The relationship between ethnicity and assimilation is very important in discussions about cultural diversity, minority rights, and how states manage different communities. Ethnicity means the shared identity of a group based on culture, language, religion, traditions, or common ancestry. For example, tribal communities in India, Indigenous peoples in Australia, or ethnic minorities in Europe have their own languages and customs that make them distinct.
Assimilation refers to the process by which minority groups adopt the culture, language, or lifestyle of the majority population. This can happen voluntarily, such as when migrants learn the local language to find jobs and participate in society. For instance, immigrants in the United States often choose to speak English while still practicing their traditional customs at home. However, assimilation can also be forced, such as when governments ban minority languages or religions. Forced assimilation is harmful because it erases cultural identity and dignity.
International law clearly distinguishes between these two forms. Voluntary integration is allowed and even encouraged because it helps minorities participate equally in society. In contrast, forced assimilation is prohibited because it violates human rights, especially the rights of minorities to preserve their culture, language, and religion.
This article explores the ongoing “dialogue” or tension between protecting ethnic identity and promoting social integration. Multicultural societies often struggle to balance unity with diversity. International legal instruments such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) protect the right of Indigenous and ethnic groups to maintain their traditions and self-identity. Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees minorities the right to enjoy their own culture and practice their religion.
By examining international laws and court decisions from different countries, the article shows how states can promote national unity without forcing minorities to give up who they are.
International Perspective
International law allows voluntary assimilation or integration, but it clearly forbids forced assimilation.
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities says that states must not follow policies that force minorities to give up their identity against their will. Likewise, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Article 8) says that indigenous peoples have the right not to be forced to assimilate or have their culture destroyed.
International law also deals with extreme cases. The Genocide Convention (1948) makes it a crime to forcibly transfer children from one group to another when the aim is to destroy that group. Although the idea of full “cultural genocide” was not included in the final text, courts still recognize and address such harmful practices in serious cases.
Key International Case Laws
Lovelace v. Canada (UN Human Rights Committee, 1981): Sandra Lovelace was a Maliseet Indigenous woman who lost her legal Indian status under Canada’s Indian Act because she married a non-Indigenous man. As a result, she could not live on her reserve or take part in her community’s culture and traditions.
The UN Human Rights Committee decided that this violated Article 27 of the ICCPR, which protects the right of minorities to enjoy their culture together with their community. The Committee said that denying her access to her cultural community after Canada accepted the ICCPR was unlawful, because no similar cultural life was available outside the reserve.
This case showed that discriminatory laws forcing assimilation violate minority rights. It led to changes in the Indian Act in 1985, restoring rights to many Indigenous women.
- Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia (UN Human Rights Committee, 2000): Members of the Rehoboth Baster Community challenged Namibia’s rule that made English the only official language for government work and banned the use of Afrikaans, their minority language.
The UN Human Rights Committee found that this policy violated Article 26 of the ICCPR, which protects equality and bans discrimination. The rule unfairly treated Afrikaans speakers without a valid reason. Although the case did not directly decide on forced assimilation, it showed that language policies that favour one group and exclude minorities can become discriminatory and push minorities to assimilate against their will.
- ICTY and ICTR Jurisprudence on Genocide and Forcible Transfer: In cases like Prosecutor v. Krstić, the international tribunal examined the Srebrenica massacre and confirmed that genocide happened because of mass killings and serious harm to people. The court said that forced movement of people alone is not genocide unless there is an intention to physically or biologically destroy the group. However, such actions can help prove genocide when combined with attacks on culture, such as destroying mosques.
Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the Rwanda tribunal ruled that serious harm includes acts like rape and severe mental suffering. The court also noted that destroying cultural life can support a genocide claim, but culture alone is not enough unless it is linked to physical destruction of the group.
These cases show that forced assimilation violates human rights, especially for minorities and indigenous peoples. However, only the most extreme acts, such as forcibly taking children from a group, legally count as genocide.
National Perspectives
Nationally, approaches vary: assimilationist models (e.g., France’s republicanism) emphasize unity through a shared national identity, often restricting visible ethnic/religious markers. Multicultural models (e.g., Canada pre-1980s shifts) celebrate diversity but face criticism for hindering integration.
