Naga Customary Law and Article 371A: Supreme Court on Ancestral Land and Village Recognition

Introduction: The Constitutional Importance of Naga Customary Law

In Nagaland, land is not simply a matter of possession, revenue records or administrative boundaries. It is closely connected with ancestry, community identity, traditional authority and the history of villages. For generations, Naga communities have maintained customary systems governing the ownership, use and transfer of land. These practices are not merely social traditions; they form an important part of the legal and cultural life of the State.

Table of Contents

It is precisely this relationship between customary rights and governmental authority that came before the Supreme Court of India in Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village & Ors., 2025 INSC 766.

The dispute arose when Kakiho Village sought formal recognition from the State Government. Old Jalukai Village Council objected, claiming that the land on which the new village had been established was part of its ancestral territory. The objection raised a difficult question: can the Government recognise a new village without properly examining the customary land rights claimed by an existing village?

The Supreme Court’s judgment of 23 May 2025 provides an important answer. It makes clear that the recognition of a village cannot be treated as an ordinary administrative formality when questions of ancestral ownership and customary consent have been raised. The authorities must examine objections properly, follow the prescribed procedure and reach a reasoned decision.

The judgment is particularly significant because it brings together three important elements of Nagaland’s legal framework: Article 371A of the Constitution, the Nagaland Village and Area Councils Act, 1978, and the customary practices governing village land.

It also demonstrates that respect for customary institutions does not relieve the State of its responsibility to act fairly, transparently and within a reasonable period.

Case Details

Particulars	Details
Case	Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village & Ors.
Citation	2025 INSC 766; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2658
Court	Supreme Court of India
Civil Appeal No.	7380 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9897 of 2016)
Date of Judgment	23 May 2025
Bench	Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
Author of Judgment	Justice J.B. Pardiwala

Article 371A: Why Nagaland Has a Special Constitutional Arrangement

To understand the importance of this judgment, one must first understand Article 371A of the Constitution of India.

Introduced through the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1962, Article 371A provides special constitutional protection to certain aspects of Naga life and governance. It reflects the historical and political circumstances surrounding the formation of Nagaland and the need to preserve the distinctive identity, traditions and customary institutions of its people.

Constitutional Protection Under Article 371A(1)(a)

Article 371A(1)(a) provides that no Act of Parliament concerning certain specified matters shall apply to Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland so decides by a resolution. These matters include the religious or social practices of the Nagas, Naga customary law and procedure, the administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, and the ownership and transfer of land and its resources.

This provision is unusual in the Indian constitutional framework. It recognises that the legal and social organisation of Nagaland cannot always be understood through the same assumptions that govern land administration in other parts of the country.

For many Naga communities, land is inseparable from the history and identity of the village. A claim to ancestral land may involve traditional boundaries, community memory, customary arrangements and relationships between villages that have developed over several generations.

Article 371A provides constitutional space for these traditions to continue.

Understanding the Scope and Limits of Article 371A

However, the provision must be understood accurately. It does not create an independent sovereign legal system outside the Constitution. Nor does it mean that every administrative action in Nagaland is immune from judicial scrutiny. Its protection concerns the specific subjects identified in the constitutional provision and the application of Parliamentary legislation to those subjects.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the present case is an important illustration of how this constitutional arrangement operates when customary land claims come into conflict with administrative decisions.

How the Dispute Between Old Jalukai and Kakiho Village Began

The dispute concerned the establishment and proposed recognition of Kakiho Village in the Dhansiripar subdivision of the then Dimapur District.

Kakiho Village was established on 1 September 2007. Its inhabitants belonged to the Sumi tribe, and the village was associated with Khumishi ‘A’ Village in Zunheboto District as its parent or ancestral village.

The proposed village covered approximately 1,012 acres. The material before the Court referred to 57 households and a population of about 300 people.

Establishment and Customary Permission

The founders of Kakiho had obtained No Objection Certificates from their parent village and neighbouring villages. From their perspective, the necessary customary and administrative steps had been undertaken for the establishment and subsequent recognition of the settlement.

