AI-Generated Deepfakes in India: Examining Copyright and Personality Rights

Abstract

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) has made it possible to create realistic synthetic images, videos and voice recordings that imitate identifiable individuals. Such media may support creative expression, education and entertainment, but it may also be used for deceptive impersonation, false endorsement, reputational injury and non-consensual intimate content. This paper examines whether India’s existing copyright and personality-rights framework adequately responds to these harms.

It adopts a doctrinal and analytical method, examining the Copyright Act, 1957, the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 as amended in 2026, and selected Indian judicial decisions.

It argues that copyright law may protect source photographs, films, sound recordings and performances where statutory requirements are met, but it does not confer ownership over a person’s identity as such. Personality-related protection has developed through privacy principles, common-law claims and judicial relief. The 2026 amendments to the IT Rules strengthen intermediary duties concerning synthetically generated information, but platform removal mechanisms do not by themselves provide a complete system of individual redress. The paper recommends a proportionate statutory framework that addresses harmful impersonation while preserving parody, satire, criticism and other legitimate expression.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence; Deepfakes; Synthetic Media; Copyright; Personality Rights; Privacy; Intermediary Liability.

1. Introduction

Generative artificial intelligence has changed the way digital images, videos and audio recordings are created. Deepfakes are synthetic or manipulated media produced through AI techniques that can make a person appear to say or do something that did not occur. They may be used for entertainment, education, satire or artistic experimentation. The same technology, however, can be misused to fabricate endorsements, impersonate individuals, circulate misleading content or produce non-consensual intimate imagery.[1]

The legal difficulty is that a deepfake may affect several interests at the same time. It may reproduce or alter a copyrighted photograph, film or sound recording; imitate a person’s face or voice; mislead viewers about the person’s consent or endorsement; and cause harm to privacy, dignity, reputation or livelihood. These interests are related but legally distinct. Copyright protects recognised works and certain performances, whereas personality-related claims concern the unauthorised use of identifiable aspects of an individual’s identity.

India does not have one comprehensive statute specifically governing every form of personality or publicity rights. Courts have addressed misuse of identity through privacy principles, common-law concepts and intellectual-property-related reasoning. In 2026, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 were amended to define ‘synthetically generated information’ (SGI) and impose additional intermediary due-diligence obligations. The amendments form an important part of the current regulatory response, but they do not resolve every question concerning individual liability and compensation.[2]

This paper examines the relationship between copyright protection and personality-related interests in the context of deepfakes. It asks whether the existing Indian legal framework adequately protects creators and individuals whose identities are digitally replicated, and how harmful synthetic impersonation can be addressed without unnecessarily restricting legitimate expression.

2. Research Questions, Objectives and Methodology

2.1 Research Questions

1. To what extent can the Copyright Act, 1957 address deepfakes that use or alter protected photographs, films, sound recordings or performances?
2. How have Indian courts approached the unauthorised commercial or misleading use of a person’s name, image, likeness and voice?
3. Do the 2026 amendments to the IT Rules provide an adequate response to harmful SGI?
4. What safeguards can balance identity protection with freedom of speech and creative expression?

2.2 Objectives

The objectives are to distinguish copyright from personality-related interests; analyse relevant statutory provisions and judicial decisions; assess the contribution and limitations of the 2026 IT Rules; and propose legal and regulatory measures for addressing harmful synthetic impersonation.

2.3 Research Methodology and Scope

The paper follows a doctrinal and analytical method. It relies primarily on legislation, court orders and government materials, together with selected academic commentary. The study is limited to the Indian legal framework, with emphasis on copyright, performers’ rights, privacy, personality-related claims and intermediary obligations. It does not attempt an empirical assessment of the prevalence of deepfake misuse or the technical effectiveness of detection systems. The legal position is considered as at 10 November 2026.

