Introduction
In the ever-evolving landscape of Indian jurisprudence, the Supreme Court stands as the sentinel of constitutional values, ensuring uniformity, predictability, and trust in the legal system. However, a recent judgment in Sk. Md. Anisur Rahaman v. State of West Bengal (Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2025, decided very recently on November 25, 2025) has cast a spotlight on a troubling undercurrent:
the increasing instances of subsequent Benches overturning or modifying decisions of their predecessors. This phenomenon, colloquially known as “bench hunting,” not only erodes the principle of stare decisis but also strikes at the heart of Article 141 of the Constitution, which mandates that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India.
Judicial Finality & Discipline
The Bench, comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih, delivered a stern admonition, emphasizing that judicial finality is not a mere procedural nicety but the bedrock of the Rule of Law & Judicial Discipline. By refusing to alter a prior bail condition in this case, the Court reaffirmed that such reversals undermine public confidence and invite chaos, urging a return to disciplined adherence to precedents.
Core Issues & Implications
This article delves into the core issues raised in Anisur Rahaman, explores the implications for bail jurisprudence, and fortifies the discussion with seminal Supreme Court precedents that underscore the sanctity of judicial pronouncements. In an era where litigation tactics increasingly exploit judicial transitions—such as retirements or bench reconstitutions—these principles serve as a clarion call for restraint and institutional integrity.
The Core Issue: Finality in Judicial Verdicts
At its essence, Anisur Rahaman arose from a 2019 murder trial in West Bengal, where the appellant, Sk. Md. Anisur Rahaman, was granted bail by a Bench led by Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice A.G. Masih on January 15, 2025. The order imposed a condition restricting Rahaman from leaving Kolkata without prior permission, a measure tailored to the case’s sensitivities, including prolonged custody (over five years) and trial delays attributable partly to the prosecution.
Mere months later, following Justice Oka’s retirement, Rahaman filed a modification application before the current Bench, seeking relaxation of this geographic restraint. The Court, while acknowledging the plea, declined to intervene, viewing it as a strategic maneuver timed to capitalize on the “changed scenario.” Justice Datta, penning the opinion, articulated a profound concern: “The strength of judicial power lies less in the hope of perfection and more in the confidence that decisions, once made, are settled.”
This echoes the timeless wisdom of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, invoked by the Bench: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” The judgment highlights a “growing pain”—a surge in cases where aggrieved parties approach succeeding Benches to revisit settled matters, often leading to piecemeal reversals that breed legal uncertainty.
Article 141 & Its Intended Finality
Central to this critique is Article 141, which transforms Supreme Court declarations into “law of the land.” The Bench elucidated:
“The object of Article 141 seems to be this: the pronouncement of a verdict by a bench on a particular issue of law… should settle the controversy, being final, and has to be followed by all courts as law declared by the Supreme Court. However, if a verdict is allowed to be reopened because a later different view appears to be better, the very purpose of enacting Article 141 would stand defeated.”
Such reopenings, the Court warned, compromise consistency, erode the Court’s “special authority,” and invite perceptions of arbitrariness, ultimately jeopardizing public trust in the judiciary’s impartiality.
Recent Examples of Reversals Highlighting the Concern
- November 20, 2025: A five-judge Bench overruled an April 8 decision in the Tamil Nadu Governor-assent dispute.
- November 18, 2025: A 2:1 verdict in the Vanshakti case reversed a May 15 prohibition on post-facto environmental clearances.
- July 2025: The Court recalled its May 2 order liquidating Bhushan Power & Steel.
While each reversal may serve justice in isolation, their proliferation signals a systemic vulnerability, prompting the Anisur Rahaman Bench to advocate for “restraint, institutional discipline, and adherence to established mechanisms.”
Judicial Observations: Extract from Paragraphs 47 & 48
It would be trite to reproduce paras 47 & 48 of the said judgment, which echoes the sensibility of Article 141 and deprecates its trampling. The Court observed thus:
47. Though elementary, it requires restatement that it is fundamental to the rule of law to maintain the sanctity and finality of judicial verdicts. Judicial orders which determine issues arising between the parties to the lis bind them and its conclusive nature ensures resolution of disputes so that justice is served. The strength of judicial power lies less in the hope of perfection and more in the confidence that decisions, once made, are settled. As Justice Robert Jackson19 famously said “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final”. By upholding the finality of verdicts, not only is endless litigation prevented but public confidence in the judiciary is also maintained. (19 Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Allen)
48. In the recent past, we have rather painfully observed a growing trend in this Court (of which we too are an indispensable part) of verdicts pronounced by Judges, whether still in office or not and irrespective of the time lapse since pronounced, being overturned by succeeding benches or specially constituted benches at the behest of some party aggrieved by the verdicts prior in point of time. To us, the object of Article 141 of the Constitution seems to be this: the pronouncement of a verdict by a bench on a particular issue of law (arising out of the facts involved) should settle the controversy, being final, and has to be followed by all courts as law declared by the Supreme Court. However, if a verdict is allowed to be reopened because a later different view appears to be better, the very purpose of enacting Article 141 would stand defeated. The prospect of opening up a further round of challenge before a succeeding bench, hoping that a change in composition will yield a different outcome, would undermine this Court’s authority and the value of its pronouncements. A matter that is res integra may not be reopened or revisited or else consistency in legal interpretation could be compromised and the special authority that is invested in decisions of this Court, under Article 141, lost. The weight and influence of that special authority depend on the credibility we, the Judges, give to it. As Judges of this Court, we are alive to the position that overturning a prior verdict by a later verdict does not necessarily mean that justice is better served.
