The New York Convention and the Global Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

I. Introduction: The Foundational Role and Pro-Enforcement Ethos of the New York Convention

A. Historical Imperative and the Convention’s Genesis

The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958)—widely known as the New York Convention (NYC)—represents the single most critical legal instrument facilitating international commerce. The Convention was conceived to overcome persistent, restrictive systems that previously governed the execution of international arbitral awards, most notably the Geneva treaties, which suffered from the rigidity of the double exequatur requirement.1

This requirement compelled an award creditor to obtain judicial recognition of the award not only at the seat of arbitration but also in the country where enforcement was sought, making cross-border collection arduous and uncertain.

The NYC was developed under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 2, which recognized the critical need for harmonizing international commercial dispute resolution texts.2 UNCITRAL’s work has consistently focused on providing legislative and non-legislative texts to facilitate international commercial dispute resolution, including rules and notes for the conduct of arbitration.2

The Convention introduced a fundamental philosophical shift: moving away from the historical judicial skepticism toward arbitration and establishing a mandatory, pro-enforcement regime that privileges the autonomy of the parties.1 The essential objective was to provide reliable machinery for recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements and the resultant awards across sovereign borders.

The Dual Objectives and Global Reach

The success and enduring utility of the New York Convention stem from its dual operational mandates.

• First Objective (Article II): The requirement for Contracting States to recognize and enforce agreements to refer disputes to arbitration.1 This necessitates that national courts compel parties to honor their agreement to arbitrate, effectively denying them access to domestic litigation in contravention of their contractual commitment.3
• Second Objective (Article III): The general obligation for Contracting States to recognize foreign arbitral awards as binding and to enforce them in accordance with their domestic rules of procedure.4

This dual framework, which enforces both the promise to arbitrate and the resulting outcome, is the instrumental basis for the success of international commercial arbitration.5

The Convention’s global significance is evident in its near-universal acceptance, with Contracting States currently comprising approximately 85% of the world’s countries.1

The reliance on this widespread adoption, however, must be tempered by a deeper understanding of its practical application. The Convention’s success is measured not merely by the number of signatory states but by the persistent judicial willingness within those states to enforce the consensual will of the commercial parties, even when that consensus conflicts with the preferences or traditional oversight mechanisms of the domestic judiciary.

This prioritization of party autonomy is the true measure of the Convention’s impact.

Jurisdictional Scope And Reservations (Article I)

Definition of a Convention Award

Article I defines the jurisdictional scope of the Convention. A Convention award is one made in the territory of a State other than the State where recognition and enforcement are sought (the principle of non-domesticity).7 Furthermore, the differences leading to the award must arise between “persons, whether physical or legal”.7

Authentic Texts of the Convention

The authentic texts of the Convention are in Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish.8

Optional Reservations Under Article I(3)

Crucially, Article I(3) allows Contracting States to make optional reservations that limit the application of the Convention, introducing localized variations in its scope.9 These include:

• Reciprocity Reservation – whereby a State may declare that it will apply the Convention only to awards made in the territory of another Contracting State.
• Commerciality Reservation – which allows a State to declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, that are considered “commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration”.9

Structural Friction And Non-Uniformity

The inclusion of the Commerciality Reservation introduces a structural point of friction within the harmonizing framework. By explicitly permitting a state to rely on its own “national law” to define “commercial,” the Convention sanctions the use of non-uniform, parochial standards to determine scope.9

This means that absolute global harmonization is inherently impossible under the current regime. Practitioners must perpetually monitor and audit the domestic legal interpretation of commercial law in every target enforcement jurisdiction, which necessitates constant vigilance and detracts slightly from the universal predictability the Convention was intended to guarantee.

Establishing the Right to Recognition: Procedural Requirements And Parity

The Mandatory Obligation And Procedural Parity (Article III)

Article III establishes the foundation for the enforcement stage, placing a general obligation on Contracting States to recognize and enforce Convention awards as binding.4 This obligation is subject only to the “conditions laid down in the following articles” (primarily Article V).4

This structural division is critical: the Convention exclusively dictates the conditions for recognizing a foreign award, while the rules of procedure governing the actual enforcement process are derived from the lex fori (the procedural law of the forum state).4 This clear distinction means the Convention is controlling over the substantive conditions for enforcement, while the forum’s local rules govern the procedural method.4

Anti-Protectionist Parity Clause

A cornerstone of Article III is its powerful anti-protectionist clause. This provision prohibits Contracting States from imposing substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of Convention awards than those imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.4

This mandate directly shields foreign awards from procedural protectionism. Without this clause, states that are compelled to enforce foreign awards substantively could resort to creating prohibitive procedural barriers, such as excessive filing fees or unduly protracted timelines, to indirectly favor domestic litigants or judgments.

