Introduction
Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), often referred to as Naxalism or Maoism, remains one of India’s most persistent internal security challenges. Originating in West Bengal’s Naxalbari village in 1967, the movement evolved into an armed insurgency with the aim of overthrowing the state through armed struggle, especially in India’s underdeveloped rural heartlands. Over the decades, it has spread across several states—Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Maharashtra—collectively forming the “Red Corridor.” Despite significant state and central government efforts, LWE elements continue to exploit socioeconomic grievances, forested terrain, weak governance and tribal marginalization.
Combatting LWE is not merely a matter of force; it is a complex interplay of security action, development interventions, governance reforms and local cooperation. At the forefront of the security response are two principal actors—the District Police, responsible for law and order at the grassroots level, and the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), which include highly trained paramilitary units such as the Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Assam Rifles. Among these, the CRPF’s specialized Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) has been central to anti-LWE operations.
However, the enduring effectiveness of counter-insurgency efforts hinges critically on coordination between the District Police and CAPF. Alone, neither institution can sustainably neutralize the LWE threat; together, they are far more potent, responsive and community-oriented. We will explore why such coordination is indispensable, what challenges it faces, examples of effective collaboration, and recommendations for strengthening this crucial partnership.
Understanding the Roles: District Police and CAPF
District Police
The district police are the principal law-enforcement agency responsible for maintaining internal security within a district. Their duties in the LWE context include:
- Maintaining public order in towns and villages
- Gathering human intelligence (HUMINT) from locals
- Investigating crimes and arrests of suspects
- Community engagement and trust-building activities
- Traffic and checkpoint management
- Coordinating with civil administration
District police officers—most notably Superintendents of Police (SPs)—are deeply rooted within local society. They understand terrain, customs, languages and local power structures. They also drive the hearts and minds dimension of counter-insurgency through community interactions.
Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF)
CAPF units, especially CRPF, are federal forces with mandates spanning internal security, counter-insurgency, border guarding, and specialized operations. Their strengths include:
- Advanced training in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency tactics
- Technical capabilities, including intelligence, explosives detection, and communications
- Mobility and reinforcement strength
- Paramilitary discipline and large manpower
In LWE zones, CAPF units often lead joint operations, provide specialized backup, and operate in deep forests where local police may lack training or resources.
Why Coordination Matters
- Intelligence Sharing and Local Knowledge Integration
Intelligence is the lifeblood of effective counter-insurgency. LWE cadres operate covertly through cells, moving between villages and forests. The district police possess critical local knowledge—village power dynamics, tribal customs, seasonal movement patterns, network of sympathizers—that is invaluable for operations.
CAPF units, on the other hand, often bring technical intelligence support, aerial surveillance, intercept capabilities and analytical resources. Without coordination, both sets of data remain siloed, and opportunities for timely action are lost.
Example:
- A district police informant reports unusual movements near a tribal village.
- Coordinated analysis with CAPF signals intercepts visualizing a planned ambush route.
- Together, they pre-empt the attack through joint deployment.
This synergy is possible only when information flows freely and seamlessly between agencies.
- Unified Operational Planning
Operations against well-armed guerrilla fighters demand meticulous planning—route reconnaissance, securing choke points, establishing gradients of force, contingency planning, casualty evacuation and media management.
District police know which villages are receptive to joint operations and which are sensitive. CAPF bring tactical expertise in jungle warfare. When they plan independently, operations may:
- Create friction with locals
- Generate civilian casualties
- Fail due to inadequate local coordination
Unified planning ensures:
- Better risk assessment
- Minimum collateral damage
- Optimized use of resources
- Clear command and control
- Building Legitimacy and Trust with Local Communities
Counter-insurgency is as much political as military. Excessive force without local buy-in fuels resentment, which LWE cadres exploit. District police, being locally embedded, are usually more attuned to cultural sensitivities and civilian concerns.
CAPF, due to their federal character, must rely on district police to navigate local societal nuances. Coordination ensures that security operations are coupled with outreach—medical camps, rehabilitation initiatives, school rebuilding, and livelihood programs.
This dual approach:
- Weakens the support base for LWE cadres
- Strengthens state legitimacy
- Encourages surrender and rehabilitation of insurgents
- Efficient Use of Resources
Without coordination, there is duplication of effort—two forces may conduct patrols in the same area without realizing it, or invest heavily in intelligence operations that could be jointly streamlined.
Combined operations enable:
- Optimal manpower deployment
- Resource pooling for logistics
- Better budgeting and provisioning
- Faster and More Effective Emergency Response
LWE encounters can escalate quickly—ambushes, IED blasts, civilian hostage situations or clashes. In such emergencies, coordinated command ensures rapid response, joint evacuation, medical aid deployment and secure communication.
