Introduction

The guarantee of religious freedom under Article 25 of the Constitution of India has long stood as a cornerstone of the nation’s secular identity. It assures every individual the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion. Through decades of judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court of India has continuously drawn boundaries that distinguish between what is constitutionally protected and what falls outside its scope.

Evolving Judicial Interpretation of Article 25

This evolving balance has found a significant contemporary expression in All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India [1], passed on 17 March, 2026. In this case, a public interest litigation sought a nationwide gazetted holiday on the birth anniversary of Guru Gobind Singh Ji. The petitioner argued that the absence of such recognition reflected arbitrariness and undermined religious equality.

While acknowledging the profound spiritual and historical significance of the Guru, the court firmly held that Article 25 does not confer a right to demand state recognition in the form of a public holiday. It emphasised that such matters lie within the realm of executive policy, shaped by administrative, economic, and federal considerations.

The court stated that the reliance on Article 25 of the Constitution of India is “totally misplaced”.

While the freedom of religion guarantees every individual the right to profess, practise and propagate religion, it does not extend to a right to seek state recognition of a religious occasion in the form of a compulsory nationwide public holiday.

Public Holiday Demand and Constitutional Limitations

Issue	Court’s Observation
Demand for nationwide gazetted holiday	Falls within executive policy domain
Reliance on Article 25	Held to be “totally misplaced”
Religious freedom protection	Protects profession, practice, and propagation of religion
State recognition of religious occasions	Not a constitutional right under Article 25

Judicial Trend on Religious Freedom

This ruling is part of a broader judicial pattern. From its early expansive readings to its more structured limitations today, Article 25 has been steadily shaped through judicial pronouncements.

Therefore, the present moment offers an opportunity to trace this journey and understand how the courts have defined not only the scope of religious freedom but also its limits.

• Article 25 guarantees freedom of conscience.
• Citizens have the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion.
• The judiciary distinguishes protected religious practices from non-protected claims.
• Executive policy decisions cannot automatically be claimed as constitutional rights.
• The Supreme Court continues to refine the boundaries of religious freedom in India.

Judicial Pronouncements: What Article 25 Protects and What It Does Not

Beginning with an expansive understanding in Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. LT Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, 1954 [2], where SC held that religion is a matter of faith with individuals and communities. A religion has its basis in “a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being”. It may prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as an integral part of religion. What constitutes an essential part of religions or religious practice has to be decided by the courts with reference to a doctrine of a particular religion and includes practices which are regarded by the community as a part of its community.

Shirur Mutt Case and Essential Religious Practices

• Religion was recognized as a matter of individual and community faith.
• Religious practices may include rituals, ceremonies, and modes of worship.
• Courts determine what constitutes an essential religious practice.
• Community acceptance plays a major role in identifying essential practices.

Building upon this broad understanding, the court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar [3] clarified that not every practice associated with religion automatically receives protection. It held that the sacrifice of a cow on Bakrid Day was not an essential part of the Mohammedan religion and hence could be prohibited by the state under Clause 2(a) of Article 25.

Mohd. Hanif Quareshi Case: Limitations on Religious Practices

• Every religious practice is not automatically protected under Article 25.
• The court differentiated between essential and non-essential practices.
• State restrictions were upheld in the interest of public welfare.

In the case of Rev. Stainislaus v. State of MP [4], the Supreme Court held that if an attempt is made to raise communal passions, i.e., on the ground that someone has been forcibly converted to another religion, it would, in all probability, give rise to an apprehension of breach of a public order, affecting the community at large. Therefore, legislation prohibiting the forcible conversion of one’s own religion in the interests of public order can be passed and not be violative of Art. 25.

Rev. Stainislaus Case: Forced Conversion and Public Order

• Freedom of religion does not include forced conversion.
• Public order remains a constitutional limitation under Article 25.
• Anti-conversion laws can be constitutionally valid.

The later decades witnessed a growing emphasis on public order and constitutional limitations. In Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta [5], the Supreme Court held that “Tandava dance in procession or at public places by Ananda Margis carrying lethal weapons and human skulls is not an essential religious rite of the followers of Ananda Marga, and hence the order under Section 144 CrPC prohibiting such procession in the interest of public order and morality is not violative of Art. 25.”