The parity clause serves as a vital mandate for equal access and treatment, ensuring that the ease of enforcement is maintained regardless of the award’s origin.

Documentary Prerequisites For Enforcement (Article IV)

To ensure efficiency and predictability, the Convention sets forth simple, ministerial documentary prerequisites in Article IV. The party seeking enforcement is required to supply only two duly authenticated documents 5:

• The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; and
• The original agreement referred to in Article II (the arbitration agreement) or a duly certified copy thereof.7

Translation Requirements

A further procedural necessity arises if the award or agreement is not rendered in an official language of the country where enforcement is sought. In this instance, the applying party must produce a translation of the documents into the official language.

The Convention specifies that this translation must be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.7

Strategic Importance Of Article IV Compliance

The apparent simplicity of Article IV often belies its strategic importance. Compliance with these ministerial prerequisites is mandatory. Award debtors frequently exploit minor procedural defects relating to the authentication method or the quality and certification of translations to delay proceedings or force technical dismissal.

Failure to ensure meticulous compliance with the formalities of authentication and sworn translation is not a substantive defense, but it is a frequent point of attack used by debtors to impede the streamlined enforcement pathway provided by the Convention.

Therefore, successful enforcement strategies prioritize preemptive, rigorous adherence to Article IV as the essential gateway to the subsequent substantive review under Article V.

III. The Defensive Barricade: Detailed Analysis of Article V Grounds for Refusal

The Structural Doctrine of Article V

Article V is the structural core of the New York Convention’s pro-enforcement policy. It lists the conditions under which recognition and enforcement “may be refused”.10 This list of grounds for refusal is universally recognized as exhaustive.10 Crucially, the exhaustive nature of Article V prevents the court from conducting any review of the merits of the underlying arbitral dispute.10 Enforcement can only be successfully resisted if the award debtor establishes one of the narrowly defined exceptions, which are designed only to permit the most serious irregularities to form the basis of a defense.10

The structure of Article V further emphasizes the Convention’s bias toward enforceability. The use of the word “may be refused,” rather than “shall be refused,” grants the enforcing court a critical layer of discretion. Even if an award debtor successfully establishes that one of the Article V defenses applies, the court retains the power to overrule the defense and enforce the award, consistent with the Convention’s overarching policy of promoting arbitration finality.10

Grounds Requiring Proof by the Debtor (Article V(1))

Article V(1) enumerates five categories of defenses that must be proven by the party resisting enforcement (the award debtor).10 This allocation of the burden of proof is crucial, as it confirms that the court’s starting presumption is always in favor of enforceability.

V(1)(a): Incapacity and Invalidity of Agreement

Enforcement may be refused if a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity (determined by the law applicable to them) or if the said agreement was invalid under the law chosen by the parties, or failing that, under the law of the country where the award was made.10 This defense expresses the fundamental consensual nature of arbitration.10

A critical nuance in the interpretation of this provision is the temporal restriction on the capacity defense: it is limited to the lack of capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement at the time it was made.10 It does not cover subsequent issues such as a lack of proper representation during the proceedings or incapacity related to the underlying contract.10 This narrow focus confirms that V(1)(a) is aimed solely at ensuring the initial validity of the parties’ foundational commitment to arbitration. The invalidity provision incorporates internationally recognized defenses such as duress, mistake, or fraud.11

V(1)(b): Procedural Unfairness (Due Process)

This ground permits refusal if the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present their case.10 This is the core due process defense.

