Topic: Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India - Article 32 of the Constitution of India
Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India
Bench: J.S. Verma, N.M. Kasliwal, K. Ramaswamy, K.J. Reddy, S.C. Agrawal - Case No.: Writ Petition (civil) 514 of 1992 - Date of Judgment: 27/08/1992
“It used to be disputed that judges make law. Today, it is no longer a matter of doubt that a substantial volume of the law governing the lives of citizens and regulating the functions of the State flows from the decisions of the superior courts. ‘There was a time observed Lord Reid, ‘when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that judges make law – they only declare it……….But we do not believe in fairy tales any more’.
1992 AIR 2219 = 1992 (1)Suppl.SCR 108 = 1992 (4) SCC 506 = 1992(5) JT 1 = 1992(2) SCALE 257
(Under Article 32 of the Constitutions of India)
The Judgment was delivered by : Hon'ble Justice J. S. Verma, Hon'ble Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy and Hon'ble Justice S. C. Agrawal
J. S.VERMA, J. (for himself and on behalf of K. Jayachandra and S. C. Agrawal, JJ.) (Majority view):-
1. The person entitled to seek judicial review and the stage at which it is available against the findings of the Inquiry Committee constituted under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in accordance with the law declared in Sub-Cornmittee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699 is the question for decision in this writ petition. According to the petitioner, the remedy of judicial review is available to the concerned Judge against the finding, if any, by the Inquiry Committee that the learned Judge is 'guilty' of misbehaviour only prior to submission of the report of the Committee to the Speaker - in accordance with Section 4 (2) of the Act or latest till it is laid before the Parliament as required by Section 4(3) of the Act, but not thereafter. Accordingly, the petitioner claims that a copy of the report should be furnished to the concerned Judge before it is submitted to the Speaker, to preserve the right of the Judge to seek judicial review of the finding of 'guilty', if any, in the report. The merit of this submission is considered herein.
2. The petitioner is the wife of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court of India. In this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, certain constitutional issues have been raised which are to be decided on the construction of Article 124 of the Constitution of India and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 read with the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 framed thereunder, in the background of the law declared in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699 In essence, this petition is a sequel to that earlier decision rendered in the context of the proceedings for removal of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami from the office of a Judge of the Supreme Court of India.
3. Certain allegations of financial improprieties and irregularities were made against Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami in his capacity as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana prior to his appointment in October 1989 as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India by 108 members of the Ninth Lok Sabha by a notice of motion for presenting an address to the President for the removal from office of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami. On March 12, 1991, the motion was admitted by the Speaker of the Ninth Lok Sabha who also proceeded to constitute a Committee consisting of Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant, a sitting Judge of this Court, Mr. Justice P. D. Desai, Chief Justice of the High Court of Bombay and Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, a retired Judge of this Court as a distinguished jurist in terms of Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. On dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha, the Union Government was of the view that the notice of motion given by 108 members of the Ninth Lok Sabha for presenting an address to the President for removal of the learned Judge as well as the decision of the Speaker of the Ninth Lok Sabha to admit the motion and constitute a Committee under the provisions of the Act had lapsed with the dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha. Accordingly, the Union Government abstained from acting in aid of the decision of the Speaker to notify that the services of the two sitting Judges on the Committee would be treated as 'actual service within the meaning of para 11(b)(i) of Part D of the Second Schedule to the Constitution to enable them to function as members of the Committee. Important constitutional issues as to the status of a motion for the removal of a Judge under the Act made pursuant to Article 124(5) of the Constitution and applicability of the doctrine of lapse to such a motion upon the dissolution of the Lok Sabha together with the connected questions including the justiciability thereof in a Court of law arose in these rather unfortunate circumstances.
4. A body called the "Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability" represented by a Senior Advocate of this Court as its Convener filed Writ Petition No. 491 of 1991 and the Supreme Court Bar Association filed Writ Petition No. 541 of 1991 in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The common prayers in both the petitions were for a direction to the Union of India to take immediate steps to enable the Inquiry Committee to discharge its functions under the Act; and to restrain the Judge concerned Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami from performing judicial functions and exercising 'judicial powers during the pendency of the proceedings before the Committee. The decision rendered therein by a Constitution Bench is Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699
5. The Constitution Bench by a majority of 4: 1 held that a motion under Section 3(2) of the Act does not lapse upon the dissolution of the House. The majority opinion concluded as under:-
"All that is necessary to do is to declare the correct constitutional position. No specific writ or direction need issue to any authority. Having regard to the nature of the subject matter and the purpose it is ultimately intended to serve all that is necessary is to declare the legal and constitutional position and leave the different organs of the State to consider matters falling within the orbit of their respective jurisdiction and powers"
6. The controversy before the Constitution Bench in those matters was so decided and Writ Petitions Nos. 491 and 541 of 1991 were disposed of by the appropriate declarations of the law as contained in the judgment.