Ananda Marga Case: Public Order and Religious Processions

• Public safety and morality can override non-essential practices.
• Religious freedom is subject to constitutional restrictions.
• Section 144 CrPC restrictions were upheld to maintain public order.

At the same time, the court protected genuine claims of conscience. In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala [6], it was held that no person can be compelled to sing the national anthem if he has a genuine, conscientious religious objection.

Bijoe Emmanuel Case: Freedom of Conscience

• Article 25 protects genuine matters of conscience.
• Citizens cannot be compelled to violate sincere religious beliefs.
• The judgment strengthened constitutional protection for individual liberty.

The next development further refined the distinction between religion- and caste-based monopolies in ritual performance. In the case of N. Aditya v. Travancore Dewaswom Board [7], the Supreme Court held that Brahmins do not have a monopoly over performing puja in a temple. A non-Brahmin can be appointed as a pujari. There is no justification in insisting that a Brahmin or Malayali Brahmin, in this case, alone can perform the rite and rituals in the temple as a part of the rights and freedom guaranteed under Art. 25.

N. Aditya Case: Non-Brahmins Performing Puja

• Caste-based monopolies in temple rituals were rejected.
• Non-Brahmins are equally eligible to perform puja.
• Article 25 promotes equality alongside religious freedom.

A significant restrictive shift occurred in M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India [8]; the court held that the State can, in exercise of its sovereign power, acquire places of worship like mosques, churches, temples, etc., which is independent of Art. 300-A, if it is mandatory for the maintenance of law and order. Such acquisition per se does not violate Arts. 25 and 26 of the constitution.

This ruling was followed in the case of Gulam Kadar Ahmadbhai Menon v. Surat Municipal Corporation [9], in which the Gujarat High Court held that the right to religion guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 do not prohibit the state from acquiring any place of worship for public purposes. Accordingly, the order for the demolition of certain portions of the two mosques for widening the road was valid.

Ismail Faruqui and Gulam Kadar Cases: Acquisition of Religious Properties

Case	Key Issue	Court Observation
M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India	State acquisition of religious places	Acquisition for law and order does not violate Arts. 25 and 26.
Gulam Kadar Ahmadbhai Menon v. Surat Municipal Corporation	Demolition for public purpose	Religious places may be acquired or altered for public infrastructure projects.

Key Takeaways on Article 25

• Article 25 protects essential religious practices and freedom of conscience.
• Public order, morality, and health remain constitutional limitations.
• Courts play a decisive role in identifying essential religious practices.
• Non-essential practices can be regulated or restricted by the state.
• Equality principles prevent caste-based monopolies in religious functions.

Subsequently, in Church of Goa (Full Gospel) in India v. KKRMC Welfare Association [10], the Supreme Court held that in the exercise of the right to religious freedom, no person can be allowed to create noise pollution or disturb the peace of others. The custom of religious prayer through the use of loudspeakers is not an essential element of any religion.

Noise Pollution and Religious Practices

• Religious freedom is subject to public peace and order.
• The use of loudspeakers is not considered an essential religious practice.
• Citizens cannot disturb others in the name of religious freedom.

In the case of Javed v. State of Haryana [11], legislation disqualified persons having more than two children from contesting elections for the post of Sarpanch. It was challenged that it violated Article 25 because the permissibility of marriages with four women under Muslim law was obvious for procreating children, and any restriction thereon would be violative of freedom of religion.

The Supreme Court held that the freedom of religion is subject to public order. So, the article itself permits legislation in the interest of social welfare and reform. The Muslim law permits marrying four women but does not anywhere mandate it as a duty to perform four marriages. Hence, it is not violative of Article 25.

Social Reform and Religious Freedom

Case	Key Issue	Court Observation
Javed v. State of Haryana	Two-child norm for Sarpanch elections	Social welfare legislation can override non-essential religious practices

In Worter Karamlki v. State of Meghalaya [12], the petitioner belonged to the Seng Khasi denomination residing in Mawlong village of Meghalaya. They possessed a burial ground which was allotted by village elders since time immemorial. The respondent threatened to dispossess them of the aforesaid land.