The difficulty arose when Old Jalukai Village Council objected to the proposed recognition. Old Jalukai, associated with the Zeliangrong group, claimed that the land in question was ancestral land belonging to its village.

Its objection was not a minor administrative disagreement. If the land was indeed part of Old Jalukai’s ancestral territory, the customary requirements governing the establishment of a new village on such land would become directly relevant.

The State was therefore required to examine whether Kakiho had fulfilled the conditions for recognition and whether the objection raised by Old Jalukai had any substance under the applicable customary and administrative framework.

How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court

The dispute eventually reached the Supreme Court after the Gauhati High Court, Kohima Bench, had affirmed directions requiring the State authorities to take steps towards formal recognition of Kakiho Village.

One important difficulty before the Supreme Court was that Old Jalukai’s case had not been properly brought into consideration in the High Court proceedings. The Court was therefore required to examine the matter with particular attention to the appellant village’s objection.

The Nagaland Village and Area Councils Act, 1978: Recognition Is Not Merely a Formality

An important part of the Supreme Court’s reasoning concerned Section 3 of the Nagaland Village and Area Councils Act, 1978.

The Act provides the statutory framework for Village Councils in Nagaland. Section 3 deals with the constitution of Village Councils for recognised villages. Its Explanation also sets out the conditions relevant to the establishment of a village.

Section 3: Requirements for Establishing a Village

In substance, the land must belong to the population seeking to establish the village, or it must have been lawfully made available by the Government or the lawful customary owner. The village must also be established in accordance with the prevailing usage and customary practices of the population concerned.

This statutory framework is important because it prevents village recognition from becoming a purely administrative exercise divorced from the question of land rights.

A settlement may exist on the ground, and its inhabitants may have been living there for years, but formal recognition still requires compliance with the applicable legal and customary conditions.

The Supreme Court’s approach makes it clear that the State must examine both the question of lawful entitlement to the land and the customary requirements governing the establishment of the proposed village.

This is particularly important in Nagaland, where conventional land documentation may not always provide a complete picture of traditional ownership and community boundaries.

The law must therefore be applied with an understanding of the local customary framework rather than through a mechanical examination of administrative paperwork.

The Government of Nagaland issued an office memorandum dated 22 March 1996 prescribing criteria for the recognition of new villages.

One of its important features concerns the establishment of a new village within the ancestral land of a parent village.

The Requirement for a No Objection Certificate

The Memorandum recognises the prevailing custom that, where a new village is sought to be established on land ancestrally belonging to another village, a No Objection Certificate from the parent or ancestral village is required in the circumstances specified in the Memorandum.

Where the boundaries of the proposed village cannot be precisely determined, the Memorandum contemplates a mutually acceptable arrangement between the concerned villages through their customary representatives.

The underlying idea is not difficult to understand. A village cannot simply disregard the customary land interests of another village merely because a new settlement has been established or because administrative recognition is being sought.

The consent requirement protects the customary interests of the village claiming ancestral ownership and provides an opportunity for the parties to resolve their differences before recognition is granted.

In the Old Jalukai dispute, this requirement assumed central importance. Old Jalukai maintained that the land belonged ancestrally to it and that its objection could not be ignored while the recognition of Kakiho was being considered.

The Supreme Court treated the customary requirement recognised by the 1996 Memorandum as a relevant part of the recognition process.

However, the Court did not automatically declare that Old Jalukai’s consent was necessary in every circumstance. It required the State authorities to examine whether the appellant’s claim was established and whether a No Objection Certificate from Old Jalukai was actually required under the applicable rules and customary practices.

This distinction deserves attention. An allegation of ancestral ownership must be examined seriously, but it cannot be treated as conclusively established merely because a village has made the claim.

The Office Memorandum of 1 October 2005: Why Public Notice Matters

The Government subsequently issued another Office Memorandum on 1 October 2005, introducing an additional procedural requirement for the recognition of new villages.

Public Notice and the Thirty-Day Objection Period

The Memorandum requires the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned district to issue a public notice containing relevant particulars of the proposed village, including its area and boundaries. The notice provides thirty days for members of the public to submit objections.

The object of this requirement is to ensure that all interested persons and communities receive an opportunity to raise concerns before the Government proceeds with recognition.