2.4 Review of Literature

Ashna Narang’s article examines the disruptive nature of deepfakes and their implications for intellectual property, personality rights and the right of publicity in the Indian context. It provides a useful starting point for understanding the overlap between copyright and identity-based interests. The present paper builds on this discussion by separately examining the 2026 SGI amendments and recent Indian court orders, and by distinguishing platform-level content removal from substantive remedies available to an affected individual.[3]

Also Read: AI-Generated Fake Nude Images: Minnesota vs. xAI and the Future of Deepfake Law

3. Deepfakes and the Nature of Legal Harm

A deepfake may be produced by combining, altering or generating visual and audio material through machine-learning systems. The legal assessment should not depend only on whether AI was used. Relevant considerations include what the material depicts, whether the person is identifiable, whether protected source material was used, whether the output is presented as authentic, the purpose of publication and the harm alleged.

Not every AI-generated depiction is unlawful. Clearly labelled fiction, parody, satire, criticism, documentary reconstruction and other creative uses may serve legitimate purposes. Conversely, a synthetic recording falsely presenting a person as endorsing a product, making a statement or participating in an intimate act may raise serious legal concerns. Lack of consent is relevant, but it should not be treated as an automatic and universal test of illegality without considering the right invoked, the context, applicable statutory exceptions and constitutional protection for expression. [4]

The distinction between a disclosed fictional depiction and deceptive impersonation is therefore important. Disclosure that content is AI-generated may reduce the risk of deception, but it does not necessarily resolve every issue. For example, the output may still reproduce a protected photograph or constitute a non-consensual intimate depiction. Different legal interests may require separate analysis.

4. Copyright Law: Protection of Works and Performances

4.1 Scope of Copyright Protection

The Copyright Act, 1957, protects specified categories of works, including original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, cinematographic films and sound recordings. Section 14 sets out the exclusive rights associated with the relevant categories of works. Copyright is concerned with the protected work or a substantial part of it; it does not, merely by depicting an individual, grant ownership over that individual’s identity. [5]

A deepfake may raise a copyright issue where it reproduces or adapts a protected photograph, film sequence, sound recording or other protected expression. A claimant must identify the protected work and ownership, establish an act restricted by the Act, and address any applicable exception or defence. The use of AI, or the fact that an image resembles a person, does not by itself establish copyright infringement.

4.2 Ownership and the Commissioned Photograph Example

The original draft stated that a commercial photographer is necessarily the first owner of a commissioned studio portrait. That statement requires qualification. Section 17 generally identifies the author as the first owner, but its proviso (b) provides that, in the case of a photograph or portrait made for valuable consideration at another person’s instance, that person is the first owner in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Ownership must therefore be determined from the facts, the statutory proviso and any contract; it cannot be assumed that the photographer always owns the copyright. [6]

For example, if a portrait is reproduced in a deepfake advertisement without permission, the person who owns copyright in that portrait may have a claim, subject to proof of a restricted act and the absence of a relevant exception. If the photograph is not reproduced in the output, a separate question may arise as to whether it was copied during data collection or training. The legal treatment of AI training under Indian copyright law remains unsettled, and it would be inaccurate to state that every instance of scraping or training necessarily constitutes infringement.

The individual depicted may have a separate personality-related or other claim if the advertisement falsely suggests endorsement. That individual does not automatically own the copyright in the photograph merely because the photograph depicts them. The distinction between ownership of a work and interests in personal identity is central to the analysis. [7]

4.3 Performers’ Rights and Section 38B

Sections 38A and 38B of the Copyright Act address performers’ rights. Section 38A provides specified exclusive rights in relation to a performance, while Section 38B recognises moral rights, including the right to be identified as the performer and the right to restrain or claim damages for distortion, mutilation or other modification of the performance that is prejudicial to the performer’s reputation, subject to the statutory explanation. [8][9]

These provisions may be relevant where an existing performance or recording is manipulated. However, a newly generated voice that imitates a person without reproducing or modifying an identifiable protected performance may not fit neatly within Section 38B. The provision should not be described as a general statutory prohibition on every form of voice cloning. The facts must establish the relevant performance and the statutory elements.