7. After declaration of the legal and constitutional position in this behalf on the points in controversy in the above decision, the Union of India took the necessary steps to act in aid of the decision of the Speaker of the Ninth Lok Sabha and the requisite notification was also issued in respect of the two sitting Judges of the Committee as required by para 11(b)(i) of Part D of the Second Schedule to the Constitution of India. The Committee constituted by the Speaker under the Act then proceeded to inquire into the allegations made against the Judge concerned Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and, as intimated at the hearing of this petition, the Committee has completed the Inquiry and also prepared its Report for being submitted to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as required by Section 4(2) of the Act.
8. The learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami sent a letter dated May 10, 1992 to Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant, Presiding Officer of the Inquiry Committee, requesting that a copy of the report of the Committee be forwarded to him giving him sufficient time to seek redress in a Court of law, if required or necessary, as a result of the findings of the Committee: He was sent a reply by the Secretary to the Committee by letter dated May 15, 1992. These letters are collectively marked Annexure 1 to the petition. They are reproduced as under:-
"Justice V, Ramaswami Judge, Supreme Court 2, Teenmurthi Marg New Delhi- 110011
May 10, 1992
Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant Presiding Officer
Committee Appointed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 433 Parliament House Annexe
New Delhi 110001.
I am informed that the Committee is resuming its sittings for further examination of witnesses on May 11, 1992. My counsel Shri Ranjit Kumar, who was present in Court during the course of the hearing in Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992 in the Supreme Court of India, learnt that only 5 or 6 witnesses remain to be examined and that thereafter the matter will be fixed for arguments. As the Committee will be sitting from May 11, 1992 onwards, presumably the entire process will be completed during the period when the Hon'ble Supreme Court is closed for summer vacation. My advocate also learned that the Hon'ble Speaker has extended the date for the Committee to furnish its report under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 till July 31, 1992. I, therefore, assume that prior to that date the report will be furnished to the Hon'ble Speaker. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v.Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699 has held that the Committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is a statutory committee and from the time it commences its proceedings till its report is placed before Parliament, its proceedings are deemed to be outside Parliament and, therefore, subject to judicial review.
As the Committee is required to render its findings in respect of the various charges framed against me, I would like to be supplied a copy of the report well in time to entitle me to challenge the same by filing appropriate proceedings, in the event any findings are rendered against me. A reading of the Constitution Bench's judgment would suggest that such an opportunity would be available to me since the Committee functions as a Tribunal outside Parliament. I, therefore, do not expect the Committee to render infructuous this valuable constitutional right, in the event its report is adverse to me, by submitting it in haste to the Hon'ble Speaker, who might place it before Parliament when in session. Recourse to such a procedure would not only be in violation of my constitutional right to receive the report but would be violative of natural justice, since I would, in that situation, be pre-empted from challenging the report in an appropriate forum.
I am writing to you well in advance so that upon completion of the report, a copy is forwarded to me forthwith and sufficient time is granted to me to seek redress in a Court of law, if required or necessary. Naturally, you would, therefore, in forwarding a copy of the report to me, withhold the forwarding of the said report to the Hon'ble Speaker, simultaneously. I, therefore, expect that you would be responding to this request of mine very soon, since any delay in this regard would be extremely prejudicial to my interests and would tend to defeat even the limited right granted to me by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Kindly respond to this request of mine within a couple of days of your receiving this letter.
"Committee Appointed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 433, Parliament House Annexe
No. 17/17- CB-11/91 May 15, 1992
S. C. Gupta, Secretary
Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, Judge,
Supreme Court of India,
2 Teen Murti Marg,
New Delhi- 110011.
With reference to your letter dated 10th May, 1992 addressed to the Presiding Officer, 1 am to inform you that counsel for the Committee brought your letter to the attention of the Constitution Bench which is now seized of the matter, during the hearing on 14th May, 1992 in Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992, stating that the Committee will abide by any directions that may be given in this regard by their Lordships in the said case.