In a State where land may be governed by customary arrangements and ancestral relationships, public notice has considerable importance. A village may have a legitimate claim that would otherwise remain unknown to the authorities unless it is given an opportunity to object.

Why Objections Must Be Meaningfully Considered

The Supreme Court emphasised that the public-notice procedure cannot be reduced to a mere formality. If objections are invited, those submitted within the stipulated period must be adequately and appropriately considered.

The principle is familiar to administrative law, but its importance is particularly evident in this case. A public authority cannot invite objections, receive a timely representation and then proceed as though no meaningful objection has been raised.

The purpose of public notice is not simply to create a record that notice was issued. It is to ensure that relevant objections are examined before the decision is taken.

Old Jalukai’s Objection and the Failure to Demonstrate Its Proper Consideration

A public notice concerning the proposed recognition of Kakiho Village was issued on 13 October 2009.

Old Jalukai Village Council submitted its objection on 16 October 2009, claiming that Kakiho was being established on land ancestrally belonging to it. The objection was also reported to have been published in a local newspaper on 18 October 2009.

The Deputy Commissioner’s Response

The Deputy Commissioner, Dimapur, by communication dated 8 November 2009, asked Old Jalukai to furnish more comprehensive details, including relevant boundaries and records, to substantiate its claim.

Old Jalukai responded on 9 November 2009 with further material in support of its objection.

The Supreme Court found that it was unclear to what extent this communication had actually been considered by the Deputy Commissioner before the proposal for recognition was forwarded to the Government.

The State had also failed to make a substantive averment explaining why Old Jalukai’s claim was baseless or devoid of merit.

Receiving an Objection Is Different From Deciding It

In these circumstances, the Court was not satisfied that the procedure contemplated by the two Office Memoranda had been properly followed.

The importance of this finding lies in the distinction between receiving an objection and deciding it.

An administrative authority may ask an objector to provide additional material. It may examine the documents, seek clarification and even reject the claim if it is unsupported. What it cannot do is leave the objection unresolved while advancing the recognition process as though the relevant issue has already been settled.

The Supreme Court therefore insisted that the objection be examined in substance.

What the Supreme Court Required the State to Determine

The Court did not decide that Old Jalukai owned the disputed land. It required the State to determine whether the claim had merit and whether the consent of Old Jalukai was necessary under the applicable customary requirements.

If the State concluded that Old Jalukai’s consent was not required, the appellant would have no basis to insist upon a No Objection Certificate on that ground. If the State concluded that its consent was required, the concerned villages would have to engage in discussions to arrive at a mutually acceptable arrangement.

The approach reflects a balance between respect for customary claims and the need to examine those claims objectively.

The Inter-District Boundary Dispute: Could It Justify Keeping Recognition Pending?

Another important issue concerned the inter-district boundary dispute involving the areas of Peren and the then Dimapur District, which was subsequently reorganised in the relevant area as Chumoukedima District.

The State had relied upon the boundary dispute and the recommendations associated with the Ezong Committee Report of 2002 to explain why formal recognition of Kakiho had remained pending.

The Ezong Committee Report and Subsequent Developments

The Supreme Court examined the subsequent developments, including the report of a Cabinet Sub-Committee submitted in 2021.

The Court noted that Kakiho Village was situated approximately 3.7 kilometres away from the relevant buffer-zone. The State’s own material therefore indicated that the village was not located within the disputed area.

The Court concluded that the inter-district boundary dispute had no nexus whatsoever with the question of recognition of Kakiho Village.

Irrelevant Reasons Cannot Justify Indefinite Administrative Delay

This finding is significant because it separates two issues that the State had treated as connected.

One was the inter-district boundary dispute.
The other was the objection raised by Old Jalukai concerning ancestral ownership of the land on which Kakiho had been established.

The first could not be used as a continuing justification for avoiding a decision on the second.

The Court’s reasoning also reflects an important principle of public administration. A decision-making authority must rely upon relevant considerations. Where a reason originally advanced for delaying a decision ceases to have a factual connection with the matter, it cannot be used indefinitely to justify inaction.