4.4 Fair Dealing and Freedom of Expression

Section 52 contains specified acts that do not constitute copyright infringement, including fair dealing for listed purposes such as private or personal use including research, criticism or review, and reporting current events. It does not create an unlimited, free-standing exception for every work described as parody or satire. Whether a particular use falls within Section 52 depends on the purpose and circumstances of the use and the precise statutory provision relied upon.[10]

Copyright analysis must also be kept distinct from a personality-related claim. A use that does not infringe copyright may still raise issues of false endorsement, privacy or defamation. Conversely, a use of copyrighted material may infringe copyright even if it does not impersonate a real person. Copyright law is therefore an important but limited part of the legal response.

5. Personality Rights, Privacy and Judicial Development

5.1 Constitutional Background

In Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India, the Supreme Court recognised privacy as a constitutionally protected right, primarily emerging from Article 21. The judgment connects privacy with autonomy, dignity and the ability of individuals to make choices about important aspects of their lives. It provides an important constitutional background for analysing harms caused by digital identity misuse. However, Puttaswamy did not enact a specific deepfake statute or itself create a complete private-law cause of action for every form of synthetic impersonation.[11]

In R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court discussed privacy in the context of unauthorised publication and observed that the use of a person’s name or likeness without consent for advertising may raise a privacy claim, subject to the qualifications discussed by the Court. The case is relevant background, but its principles must be applied in their factual and legal context.[12]

5.2 Anil Kapoor v Simply Life India

In Anil Kapoor v Simply Life India & Ors, the Delhi High Court considered alleged misuse of the actor’s name, image, likeness, voice and other personality attributes, including through AI tools, deepfakes and face-morphing. The Court observed that authentic news, satire, parody and genuine criticism remain protected forms of expression, but that such expression may cross a line where it results in tarnishment or jeopardises the individual’s personality. It granted ex parte interim protection on the facts before it.[13]

The order is significant because it directly addresses AI-based misuse of a person’s persona. Nevertheless, it was an interim order made at an early stage of the proceedings. It should not be represented as a final determination that every non-consensual digital depiction is unlawful or that all synthetic media is prohibited.

5.3 Arijit Singh v Codible Ventures LLP

In Arijit Singh v Codible Ventures LLP & Ors, the Bombay High Court considered alleged unauthorised AI voice-cloning tools, synthetic voice models, merchandise and other uses of the singer’s name, image and voice. The Court stated, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s name, voice, photograph, image, likeness and other personality attributes were protectable elements of personality and publicity rights. It also discussed identifiability and commercial gain in the context of the claim and granted ex parte ad-interim relief.[14]

The order is particularly relevant to voice cloning because it addressed tools capable of converting text or audio into a synthetic version of the singer’s voice. The Court’s findings were made at the interim stage and on the record before it. The decision should therefore be cited as an important interim judicial development, not as a final universal rule governing every AI-generated imitation.

5.4 Akira Desai alias Akira Nandan v Sambhawaami Studios LLP

In Mr Akira Desai alias Akira Nandan v Sambhawaami Studios LLP & Ors, the Delhi High Court considered a complaint concerning an AI-generated film titled ‘AI LOVE STORY’, which allegedly used the plaintiff’s face, voice, likeness and identity without authorisation. On 23 January 2026, the Court granted ex parte ad-interim protection after recording a prima facie view of the plaintiff’s case and the risk of irreparable injury. The order also recognised that caricature, lampooning and parody may constitute legitimate expression and should not automatically be treated as infringement.[15]

The interim character of the order is important. Subsequent proceedings recorded settlement-related developments, including a decree against Defendant No 1 based on a settlement agreement dated 17 April 2026, and the suit was disposed of on 28 September 2026. The initial injunction should therefore be understood in the context of the subsequent procedural history rather than described as a final merits ruling establishing a comprehensive legal test.[16]

5.5 Effect of the Judicial Developments

These decisions show that Indian courts have been prepared to consider relief where identifiable personal attributes are allegedly used in misleading, derogatory or unauthorised commercial contexts. They also show the importance of the factual record, including identifiability, context, commercial exploitation, reputational injury and the nature of the expression. In Arijit Singh, the Court discussed celebrity status, identifiability and commercial gain in the particular setting of a publicity-rights claim. That observation should not be converted into a rule that ordinary individuals have no remedies. Passing off, defamation, privacy-based claims and other remedies have distinct legal elements, which must be established on the facts.[17][18]

6. The 2026 IT Rules and Intermediary Responsibilities

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026 were notified through GSR 120(E) on 10 February 2026 and came into force on 20 February 2026. The amendments inserted definitions concerning audio-visual information and ‘synthetically generated information’ in Rule 2.