• The procedural irregularity must be deemed “sufficiently serious” for the objection to succeed.10
• The standard of due process applied is generally that of the enforcing state.
• Courts are expected to apply this standard while accounting for the specificity and international character of arbitration proceedings.10

V(1)(c): Excess of Authority (Ultra Petitum)

Refusal is permissible if the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or falling outside the terms of the submission to arbitration, or if it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission.10

This is a jurisdictional defense focused on the scope of the mandate given to the tribunal, covering instances where the arbitrators grant relief that was not requested (ultra petitum) or decide on issues not encompassed by the operative arbitration clause.10

V(1)(d): Irregularity in Composition or Procedure

This defense applies if the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.10

V(1)(e): Status of the Award

Enforcement may be refused if the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made (the seat).10

Grounds Invoked by the Court Ex Officio (Article V(2))

Article V(2) lists two distinct grounds for refusal that are considered so fundamental to the enforcement state’s legal order that the court may take them into account on its own motion, even if the debtor does not raise the objection.10

V(2)(a): Non-Arbitrability

This applies if the court finds that the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the state where enforcement is sought.10

This relates to specific areas of law often reserved exclusively for judicial resolution in that jurisdiction, such as certain regulatory matters, patent validity, or family law disputes.

V(2)(b): Public Policy Exception

Enforcement may be refused if the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.10 This is the most contentious and variable defense, necessitating a deeper analysis in the subsequent section.

Advanced Jurisdictional Conflicts and Judicial Discretion

The Public Policy Divide (Article V(2)(b)): Variation and Trend

The public policy exception under Article V(2)(b) is arguably the most unsettled ground for refusing enforcement because the Convention provides no definition, allowing its meaning to vary substantially between Contracting States.10 This lack of uniformity means the predictability of enforcement is not a static legal construct but is instead a function of the political and legal philosophy prevalent in the specific enforcing state.

Indeed, a report by the International Bar Association confirmed no uniformity in the extent of review of an award by the enforcing courts.10

Narrow Interpretation and the Pro-Enforcement Trend

A reassuring trend has emerged globally toward defining public policy narrowly, aligning with the Convention’s intended pro-enforcement ethos.10 This standard, often referred to as International Public Policy, dictates that the violation must be sufficiently serious to warrant refusal, typically requiring a breach of the forum state’s most fundamental notions of morality and justice.

This approach rigidly excludes any review of the merits of the award.10 For example, the English Commercial Court has emphasized that the public interest in the finality of arbitration awards generally outweighs objections, even those alleging transactions “tainted” by fraud.10

Core Elements of the International Public Policy Standard

• Public policy must be interpreted narrowly.
• The violation must be sufficiently serious.
• The breach must offend the forum state’s most fundamental notions of morality and justice.
• Review of the merits of the arbitral award is strictly excluded.

Curtailment of Parochial Approaches

Historically, certain jurisdictions maintained parochial approaches, using V(2)(b) opportunistically as a gateway to conduct a de facto review of the merits of the underlying dispute.10 However, significant movement toward international alignment has been observed.

A notable example is the Indian judiciary, which once endorsed an expansive definition that included a mere error of law but has subsequently aligned its application with the generally accepted, narrowly interpreted international standard.10

This trend toward curtailment reduces the legal risk associated with enforcement in jurisdictions that previously demonstrated idiosyncratic review philosophies.

Waiver and Preclusion

The nature of the public policy defense allows courts to consider it ex officio.10 Furthermore, because the objection is based principally on the fundamental national law of the enforcement forum, failure to seek annulment of the award on public policy grounds at the arbitral seat should not preclude a party from resisting enforcement on the same basis.10

Similarly, failure to raise the public policy argument during the arbitration proceedings itself is generally not considered a bar to consideration by the enforcing court.10

However, if the arbitrators considered and rejected the public policy argument, certain courts have considered themselves bound by the arbitrators’ findings and have refused to entertain the argument de novo.10

Practical Implications of Waiver and Preclusion

• Courts may raise public policy issues on their own motion.
• Failure to seek annulment at the seat does not bar enforcement resistance.
• Failure to raise public policy during arbitration is generally not fatal.
• Prior rejection by arbitrators may limit reconsideration by enforcing courts.

The Annulled Award Doctrine: Enforcing the Set-Aside Award (Article V(1)(e))

Article V(1)(e) permits, but does not mandate, the refusal of enforcement if the award has been set aside or suspended by the competent authority of the arbitral seat.10 This discretionary wording is critically important: the Convention does not oblige Contracting States to refuse enforcement of an annulled award, nor does the provision prohibit such enforcement.12

This allowance is a necessary counter-measure against protectionist annulment practices by seat courts.

