, particularly during election periods.
Appointment Mechanism
The appointment process for Election Commissioners has long lacked transparency and multi-stakeholder participation. The legislative override of the Anoop Baranwal judgment perpetuates the perception of political capture and undermines institutional independence.
Absence of Institutional Safeguards
- The lack of a collegium system, post-retirement restrictions, and protections against arbitrary removal leaves Commissioners vulnerable to executive pressure.
- The 2020 resignation of Ashok Lavasa, who had dissented from decisions granting clean chits to senior BJP leaders, exemplifies these concerns.
State Election Commissions
State Election Commissions face similar challenges. Although empowered under Article 243K to conduct local body elections, they remain administratively dependent on state governments for staff, finances, and logistics. In West Bengal (2021) and Uttar Pradesh (2022), state governments have been accused of exerting direct control over SECs, undermining the spirit of decentralized democracy envisioned in the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments.
Impact On Democratic Legitimacy
The perceived erosion of neutrality has profound implications for democratic legitimacy. When the impartiality of electoral institutions is questioned, the foundation of representative governance is threatened.
Declining Public Confidence
Repeated allegations of partisan conduct and selective enforcement have contributed to declining voter trust in the Commission’s impartiality. While voter participation remains high, surveys by independent organizations indicate reduced confidence that the Commission operates without bias.
Judicial Concerns
The judiciary has increasingly expressed concern about the Commission’s functioning. In Anoop Baranwal, the Supreme Court explicitly warned that “a pliant Commission is the first step towards the breakdown of constitutional democracy.” The Court emphasized that free and fair elections are not merely procedural requirements but form part of the Constitution’s basic structure.
Accountability Deficit
A major criticism concerns the Commission’s silence during moments of political polarization or communal tension during campaigns. Selective invocation of the Model Code of Conduct—strictly enforced against opposition leaders but lenient toward ruling party members—has reinforced accusations of double standards.
Electoral legitimacy is not merely a function of procedural conduct but of perceived fairness. Without trust in the referee, even the fairest rules become meaningless.
Reform Agenda: Restoring Independence and Credibility
Strengthening the Election Commission requires comprehensive institutional, procedural, and legislative reforms.
Institutional Reforms
- Independent Collegium for Appointments: A constitutionally entrenched collegium should include the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, Chief Justice of India, and two eminent persons nominated by a bipartisan parliamentary committee. This structure would ensure multi-stakeholder participation and prevent monopolization by the ruling government.
- Fixed Financial Autonomy: The Commission’s budget should be directly charged to the Consolidated Fund of India, guaranteeing fiscal independence and operational efficiency without reliance on ministerial sanction.
- Security of Tenure and Post-Retirement Restrictions: Election Commissioners should have non-renewable, fixed tenures with mandatory cooling-off periods before accepting government or political positions. This would minimize incentives for compliance with political interests in expectation of future appointments.
- Transparent Selection and Removal: The selection process should be publicly accessible, including disclosure of shortlisted candidates and selection criteria. Removal mechanisms should involve judicial oversight to prevent arbitrary dismissals.
- Statutory Backing for the Model Code of Conduct: Limited statutory codification of the Model Code would ensure enforceability and accountability, enabling the Commission to act decisively against violations without accusations of arbitrariness.
- Strengthening State Election Commissions: SEC autonomy must be reinforced through independent budgets, dedicated staff, and protection parity with the national Commission. Amendments to Article 243K and relevant state laws should insulate SECs from state executive control.
Procedural and Technological Safeguards
| Safeguard Area | Reform Measure | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Enhanced EVM and VVPAT Verification | Randomized and larger-scale VVPAT verification, third-party cybersecurity audits, and blockchain-based audit trails | Complete transparency in vote counting |
| Digital Transparency | Online publication of complaints, actions taken, and orders within fixed time frames | Counter misinformation and build public trust |
| Independent Oversight | Periodic review by a Parliamentary Standing Committee or Ombudsman | Ensure checks without undermining independence |
Conclusion
The Election Commission of India occupies a unique position as both a constitutional authority and a guardian of democratic norms. While it has historically strengthened democratic traditions, recent years have witnessed a crisis of confidence fueled by perceptions of partisanship, executive interference, and institutional opacity. The challenge facing India today is not one of legal insufficiency but of political will and institutional integrity.
The constitutional framework established in Ponnuswami, refined in Mohinder Singh Gill, and strengthened in Anoop Baranwal and Association for Democratic Reforms affirms that the Commission’s independence is a constitutional necessity, not a discretionary privilege.
To safeguard democracy, the Commission must return to its foundational values of transparency, accountability, and neutrality. Structural reforms in appointment, tenure, and finance are no longer optional but imperative. Without public trust, elections may remain procedurally valid yet substantively illegitimate.
In the final analysis, law and legitimacy must converge: the law provides the structure, but legitimacy breathes life into democracy. The Election Commission of India, as the sentinel of that democracy, must embody not just constitutional authority but moral authority as well. Only then can it fulfill its mandate as the true guardian of India’s democratic future.