In broad terms, SGI covers audio, visual or audio-visual information artificially or algorithmically created, generated, modified or altered using a computer resource in a manner that appears real or authentic and depicts an individual or event as indistinguishable, or likely to be perceived as indistinguishable, from a natural person or real-world event.

The definition contains exclusions for specified routine or good-faith editing, document preparation and accessibility-related processes.^[19]

Strengthened Intermediary Due Diligence

The amendments strengthen intermediary due diligence. They introduce a framework for technical measures directed at unlawful SGI and labelling or metadata requirements for other SGI.

Significant social media intermediaries have additional duties concerning user declarations, verification and prominent labelling. These measures seek to improve transparency and reduce the circulation of deceptive or unlawful synthetic material.^[20]

Revised Response Timelines Under the IT Rules

The revised response timelines must be stated precisely. Under Rule 3(1)(d), action upon actual knowledge through a qualifying court order or reasoned intimation from an authorised government officer is subject to a three-hour timeline.

A separate two-hour timeline under Rule 3(2)(b) applies to specified categories of complaints, including certain complaints involving nudity, sexual content, morphed content or impersonation.

A further 36-hour timeline applies to certain grievance requests connected with Rule 3(1)(b) under the proviso to Rule 3(2)(a)(i).

These timelines are not interchangeable and should not be described as a universal three-hour deadline for every user report about any deepfake.^[21][22][23]

Scope and Limitations of the 2026 Amendments

The 2026 amendments are an important regulatory development, but they primarily strengthen platform processes: prevention, labelling, grievance handling and removal.

They do not, by themselves, create a comprehensive statutory civil compensation scheme against every person who creates a deepfake.

Depending on the facts, an affected person may need to rely on civil, criminal, privacy, intellectual-property or other legal remedies.

The IT Act provisions listed in the footnote are relevant only where their individual statutory elements are satisfied; they should not be treated as automatically applicable to every deepfake.^[24]

7. Critical Analysis: Remaining Gaps

Despite the existing legal framework, several important gaps remain in addressing the challenges posed by deepfakes and unauthorised synthetic media.

1. Fragmented Legal Framework

First, the legal framework is fragmented. Copyright, performers’ rights, privacy, passing off, defamation and intermediary duties address different aspects of the problem.

A victim may have to identify several possible causes of action and determine which one fits the facts. This can be difficult where the creator is anonymous, content is rapidly copied or the victim has limited resources.

2. Copyright Is Not a Substitute for Identity Protection

Secondly, copyright is not a substitute for identity protection. A person depicted in a photograph may not own the copyright in it, and a synthetic voice may imitate a person without reproducing a protected sound recording.

Copyright remedies may therefore be unavailable even where identity-related harm is serious.

3. Limitations of Platform Removal

Thirdly, platform removal is not the same as complete redress. A takedown may reduce ongoing circulation, but it may not compensate for reputational or economic injury, identify the original creator, preserve evidence or prevent re-uploading.

Automated detection and removal can also make mistakes, particularly where content is satire, commentary, documentary material or consensual creative work.

4. Protecting Ordinary Individuals and Public Figures

Fourthly, the law should protect ordinary individuals as well as public figures.

Commercial goodwill may be relevant to some claims, especially passing off, but privacy and dignity concerns should not depend solely on whether a person has a marketable public identity.

The applicable cause of action and remedy must nevertheless be grounded in a recognised legal right and the facts of the case.

5. Balancing Regulation and Freedom of Expression

Finally, regulation must avoid treating all synthetic media as harmful. Excessively broad restrictions may chill artistic freedom, political criticism, parody, research and legitimate uses of AI.

