Review Before the High Court After Dismissal of an SLP: A Doctrinal Treatise on Kunhayammed, Khoday Distilleries and the Limits of Finality

A High Court judgement is not swallowed by the Supreme Court merely because the Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal against it. What the Supreme Court actually did decides whether the High Court may still review its own judgement.

I. The Question and the Short Answer

A litigant loses before a High Court, carries the matter to the Supreme Court under Article 136, and has the special leave petition (SLP) dismissed. Can the same litigant then ask the High Court to review its own judgement? The question is practical, recurring, and, for two decades, was unsettled.

The answer, now settled by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, is this. A review before the High Court remains maintainable where the SLP was dismissed without leave being granted, whether by a non-speaking or a speaking order. The doctrine of merger is triggered only when leave is granted and the appeal is decided. Maintainability, however, is the beginning of the inquiry and not its end: the review must still fit within Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC (or the corresponding jurisdiction in writ and statutory proceedings), and a failed review does not reopen the door to the Supreme Court.

This treatise proceeds in this order: the constitutional framework; the doctrine of merger and its limits; Kunhayammed and Khoday Distilleries; a four-part taxonomy of SLP dispositions; later applications in the Supreme Court and High Courts; the standards governing review; the finality that follows a failed review; adjacent remedies (recall, curative petitions and the criminal-law bar); a synthesis of principles; a practitioner’s checklist; and a citation table.

II. Constitutional and Procedural Framework

1. Article 136: A Discretion, Not an Appeal

Article 136 confers a residuary and discretionary power on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgement, decree or order of any court or tribunal. Its exercise is divisible into two stages. In the first, the Court decides whether to grant leave. Only if leave is granted does the second stage begin, when the petition is converted into an appeal and the court exercises appellate jurisdiction. A refusal at the first stage is an exercise of discretion not to hear; it is not an adjudication of the correctness of the order under challenge.

2. Articles 137 and 141

Article 137 empowers the Supreme Court to review its own judgements and orders, subject to parliamentary law and its rules. Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts. The interplay with Article 141 matters in one respect: a reasoned order refusing leave may carry a declaration of law, even though it does not merge the impugned judgement (Part V below).

3. The Source of the High Court’s Review Power

Civil proceedings: Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Grounds: discovery of new and important matter or evidence not within knowledge or not producible despite due diligence; mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or any other sufficient reason.

Writ jurisdiction: a High Court is a court of record and has an inherent power to review its writ judgements, a power recognised in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, and applied in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389, which also confines that power within strict limits.

Criminal proceedings: Section 362 CrPC (now Section 403 BNSS, 2023) bars a court from altering or reviewing a signed judgement or final order save to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. The civil-law position on review after SLP dismissal therefore does not translate to criminal judgements (Part VIII).

Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC: no appeal lies from an order granting or refusing review in the manner the Rule describes, a point that shapes the finality analysis in Part VII.

III. The Doctrine of Merger: Anatomy and Limits

To merge is to sink into and be absorbed by something else. When a superior forum decides an appeal or revision against an order, the subordinate order is said to merge in the superior order so that the superior order alone is operative. The doctrine rests on the hierarchy of courts and on the need for a single operative decision. It is, however, a doctrine of limited, not universal, application: whether it applies depends on the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the subject-matter of the challenge before it.

The Supreme Court’s settled position is that the occasion for merger arises only when the superior forum exercises appellate (or revisional) jurisdiction over the order. Where it declines to entertain the challenge at the threshold, nothing is decided that could displace the order below. This is the foundation on which Kunhayammed stands.

The Pre-2000 Divergence

Before Kunhayammed, two lines of authority coexisted. In Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran, (1998) 7 SCC 386, the Court took the view that once an SLP had been dismissed, a review before the High Court could not be entertained, a view that rested on judicial discipline and the idea that the Supreme Court had by then put its seal on the matter. Other benches viewed the High Court’s review power as untouched by a threshold refusal of leave. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372, had already explained that review and appeal proceed on distinct footings and that the invocation of appellate jurisdiction is what ordinarily ousts the review power of the lower forum. Kunhayammed was the three-judge bench that resolved the conflict.