Sd/- S. C. Gupta
9. The petitioner, Smt. Sarojini Ramaswami, wife of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, has filed this writ petition on July 6, 1992 after receipt of the letter dated May 15, 1992 by Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami from the Secretary to the Committee, impleading the Union of India and the Committee appointed under the Act as the respondents. The relief sought in this writ petition is for a direction to the Committee to supply a copy of the Report of the Committee to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and to withhold forwarding of the said Report to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha simultaneously to enable Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami to seek redress in a court of law, if required or necessary, against the findings of the Committee in its Report. This relief is sought on the basis of the decision of the Constitution Bench reported in (1991) 4 SCC 699 (AIR 1992 SC 320) that the entire proceedings of the Committee are statutory in nature and, therefore, subject to judicial review.
10. When the matter came up for hearing before us first on July 21, 1992, we indicated to Shri Kapil Sibal, senior counsel for the petitioner that even though the petitioner's right for the relief claimed in this petition is founded on her status as wife of the learned Judge and the right flowing to her through her husband, yet Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami had not been impleaded as a party and it was also not indicated that the writ petition was for and on behalf of the learned Judge so as to bind the learned Judge himself to the decision in this petition. We also pointed out that the exact position of the learned Judge has to be made clear to us before we proceed to consider and decide this writ petition on merits. Shri Kapil Sibal indicated that the learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami would be bound by the decision herein and he also undertook to file a writing to that effect. We accordingly adjourned the matter to the next day July 22, 1992 for this purpose. The proceedings of July 21, 1992 are as under:-
"Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appears for the petitioner. In response to our query whether Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami would be bound by the adjudication made in this petition wherein his wife is the petitioner, Shri Sibal submitted that he will obtain written instructions to this effect from the learned Judge, Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and file the same in the Court by tomorrow morning.
The matter will be taken up tomorrow, the 22nd July, 1992."
11. On July 22,1992, Shri Ranjit Kumar, the counsel instructing Shri Kapil Sibal, senior counsel for the petitioner filed in the Court a letter addressed by him to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami with the endorsement of the learned Judge at the foot thereof. The same is reproduced as under:-
July 21, 1992.
Sub: Writ Petition (C) No. 514 of 1992 Mrs. Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India and others.
When Writ Petition (Civil) No. 514/ 1992 was taken up today, the Hon'ble Judges comprising the Bench wanted to be informed of your stand in respect of the binding nature of the adjudication in the event the petition was taken up for hearing and judgment rendered thereon.
Shri Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner in this Writ Petition informed the learned Judges that as the right of Mrs. Ramaswami to move this Hon'ble Court directly flowed from your right to continue to hold office as a Judge of this Hon'ble Court, you would naturally be bound by the adjudication rendered in respect of the relief sought in Writ Petition No. 514 of 1992. Please confirm if Mr. Sibal has rightly conveyed to the Hon'ble Judges your position in this regard.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami
2, Teen Murti Marg
The statement made by Mr. Sibal correctly reflects my position.
Sd/- V. Ramaswami
12. On production of the above letter of Shri Ranjit Kumar, bearing thereon the endorsement of acceptance by Mr. Justice v. Ramaswami in his own hand, we made an order to this effect which is contained in the proceedings dated July 22,1992 asunder:-
"Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a letter dated July 21, 1992 addressed by him to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami bearing the endorsement of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami at the foot of it accepting as correct Justice V. Ramaswami the position is that this writ petition is in substance by the learned Judge himself field through his wife who is shown as the petitioner" (Emphasis supplied)
13. The result, therefore, is that this writ petition is in substance by the learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami himself filed through his wife, the petitioner Smt. Sarojini Ramaswami for the relief claimed herein on behalf of her husband Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami. This writ petition is treated accordingly for the purpose of deciding the points raised herein.
14. In addition to issuing notice to the respondents, namely, the Union of India and the Inquiry Committee appointed under Section 3 (2) of the Act, we also requested the learned Attorney General to appear and assist the Court in his capacity as the Attorney General of India. We have heard Shri Kapil Sibal for the petitioner, Shri F. S. Nariman for the Inquiry Committee and the Attorney General Shri G. Ramaswamy.
15. Before proceeding to consider the arguments advanced by these learned counsel, we consider it appropriate to make a brief reference to Writ Petition (Civil) No. 149 of 1992 - Shri Krishna Swami v. Union of India - which had been filed earlier and of which reference is made in this writ petition as well as in the correspondence between Mr. Justice v. Ramaswami and the Committee.
16. Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992 was filed in this Court by M. Krishna Swami, a member of the Tenth Lok Sabha for several reliefs specified therein. Those reliefs relate to the aforesaid Inquiry by the Committee appointed under the Act to investigate into the allegations made against Mr. Justice v. Ramaswami. The petitioner therein M. Krishna Swami claiming to be a person interested as a member of the Tenth Lok Sabha as well as an advocate of Madras known to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami for long alleged certain illegalities in the procedure adopted by the Committee prejudicial to the learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and on that basis, apart from seeking reconsideration of the decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, (AIR 1991 SC 320 ), also sought quashing of the charges framed by the Committee and a declaration that the proceedings of the Committee are null and void. That writ petition was listed initially before a Division Bench comprising of three learned Judges which referred the writ petition for hearing by a larger Bench. This is how Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992 came up for hearing before this Bench. On 6-5-1992, during consideration of the question of maintainability of that writ petition in the absence of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami as a party, Shri Kapil Sibal, senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in that writ petition also took time to make an application for impleading Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami as a party in that petition. However, on 7-5-1992, Shri Kapil Sibal stated that the petitioner therein did not want to implead Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami as a party and he had decided to pursue that writ petition as framed. Accordingly, that writ petition was heard on the question of its maintainability for grant of the reliefs claimed therein without impleading the learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, who would undoubtedly be directly affected by the decision on merits of the questions raised therein. We are disposing of Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992 also separately on the definite stand taken by the petitioner therein of pursuing that petition declining to implead Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami in spite of opportunity given for the purpose. The present Writ Petition No. 514 of 1992 by Smt. Sarojini Ramaswami came to be filed thereafter in these circumstances on conclusion of the Inquiry by the Committee constituted under the Act.
17. The main point for decision in this writ petition - Writ Petition No. 514 of 1992 - is: Whether as a result of the decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami is entitled to be supplied a copy of the report of the Committee containing its findings before submission of that report to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in accordance with Section 4 (2) of the Act to enable him to challenge the adverse, findings, if any, against him at this stage in a Court of law? The submission of Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is that this right of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami is a logical corollary of the decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, (AIR 1992 SC 320 ), wherein it has been held that the process up to submission of the report to the Speaker and it being laid before the House for its consideration is statutory subject to judicial review. The further submission of learned counsel is that the contrary view would result in depriving the learned Judge of his right to challenge the adverse finding of 'guilty', if any, once the parliamentary part of the process commences. He submitted that the order of removal thereafter would be immune from challenge being the culmination of the parliamentary process and, therefore, the learned Judge would be denied his constitutional right of seeking judicial review of the statutory part of the process even though that is the foundation for the subsequent parliamentary part. Shri Sibal urged that the order of removal made by the President as a result of this process being in effect the culmination of the parliamentary process would be immune from judicial review and, therefore, unless the learned Judge has the opportunity of seeking judicial review before commencement of the parliamentary part of the process, his constitutional right, notwithstanding any illegality in the procedure culminating in the adverse findings of the Committee, would be defeated in spite of the declaration of law made in the earlier decision. Finally, Shri Sibal modified this part of the argument slightly to contend that even assuming the order of removal made by the President under Article 124 (4) be not immune from judicial review on permissible grounds of illegality, which according to learned counsel is extremely doubtful, great prejudice would be caused to the learned Judge by postponement of the stage of judicial review till after the making of the order of removal under Article 124(4) if the illegality attaches to the finding of 'guilty' in the report of the Committee. In short, according to Shri Kapil Sibal, judicial review to test the legality of the Committee's findings is available either 'now' before commencement of the parliamentary process on submission of the report to the Speaker under Section 4 (2) of the Act 'or never'. This, according to Shri Sibal, is the reason for directing the Committee, a statutory authority, to furnish a copy of its report to the learned Judge before submitting the report to the Speaker in accordance with Section 4(2) of the Act. The question, therefore, is: Whether the basic premise on which the argument is based, namely, judicial review now or never' is correct or the law is that judicial review on permissible grounds is not now but only later in case an order of removal is made by the President under Article 124(1) of the Constitution? Is it that the challenge permissible in the constitutional scheme is actually to the order of removal made by the President under Article 124(4) based on the composite process of removal comprising of the initial statutory part which provides the condition precedent for, and the parliamentary part of the process thereafter?
