Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi and the connected appeal Patel Field Marshal Industries v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. are landmark judgments on the law of territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes. The ruling addressed a recurring problem faced by trademark owners and copyright holders: determining the proper court in which infringement and passing-off actions may be instituted.
The case is particularly significant because it clarified the relationship between the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Copyright Act, 1957, and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The Court examined whether a plaintiff could invoke the special jurisdictional provision contained in Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act to maintain a suit that was substantially based on trademark infringement and passing-off claims.
The judgment continues to be of immense importance for businesses, trademark proprietors, copyright owners, intellectual property practitioners, and courts dealing with jurisdictional objections. It emphasizes that jurisdiction cannot be assumed merely on grounds of convenience and that statutory requirements governing territorial jurisdiction must be strictly satisfied. The ruling has played a crucial role in shaping the jurisprudence governing intellectual property litigation in India.
Key Highlights
- Clarifies territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes.
- Examines the interaction between the Code of Civil Procedure, the Copyright Act, and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act.
- Defines the scope of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
- Explains whether composite copyright and trademark suits can expand territorial jurisdiction.
- Continues to serve as a leading precedent on jurisdictional objections in IP litigation.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Supreme Court considered two connected appeals involving questions relating to territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes.
First Appeal: Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi
The first appeal arose from a dispute between Dhodha House and S.K. Maingi. Dhodha House claimed ownership of the registered trademark “Dhodha House” in Class 30 under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. It also asserted copyright registrations in artistic works relating to its labels and wrappers. According to the plaintiff, it had been using the mark since 1960 and had acquired substantial goodwill and reputation.
Dhodha House carried on business in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, whereas the defendant conducted a similar sweetmeat business in Kotkapura, District Faridkot, Punjab. Alleging infringement of trademark, copyright, and passing off, the plaintiff instituted a suit before the District Judge at Ghaziabad seeking an injunction and other reliefs.
On 17 January 1992, the additional district judge granted an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using labels, wrappers, and trade dress allegedly similar to those of the plaintiff. The defendant challenged the order before the Allahabad High Court. By judgment dated 5 May 1997, the High Court held that the Ghaziabad court lacked territorial jurisdiction and further observed that “Dhodha” was the name of a variety of sweet and not an exclusive product of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by this decision, Dhodha House approached the Supreme Court.
Second Appeal: Patel Field Marshal Industries v. P.M. Diesels Ltd.
The second appeal involved Patel Field Marshal Industries and P.M. Diesels Ltd. Both parties carried on business in diesel engines at Rajkot in Gujarat. The plaintiff claimed ownership of the trademark “Field Marshal” and also asserted copyright in its label and artistic work. A suit was instituted on the original side of the Delhi High Court seeking a perpetual injunction for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, passing off, and rendition of accounts.
The plaintiff attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court on the grounds that the defendants’ trademark applications had been advertised in the Trade Marks Journal and that goods bearing the disputed marks were allegedly sold in Delhi. The Single Judge rejected the injunction application on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. However, the Division Bench reversed the decision and held that the Delhi High Court possessed jurisdiction. This led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.
The central issue in both matters ultimately concerned the extent of territorial jurisdiction available in intellectual property disputes and the scope of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
Case Overview
| Particulars | First Appeal | Second Appeal |
|---|---|---|
| Case | Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi | Patel Field Marshal Industries v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. |
| Nature of Dispute | Trademark, copyright and passing-off | Trademark, copyright, passing-off, and rendition of accounts |
| Plaintiff’s Business Location | Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh | Rajkot, Gujarat |
| Defendant’s Business Location | Kotkapura, Punjab | Rajkot, Gujarat |
| Court Where Suit Was Filed | District Judge, Ghaziabad | Delhi High Court |
| Core Jurisdictional Issue | Whether Ghaziabad Court had territorial jurisdiction | Whether Delhi High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction |
Dispute Before the Court
The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether a plaintiff could rely upon Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 to institute a suit at a place where it resided or carried on business when the primary grievance related to trademark infringement and passing-off under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
The appellants contended that the special jurisdictional provision under the Copyright Act created an additional forum and that a composite suit involving copyright and trademark claims could be filed where the plaintiff resided or carried on business. They also argued that publication of trademark applications in the Trade Marks Journal and the possibility of the sale of goods in a particular territory furnished sufficient cause of action for conferring jurisdiction.
The respondents disputed these contentions. They argued that trademark infringement and copyright infringement constitute distinct causes of action. According to them, Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act applied only to copyright disputes and could not be used to create jurisdiction for trademark infringement proceedings. It was further contended that publication of a trademark application in the Trade Marks Journal or mere availability of goods in a market did not confer territorial jurisdiction upon a court.
