Author: ADVOCATE AJAY AMITABH SUMAN

This judgment clarifies that under Order XI Rule 1(10) CPC, as applicable to commercial suits, “reasonable cause” for non-disclosure of documents with the written statement demands a genuine, specific explanation, with a lower proof threshold than “good cause” but mandating demonstration that documents were not in the defendant’s power, possession, custody, or control at filing; mere delay or post-appeal discovery without prior diligence does not suffice, reinforcing the Commercial Courts Act’s intent for vigilant, time-bound litigation over procedural leniency in ordinary suits.

High Court of Delhi holds that writ petitions challenging pre-abolition orders of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) on trademark matters are to be heard by a Single Judge of the Intellectual Property Division (IPD), as per IPD Rules, 2021, unless falling under specific Division Bench exceptions in Delhi High Court Rules; rejects mandatory Division Bench listing, treating such petitions as original IPD proceedings for efficient adjudication post-IPAB dissolution.

The Delhi High Court held that the Commercial Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018, reducing the specified value for commercial disputes to Rs. 3 lakhs, applies prospectively only to suits filed on or after May 3, 2018, and does not permit retrospective transfers of pre-2018 suits under Section 15 of the 2015 Act, preserving vested rights and avoiding administrative burdens.

Introduction This judgment, delivered by a division bench, underscores the distinction between mere prior use and the requirement to establish…

This judgment settles several critical points in patent litigation, particularly for biologics in quia timet scenarios, affirming that product-to-claim mapping under Rule 3(A)(ix) of the Delhi High Court Patent Suits Rules cannot be entirely dispensed with, even in anticipatory actions; the phrase “to the extent possible” allows flexibility but demands maximum feasible effort, and collateral evidence alone may not suffice for prima facie infringement without raising triable issues.

This judgment settles that in trademark disputes involving registered marks, no statutory infringement action lies against another registered proprietor under Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, but passing off remains actionable under common law via Section 27(2), provided the plaintiff proves prior goodwill predating the defendant’s use, misrepresentation, and damage.

The Division Bench’s reasoning pivoted on a critical procedural distinction between interim relief and final rectification under Section 57 of the Act. While acknowledging the Single Judge’s analysis of phonetic similarity—observing that “INSEAD” and “INSAID” shared auditory traits that could invoke initial interest confusion, especially in educational services—the court noted that these conclusions were repeatedly qualified as “prima facie.” For instance, the Single Judge held that phonetic similarity existed based on examples like “dead” and “said,” and that even enlightened students might experience momentary wonderment upon encountering the marks, satisfying the likelihood of confusion test under Section 11.

Introduction The dispute between The Procter & Gamble Company, a global giant in consumer goods, and IPI India Private Limited,…

Introduction The case of Fair Food Overseas Pvt Ltd v. KRBL Limited, decided by the High Court of Delhi, represents…

This case revolves around a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the petitioner sought the cancellation or removal of the respondent’s trademark ‘GMW’ in Class 11, arguing it was deceptively similar to their own ‘GM’ marks used since 1999 in the electrical goods sector. The court, presiding over an ex-parte proceeding due to the respondent’s non-appearance, emphasized the overriding principle that prior adoption and continuous use, backed by substantial goodwill evidenced through sales and registrations, prevail over later registrations that could lead to confusion or passing off.