The Supreme Court therefore required the State to deal with the recognition issue with urgency and in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

Why the Supreme Court Did Not Decide the Ownership Dispute Itself

A natural question arises: if the Supreme Court found that the objection had not been properly considered, why did it not decide whether the disputed land belonged to Old Jalukai or Kakiho?

The answer lies in the nature of the dispute.

The competing claims involved the history of the land, customary boundaries, traditional relationships between villages and the practices governing ancestral ownership. These are matters that may require examination of oral history, customary records, traditional evidence and the knowledge of persons familiar with the relevant communities.

The Supreme Court observed that it was not well-equipped to authoritatively determine such complex factual questions at that stage of the litigation.

The State authorities, having access to the relevant administrative and customary institutions, were better placed to investigate the competing claims and reach a decision.

This was not an abdication of judicial responsibility. The Court examined the legality of the administrative process, identified the deficiencies and issued directions to ensure that the State performed its obligations.

At the same time, it recognised that a constitutional court should not attempt to replace the fact-finding responsibility of the competent authorities where the dispute requires detailed examination of local history and customary practices.

The judgment therefore demonstrates an important distinction between judicial review and the initial determination of disputed customary facts.

The Court retained its supervisory role while requiring the State to undertake the examination entrusted to it.

The Supreme Court’s Directions: A Fresh and Time-Bound Decision

In its judgment dated 23 May 2025, the Supreme Court concluded that the procedure contemplated by the Office Memoranda dated 22 March 1996 and 1 October 2005 had not been complied with.

It also held that the inter-district boundary dispute had no nexus whatsoever with the recognition of Kakiho Village.

The Court set aside the relevant observations of the High Court concerning compliance with the two Office Memoranda, specifically because the High Court had not been alive to the case of Old Jalukai Village Council.

The State authorities were directed to re-issue a public notice concerning the recognition of Kakiho Village and exhaustively consider all objections that might be raised from every quarter, including those of Old Jalukai.

The State was given six months to complete the process and take a decision on whether recognition should be granted.

The Court made it clear that non-adherence to the timeline would be viewed strictly.

It is important to understand what the Court did not do. It did not declare Old Jalukai to be the owner of the disputed land. It did not itself grant formal recognition to Kakiho Village. Instead, it required the State to undertake a fresh examination and reach a decision after considering all relevant objections.

The matter was treated as part-heard, with the Registry directed to list it after six months before the same Bench, subject to appropriate orders from the Chief Justice of India.

The Subsequent Order of 27 November 2025: Dobashis and the Role of Customary Institutions

The matter came before the Supreme Court again on 27 November 2025, when the State’s compliance with the earlier directions was considered.

The Court was dissatisfied with the steps taken by the State and described its affidavit of compliance as “just an eyewash”.

A notification dated 24 November 2025 had constituted a committee under the chairmanship of the Commissioner, Nagaland. The committee included the Deputy Commissioners of Peren and Chumoukedima and representatives of the concerned tribal bodies and organisations.

Significantly, the committee was also authorised to co-opt three Dobashis each from the respective District Dobashis Customary Courts, provided they had experience in dealing with customary land matters.

The committee was expected to consult all stakeholders, examine the competing claims and objections, and submit its report to the Government within three months. The State was thereafter required to take an appropriate decision in accordance with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 23 May 2025.

The Court granted further time for the process, while making it clear that failure to take a decision within the extended period could lead to further orders.

The November order is important because it recognises the practical value of customary expertise in resolving land disputes in Nagaland.

Why the Participation of Dobashis Is Significant

The involvement of Dobashis is not an incidental feature of the proceedings. It reflects the fact that customary land disputes may require an understanding of traditional boundaries, community history and local practices that cannot always be established through conventional administrative records alone.

Dobashis occupy an important position in the customary justice framework of Nagaland. Their experience may assist the authorities in understanding the history and customary basis of competing village claims.

The Supreme Court’s direction therefore provides an opportunity for customary institutions and modern administrative authorities to work together.

However, the committee’s role must be understood accurately. It was constituted to consult stakeholders and assist the Government in examining the dispute. The final administrative decision remained the responsibility of the State Government.