The Supreme Court was therefore required to determine the true scope of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, the principles governing territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and whether a composite intellectual property suit could be used to enlarge the jurisdiction of a court otherwise lacking authority to entertain trademark claims.
Issues Before the Supreme Court
- Whether Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, provides an additional forum for composite intellectual property suits.
- Whether trademark infringement and copyright infringement constitute separate causes of action.
- Whether Section 62(2) can be invoked for trademark infringement and passing-off claims.
- Whether publication of a trademark application in the Trade Marks Journal creates a cause of action.
- Whether the alleged sale or availability of goods in a particular territory is sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction.
- How Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applies to intellectual property disputes involving trademark claims.
Reasoning and Analysis of the Court
The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining the statutory framework governing territorial jurisdiction. It observed that the determination of territorial jurisdiction is primarily governed by Sections 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 20 provides that a suit may ordinarily be instituted where the defendant resides or carries on business or where the cause of action wholly or partly arises.
The Court then examined Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957. This provision creates an additional forum for copyright litigation by permitting a plaintiff to institute proceedings where he actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain. The Court emphasized that this provision was enacted to benefit authors and copyright owners who might otherwise be compelled to litigate in distant places where infringement occurred.
Distinction Between Copyright and Trademark Jurisdiction
A central aspect of the Court’s reasoning was that the Copyright Act and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act operate in different spheres. While certain factual circumstances may overlap, a copyright infringement claim and a trademark infringement claim are distinct causes of action. The Court held that merely joining different causes of action in a composite suit under Order II Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer jurisdiction where none otherwise exists.
Legislative Intent Behind Section 62(2)
The Court gave considerable importance to legislative intent. It observed that when Parliament enacted the Copyright Act in 1957, it consciously introduced Section 62(2) granting an additional forum. However, when Parliament enacted the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act in 1958, it did not incorporate a similar provision. According to the Court, this omission was deliberate and reflected legislative intent not to create an additional jurisdictional forum for trademark disputes under the 1958 Act. The Court noted that Parliament eventually introduced such a provision in Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, thereby confirming that no such additional forum existed under the earlier law.
Jurisdiction Must Be Created by Statute
The Court further emphasized the well-established principle that jurisdiction cannot be presumed and must be expressly conferred by statute. A court lacking territorial jurisdiction cannot acquire jurisdiction merely because multiple causes of action are joined in a single suit. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction would be a nullity. For this proposition, the Court relied upon Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, [1955] 1 SCR 117, where it was held that a decree passed without jurisdiction is void and can be challenged even in collateral proceedings.
Analysis of Earlier Judicial Precedents
The Supreme Court also considered Jawahar Engineering Co. v. Jawahar Engineering Pvt. Ltd., 1983 PTC 207, where the Delhi High Court had recognized jurisdiction based on threatened infringement arising from a trademark registration application. The Court distinguished that decision and held that mere publication of a trademark application in the Trade Marks Journal does not by itself create a cause of action. A cause of action for trademark infringement arises from actual use of the mark and not merely from filing an application for registration.
The Court relied upon Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711, where it was held that incidental facts such as reading an advertisement or sending communications from a particular location do not constitute integral parts of a cause of action. Applying this principle, the Court held that publication of an advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal could not confer territorial jurisdiction.
The Court also discussed Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 28 PTC 251 SC, where Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act was interpreted as providing an additional forum for copyright actions. However, the Court clarified that Exphar dealt primarily with copyright infringement and did not decide the issue presently under consideration, namely whether Section 62(2) could be used to confer jurisdiction in trademark disputes.
The Court approved the reasoning of the Madras High Court in Premier Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. v. Shashi Distilleries, 2001 PTC 907 (Mad), which held that filing an application for trademark registration does not constitute a part of the cause of action in a passing-off action. The court agreed that convenience of the plaintiff cannot determine jurisdiction.
Meaning of “Carries on Business”
The judgment also provides a detailed explanation of the phrase “carries on business.” The Court held that a person carries on business at a place only when there is a real business presence involving control, participation, and commercial activity. Merely selling goods in a market through distributors or having products available in a particular city does not mean that the proprietor carries on business there. Similarly, mere availability of products in Delhi would not establish that the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi.
Application of Principles to the Present Cases
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the Ghaziabad court lacked territorial jurisdiction in the Dhodha House matter because the primary grievance related to trademark infringement under the 1958 Act. Likewise, the Delhi High Court lacked jurisdiction in the Field Marshal matter because neither party resided nor carried on business in Delhi, and publication of trademark applications in the Trade Marks Journal could not create jurisdiction.