18. Shri F. S. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Committee did not dispute the right of the learned Judge to seek judicial review of the statutory part of the process as declared in the earlier decision on permissible grounds of judicial review, but he urged that on completion of the Inquiry culminating in recording of the findings in the report. The principle of committee between the constitutional authorities requires that the Courts must not interdict the process contemplated by the Act once the findings have been recorded in the report; and judicial review to the extent permissible must be only in the event an order of removal is made by the President under Article 124 (4) of the Constitution if the Parliament chooses to act on the adverse finding of 'guilty', if any, in the Committee's report by adopting the motion of removal as prescribed. Shri Nariman submitted that the learned Judge is entitled to an opportunity during the parliamentary process to assail the adverse findings and thereby facilitate the Parliament to consider the matter properly while discussing the motion on receipt of the Committee's report, as was the procedure adopted during the impeachment of Justice Angelo Vasta in Australia where the procedure is entirely parliamentary. Shri Nariman added that there is no reason to assume that the Parliament would not give such an opportunity to the learned Judge or that it would not properly consider the objections to the findings raised by the learned Judge before voting on the motion; and in case those objections are accepted and the motion fails, the proceedings would end in favour of the learned Judge without any need for him to seek redress by judicial review. Shri Nariman further submitted that even though he could not make a definite submission that the ultimate order of removal, if any, would be subject to judicial review, yet he was unable to find any clear limitation, in principle or authority, on the power of judicial review against an order of removal by the President under Article 124(4) of the Constitution on the permissible grounds of illegality on which alone the learned Judge can assail the adverse findings of the Committee at this stage, assuming he has a right to do so, before Commencement of the parliamentary process.
19. The learned Attorney General, to begin with, adopted fully the arguments of Shri Kapil Sibal and supported the petitioner's case. However, the final stand of the learned Attorney General was modified wherein he submitted that the right of the learned Judge to challenge the order of removal made by the President under Article 124(4) being doubtful, it is appropriate that in order to avoid defeating his right of seeking judicial review in case of an adverse findings, if any, the learned Judge should be furnished a copy of the report of the Committee at this stage before it is submitted to the Speaker under Section 4(2) of the Act. The learned Attorney General entirely agreed with Shri F. S. Nariman that in the event of an adverse finding by the Committee, the learned Judge would be entitled to an opportunity during the parliamentary process to assail the finding against him and thereby facilitate the Parliament to consider the motion properly.
20. From the rival submissions, as summarised above, it is clear that in case the learned Judge would have the right to seek judicial review in the event an order of removal is made against him under Article 124(4) of the Constitution, and the permissible grounds of judicial review whatever they be at this stage, would remain unimpaired then, the main reason for requiring a copy of the Report of the Committee to be furnished now before commencement of the parliamentary process would disappear. In such a situation, the only other question would be: Whether there is any added prejudice by deferment of the exercise of that right till after the making of the order of removal, if any? This further question would arise only if the constitutional scheme envisages the remedy of judicial review to the learned Judge now as well as at the end. If it is held that the constitutional scheme envisages and permits a challenge by the concerned Judge to the adverse finding of 'guilty' recorded in the report of the Committee only if, and when, the order of removal is made by the President under Article 124(4) of the Constitution and not earlier, it being contemplated that during the parliamentary process the concerned Judge would be given an opportunity for the purpose to enable the Parliament to take into account the objections, if any, of the concerned Judge to the adverse findings against him before voting on the motion for removal of the Judge, then any interdiction by the Court at an intermediate stage would be excluded in a matter of this kind where expedition and early conclusion of the process is of utmost public importance. The scheme then would be that in case of an adverse finding of 'guilty' by the Committee, the Parliament gives an opportunity to the concerned Judge to show cause against his removal on the basis of the adverse findings and takes that into consideration for voting on the motion so that if it accepts the objections of the concerned Judge, the motion would not be passed and the matter would rest there. The learned Judge would not then be required to seek redress in the Court of law to challenge the statutory part of the process preceding the parliamentary process.
21. If, however, the motion is passed, notwithstanding the objections to the findings raised by the concerned Judge, leading to the order of removal being made by the President under Article 124(4) of the Constitution, then alone there is occasion for the concerned Judge to assail the adverse finding of 'guilty' and the statutory process preceding it on the permissible grounds of judicial review by challenging the order of removal in a Court of law on that basis. Keeping in view the desirability of early conclusion of the proceedings of this nature in public interest, such a constitutional scheme would not be unreasonable reconciling the larger public interest with the individual interest of the concerned Judge himself. The first point for consideration, therefore, is: The existence of the right of judicial review in the concerned Judge of the Order of removal made by the President under Article 124 (4) of the Constitution, if and when it is made.
22. Another submission of Shri Kapil Sibal, in effect, to buttress his main submission indicated above, is that the Committee constituted under Section 3(2) of the Act, is a Tribunal and, therefore, its findings are subject to appeal in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. This argument also is to claim that the learned Judge is entitled to a copy of the report before its submission under Section 4 (2) of the Act to the Speaker to exercise the right of appeal against the adverse finding of 'guilty', if any, in the report.