Discretion of Enforcing Courts

This permissive power grants the enforcing court a quasi-supreme role in preserving the international validity of an award. By reserving the right to enforce, the enforcing court essentially acts as a supervisor of the quality of the judicial review performed by the seat court.

Enforcement may be granted if the annulment decision itself violates international due process or relies on parochial, internationally unacceptable grounds.

Comparative Judicial Approaches

While the Dutch Supreme Court affirmed this discretion, it held that the power to enforce an annulled award under Article V(1)(e) can be exercised only in exceptional cases—specifically, where the basis for annulment at the seat does not reflect fundamental international norms.12

Conversely, courts often refuse enforcement when the annulment was based on grounds that conform to international standards, upholding judicial comity, as seen in cases like Maximov v OJSC Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky Kombinat.12

This doctrine introduces systemic uncertainty for award debtors, as a successful local annulment is not a definitive guarantee against global execution.

The Modern Challenge of Sovereign Enforcement

Investor-State Disputes (ISDS) and the NYC Nexus

The rise of investor-state disputes (ISDS), typically governed by bilateral investment treaties (BITs), presents a complex jurisdictional challenge for the New York Convention. When comparing the NYC regime to the Washington Convention (ICSID), the differences are stark: ICSID establishes a dedicated dispute resolution mechanism and guarantees near-automatic enforcement through Article 54, which constitutes an express waiver of immunity for recognition.13 Conversely, the NYC requires navigating Article V defenses and subsequent domestic sovereign immunity laws.13

The New York Convention as an Enforcement Backstop

Crucially, the New York Convention functions as the essential enforcement backstop for non-ICSID, ad hoc awards, particularly those arising under BITs that do not offer an ICSID option (e.g., the China-Nigeria BIT, which mandates only an “ad hoc arbitral tribunal”).15 In such cases, the investor’s ability to enforce the resulting award relies entirely on the host state being a party to the NYC.15

Judicial Affirmation of the Convention’s Applicability to Sovereign Disputes

The application of the Convention to sovereign disputes was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.16 To apply the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) arbitration exception, the court had to confirm that the award was governed by the NYC, requiring a finding that the award arose from a commercial, legal relationship between “persons”.15

The D.C. Circuit’s majority position confirmed that treating investor-state awards as subject to the New York Convention is a proposition “taken for granted in the world of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)”.15

Legal and Commercial Relationship

The court determined that the China-Nigeria BIT established a legal relationship with the investor (Zhongshan) through analogy to third-party beneficiary contract law.15 The relationship was deemed commercial because Zhongshan invested in a money-making enterprise (a free-trade zone) and the BIT itself was designed to promote commerce.15

• The relationship may be commercial even if it does not arise from a contract.15
• A sufficient connection with commerce is the determining factor.15

This judicial trend accelerates the erosion of the traditional public/private distinction for state actors, meaning states face similar commercial enforcement risks for investment activities as private commercial entities.

Sovereign State as a “Person” Under the Convention

The D.C. Circuit found no textual or practical basis for treating states differently based on whether they act in a private or public (sovereign) capacity.15 The court held that a sovereign state is a “person” for the purposes of the Convention, even when acting in a public capacity.15

This interpretation aligned with historical US positions, including a 1980 amicus brief stating that the negotiating history reflects the interpretation that states are legal persons.15 Confirmation of this understanding is also found in treaties like the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), where Article 26 explicitly states that claims under the ECT “shall be considered to arise out of a commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of article I of the Convention”.15

Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to Execution

The successful recognition of an award against a state under the New York Convention represents only the first stage of enforcement. Execution against sovereign assets remains subject to the second, separate hurdle of sovereign immunity, governed by domestic legislation such as the UK State Immunity Act (SIA) or the US FSIA.