Key Principles Emerging from the Reasoning
- Territorial jurisdiction is governed primarily by Sections 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
- Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, creates an additional forum only for copyright litigation.
- Copyright and trademark infringement constitute separate causes of action.
- Joining multiple causes of action does not create territorial jurisdiction where none exists.
- Jurisdiction must be expressly conferred by statute.
- Publication of a trademark application in the Trade Marks Journal does not itself create a cause of action.
- A business “carries on business” only where there is a genuine commercial presence involving control and participation.
Final Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court dismissed Civil Appeal No. 6248 of 1997 filed by Dhodha House and upheld the Allahabad High Court’s conclusion that the Ghaziabad court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
The Court allowed Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1999 filed by Patel Field Marshal Industries and held that the Delhi High Court did not possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain the trademark and passing-off action merely because trademark applications were advertised in the Trade Marks Journal or because goods were allegedly available in Delhi.
The Court clarified that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act could not be invoked to create jurisdiction for disputes primarily arising under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.
Outcome at a Glance
| Appeal | Decision | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Civil Appeal No. 6248 of 1997 (Dhodha House) | Dismissed | The Ghaziabad Court lacked territorial jurisdiction. |
| Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1999 (Patel Field Marshal Industries) | Allowed | Delhi High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction. |
Point of Law Settled
The judgment settled the principle that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, creates an additional forum only for copyright-related disputes and cannot be used to confer territorial jurisdiction in trademark infringement or passing-off actions arising under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
The Court further clarified that joining copyright and trademark claims in a composite suit does not automatically enlarge the territorial jurisdiction of a court. Jurisdiction must independently exist in respect of each cause of action.
The decision also establishes that publication of a trademark application in the Trade Marks Journal does not constitute a cause of action for trademark infringement and does not confer territorial jurisdiction. Additionally, the mere sale or availability of products in a particular market does not mean that a business “carries on business” at that location.
The ruling remains a foundational authority on territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property litigation and continues to guide courts in determining the proper forum for trademark, copyright, and passing-off disputes.
Legal Principles Settled
- Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, applies exclusively to copyright disputes.
- Trademark and passing-off actions require independent territorial jurisdiction.
- A composite suit cannot enlarge the territorial jurisdiction of a court.
- Publication in the Trade Marks Journal is not a cause of action for trademark infringement.
- Mere availability or sale of goods in a city does not establish that a party “carries on business” there.
Case Details
| Title of the Case | Dhodha House vs. S.K. Maingi; Connected with Patel Field Marshal Industries & Ors. v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. |
|---|---|
| Date of Judgment/Order | 15 December 2005 |
| Case Number | Civil Appeal Nos. 6248 of 1997 and 16 of 1999 |
| Citations | AIR 2006 SC 730; (2006) 6 SCC 41; |
| Name of Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Name of Honorable Judge | Justice B.P. Singh and Justice S.B. Sinha |
| Written By | Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi |
Disclaimer
Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement and that the same are for illustrative purposes only. Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice, as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.
Dispute Before the Court
The central question before the Supreme Court was whether Hardie’s trademarks could be removed from the register on the ground of non-use under Section 46(1)(b) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
The court had to determine whether the expression “use” required actual sale of goods bearing the trademark or whether other commercial acts connected with the mark could also constitute use.
Another important issue was whether Hardie had abandoned its trademarks. Addisons argued that Hardie had neither manufactured nor sold goods under the trademarks during the statutory period and had therefore abandoned its rights.
Hardie disputed this contention and argued that it had continuously intended to use the trademarks in India through a registered user arrangement. It contended that extensive negotiations, promotional efforts, licensing arrangements, and steps taken to secure regulatory approvals demonstrated continuing commercial interest in the marks and completely negated any intention to abandon them.
The court was also required to decide whether governmental restrictions on imports and foreign collaboration constituted “special circumstances in the trade” under Section 46(3) of the act, thereby protecting the trademarks from removal despite the absence of substantial commercial sales.
In addition, disputes concerning registration of the warrior device mark and Addisons’ claim of proprietorship over the device also required adjudication.
Key Issues Before the Supreme Court
- Whether Hardie’s trademarks were liable to be removed for non-use under Section 46(1)(b) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
- Whether the expression “use” required actual commercial sales or included other commercial activities connected with the trademark.
- Whether Hardie had abandoned its trademarks by failing to manufacture or sell goods during the statutory period.
- Whether negotiations, licensing arrangements, promotional efforts, and regulatory approvals constituted evidence of bona fide use.