Uncoordinated responses can lead to:
- Friendly fire incidents
- Delayed relief
- Breakdown of command
A shared operations centre mitigates these risks.
Challenges in Coordination
Despite its clear benefits, coordination between district police and CAPF faces several challenges:
- Jurisdictional Differences
District police function under the state government, while CAPF units operate under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Differing chains of command can create friction. For example:
- Operational priority clashes
- Differing risk thresholds
- Delay in permissions for joint actions
This requires clear standard operating procedures (SOPs) agreed upon by both sides.
- Cultural and Structural Differences
District police and CAPF personnel come from different organizational cultures. Differences can emerge in:
- Communication protocols
- Bureaucratic approaches
- Training philosophies
Bridging these differences needs deliberate joint training and exchange programs.
- Intelligence Gaps
Often intelligence systems are siloed. CAPF may withhold sensitive intercepts from police fearing leaks, while police may not share grassroots intelligence due to mistrust or bureaucratic delays. Overcoming this requires:
- Secure integrated intelligence platforms
- Protocols for data sharing
- Joint intelligence fusion centres
- Resource and Capability Imbalances
CAPF units are often better equipped and trained but lack localized knowledge. Conversely, district police may understand local dynamics but lack equipment. Balancing these discrepancies is critical so that neither side dominates decision-making.
- Political and Administrative Pressures
Local political pressures may push district police toward immediate arrests or visible operations, whereas CAPF might advocate a long-term tactical approach. Harmonizing these priorities requires:
- Clear legal frameworks
- Supportive political will
- A focus on strategy over short-term optics
Models of Effective Coordination
- Unified Command Structures
Several LWE-affected states have experimented with joint task forces where district police and CAPF report to a unified command centre. This structure ensures:
- Joint planning
- Shared intelligence
- Common operational command
Such structures have shown measurable improvements in operational success rates and community responses.
- Joint Training Programs
Joint training exercises—covering jungle warfare, negotiation tactics, human rights compliance, and development engagement—create mutual trust and understanding between district police and CAPF units.
These programs:
- Harmonize tactics
- Build camaraderie
- Reduce mistrust
- Community-Centric Missions
Successful programs integrate police and CAPF personnel into community development missions—like opening schools, rebuilding infrastructure, or offering medical camps in remote areas. These missions:
- Humanize the security forces
- Reduce LWE propaganda
- Encourage locals to share intelligence willingly
Case Studies Showing the Power of Coordination
Case 1: Successful Ambush Prevention
In a district where police intelligence indicated unusual movements and CAPF technical intercepts suggested a planned ambush, coordinated action led to a pre-emptive deployment that foiled the attack, resulting in the capture of key LWE operatives.
This success stemmed from:
- Real-time intelligence sharing
- Joint operational planning
- Coordinated execution
Case 2: Winning Hearts and Minds
In another region, joint teams of district police and CAPF conducted a combined operation followed by community development activities—repairing a local road, organizing a health camp, and distributing educational materials.
Outcomes included:
- Increased public cooperation
- Local informants providing critical leads
- Reduced LWE movement in the area
Policy Recommendations
To deepen and institutionalize the coordination between district police and CAPF, several policy measures are vital:
- Establish Integrated Intelligence Centres
State and central governments should fund and deploy intelligence fusion centres where information from police, CAPF, and civil administration is analysed jointly and shared securely.
- Formalize Joint Command Protocols
Clear SOPs must outline:
- When and how joint operations will be initiated
- Authority hierarchies during joint missions
- Communication and reporting standards
This reduces confusion and reinforces shared responsibility.
- Institutionalize Joint Training and Exchanges
Regular combined training programs, officer exchanges, and joint seminars will build professional rapport and enhance operational readiness.
- Technological Integration
Govt should invest in shared communication platforms, secure databases, GIS mapping tools and aerial surveillance that can be accessed by both police and CAPF securely.
- Community Engagement Framework
Coordination between security forces should extend to coordinated civic action plans that integrate law enforcement with development goals.
Conclusion
Left-Wing Extremism in India represents a multifaceted challenge that combines ideology, underdevelopment and social grievances. Purely militaristic approaches are insufficient; sustainable peace and security require the joined forces of effective law enforcement, governance, development and community trust.
Coordination between the district police and Central Armed Police Forces is not a mere administrative convenience— it is the backbone of India’s response to LWE. When local insight meets tactical expertise, and when community trust complements operational strength, the state’s capability to protect its citizens and restore normalcy is dramatically amplified.
In the face of evolving insurgent tactics and resilient networks, India’s security architecture must continue to reinforce this partnership, ensuring that coordination is strategic, systematic, and sustained. Only then can the long shadow of LWE be fully dispelled and replaced with the shield of inclusive development and durable peace.