IV. Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359

Facts and Holding

The Forest Tribunal held on 11.08.1982 that certain land did not vest in the government. The State’s appeal to the Kerala High Court was dismissed on 17.12.1982. The State filed SLP (C) No. 8098 of 1983 and, in January 1984, also filed Review Petition No. 14 of 1984 in the High Court. The three-judge bench (K.T. Thomas, D.P. Mohapatra and R.C. Lahoti, JJ.; judgement authored by Lahoti, J., on 19.07.2000; also reported as AIR 2000 SC 2587) held that the dismissal of the SLP did not take away the High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the review. Notably, the SLP there had itself been dismissed by an order recording that it was dismissed on merits; the court nonetheless held that this did not amount to the grant of leave or to a merger.

The Conclusions in Paragraph 44

The Court’s summary of the law, in paragraph 44, may be stated in seven propositions:

1. Where an appeal or revision lies and the superior forum affirms, modifies or reverses the order, the order below merges in the order of the superior forum.
2. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is divisible into two stages: the stage up to the decision on the prayer for leave, and the stage after leave is granted and the petition is converted into an appeal.
3. Merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. The nature of the jurisdiction exercised and the subject-matter of the challenge determine whether it applies.
4. An order refusing special leave, speaking or non-speaking, does not attract the doctrine of merger. It does not stand substituted for the order under challenge; it only means the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal.
5. If the order refusing leave is a speaking order, two consequences follow: the statement of law in it is a declaration of law under Article 141, and its findings bind the parties and the courts below by way of judicial discipline. This is not a merger, and it does not make the Supreme Court’s order the only order binding as res judicata between the parties.
6. Once leave is granted and appellate jurisdiction is invoked, the order in appeal (whether of reversal, modification or affirmation) attracts the doctrine of merger.
7. Once an appeal is preferred, or a petition for leave is converted into an appeal, the High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a review is lost because the matter stands vested in the Supreme Court.

An order refusing special leave to appeal, speaking or non-speaking, does not attract the doctrine of merger. — Kunhayammed, para 44(iv) (paraphrased; see the Supreme Court’s own reiteration in Khoday Distilleries, para 26). 2)

V. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd. (2019) 4 SCC 376

The Occasion for Reference

The respondent was a cooperative sugar factory in liquidation that had sued the appellant for recovery of money. The appellant’s special leave petition against the High Court’s decree was opposed and dismissed in limine by an order stating simply that the special leave petition was dismissed. The High Court then entertained the review, but when it later refused to proceed on the footing that the review was barred, the question reached the Supreme Court. The Bench asked itself whether a review petition is maintainable before the High Court against a judgement where the SLP has already been dismissed. In answering, it surveyed Abbai Maligai, Kunhayammed, Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy (2010) 8 SCC 383, and Gangadhara Palo v. Revenue Divisional Officer (2011) 4 SCC 602 and concluded that the detailed judgement in Kunhayammed lays down the correct law and that no reference to a larger bench was necessary.

Paragraph 26: The Consolidated Position

26.1

The conclusions of the three-Judge Bench in Kunhayammed, summed up in its paragraph 44, are affirmed and reiterated.

26.2

The Court restates the conclusions relevant to the case, namely propositions (iv) to (vii) set out in Part IV above (refusal of leave: no merger; speaking order: Article 141 and judicial discipline; leave granted: merger; appeal pending: High Court review lost.

26.3

Once the law in Kunhayammed is followed, it makes no difference whether the review was filed before the SLP was filed or after it was dismissed. That situation is covered by paragraph 37 of Kunhayammed.

The Court therefore held that, since the SLP in Civil Appeal No. 2432 of 2019 had been dismissed in limine without reasons, the review filed in the High Court was maintainable and should have been decided on merits, and it remitted the matters accordingly. A later three-Judge order of the Supreme Court (order dated 01.04.2024 in a matter bearing Diary No. 42423 of 2023) records that, in Khoday, the Bench also treated condonation of delay in an SLP as a stage at which leave may be taken to have been granted.

Whether the review was filed before the special leave petition or after its dismissal makes no difference. — Khoday Distilleries, para 26.3 (paraphrased)

VI. A Four-Part Taxonomy of SLP Dispositions

The following table reconstructs it from paragraph 44 of Kunhayammed and paragraph 26 of Khoday, together with the later cases discussed in Part VII. The decisive question is always what the Supreme Court actually did.