- Whether governmental import restrictions amounted to “special circumstances in the trade” under Section 46(3).
- Whether Addisons could claim proprietorship and registration of the warrior device mark.
Summary of the Dispute
| Issue | Hardie’s Stand | Addison’s Stand |
|---|---|---|
| Non-use of trademark | Commercial activities amounted to bona fide use. | No actual sales meant the trademarks were liable to be removed. |
| Abandonment | No intention to abandon; continuous preparations showed commercial interest. | Failure to manufacture or sell indicated abandonment. |
| Special circumstances | Government restrictions prevented commercial exploitation. | Restrictions were merely commercial difficulties and not statutory protection. |
| Warrior device | Hardie remained the true proprietor. | Addisons claimed ownership and registration. |
Reasoning and Analysis of the Court
The Supreme Court undertook an extensive analysis of Section 46 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The Court noted that under Section 46(1)(b), removal of a registered trademark is permissible only when there has been a continuous period of five years or more during which the mark was not used bona fide in relation to the goods concerned.
Meaning of “Use” Under Section 46
A crucial aspect of the judgment concerns the meaning of the word “use.” The Court observed that Section 2(2)(b) defines use of a trademark in relation to goods as use upon the goods or “in any physical or any other relation whatsoever” to such goods. The statutory language is deliberately broad and does not confine use merely to physical affixation of the mark on goods sold in the market.
To explain this principle, the Court relied upon the English decision in Hermes Trade Mark, (1872) RPC 425, where advertisements, orders, and other commercial activities were held sufficient to constitute use even in the absence of actual sales. The Court observed that trademark use may occur through advertisements, invoices, promotional materials, orders, and other commercial acts connected with the marketing of goods.
The Court also referred to Bon Matin Trade Mark, (1989) RPC 536, where issuance of price lists, promotional literature, and efforts to establish a market were treated as sufficient evidence of bona fide use. The decision demonstrated that genuine attempts to develop commercial presence may defeat a rectification action based on non-use.
Whether Hardie Abandoned Its Trademarks
A major issue before the Court was whether Hardie had abandoned its trademarks. The Court emphasized that abandonment requires proof of an intention to relinquish trademark rights. Mere absence of sales does not automatically establish abandonment.
For this proposition, the Court referred to Mouson & Co. v. Boehm, 26 Ch D 398 (1884), where retention of trademark materials, circulation of price lists, and continued commercial efforts were held inconsistent with abandonment. The Court also relied upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911), which held that abandonment requires proof of an intention to abandon and cannot be inferred solely from non-use.
The Court further relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in American Home Products Corporation v. Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 137, where it was held that a trademark proprietor may legitimately retain rights in a mark despite the absence of actual market sales if preparatory steps for commercial use are being undertaken. The Court noted that manufacturing industries often require extensive preparation and regulatory compliance before products can be marketed.
Applying these principles, the Court found overwhelming evidence demonstrating Hardie’s continuing intention to use the trademarks. The correspondence between Hardie and Hansa revealed sustained negotiations, preparation of registered user agreements, efforts to secure governmental approvals, and eventual execution of the agreement within the relevant statutory period. These circumstances completely negated any suggestion of abandonment.
Special Circumstances in the Trade
The Court then examined Section 46(3), which protects a trademark proprietor where non-use results from “special circumstances in the trade” rather than an intention to abandon the mark.
The High Court had rejected Hardie’s defense on the ground that economic considerations and market conditions were personal to the proprietor and did not amount to special circumstances. The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court relied upon Aktiebolaget Manus v. R.J. Fullwood and Bland Ltd., (1949) 66 RPC 71, where prohibitive tariffs and restrictions affecting international trade were recognized as special circumstances. The Court also referred to BALI Trade Mark, (1966) RPC 387, later approved by the House of Lords in Berlei (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bali Brassiere Co. Inc., (1969) 2 All ER 812, which recognized that commercial impracticability arising from governmental policies could constitute special circumstances.
The Court observed that India’s import trade control policies effectively restricted the importation of paints, varnishes, and lacquers by foreign manufacturers. Hardie could not freely import products into India without establishing local manufacturing facilities and complying with extensive regulatory requirements. These restrictions were not peculiar to Hardie but applied generally to foreign manufacturers operating in the sector.
The Court therefore concluded that the non-use, if any, was attributable to special circumstances in trade and not to abandonment. Accordingly, the statutory defense under Section 46(3) was fully available to Hardie.