The order does not mean that the committee itself was authorised to grant village recognition or conclusively determine title to the disputed land.

The broader lesson is that customary institutions can play a meaningful role in administrative decision-making without displacing the legal responsibility of the State.

Article 371A and Fundamental Rights: A Constitutional Question Left Open

Perhaps the most sensitive constitutional issue arising from the case concerns the relationship between Article 371A and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.

The parties raised arguments concerning whether customary practices protected by Article 371A could be relied upon in a manner that adversely affected rights under Articles 14, 19 and 21.

The question is important. While the Constitution recognises and protects Naga customary practices, the relationship between customary autonomy and individual constitutional rights may require judicial examination in an appropriate case.

The Supreme Court, however, did not decide this broader question in the present appeal.

In paragraph 70 of the judgment, the Court declined to examine the issue because the relevant provisions of the Nagaland Village and Area Councils Act, 1978, and the Office Memoranda had not themselves been challenged as violative of Articles 14, 19 or 21.

This qualification is essential when discussing the judgment.

It would be incorrect to suggest that the Supreme Court conclusively held in this case that every customary practice having the force of law is invalid if it conflicts with a fundamental right. Equally, it would be incorrect to claim that Article 371A gives every customary practice absolute immunity from constitutional scrutiny.

The Court deliberately left the broader question open.

In my view, this is a matter of considerable constitutional importance. The protection of customary institutions and the preservation of individual rights need not necessarily be treated as mutually exclusive objectives. The challenge for constitutional law is to determine how the special protection afforded to Naga traditions can operate alongside the guarantees of dignity, equality and fairness.

That question will have to be decided in a case where the relevant constitutional challenge is properly raised and requires determination.

What the Judgment Means for Village Recognition in Nagaland

The practical importance of Old Jalukai Village Council extends beyond the immediate dispute between the two villages.

First, it reinforces that ancestral land claims must be taken seriously when the State considers recognition of a new village. Where a village raises an objection supported by customary claims and relevant material, the competent authority must examine it before proceeding.

Second, the judgment gives real importance to the public-notice requirement under the 2005 Office Memorandum. A public notice is meaningful only when objections received within the stipulated period are considered fairly.

Third, it clarifies that the requirement of a No Objection Certificate from a parent or ancestral village must be examined in the context of the applicable customary practice and the facts of the particular case. The mere assertion of ancestral ownership is not a final determination of title.

Fourth, the judgment discourages administrative delay based on grounds that have no actual connection with the recognition application. An inter-district boundary dispute cannot become a permanent excuse for avoiding a decision where the relevant material shows that it has no nexus with the village concerned.

Finally, the subsequent order demonstrates that customary institutions can assist the State in resolving disputes that require a deeper understanding of traditional landholding arrangements.

The judgment is therefore relevant not only to village recognition but also to the wider administration of customary land rights in Nagaland.

A Wider Lesson for Indian Constitutional Law

India’s Constitution does not follow a completely uniform model of governance for every region and community. It recognises special arrangements where historical circumstances, cultural identity and customary institutions require constitutional accommodation.

Article 371A is one of the clearest examples of this approach.

But constitutional accommodation also creates responsibilities. The State must understand the customary framework within which it operates, and administrative authorities must not reduce customary rights to mere procedural paperwork.

At the same time, customary claims must be examined through a fair and credible process. The existence of a customary practice does not relieve the State of its duty to hear affected parties, examine relevant material and take a reasoned decision.

The Supreme Court’s approach in Old Jalukai Village Council is instructive because it avoids two extremes. It does not disregard customary institutions in favour of a purely conventional administrative approach. Nor does it allow the invocation of custom to become a reason for indefinite administrative inaction.

Instead, it requires the State to respect customary practices, involve relevant stakeholders and fulfil its legal responsibilities within a definite period.

That is a valuable lesson for the administration of justice in regions where traditional institutions continue to play an important role in community life.

Conclusion: Respecting Customary Rights Within the Constitutional Framework

The judgment in Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village & Ors. is an important contribution to the understanding of Naga Customary Law and the constitutional protection provided by Article 371A.