Disposition	What It Means	Effect on the High Court Judgment	Review Before the High Court
1. SLP Dismissed Without Reasons (Non-Speaking)	Discretion not to grant leave. No adjudication, no declaration of law.	No merger. No res judicata. No Article 141 effect. The judgment stands as the operative order.	Maintainable (Kunhayammed; Khoday).
2. SLP Dismissed by a Speaking Order, Leave Not Granted	Reasons are given for refusing leave.	No merger. Statement of law is an Article 141 declaration; findings bind the parties and lower courts by judicial discipline.	Maintainable, but the High Court cannot take a view contrary to the declaration of law or the findings.
3. Leave Granted; Appeal Decided (Including Dismissal, Affirmation, Modification or Reversal)	Appellate jurisdiction invoked and exercised.	Merger. The Supreme Court’s order alone operates.	Barred (Kunhayammed 44(vi)-(vii)). The High Court has no jurisdiction.
4. SLP Withdrawn or Dismissed as Withdrawn	No adjudication of any kind.	No merger. The judgment is untouched.	Maintainable as a consequence of non-merger; but a second SLP is barred if withdrawal was unconditional (Satheesh V.K.; Part VII).

VII. Later Applications and the Finality That Follows

1. The Supreme Court After Khoday

Experion Developers (P) Ltd. v. Himanshu Dewan (decided 18.08.2023; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1029): The Court surveyed the doctrine of merger, cited Kunhayammed and Khoday, and explained that merger means absorption or extinction, so that dismissal of an earlier appeal in another matter was not a decision that bound the present case as a precedent.

United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi (29.01.2026; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208): Applying Kunhayammed and Khoday (including paragraphs 24 to 26.3), the Supreme Court held that the Madras High Court ought to have entertained a contempt petition on merits; a prior refusal of leave without a grant did not bar it. The decision shows that the principle is applied beyond review proper.

Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP ((2024) 6 SCALE 724): Cited in later orders alongside Kunhayammed and Khoday on the effect of the disposal of an SLP; SCC citation to be added on confirmation.

2. The High Courts

Dhiraj Manoharro Chore v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2020 Bom 65 (Full Bench), W.P. No. 3494 of 2016 decided 19.12.2019: Dismissal in limine of an SLP without granting leave does not attract the doctrine of merger, following Khoday.

Zahedabi Abdul Razaque Shete v. Maharashtra State Board of Waqf, AIR 2020 Bom 100: A non-speaking refusal of special leave does not engage merger, following Khoday.

National Highways Authority of India v. Guruvayoor Infrastructure (2024:DHC:8011): The Delhi High Court, reaffirming Khoday, held that a non-speaking dismissal of an SLP does not stop the High Court from modifying or clarifying its own interim order.

State of U.P. v. Yamuna Prasad Gupta (CMRA No. 11 of 2026, Allahabad High Court): Treated in the source draft as applying Kunhayammed and Khoday to hold the State’s review maintainable despite dismissal of its SLP on 14.08.2023, yet dismissing it because the objection under the Uttar Pradesh Validation Act, 2021 had never been raised before the Tribunal, the writ court or the Supreme Court.

3. The Hurdle of the “Question of Law Kept Open” Observation

The draft records that the Supreme Court’s order contained the words “the question of law, if any, is kept open”, and that the High Court held this did not reopen the matter between the same parties.

That is consistent with Kunhayammed: an observation that a question of law is left open operates for other cases and other parties. It does not convert a refusal of leave into a grant, and it does not enlarge the grounds on which the same parties may seek review.

Where the order is a speaking one, however, the High Court must take care that its review does not contradict any finding or declaration of law the Supreme Court has recorded (Part VI, row 2).

4. Academic Criticism

Arvind Datar has argued in Bar & Bench that Kunhayammed needs reconsideration, pointing to the tension with Junior Telecom Officers Forum v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 693, a case the Court discussed in paragraph 30 of Kunhayammed, where an SLP was dismissed on merits.

Khoday has since declined to refer the question to a larger Bench, so the law is, for present purposes, settled; but the criticism is worth knowing in an argument where the opposing party contends that a review is an indirect attack on the Supreme Court’s own refusal.