They lodged several complaints, but no action was taken by the concerned authorities. They were prevented from performing the last rites and cremating the dead bodies of their family members belonging to their community on the said land.

The court held that the denial of such rights and dispossessing them from the cremation ground amounted to the abridgement of their fundamental right to freedom of religion. The practice of cremating the dead bodies of the members belonging to the Seng Khasi faith is an integral part of their faith.

Protection of Religious Customs and Cremation Rights

• The right to perform last rites is protected under Article 25.
• Cremation practices of the Seng Khasi faith were treated as integral religious practices.
• Dispossession from cremation grounds violated religious freedom.

Constitutional Morality and Article 25

In the modern era, the Court has increasingly invoked constitutional morality. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India [13], the Supreme Court declared Talaq-e-Biddat unconstitutional.

The court overruled the Privy Council decision of Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun [14], which had held Triple Talaq valid, and stated that it forms no part of Article 25(1) of the constitution.

This transformative approach was carried forward in Indian Young Lawyer Association v. State of Kerala [15] (Sabrimala case); gender equality was prioritised over religious exclusion.

Triple Talaq and Sabarimala Judgments

Case	Issue	Judicial Outcome
Shayara Bano v. Union of India	Triple Talaq	Talaq-e-Biddat declared unconstitutional
Indian Young Lawyer Association v. State of Kerala	Sabarimala entry restrictions	Gender equality prioritised over exclusionary practices

Religious Expression and Institutional Discipline

More recent decisions highlight the tension between individual religious expression and institutional discipline. In Fathima Tasneem v. State of Kerala [16], the court observed that while wearing the headscarf could be part of religious practice, schools also possess the authority to prescribe uniforms to promote discipline and equality.

And held that enforcing a uniform policy does not amount to an infringement of fundamental rights, provided that such policy applies equally and serves a legitimate purpose.

Further, in Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka [17], the Karnataka High Court held that wearing the hijab is not an essential religious practice in Islam protected under Article 25.

The court also noted that the petitioners had voluntarily joined institutions with uniform codes and thus were bound by them.

Hijab Cases and School Uniform Rules

• Educational institutions can enforce uniform policies.
• Uniform rules are valid if applied equally.
• The Karnataka High Court held that hijab is not an essential religious practice under Article 25.

Conclusion

The Shiromani Sabha case of 2026 is significant because it clearly reiterates that religious freedom under Article 25 cannot be transformed into a claim over state policy, such as the declaration of a nationwide public holiday.

At the same time, the broader jurisprudence surrounding Article 25 of the Indian Constitution continues to raise important concerns. Scholars such as Prof. Faizan Mustafa have persuasively argued that the essentiality/integrality doctrine has tended to lead the Court into an area that is beyond its competence and given judges the power to decide purely religious questions.

As a result, over the years, courts have been inconsistent on this question. This inconsistency makes Article 25 adjudication appear uncertain and, at times, overly judge-centric. [18]

Key Issues in Article 25 Adjudication

• Courts continue to apply the essential religious practices doctrine inconsistently.
• Judicial interpretation often overlaps with theological questions.
• Constitutional morality increasingly influences religious freedom cases.
• The balance between faith, governance, equality and public order remains evolving.

In my view, the Shiromani Sabha ruling should not be seen as the endpoint of jurisprudence of Article 25 but as an important contemporary marker in its continuing evolution.

As new conflicts emerge between faith, governance and constitutional morality, the scope of Article 25 will continue to be tested and redefined by future courts. End-Notes:

1. 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 290.
2. AIR 1954 SC 282.
3. AIR 1958 SC 731.
4. AIR 1977 SC 908.
5. (1983) 4 SCC 522.
6. (1986) 3 SCC 615.
7. (2002) 8 SCC 106.
8. (1994) 6 SCC 360.
9. AIR 1998 Guj. 234.
10. AIR 2000 SC 2773.
11. AIR 2003 SC 3057.
12. AIR 2010 Gau 51.
13. AIR 2017 SC 4609.
14. AIR 1932 PC 25.
15. (2018) 10 SCC 1.
16. 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 5267.
17. 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 323.
18. Editorial, “The problem with the Karnataka HC’s hijab ruling” The Indian Express, March 16, 2022.