The Supreme Court recognised that the establishment and recognition of a new village in Nagaland cannot be examined without considering the customary practices governing ancestral land. It emphasised that the State must properly consider objections raised in response to a public notice and cannot avoid its responsibility by relying upon an unrelated inter-district boundary dispute.

The subsequent order of 27 November 2025 further strengthened the process by providing for the participation of experienced Dobashis and representatives of the concerned communities.

At the same time, the Court carefully refrained from deciding issues that were not necessary for the disposal of the appeal. It did not determine ownership of the disputed land, grant final recognition to Kakiho Village or settle the wider constitutional question concerning Article 371A and fundamental rights.

That judicial restraint is an important part of the judgment.

The larger message is that customary autonomy and constitutional governance need not stand in opposition to one another. A democratic constitutional system must be capable of respecting the traditions of its communities while ensuring that public authorities act fairly, responsibly and without unreasonable delay.

For Nagaland, the preservation of customary land rights is inseparable from the preservation of community identity. But the continued strength of customary institutions will also depend upon their ability to operate through processes that are credible, fair and responsive to the concerns of all affected communities.

The Supreme Court’s judgment offers an important reminder that constitutional protection is meaningful not merely when traditions are preserved in principle, but when the institutions responsible for administering them act with fairness, sensitivity and respect for the law.

⚖️ Facing an Ancestral Land Dispute or a Dispute Involving Naga Customary Law?

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Frequently Asked Questions on Naga Customary Law and Article 371A

1. What Is Naga Customary Law?

Naga Customary Law refers to the traditional rules, practices and institutions followed by Naga communities in matters such as land ownership, inheritance, social relations, village administration and customary dispute resolution. These practices may differ among tribes and communities.

2. What Protection Does Article 371A Provide to Nagaland?

Article 371A provides that Parliamentary legislation concerning specified subjects, including Naga customary law and procedure and ownership and transfer of land and its resources, does not apply to Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland resolves otherwise.

3. What Was the Supreme Court Case Concerning Old Jalukai and Kakiho Village About?

The case concerned the proposed recognition of Kakiho Village and an objection by Old Jalukai Village Council claiming that the land was part of its ancestral territory. The Supreme Court examined whether the State had properly followed the applicable Office Memoranda and considered the objection.

4. Did the Supreme Court Declare Old Jalukai to Be the Owner of the Disputed Land?

No. The Court did not decide the question of ownership. It directed the State authorities to examine the competing claims and objections on their merits.

5. Is a No Objection Certificate From the Ancestral Village Necessary?

The Office Memorandum dated 22 March 1996 recognises the customary requirement of a No Objection Certificate in specified circumstances where a new village is established on the ancestral land of another village. Whether the requirement applies depends on the facts and the applicable customary arrangements.

6. What Is the Significance of the 1 October 2005 Office Memorandum?

It introduced a public-notice requirement for village recognition, providing thirty days for interested persons or communities to raise objections. The Supreme Court emphasised that objections submitted within the prescribed period must be properly considered.

7. What Is the Role of Dobashis in Nagaland?

Dobashis are associated with the customary justice system of Nagaland. Their experience may assist in examining disputes involving traditional landholding practices, customary boundaries and village history. The Supreme Court’s order dated 27 November 2025 specifically contemplated their participation in the consultative process concerning Kakiho Village.

8. Did the Supreme Court Decide Whether Article 371A Overrides Fundamental Rights?

No. The Court expressly declined to decide the broader relationship between Article 371A and Articles 14, 19 and 21 because the relevant provisions of the 1978 Act and the Office Memoranda had not been challenged on that constitutional ground.

9. Can the State Delay Village Recognition Because of an Inter-District Boundary Dispute?

The Supreme Court held that the inter-district boundary dispute in this case had no nexus whatsoever with the recognition of Kakiho Village. It could therefore not be relied upon as a continuing justification for delaying the recognition process.

10. Did the Supreme Court Itself Grant Recognition to Kakiho Village?

No. It directed the State to re-issue public notice, consider all objections and take a final decision within the stipulated period. The Court did not itself grant recognition.