5. Finality After a Failed Review: No Second SLP

Kunhayammed and Khoday preserve the High Court’s review jurisdiction; they do not create a second round of special-leave litigation. Three recent Supreme Court decisions draw the line:

• Kangra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. KCCB Pensioners Welfare Association, 2025 INSC 1416 (Amanullah and P.K. Mishra, JJ.): After an SLP is dismissed by a non-speaking order, no liberty is needed to seek review in the High Court. But once the High Court dismisses the review, the party cannot return to the Supreme Court unless liberty to do so was expressly granted. The dismissal of the review does not merge the original judgment in it, and the party cannot challenge either the review order or the original judgment.
• Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank Ltd., 2025 INSC 1140 (23.09.2025): A second SLP against the same order is not maintainable where the first SLP was withdrawn unconditionally without liberty to re-approach; the Court relied on Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P., (1999) 1 SCC 81, and Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 5, and treated the point as one of finality and public policy. The decision also bears on Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC.
• S. Narahari and Bussa Overseas, both discussed in Kangra: The Court applied the same bar where the first SLP was withdrawn with liberty to seek review only, and the review was later dismissed.

The result is a clean architecture. Refusal of leave without a grant leaves the High Court judgment open to review; an adverse review ends the matter unless liberty to return to the Supreme Court was recorded in terms. Counsel who intend to seek review should consider asking, at the time of withdrawal or dismissal, that any liberty be stated expressly.

VIII. The Standards Governing Review

Maintainability opens the door. What lies behind it is a narrow jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that a review is not an appeal in disguise.

Leading Supreme Court Judgments on the Scope of Review

• Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389: Review lies for an error apparent on the face of the record, not to correct an erroneous view on the merits. An error that must be established by a long process of reasoning is not an error apparent on the face of the record.
• Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170: Approving Aribam; review proceedings are not by way of appeal and are strictly confined to Order XLVII Rule 1.
• Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715: An error not self-evident, which has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be called an error apparent; it is impermissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected in review.
• Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 (P. Sathasivam and Dipak Misra, JJ., 08.08.2013): The leading consolidation, setting out when review is maintainable and when it is not, including that a repetition of old and overruled arguments does not reopen a concluded adjudication, and that the error must not be one that has to be fished out and searched for.
• Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337; Sasi v. Aravindakshan Nair, (2017) 4 SCC 692; State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612; S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (2022) 17 SCC 255: Later decisions applying the same narrow standard to civil, tribunal and writ review.
• Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372: The foundational statement that review is not an appeal, and that Order XLVII Rule 1 demands a recognised ground.

Application of Review Principles in Yamuna Prasad Gupta

The Allahabad High Court’s approach in Yamuna Prasad Gupta, illustrates the point: the review was maintainable despite the SLP, yet failed because the State attempted to introduce, for the first time, a statutory objection (the Uttar Pradesh Validation Act, 2021) that it had never urged before the Tribunal, the writ court or the Supreme Court.

A point that could have been raised earlier, and was not, is not a ground for review unless it falls within the narrow compass of new and important matter that could not be produced despite due diligence.

IX. Adjacent Remedies and the Criminal-Law Bar

1. Recall for Fraud or Breach of Natural Justice

A court has inherent power to recall its own order where the order was obtained by fraud, where the court was misled, or where a party was denied a hearing. Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550, recognised the Section 151 CPC power to recall where the court had been misled by forged documents, and distinguished recall from review on merits.

It sits with S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 (a decree obtained by fraud is a nullity and may be challenged at any time), United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 581, and A.V. Papayya Sastry v. State of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221.

The draft rightly treats Satyam Fibres as showing that finality gives way to a grave injustice; the nuance is that the remedy is recall, not review, and it is not constrained by the limits of Order XLVII.

2. The Curative Petition

Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388 (Constitution Bench of five Judges, 10.04.2002, W.P. (C) No. 509 of 1997), recognised the Supreme Court’s inherent power to reconsider its own final judgment even after dismissal of a review, in the rarest of rare cases, to prevent abuse of process or a gross miscarriage of justice, such as a violation of natural justice or bias.

The procedure is now codified in Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, and is routinely refused where no ground within Hurra is shown (for example, T.K. David v. Kuruppumpady Service Co-operative Bank, and the 2023 refusal of the Union Carbide curative petition).

Hurra is a counterpart, not an alternative, to the High Court’s review jurisdiction: it concerns the Supreme Court’s own judgment and operates only after review has failed.

3. Criminal Judgments: Section 362 CrPC and State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar

State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770 ([2011] 15 SCR 540; B.S. Chauhan and A.K. Patnaik, JJ., 07.12.2011) is often cited for the proposition that a criminal court has no power of review.