A workable framework should distinguish deceptive or abusive impersonation from disclosed and contextually legitimate expression.

8. Suggestions and Recommendations

Addressing the legal challenges posed by deepfakes requires a balanced framework that protects individual rights while preserving legitimate technological innovation and freedom of expression.

8.1 A Clear Statutory Framework for Digital Identity

Parliament should consider a focused statutory framework addressing unauthorised digital replicas and harmful impersonation.

It should define protected identity attributes, such as name, image, likeness and identifiable voice, while specifying the forms of misuse that trigger liability.

Protection should not be limited to celebrities or commercial endorsement.

The framework should provide accessible civil remedies, including urgent injunctions and proportionate compensation where the legal elements are established.

8.2 Safeguards for Expression and Consent

Any new framework should protect legitimate news reporting, criticism, parody, satire, education, research and artistic expression, subject to safeguards against deception, unlawful exploitation and serious harm.

Consent should be informed, specific and capable of being limited by purpose and duration.

Consent to one use of an image or voice should not automatically be treated as consent to every later AI-generated use.

8.3 Provenance and Watermarking

Generative AI providers and platforms should adopt reliable provenance tools, including machine-readable labels, metadata and watermarking where technically feasible.

No single watermark should be treated as a complete solution because it may be removed, altered or fail across different systems.

Provenance measures should be combined with record-keeping, complaint channels, auditability and proportionate duties on providers and intermediaries.

8.4 Accessible Remedies and Evidence Preservation

Platforms should provide clear reporting channels, preserve relevant information when legally required, and communicate the basis for action or rejection.

Victims should be able to request urgent removal where the law permits, while preserving evidence needed for proceedings.

Procedures should include safeguards against malicious or mistaken complaints and provide an effective review mechanism.

8.5 Clarification of Copyright Issues

The policy discussion on AI training should distinguish between copying during training and reproduction in generated output.

Any reform of Section 52 should be evidence-based and should not assume that parody or synthetic impersonation can be resolved by a single broad rule.

The rights of photographers, producers, authors and performers should remain distinct from an individual’s interest in controlling the unauthorised use of their identity.

Conclusion

Deepfakes challenge traditional legal categories because a single synthetic recording may involve copyrighted material, a person’s identity, privacy, reputation and freedom of expression. The Copyright Act, 1957 can protect source works and qualifying performances, but it does not confer ownership over a person’s face or voice as such.

Indian courts have increasingly considered personality-related claims in cases involving alleged unauthorised use of names, images and voices, although several important orders were passed at the interim stage. The 2026 amendments to the IT Rules add an important layer of intermediary responsibility through SGI-related definitions, technical measures, labelling and revised response timelines.

These developments do not eliminate the need for a clearer and more accessible legal framework for individuals harmed by synthetic impersonation. India should develop proportionate statutory protection for digital identity, strengthen evidence and provenance practices, and ensure effective remedies while preserving legitimate expression.

The central challenge is not to prohibit synthetic media as a category, but to prevent deceptive and harmful uses without undermining lawful creativity, criticism and innovation.

Bibliography

A. Legislation and Constitutional Materials

• Constitution of India.
• Copyright Act 1957.
• Information Technology Act 2000.
• Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021, as amended by the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules 2026, GSR 120(E), 10 February 2026.

B. Cases

• Anil Kapoor v Simply Life India & Ors, CS(COMM) 652/2023, order dated 20 September 2023 (Delhi High Court), 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6914.
• Arijit Singh v Codible Ventures LLP & Ors, Interim Application (L) No 23560 of 2024 in COM IPR Suit (L) No 23443 of 2024, order dated 26 July 2024 (Bombay High Court), 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2445.
• Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.
• Mr Akira Desai alias Akira Nandan v Sambhawaami Studios LLP & Ors, CS(COMM) 68/2026, order dated 23 January 2026 (Delhi High Court).
• Mr Akira Desai alias Akira Nandan v Sambhawaami Studios LLP & Ors, CS(COMM) 68/2026, order dated 28 September 2026 (Delhi High Court).
• R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632.

