Introduction
Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly known as Naxalism or Maoism in India, remains one of the country’s most enduring internal security threats since independence. Driven by Maoist ideology, it aims to overthrow the state through armed struggle, drawing significant support from marginalized rural, tribal, and impoverished communities who feel neglected by development. At its height around 2010, LWE exerted influence over more than 200 districts in roughly 20 states, creating the notorious “Red Corridor” spanning from Andhra Pradesh in the south to West Bengal in the east.
Sustained multi-pronged government strategies—combining robust security operations, infrastructure development, and targeted welfare initiatives in affected areas—have dramatically curtailed its reach and intensity. By late 2025, the number of LWE-affected districts has shrunk to just 11 across a handful of states (primarily Chhattisgarh, with pockets in Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, and others), with only three classified as “most affected.” Violent incidents have plummeted by approximately 89% from the 2010 peak of 1,936 to around 218–234 in 2025, while related deaths have fallen by over 90%. The government has set a target to eliminate LWE entirely by March 31, 2026, signalling the near-collapse of the once-expansive Red Corridor.
Despite remarkable progress in curbing Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), underdevelopment continues to serve as a primary driver of its lingering influence. Remote, tribal-dominated regions—marked by chronic poverty, inadequate infrastructure, weak governance, land alienation, and exploitation—foster deep grievances that Maoist groups exploit for recruitment and ideological propagation. These areas, often rich in resources yet starved of equitable growth, create a vacuum where extremists portray themselves as protectors against state neglect, transforming socio-economic deprivation into sustained support for armed rebellion.
Analyses highlight that LWE persists not solely from ideology but from the state’s historical failure to deliver inclusive development, allowing Maoists to weaponize economic marginalization. Addressing root causes through accelerated infrastructure, tribal rights enforcement, employment generation, and governance reforms remains essential to prevent resurgence, even as security gains near the government’s March 2026 eradication target.
Historical Context
The origins of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) trace back to the 1967 Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal, where peasants, led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal under the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), revolted against exploitative landlords. Inspired by Mao Zedong’s tactics, the movement sought to seize power through guerrilla warfare and establish a “people’s government.” Initially suppressed, it fragmented and spread to underdeveloped rural areas, culminating in the 2004 merger that formed the Communist Party of India (Maoist).
The “Red Corridor” spanned states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, and Maharashtra, where resource-rich yet impoverished tribal regions faced rampant economic backwardness and alienation. NITI Aayog’s 2023 Multidimensional Poverty Index shows many LWE-affected districts among India’s most deprived, perpetuating grievances. By the early 2000s, Maoists controlled vast areas, running parallel administrations and extorting “levies” from industries, further hindering development.
Factors of Underdevelopment Contributing to LWE
Underdevelopment in LWE-prone areas is multifaceted, involving economic, social, and institutional deficits that deepen inequalities and supply Maoists with propaganda portraying the state as exploitative.
Poverty and Unemployment
LWE-affected regions rank among India’s poorest, plagued by high poverty, illiteracy, and joblessness. Tribal rural populations endure subsistence farming, irrigation shortages, and climate vulnerabilities. Droughts and income shocks correlate with rising Maoist violence and recruitment, as youth, lacking alternatives, join for promised economic justice and livelihoods.
Land Alienation and Forest Rights
Tribals, reliant on forests, face systematic dispossession through mining, dams, and industries without adequate compensation or rehabilitation. Poor enforcement of the Forest Rights Act (2006) and PESA (1996) denies access to “Jal, Jungle, Jameen,” fuelling grievances. Maoists exploit this by posing as tribal defenders against corporate and state exploitation.
Lack of Infrastructure and Basic Services
Remote areas suffer from absent roads, electricity, schools, and healthcare, fostering a governance vacuum. Maoists fill it with “Janatana Sarkar” parallel systems while attacking state projects like bridges and schools, delaying progress. Isolation hinders market access and intensifies neglect perceptions.
Governance Vacuum and Exploitation
Weak administration, corruption, and rights abuses alienate communities. Officials, contractors, and moneylenders trap tribals in debt bondage. Excessive security actions, including alleged fake encounters, erode trust, driving locals toward Maoists for protection. Discrimination against STs and SCs amplifies resentment.
