Introduction

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Exotic Mile is an important addition to Indian trademark jurisprudence dealing not only with deceptive similarity and passing off but also with the procedural limitations governing successive applications for interim injunctions. The judgment clarifies that even where a party believes an earlier order omitted a particular relief due to oversight, the proper remedy is not to repeatedly seek identical interim relief through fresh applications.

Factual and Procedural Background

Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd., the proprietor of the well-known trademark “BOAT” for electronic goods and accessories, instituted a commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction against Exotic Mile, alleging infringement of its trademark, copyright, dilution of its brand, and passing off. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had adopted the mark “BOULT” along with several device marks, logos, and packaging that were deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s well-established “BOAT” brand.

At the inception of the suit, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the word mark “BOULT,” its device marks, and other deceptively similar marks. Subsequently, the defendant applied for vacation of the interim injunction.

By judgment dated 21 January 2020, the Court disposed of both applications. While holding that the plaintiff was the prior user and observing that “BOAT” and “BOULT” were phonetically similar, the Court granted interim protection only with respect to specified device marks, copyright infringement, passing off, and dilution. The operative portion of the order, however, did not expressly restrain the defendant from using the standalone word mark “BOULT.”

The defendant challenged the order before the Division Bench. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant informed the court that it had substantially discontinued the use of the impugned marks and had transitioned to the mark “GOBOULT.” The Division Bench ultimately upheld the injunction regarding the device marks but clarified that there had never been any injunction restraining the use of “GOBOULT,” leaving it open to the plaintiff to challenge that mark separately if advised.

After disposal of the appeal, the plaintiff filed another application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking an interim injunction specifically against the word mark “BOULT.” The plaintiff argued that omission of the word mark from the earlier operative order was merely inadvertent and contrary to the findings recorded in the judgment regarding deceptive similarity. The defendant opposed the application, contending that it sought identical relief that had effectively already been refused and was therefore barred by settled procedural principles governing successive injunction applications.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff could maintain a second application seeking substantially the same interim injunction that had not been granted in the earlier proceedings.

The plaintiff maintained that the findings recorded in the earlier judgment clearly established deceptive phonetic similarity between “BOAT” and “BOULT.” According to the plaintiff, the omission of the word mark from the operative portion of the earlier order was only an accidental oversight that should not deprive it of protection. It further argued that the Division Bench had affirmed the findings relating to deceptive similarity, and therefore the defendant ought to be restrained from continuing to use the impugned word mark.

The defendant, on the other hand, argued that the plaintiff never sought review, clarification, or modification of the earlier order nor filed any cross-appeal. Instead, after allowing the earlier proceedings to attain finality, it attempted to obtain the same relief through a fresh injunction application. According to the defendant, permitting such a course would undermine the doctrine of finality, encourage repetitive litigation, and amount to an abuse of the judicial process.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The High Court carefully examined the procedural history of the litigation and concluded that the earlier judgment unmistakably restricted interim protection to specified device marks and did not extend the injunction to the standalone word mark “BOULT.” The Court observed that if the plaintiff genuinely believed the omission resulted from oversight, the appropriate legal remedies were review, clarification, modification, or cross appeal. Having failed to adopt any of those remedies and having allowed several years to pass, the plaintiff could not seek identical relief through a fresh interlocutory application.

The Court relied extensively upon the principles governing successive applications for interim injunctions. It referred to Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Others, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 43, explaining that interlocutory orders may be revisited only in legally recognized circumstances. The court also discussed Rakesh Madan and Another v. Rajasthan Financial Corporation and Others, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 39, which recognizes that a subsequent injunction application may be entertained only where there exists a genuine change in circumstances or where the earlier order causes undue hardship.

The Court found that neither requirement had been satisfied. According to the Court, the observations made by the Division Bench merely clarified what already existed in the earlier judgment and did not constitute a fresh circumstance giving rise to a new cause for interim relief. Likewise, the plaintiff had failed to specifically plead or establish any undue hardship as required by law.

The Court also referred to Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, (1987) 1 SCC 727, while discussing the applicability of principles analogous to res judicata at successive stages of the same proceedings. It further relied upon S. Malla Reddy v. Future Builders Cooperative Housing Society, (2013) 9 SCC 349; K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573; and Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade, (1999) 5 SCC 590 to reiterate that repetitive proceedings seeking substantially identical relief amount to an abuse of the judicial process.

The Court also considered the plaintiff’s reliance on Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 14, regarding deceptive similarity between competing marks. While acknowledging the legal principles governing trademark infringement and passing off, the court held that the present controversy was fundamentally procedural. The issue was not whether “BOAT” and “BOULT” were phonetically similar, but whether the plaintiff could reopen an issue already concluded through another interim application.

The Court further examined the plaintiff’s invocation of the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Referring to K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275, it was observed that inherent powers cannot be exercised to circumvent or override specific statutory provisions governing interlocutory injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.

The court also noticed that the defendant had consistently stated before the division bench as well as before the single judge that it had already transitioned from “BOULT” to “GOBOULT” and was prepared to cooperate in removing any residual online listings. This further weakened the plaintiff’s plea of continuing hardship.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application seeking an interim injunction against the use of the word mark “BOULT.” The Court held that the application was not maintainable because it sought substantially the same interim relief that had not been granted in the earlier proceedings. It found that the plaintiff had neither established any change in circumstances nor demonstrated undue hardship, which alone could justify entertaining a second application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court further observed that granting the relief sought would effectively amount to rewriting the earlier orders of both the Single Judge and the Division Bench, which had already attained finality. Accordingly, the application was dismissed without granting any further interim protection against the use of the word mark “BOULT.”

Point of Law Settled

• The judgment reiterates that a second application for interim injunction seeking substantially identical relief is ordinarily not maintainable merely because a party believes that an earlier order omitted a particular relief or contains an inadvertent error.
• Such an application can be entertained only where the applicant establishes genuine changed circumstances or undue hardship arising after the earlier order.
• The decision also reinforces that parties must pursue appropriate remedies such as review, clarification, modification, or appeal instead of attempting to indirectly secure the same relief through successive interlocutory applications.
• The judgment strengthens procedural discipline in commercial and intellectual property litigation while reaffirming the principle that interlocutory proceedings cannot be repeatedly reopened in the absence of legally recognized grounds.

Case Details

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