Warrior Device Trademark Dispute
The Supreme Court also addressed Addison’s attempt to secure registration of the warrior device. The Court found that Hardie had historically used the device internationally and had introduced it into the Indian market through Addisons. There was insufficient evidence establishing Addisons as the true proprietor of the device.
The Court further observed that Addisons had publicly renounced use of the device in 1971 and later undertook before the Calcutta High Court not to use the disputed warrior-rear device. These circumstances undermined Addison’s claim to registration.
The Court additionally noted that continued use of the warrior device by Hansa after 1979 strengthened Hardie’s position and demonstrated that the mark had not lost its distinctiveness.
Key Principles Laid Down by the Court
- Trademark “use” extends beyond actual sales and includes other bona fide commercial activities.
- Advertisements, promotional materials, negotiations, invoices, and licensing efforts may constitute trademark use.
- Non-use alone does not establish abandonment without proof of an intention to abandon.
- Preparatory commercial activities can preserve trademark rights.
- Governmental trade restrictions may amount to “special circumstances in the trade” under Section 46(3).
- The true proprietor of a trademark must establish genuine ownership through evidence and continuous association with the mark.
Important Judicial Precedents Relied Upon
| Case | Legal Principle |
|---|---|
| Hermes Trade Mark (1872) RPC 425 | Advertisements and commercial activities may constitute trademark use. |
| Bon Matin Trade Mark (1989) RPC 536 | Promotional efforts and market development demonstrate bona fide use. |
| Mouson & Co. v. Boehm (1884) | Abandonment requires intention to relinquish rights. |
| Baglin v. Cusenier Co. (1911) | Non-use alone is insufficient to establish abandonment. |
| American Home Products Corporation v. Mac Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 137 | Preparatory commercial steps can preserve trademark rights. |
| Aktiebolaget Manus v. R.J. Fullwood and Bland Ltd. (1949) | Government-imposed trade restrictions may constitute special circumstances. |
| BALI Trade Mark (1966) RPC 387 | Government policies creating commercial impracticability qualify as special circumstances. |
| Berlei (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bali Brassiere Co. Inc. (1969) | Approved the principle relating to special circumstances in trade. |
Final Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court allowed Hardie’s appeals and set aside the decisions of the Joint Registrar, the Single Judge, and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court.
The Court held that Hardie’s trademarks “Spartan” and “Spartan Velox” could not be removed from the register on the ground of non-use. It concluded that Hardie had continuously intended to use the trademarks and had undertaken substantial efforts to maintain and exploit them commercially.
The Court further held that the prevailing import restrictions and regulatory barriers constituted special circumstances in the trade sufficient to justify any alleged non-use.
The Court also allowed the appeals relating to the warrior device and other registration proceedings, holding that Addisons had failed to establish entitlement to registration and that Hardie’s rights in the marks continued to subsist.
Point of Law Settled
The judgment establishes that trademark “use” under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, is not confined to actual sale of goods.
Promotional activities, advertisements, licensing arrangements, negotiations with registered users, preparatory commercial steps, and other acts connected with exploitation of the mark may constitute bona fide use.
The decision further clarifies that abandonment is an essential element in a claim based on non-use.
Mere absence of sales does not prove abandonment unless accompanied by an intention to relinquish trademark rights.
The Court also authoritatively held that governmental restrictions, import controls, economic impracticability, and other external commercial barriers may amount to “special circumstances in the trade” under Section 46(3), thereby protecting trademarks from removal despite periods of limited commercial activity.
The judgment remains one of the leading authorities in India on trademark non-use, abandonment, special circumstances, and the protection of international trademark rights.
Key Legal Principles from the Judgment
- Trademark “use” is not limited to the actual sale of goods.
- Advertisements, promotional activities, licensing arrangements, and preparatory commercial steps may constitute bona fide use.
- Abandonment requires both non-use and an intention to relinquish trademark rights.
- Mere absence of sales is insufficient to establish abandonment.
- Governmental restrictions, import controls, and other commercial barriers may qualify as “special circumstances in the trade” under Section 46(3).
- International trademark rights remain protected where genuine commercial efforts and intent to use are demonstrated.
Case Details
| Title of the Case | Hardie Trading Ltd. and Another Vs. Addisons Paint and Chemicals Ltd. |
|---|---|
| Date of Judgment/Order | 12.09.2003 |
| Case Number | Civil Appeal Nos. 5307-5311 of 1993 |
| Citation | AIR 2003 SC 3377 |
| Name of Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Names of Honorable Judges | Justice Ruma Pal and Justice B.N. Srikrishna, JJ. |
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
Disclaimer: Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement, and the same are for illustrative purposes only. Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice, as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.