Bail Orders and Judicial Discipline
Bail jurisprudence exemplifies the perils of lax finality. In Anisur Rahaman, the Court refused to dilute the Kolkata restriction, reasoning that it was “premised on some worthy reason” tied to the accused’s circumstances and trial integrity. Modifying it, the Bench held, would “send a wrong message of this Court being unconcerned with the principle of finality,” especially absent a “material change of circumstance.” The plea for cancellation by the State was also rebuffed as “retaliatory,” underscoring that bail is not a punitive tool but a provisional liberty, revocable only on compelling grounds.
This stance aligns with the doctrine that bail conditions demand deference unless:
- “Something so grossly erroneous on the face of the record or palpably wrong” warrants review
- Curative intervention becomes necessary, as per Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388
The Court distinguished genuine reviews from manipulative “bench hunting,” cautioning that the latter fosters “forum shopping” and repeated harassment, contrary to the expeditious justice envisioned under Article 21.
Relevant Precedents Fortifying the Finality of Judgments
The Supreme Court’s rich tapestry of precedents provides robust fortification for Anisur Rahaman’s tenets, emphasizing Article 141’s imperative and the perils of judicial adventurism.
Article 141 and the Binding Nature of Precedents
- In Union of India v. R. Gandhi (2010) 11 SCC 1 — A Constitution Bench affirmed that interpretations under Article 141 are “universally binding” until expressly overruled by a larger Bench, warning that selective disregard invites “judicial indiscipline.”
- Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 — Established that even coordinate Benches must adhere to earlier rulings to preserve uniformity.
- Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 2 SCC 735 — Reiterated that conflicts must be referred to a larger Bench rather than resolved through unilateral overruling.
Review and Curative Petitions as Exclusive Remedies
The triumvirate of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982) 2 SCC 7 (the Judges Transfer case), Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra), and R. Regupathi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020) 7 SCC 514 delineates the narrow gateways for revisiting finality. S.P. Gupta underscored that Article 141 demands “unwavering obedience” to settled law, while Rupa Ashok Hurra introduced the curative petition as an “extraordinary” last resort for “gross miscarriage of justice,” limited to errors apparent on record. Regupathi extended this to SLPs, prohibiting second petitions as “bench-hunting” tactics that subvert finality.
| Case | Key Principle |
|---|---|
| S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1982) | Article 141 requires unwavering obedience to settled law |
| Rupa Ashok Hurra | Curative petition permitted only to prevent gross miscarriage of justice |
| R. Regupathi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020) | Prohibits second SLPs and bench hunting |
Prohibition on Bench Hunting and Judicial Comity
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 592, a seven-judge Bench decision, proclaimed that finality prevents “endless litigation” and upholds the “dignity of the Court.” Echoing this, Sanjay Kumar v. Narain Singh 12 SCC 402 censured “cherry-picking” Benches for favorable outcomes, mandating that parties exhaust review before fresh approaches. More recently, Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd. (2020) 2 SCC 455 decried “multiplicity of proceedings” as antithetical to Article 141, advocating consolidation over fragmentation.
- Finality prevents endless litigation
- Bench hunting or cherry-picking is prohibited
- Consolidation of proceedings is preferred over fragmentation
Sanctity of Bail Orders
On bail, Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 1 SCC 118 clarified that conditions are “tailored safeguards,” alterable only on “fresh facts” to avoid “whimsical interference.” This was buttressed in Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi (2001) 4 SCC 280, where the Court held that successive bail prayers must demonstrate “changed circumstances,” lest they degenerate into “abuse of process.” Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 5 SCC 1 further entrenched that interim bail orders attain finality post-adjudication, barring exceptional review.
These precedents, spanning decades, form an unassailable bulwark against erosion of finality, reminding that judicial power derives from certainty, not perpetual flux.
Conclusion
The Anisur Rahaman judgment is a watershed, not merely for its disposition but for its unflinching defense of judicial sanctity amid mounting pressures. By invoking Article 141’s solemn mandate and decrying bench hunting as a “threat to institutional credibility,” the Supreme Court has issued a clarion call: finality is the judiciary’s lifeblood, ensuring that justice is not a lottery of compositions but a predictable pillar of democracy. As the Bench poignantly noted, overturning priors “does not necessarily mean that justice is better served”—it risks unraveling the rule of law’s fabric.
Precedents like Rupa Ashok Hurra, Union of India v. R. Gandhi, and Gurcharan Singh fortify this edifice, affirming that review and curative petitions are the sole sentinels against error, not successive litigations. In an age of strategic advocacy, upholding these doctrines is imperative to restore faith in the Court as an oracle of stability. Only through such discipline can the Supreme Court reclaim its mantle as the “final interpreter” of the Constitution, safeguarding India’s constitutional democracy from the tempests of uncertainty.