The source draft describes it as cautionary, and that is right, but its precise teaching deserves restating, because the draft’s description of the civil doctrine as resting on “Article 226/227 read with Order XLVII” blurs several distinct sources of power.

No Power of Review in Criminal Proceedings

There is no power of review with a criminal court once judgment has been rendered (paragraph 26 of the report), because Section 362 CrPC bars alteration except for clerical or arithmetical error, subject to what the Code or other law expressly provides.

Recall Is Different from Review

Recall is different from review. Where a judgment was pronounced without jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, or procured by fraud, inherent power may be exercised to recall it, since the judgment is then a nullity and Section 362 does not operate (paragraph 46, applied in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Krishna Kumar Pandey, (2021) 14 SCC 683).

Effect of an In Limine Dismissal of an SLP

The Court in Bhullar also dealt with the effect of an in limine dismissal of an SLP, holding that it does not mean the reasoning of the High Court judgment was approved. This lends direct support to the proposition in Part VI, row 1.

The Section 362 Bar and Its Exceptions

The Court has since stressed that the Section 362 bar is almost absolute, with abuse of process and the ends of justice as the only exceptions (Raghunath Sharma v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 723).

The practical consequence: the Kunhayammed principle governs the question whether an SLP dismissal bars review. It does not enlarge the High Court’s power of review in criminal matters, which remains confined by Section 362 CrPC (Section 403 BNSS, 2023).

Article 137 gives the Supreme Court an express power of review in criminal as well as civil matters; the High Court has no such general power.

X. Synthesis of Principles

The following principles summarise the legal position governing dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, merger, review jurisdiction and the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings.

1. Refusal of Leave Is Not Merger

A non-speaking dismissal of an SLP, and a reasoned dismissal that does not grant leave, do not merge the High Court judgment in any Supreme Court order.

2. Review Remains Available

The High Court may entertain a review after such dismissal, whether the review was filed before the SLP or after its dismissal (Khoday, para 26.3).

3. Merger Follows Leave and Decision

Once leave is granted and the appeal is decided, the High Court judgment merges and High Court review is barred; the same follows once the SLP is converted into an appeal.

4. A Speaking Refusal Binds Differently

Reasons given for refusing leave may carry an Article 141 declaration of law and findings that bind the parties by judicial discipline; the High Court cannot review in a manner that contradicts them.

5. Withdrawal Is Not Adjudication

Withdrawal of an SLP leaves the High Court judgment untouched, but an unconditional withdrawal bars a second SLP.

6. Review Is Not a Fresh Appeal

The applicant must bring the case within Order XLVII Rule 1 or the corresponding writ-jurisdiction standard: error apparent on the face of the record, new and important matter not producible earlier despite due diligence, or other sufficient reason.

7. No Second SLP After a Failed Review

Unless liberty to return was expressly granted, the Supreme Court will not entertain a second SLP against the original judgment or the review order, and the review order does not merge the original judgment.

8. Criminal Judgments Stand Apart

The civil principle does not enlarge a criminal court’s power of review; Section 362 CrPC / Section 403 BNSS governs, and recall for fraud or breach of natural justice is the narrow exception.

XI. Practitioner’s Checklist

Before filing a review petition or considering a second Special Leave Petition, practitioners should carefully examine the nature and effect of the Supreme Court’s order.

1. Read the Supreme Court Order First

Establish whether it is non-speaking, speaking, a grant of leave, a withdrawal, or a disposal with liberty. Obtain the signed order and the record of proceedings, not just the cause-list entry.

2. Check Whether Leave Was Granted

Check whether leave was granted, including any suggestion that condonation of delay or conversion of the SLP into an appeal amounted to a grant.

3. Identify Binding Findings and Declarations of Law

If the order is speaking, extract every declaration of law and every finding; the review must not contradict them.

4. Identify the Review Ground

Identify the review ground under Order XLVII Rule 1 (or the writ-court equivalent) and confirm that it was not available earlier; a point not raised in the original proceedings is a poor ground.

5. Mind Limitation and Delay

Mind limitation and delay. File the review promptly; explain any delay after the SLP dismissal.

6. Seek Liberty If It Matters

Seek liberty if it matters. If a withdrawal or a recall application is being disposed of, ask that any liberty to return to the Supreme Court after review be stated in terms.