The following table summarizes key underdevelopment indicators in major LWE-affected states (based on recent data from NITI Aayog MPI 2023, PLFS 2023-24, and related reports):
|
State |
Multidimensional Poverty Headcount Ratio (%) (NFHS-5, 2019-21) |
Literacy Rate (%) (PLFS 2023-24, age 7+) |
Unemployment Rate (%) (recent PLFS/Economic Survey) |
Key Issues |
|
Chhattisgarh |
16.37 |
78.5 |
~2.4–5.6 |
Mining displacement, forest rights violations, tribal poverty |
|
Jharkhand |
28.81 |
76.7 |
~1.7–2.8 |
High poverty, industrial exploitation, tribal alienation |
|
Odisha |
15.68 |
79.0 |
~3.9–6.5 |
Tribal marginalization, poor infrastructure in remote areas |
|
Bihar |
33.76 |
74.3 |
~3.9–5.2 |
Chronic unemployment, governance gaps, low education access |
These indicators highlight persistent socio-economic vulnerabilities in LWE-prone regions, where multidimensional poverty, low literacy, and job scarcity create fertile ground for extremist recruitment despite overall national improvements.
How Underdevelopment Increases LWE Influence
Underdevelopment directly boosts Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) influence by reinforcing narratives of state neglect and creating operational advantages for Maoists. Impoverished youth, facing chronic poverty and unemployment, are prime recruitment targets, lured by stipends, a sense of purpose, and promises of economic justice within Maoist ranks. In governance voids, extremists dispense “justice” via kangaroo courts (Jan Adalats), provide rudimentary services, and position themselves as protectors against exploitation, gaining local legitimacy and support.
Maoists perpetuate backwardness through a vicious cycle: they sabotage infrastructure projects—roads, schools, bridges—and attack development initiatives to block state penetration, ensuring isolation and continued grievances. Post-1991 economic liberalization intensified this by accelerating mining and industrialization in resource-rich tribal areas, causing displacement without equitable benefits or rehabilitation, eroding state trust and enhancing Maoist credibility as champions of rural and tribal interests. Studies confirm that stalled growth and poor program execution allow extremists to exploit discontent, sustaining and expanding their influence despite recent security gains.
Government Responses: Balancing Security and Development
India pursues a holistic strategy against Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) under the 2015 National Policy and Action Plan, integrating security with accelerated development. The SAMADHAN doctrine—focusing on smart leadership, actionable intelligence, modern technology, and aggressive operations—has empowered forces like CRPF’s COBRA units to neutralize threats, resulting in over 2,500 Maoist surrenders in recent years. Development initiatives include the Aspirational Districts Programme targeting LWE-affected areas for gains in health, education, and livelihoods; Special Central Assistance funding the Road Requirement Plan-I (over 4,800 km completed), rural electrification, mobile towers, and skill training. Generous surrender-and-rehabilitation policies provide financial incentives, vocational support, and security to encourage defections. The government targets complete LWE elimination by March 31, 2026, viewing it as the primary obstacle to remote-area progress.
Challenges and Way Forward
Persistent challenges remain: sporadic Maoist resurgence in isolated pockets, the delicate balance between aggressive security operations and safeguarding human rights, and their continued exploitation of mining-induced displacements and tribal grievances. Critics rightly stress that development efforts must be genuinely inclusive, rights-centric, and community-driven to prevent further alienation and backlash.
The way forward lies in empowering grassroots Panchayati Raj institutions, ensuring strict and timely implementation of the Forest Rights Act (2006) and PESA (1996), promoting community-led planning, advancing land reforms, and generating local employment through strengthened rural infrastructure. Deploying drone and GIS-based monitoring, alongside targeted education initiatives to counter extremist propaganda, will enhance governance reach. Above all, sustained equitable growth—rooted in tribal dignity, justice, and meaningful participation—is critical to eliminate conditions conducive to revival and secure lasting peace.
Conclusion
Underdevelopment has long fuelled LWE by converting socio-economic grievances into armed rebellion. While security operations have drastically reduced violence and shrunk the Red Corridor, lasting peace demands addressing root causes through inclusive, participatory development. India’s progress demonstrates the effectiveness of a balanced approach, but continued focus on post-conflict rehabilitation, robust governance, and mainstream integration is vital to ensure dignity, justice, and enduring stability in affected regions by 2026 and beyond.