11. What Happened After the Judgment of 23 May 2025?

On 27 November 2025, the Supreme Court considered the State’s compliance affidavit and directed a further consultative process involving the Commissioner, Nagaland, the concerned Deputy Commissioners, tribal representatives and experienced Dobashis.

12. Is the Judgment a Final Decision on the Ownership of the Disputed Land?

No. The judgment dealt primarily with the legality and fairness of the village-recognition process. The competing claims of ancestral ownership were left for examination by the competent State authorities.

Important Legal References

Constitution of India — Article 371A.
Nagaland Village and Area Councils Act, 1978 — Section 3.
Government of Nagaland Office Memorandum dated 22 March 1996.
Government of Nagaland Office Memorandum dated 1 October 2005.
Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village & Ors., 2025 INSC 766; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2658.
Supreme Court order dated 27 November 2025 in Civil Appeal No. 7380 of 2025.
Primary judgment: Official Supreme Court of India judgment dated 23 May 2025.
Subsequent order: Official Supreme Court of India order dated 27 November 2025.

Key Takeaways: Naga Customary Law and Article 371A

Naga Customary Law has constitutional recognition: Article 371A of the Constitution of India provides special constitutional protection to specified aspects of Naga religious and social practices, customary law and procedures, and ownership and transfer of land and its resources.
Customary rights must be considered in village recognition: The Supreme Court emphasised that recognition of a new village in Nagaland cannot be considered without examining applicable customary practices and the relevant statutory and administrative requirements.
Ancestral land claims cannot be ignored: Where a new village is proposed on land claimed to belong ancestrally to another village, the authorities must properly examine the customary requirements, including the need for a No Objection Certificate (NOC), wherever applicable.
The 1996 Government Office Memorandum is significant: The Office Memorandum dated 22 March 1996 recognises the relevance of prevailing customary practices concerning ancestral land and the consent of the parent or ancestral village in specified circumstances.
Public objections must receive meaningful consideration: The Office Memorandum dated 1 October 2005 requires public notice and provides an opportunity for objections. Authorities must examine objections substantively rather than treating the notice procedure as a mere formality.
The Supreme Court identified procedural deficiencies: In Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village & Ors., 2025 INSC 766, the Court found that the prescribed procedures had not been properly followed in considering the village recognition proposal.
An inter-district boundary dispute was not relevant to the recognition issue: The Court held that the inter-district boundary dispute relied upon by the State had no nexus whatsoever with the question of recognition of Kakiho Village.
The Supreme Court did not decide ownership of the disputed land: The judgment did not finally determine whether Old Jalukai Village or Kakiho Village had ownership rights over the disputed land. It required the competent authorities to examine the claims through the prescribed process.
The State Government was directed to reconsider the matter: The Supreme Court directed the authorities to issue a fresh public notice, exhaustively consider objections from all concerned parties, including Old Jalukai Village, and take a decision within six months.
Dobashis and customary institutions have an important role: In its subsequent order dated 27 November 2025, the Supreme Court took note of a committee constituted by the Nagaland Government, involving administrative authorities and customary representatives, including Dobashis, to examine the matter and consult stakeholders.
The relationship between Article 371A and fundamental rights remains open: The Supreme Court did not decide the broader constitutional questions concerning Articles 14, 19 and 21 because the constitutional validity of the relevant Act and Office Memorandums had not been challenged on those grounds.
The judgment reinforces procedural fairness in customary matters: The decision highlights that customary practices, ancestral land claims, statutory requirements and administrative fairness must be considered together when authorities deal with village recognition in Nagaland.

The Central Message of the Judgment

The Supreme Court’s decision in Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village & Ors. is significant for the protection and consideration of Naga Customary Law, ancestral land claims and traditional village interests. It makes clear that administrative authorities cannot bypass applicable customary procedures or disregard genuine objections while considering village recognition. At the same time, the Court left the ultimate question of land ownership to be examined by the competent authorities.

Case Details

Case Citation: Old Jalukai Village Council v. Kakiho Village & Ors., 2025 INSC 766; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 2658.

Judgment Date: 23 May 2025.

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