7. Consider the Position in Criminal Matters

Criminal matters: consider whether a recall (not review) lies on fraud or natural-justice grounds, or whether Article 137 is the only route.

8. Plan the Endgame

Plan the endgame. A failed review ends the High Court route; do not assume a second SLP. Consider whether a curative petition could ever lie.

XII. Citation Table

The following table brings together the principal Supreme Court and High Court authorities relevant to merger, dismissal of Special Leave Petitions, review jurisdiction, curative petitions and recall of judgments.

Case Name	Citation	Legal Principle and Relevance
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala	(2000) 6 SCC 359; AIR 2000 SC 2587	Three-Judge Bench, 19.07.2000. Refusal of leave: no merger; review lies. Para 44 conclusions confirmed from the Supreme Court’s own reiteration in Khoday.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd.	(2019) 4 SCC 376; [2019] 3 SCR 411	Three-Judge Bench, 01.03.2019. Para 26.1-26.3 confirmed.
Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm v. K. Santhakumaran	(1998) 7 SCC 386	Earlier contrary view, distinguished and not followed in Kunhayammed/Khoday.
Thungabhadra Industries v. Govt. of A.P.	AIR 1964 SC 1372	Review and appeal distinct; appellate jurisdiction ousts review.
Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy; Gangadhara Palo v. RDO	(2010) 8 SCC 383; (2011) 4 SCC 602	Review and SLP sequencing; discussed in Khoday.
Experion Developers v. Himanshu Dewan	2023 SCC OnLine SC 1029 (18.08.2023)	Merger and res judicata; applies Kunhayammed and Khoday.
United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi	2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 (29.01.2026)	High Court ought to have entertained contempt petition; Khoday paras 24-26.3 applied.
Kangra Central Co-op. Bank v. KCCB Pensioners Welfare Assn.	2025 INSC 1416	No second SLP after failed review absent liberty; review order does not merge original.
Satheesh V.K. v. Federal Bank	2025 INSC 1140 (23.09.2025)	No second SLP after unconditional withdrawal.
Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma; Meera Bhanja; Parsion Devi; Kamlesh Verma	(1979) 4 SCC 389; (1995) 1 SCC 170; (1997) 8 SCC 715; (2013) 8 SCC 320	Review is not an appeal in disguise; grounds and limits.
Sandur Manganese; Sasi v. Aravindakshan Nair; Kamal Sengupta; S. Madhusudhan Reddy	(2013) 8 SCC 337; (2017) 4 SCC 692; (2008) 8 SCC 612; (2022) 17 SCC 255	Narrow scope of review.
Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres	(1996) 5 SCC 550	Recall where the court was misled by fraud; Section 151 CPC.
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra	(2002) 4 SCC 388	Five-Judge Bench, 10.04.2002; curative petition; Order XLVIII SC Rules 2013.
State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar	(2011) 14 SCC 770; [2011] 15 SCR 540	No review power in criminal court (para 26); recall for nullity (para 46); in limine SLP dismissal is not approval.
New India Assurance v. Krishna Kumar Pandey; Raghunath Sharma v. State of Haryana	(2021) 14 SCC 683; 2025 INSC 723	Section 362 CrPC bar and its exceptions.
Dhiraj Manoharro Chore; Zahedabi Abdul Razaque Shete	AIR 2020 Bom 65 (FB); AIR 2020 Bom 100	Khoday followed; no merger.
NHAI v. Guruvayoor Infrastructure	2024:DHC:8011	High Court may modify own interim order after SLP dismissal; Khoday reaffirmed.
Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP	(2024) 6 SCALE 724	Cited with Kunhayammed and Khoday.
Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab; Upadhyay & Co.; Sarguja Transport; Chengalvaraya Naidu; Papayya Sastry; United India Insurance v. Rajendra Singh	AIR 1963 SC 1909; (1999) 1 SCC 81; (1987) 1 SCC 5; (1994) 1 SCC 1; (2007) 4 SCC 221; (2000) 3 SCC 581	Authorities concerning review, withdrawal of proceedings, fraud and recall.
State of U.P. v. Yamuna Prasad Gupta, CMRA No. 11 of 2026 (Allahabad HC)	2026 : AHC-LKO: 80624- DB	Date of Judgment: November 6, 2026.

Written By: Inder Chand Jain
Ph no: 8279945021, Email: [email protected]

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