Selected National Contexts with Case Laws
United States: Historical assimilation policies targeted immigrants and Native Americans. In United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (U.S. Supreme Court, 1923), the Court ruled Asian Indians ineligible for citizenship despite anthropological classification as “Caucasian,” reasoning that common understanding excluded them due to perceived non-assimilability. This reflected early 20th-century racial assimilation biases, leading to denaturalizations.
For Native Americans, policies like residential schools aimed at forced assimilation, later recognized as cultural harm.
Canada: Shifted from assimilation (e.g., Indian Act provisions) to multiculturalism. The Lovelace case (above) prompted reforms, affirming integration over forced loss of identity.
Europe: France’s assimilationist bans on religious symbols (e.g., headscarves in schools) contrast with multicultural approaches in the UK. No direct Supreme Court equivalents, but European Court of Human Rights cases often uphold state integration policies if proportionate.
India: The Constitution promotes unity in diversity, protecting minority rights (Articles 29-30). Supreme Court judgments recognize tribal peoples as original inhabitants facing historical oppression, condemning atrocities while upholding cultural preservation. No direct forced assimilation rulings akin to Lovelace, but cases affirm non-discrimination and cultural rights.
Indian Judicial Approach
Indian judiciary has consistently safeguarded tribal, religious, and minority identities, ruling that national unity cannot justify forced cultural or social assimilation.
Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011): Declared arming tribal youth as Special Police Officers unconstitutional; such policies violate dignity (Article 21) and equality (Article 14) by disrupting indigenous social structures.
Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997): Prohibited transfer of tribal lands in scheduled areas to non-tribals/companies, emphasising that development must not erode tribal autonomy or cultural survival (Fifth Schedule).
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986): Upheld Jehovah’s Witnesses’ right to abstain from singing the national anthem, holding forced cultural conformity violates freedom of conscience (Article 25) and expression (Article 19).
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002): Affirmed religious and linguistic minorities’ right (Article 30) to establish educational institutions to preserve their distinct culture and language.
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (Forest Conservation Cases): Recognised forest-dwelling communities’ traditional rights and cultural ties to land; conservation policies must avoid displacement leading to cultural disruption.
Recent Supreme Court Developments
Aligarh Muslim University Minority Status Case (November 2024): A 7-judge bench (4:3 majority) overruled the 1967 Azeez Basha precedent, clarifying that statutory incorporation does not bar an institution from minority status under Article 30. This strengthens religious and linguistic minorities’ rights to establish and administer educational institutions to preserve their culture and language.
Uttar Pradesh Madarsa Education Act Case (October/November 2024): The Court upheld (overturning Allahabad HC’s strike-down) the regulation of madarsas, affirming their role in providing religious and secular education while preserving minority character. It emphasized substantive equality and state involvement without compromising cultural fabric under Articles 29–30.
Sacred Groves (Orans) Protection Order (December 2024): In ongoing forest conservation matters, the Court directed mapping of Rajasthan’s sacred groves and urged a national policy for preservation, recognizing their ecological and cultural significance to local/traditional communities (linked to Forest Rights Act protections).
Key Takeaway
These above cases perfectly illustrate the “Salad Bowl” theory of Indian secularism—where each culture retains its distinct flavour—as opposed to a “Melting Pot” of forced assimilation. Indian courts emphasise that state policies—whether for security, development, or unity—must respect diversity and cannot impose assimilation on tribal, religious, or linguistic groups, in line with constitutional protections and human rights norms.
Conclusion
The dialogue between ethnicity and assimilation reveals a clear legal and moral consensus: societies function best when integration is voluntary and respectful, not forced. International law and judicial decisions consistently affirm that while states may encourage social participation and unity, they must not compel minorities to abandon their language, culture, religion, or identity. Cases such as Lovelace and Diergaardt demonstrate strong protections against discriminatory assimilation, while genocide jurisprudence addresses only the most extreme and destructive practices.
Indian constitutional law similarly upholds “unity in diversity,” rejecting coercive policies in favour of rights-based inclusion. In an era of increasing migration and pluralism, sustainable national unity depends on respecting diversity, protecting minority rights, and promoting integration without coercion.