The Two-Stage Enforcement Process Clarified

A critical clarification regarding this two-stage process was delivered by the English High Court in CC/Devas et al. v. The Republic of India.14 The court held that a State’s ratification of the New York Convention does not amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity by prior written agreement for execution purposes, specifically rejecting the claim that it constituted submission to jurisdiction under Section 2(2) of the SIA.14

This stands in sharp contrast to Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, which does constitute such an express waiver for recognition.14

Domestic Immunity Exceptions and Execution Risks

Consequently, even after obtaining recognition under the NYC, the award creditor must satisfy the narrow exceptions to sovereign immunity set out in the domestic immunity statute (e.g., the “arbitration exception” under Section 9 of the SIA, or the “commercial activity” exception) before proceeding to execution against state assets.17

The primary risk for awards against states is therefore not Article V, but rather the complexity and inherent narrowness of the domestic immunity exceptions controlling the execution process.

New York Convention vs. ICSID: Enforcement Comparison

Aspect	New York Convention (NYC)	ICSID Convention
Enforcement Mechanism	Relies on domestic courts and Article V defenses	Dedicated self-contained enforcement system
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity	No automatic waiver for execution	Article 54 provides express waiver for recognition
Execution Against State Assets	Subject to narrow domestic immunity exceptions	Facilitated by treaty-based obligations
Risk to Award Creditor	High due to domestic immunity barriers	Significantly reduced

Side-by-Side Comparison of Enforcement Frameworks

Feature	New York Convention (NYC)	ICSID Convention (Washington)
Applicable Award Types	Commercial, non-domestic, and non-ICSID BIT awards.	Investor-State disputes under ICSID only.
Defenses Available	Exhaustive list under Article V (Narrow, seven defenses).	Extremely limited; no challenge to the merits possible.
Waiver of Immunity (Recognition)	Ratification is not a prior written waiver of immunity.	Article 54 constitutes an express, automatic waiver for recognition.
Execution Against Sovereign Assets	Requires successful navigation of domestic Sovereign Immunity Acts (e.g., US FSIA).	Generally streamlined but specific execution requires domestic law compliance.

Enforcement Against Non-Signatories

The Conflict With the Consensual Principle

A fundamental tension exists in enforcing awards against parties who did not formally sign the arbitration agreement. Since the Convention is rooted in consent, the attempt to bind a non-signatory naturally triggers the jurisdictional defense under Article V(1)(a) (lack of a valid arbitration agreement).10

Despite the Convention’s silence on the matter, the prevailing international consensus is that the New York Convention will not act as a barrier to binding a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement or enforcing an arbitral award against it.18 This demonstrates the adaptability of the Convention’s framework to evolving commercial realities.

The Reliance on Domestic Substantive Doctrines

Because the NYC does not provide an international standard for extending arbitration agreements, enforcement against non-signatories hinges entirely upon the enforcing court’s application of domestic substantive legal doctrines.18

These doctrines include:

• Alter ego
• Piercing the corporate veil
• Agency principles
• Estoppel
• The group of companies doctrine

The reliance on this “patchwork legal framework” means that the success of enforcement often turns on the particular domestic law of the target jurisdiction, which can introduce inconsistency and uncertainty.18

To satisfy the V(1)(a) requirement—that the non-signatory is legally bound—the enforcing court must often import these domestic, often equitable, concepts into the Convention’s framework.

This creative judicial application ensures that the narrow jurisdictional exceptions of the NYC cannot be utilized to shield related entities where commercial justice dictates otherwise. This means that the enforcing court may review the application of these doctrines de novo, independent of the arbitral tribunal’s original findings, adding complexity and strategic delay to the process.18

The inconsistency in the substantive approach used by different domestic courts in this area remains a significant challenge, one that calls for further international consensus.18

Strategic Recommendations for Global Enforcement

Based on the analysis of the Convention’s structure and judicial application, the following strategic recommendations are vital for maximizing the enforceability of international arbitral awards:

1. Risk Mitigation via Capacity and Jurisdiction Review: Prioritize stringent due diligence during the pre-arbitration phase to confirm the legal capacity of all signatory parties and to ensure the proper choice of law for the arbitration agreement. This preemptive measure directly addresses the narrow but critical V(1)(a) capacity challenges, which must be assessed as of the time the agreement was made.
2. Targeted Public Policy Analysis: Since the application of the public policy defense (V(2)(b)) remains highly variable, practitioners must utilize comparative legal analysis to assess the risk profile of enforcement jurisdictions based on their historical tendency toward narrow (International Public Policy) versus expansive (parochial) interpretations. This allows for a quantified assessment of the primary variable risk factor in international enforcement.
3. Sovereign Enforcement Protocol: When pursuing an award against a sovereign state, practitioners must recognize the necessity of a two-stage enforcement process. Success in obtaining NYC recognition must be treated as a necessary, but insufficient, first step. Execution planning must immediately pivot to strategies tailored to satisfying the specific, narrow exceptions contained within the domestic sovereign immunity legislation of the target enforcement jurisdiction, recognizing that NYC ratification does not constitute a waiver of execution immunity.
4. Non-Signatory Proof Preparation: If enforcement against a non-signatory entity is anticipated, the arbitral record must be deliberately constructed during the arbitration phase to include evidence satisfying the domestic alter ego, veil piercing, or agency requirements of probable enforcement jurisdictions. This preemptive evidence collection is essential to successfully overcome V(1)(a) challenges in the enforcement forum, where the enforcing court may conduct a de novo review of these domestic doctrines.

Works Cited

1. The New York Convention 1958 Through the Looking Glass in 2021 | 39 Essex Chambers, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.39essex.com/information-hub/blog/new-york-convention-1958-through-looking-glass-2021
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) – United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), accessed September 28, 2025, https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/new-york-convention-e.pdf
3. The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – UNCITRAL, accessed September 28, 2025, https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/new-york-convention-commonwealth.pdf
4. New York Convention of 1958 Annotated List of Topics, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.newyorkconvention.org/media/uploads/pdf/9/7/97_list-of-topics-descriptions-29-sep-2013.pdf
5. The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview – International Council for Commercial Arbitration, accessed September 28, 2025, https://cdn.arbitration-icca.org/s3fs-public/document/media_document/media012125884227980new_york_convention_of_1958_overview.pdf
6. Contracting States | New York Convention, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states
7. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958), accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.newyorkconvention.org/english
8. New York Convention Text, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.newyorkconvention.org/text
9. Article I(3) – Provisions – 1958 New York Convention Guide, accessed September 28, 2025, https://newyorkconvention1958.org/index.php?lvl=cmspage&pageid=12&menu=677&opac_view=-1
10. Issues relating to Challenging and Enforcing Arbitration Awards, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/ee45f3c2/issues-relating-to-challenging-and-enforcing-arbitration-awards-grounds-to-refuse-enforcement
11. Non-Signatories and the New York Convention – Boston University School of Law, accessed September 28, 2025, https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4690&context=faculty_scholarship
12. Awards set aside or annulled at the seat — Zombies, ghosts and buried treasure, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/e202e90e/awards-set-aside-or-annulled-at-the-seat
13. A comparison of the enforcement regimes under the New York and Washington Conventions — Norton Rose Fulbright, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/04f14b2a/a-comparison-of-the-enforcement-regimes-under-the-new-york-and-washington-conventions-mdashbra-tale-of-two-cities
14. English High Court Clarifies Sovereign Immunity: Ratification of New York Convention Not a Waiver – Morrison Foerster, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/250509-english-high-court-clarifies-sovereign-immunity
15. Does the New York Convention Apply to Investor-State Awards, accessed September 28, 2025, https://tlblog.org/does-the-new-york-convention-apply-to-investor-state-awards/
16. United States Court of Appeals – italaw, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw182140.pdf
17. Ratification of the New York Convention is not a waiver of state immunity – Twenty Essex, accessed September 28, 2025, https://www.twentyessex.com/ratification-of-the-new-york-convention-is-not-a-waiver-of-state-immunity/
18. New York Arbitration Week Revisited: Non-Signatories Before and After Arbitration – Wolters Kluwer, accessed September 28, 2025, https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/new-york-arbitration-week-revisited-non-signatories-before-and-after-arbitration-closing-in-on-an-international-approach/

Written By: Nazmul Hasan

Senior Judicial Magistrate

Professional Highlights

• Senior Judicial Magistrate, 11th Bangladesh Judicial Service (BJS)
• Merit Position: 7th in the 11th BJS

Academic Qualifications

Degree	Result	University
LL.B. (Hons.)	First Class First	University of Rajshahi
LL.M.	First Class	University of Rajshahi

Honors & Achievements

• Prime Minister Gold Medalist – 2017
• Agrani Bank Gold Medalist for Academic Excellence – 202