C. Secondary and Government Sources

• Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026’ (10 February 2026).
• Narang A, ‘Exploring the Intersection of AI and IPR in the Context of the Emerging Phenomenon of Deepfakes’ (2025) 30(1) Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 59–64 <https://doi.org/10.56042/jipr.v30i1.9984>.

Bibliography and Citation Note

Note: This paper uses OSCOLA-style footnotes and bibliography. Pinpoint references are supplied where the cited judgment contains numbered paragraphs. The Akira Desai order is cited by case number and date rather than an unverified report citation. The author should check the target journal’s house style and disclosure requirements before submission.

Footnotes and Legal References

1. Ashna Narang, ‘Exploring the Intersection of AI and IPR in the Context of the Emerging Phenomenon of Deepfakes’ (2025) 30(1) Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 59–64 <https://doi.org/10.56042/jipr.v30i1.9984> accessed 10 November 2026.
2. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021, r 2(1)(wa), inserted by the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules 2026, GSR 120(E), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, section 3, sub-section (i), 10 February 2026.
3. Narang (n 1) 59–64.
4. Constitution of India, arts 19(1)(a), 19(2) and 21.
5. Copyright Act 1957, ss 13–14.
6. Copyright Act 1957, s 17, especially proviso (b), which addresses photographs, portraits and cinematograph films made for valuable consideration at another person’s instance, subject to an agreement to the contrary.
7. Copyright Act 1957, ss 14, 17 and 52; see also the distinction between copyright in a work and a person’s interest in their identity.
8. Copyright Act 1957, ss 38A–38B.
9. Copyright Act 1957, s 38B(b).
10. Copyright Act 1957, s 52(1)(a)(i)–(iii).
11. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 [297]–[298].
12. R Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632 [26].
13. Anil Kapoor v Simply Life India & Ors, CS(COMM) 652/2023, order dated 20 September 2023 (Delhi High Court) [38]–[48], reported as 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6914.
14. Arijit Singh v Codible Ventures LLP & Ors, Interim Application (L) No 23560 of 2024 in COM IPR Suit (L) No 23443 of 2024, order dated 26 July 2024 (Bombay High Court) [17]–[22], reported as 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2445.
15. Mr Akira Desai alias Akira Nandan v Sambhawaami Studios LLP & Ors, CS(COMM) 68/2026, order dated 23 January 2026 (Delhi High Court) [28]–[32].
16. Mr Akira Desai alias Akira Nandan v Sambhawaami Studios LLP & Ors, CS(COMM) 68/2026, order dated 28 September 2026 (Delhi High Court) [1]–[6].
17. Anil Kapoor (n 13) [38]–[39]; Arijit Singh (n 14) [18]–[22].
18. Akira Desai (n 15) [31]–[32]; see also Akira Desai (n 16) [1]–[6] for the subsequent procedural disposal following settlement-related developments.
19. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021, rr 2(1)(ca), 2(1)(wa) and 3(3), as amended by the 2026 Amendment Rules.
20. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021, rr 3(3)(a)(i)–(ii), 3(3)(b) and 4(1A), as amended by GSR 120(E), 10 February 2026.
21. Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026’ (10 February 2026) questions 16–18 and summary table at 17.
22. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021, rr 3(1)(d), 3(2)(a)(i) and 3(2)(b), as amended by GSR 120(E), 10 February 2026.
23. Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (n 21) questions 16–18.
24. Information Technology Act 2000, ss 66C, 66D, 66E, 67 and 79, where the elements of the relevant offence or statutory obligation are satisfied.

Written By: Sarah Fule | Mangalayatan University, Jabalpur

• AI Deepfakes and Right to Privacy in India: Laws, Rights & Legal Remedies
• Deepfake Technology and the Right to Privacy: A Legal Analysis of AI-Generated Video
• Regulation Of Deepfakes And Synthetic Media-Legal Gaps And Proposals
• Synthetic Speech Regulation: Confronting the Challenge of Deepfakes and AI-Generated Impersonations
• Deepfakes and Indian Law: Legal Framework, Privacy, Cybercrime, AI Regulation & Supreme Court Analysis