Introduction

The judgment pronounced by the apex court one year ago in Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors v. State of Kerala & Ors., popularly known as the Sabarimala case, is incontestably a groundbreaking work of the higher judiciary. The ruling lifted the age-old ban on entry of women belonging to the menstruating age group (i.e., 10–50 years) in the famous Sabarimala temple of Lord Ayyappa in Kerala, opining that such prohibition does not only violate the fundamental right to religion and right to equality, as guaranteed by the Constitution, but is also highly regressive and derogatory in substance.

The constitutional bench comprising Hon’ble Chief Justice J. Dipak Mishra, J. A. M. Khanwilkar, J. Chandrachud, J. Nariman, and J. Indu Malhotra delivered the judgment on 26th September 2018 with a 4:1 majority, with the sole dissenting opinion coming ironically from the only lady judge on the bench, J. Indu Malhotra.

Public Reaction and Debate

There has been a nation-wide uproar after the judgment. While one section is celebrating this ruling, viewing it as a milestone for attaining gender equality in the age-old patriarchal society of India, another section comprising of stern believers of the faith regard this decision as an unwarranted encroachment over religious freedom and a threat to the secular character of the Indian Constitution.

Consequently, the extent of authority of the Supreme Court on religious matters has been extensively debated, raising profound constitutional questions about the balance between religion, equality, and the limits of judicial intervention.

Background

The matter concerning the exclusion of women from the Sabarimala temple was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2006 by a group of lawyers through a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). Recently, there have been multiple instances where the topic of religion-based equality and the safeguarding of religious rights has emerged in the courts, including:

• The ruling on Triple Talaq, which examined gender equality within personal religious law.
• The Ayodhya dispute, concerning religious rights and historical claims to sacred land.

In these situations, the main challenge for the judiciary is to navigate the tension and find a balance between the fundamental rights of equality and freedom of religion.

Constitutional Balancing: Article 14 vs. Article 25

It can be argued that Article 25 is subject to the considerations of public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights, including Article 14, suggesting that equality should take precedence over religious freedom when the two conflict.

Conversely, some contend that in matters of faith, Article 14 cannot be interpreted in isolation and must be understood in conjunction with religious beliefs, including the exception of intelligible differentia.

Judicial Interpretation and Social Context

Furthermore, it is argued that the State should maintain minimal involvement in religious matters, as secularism is a vital aspect and a fundamental component of the Indian Constitution.

The bench thoroughly examined the constitutional, legislative, religious, and societal dimensions of the issue, concluding that biological or physiological traits of women or concepts of impurity linked to menstruation cannot and should not serve as reasons to prohibit entry into a place of worship.

The majority opinion asserted that every devotee, regardless of gender, deserves an equal right to worship the Divine. It was further stated that the presence of women in temples should not be deemed “impure,” particularly in a nation like India where women are revered as goddesses in many forms and religions.

Facts and Issues

In this instance, the constitutional legitimacy of Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 was contested in the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the grounds that it infringed upon fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 17, and 25(1) of the Constitution.

The mentioned Rule 3(b) and the related notification issued in this regard barred women aged between 10 and 50 from accessing the Sabarimala Temple. The main discussion in this case centred on the clash between the right to equality under Article 14 and the rights to religion under Articles 25 and 26.

The Petitioners (Lawyers’ Association) argued that Rule 3(b), which prohibits entry for women of a specific age group, not only leads to unreasonable discrimination against them and contravenes Article 14, but also infringes upon their right to worship as guaranteed by Article 25. Essentially, the Petitioners framed their argument as one concerning gender discrimination, underlining the patriarchal nature of Indian society and particularly focusing on the concept of menstrual impurity.

In contrast, the Respondents (Temple Board), claiming their status as a distinct religious denomination, asserted their rights under Articles 25 and 26 to manage their own affairs, which includes the authority to regulate who can enter the temple. Consequently, both groups contended breaches of rights under Article 25.

The Petitioners maintained that the right to practice their religion is infringed upon because they are barred from entering the temple and worshipping Lord Ayyappa, whereas the Respondents contended that their religious rights (and their authority to manage religious practices) would be compromised if women were allowed entry into the temple, as their beliefs necessitate the exclusion of such women due to the celibate nature of the deity and the fundamental principles of the Ayyappan faith.

Principal Issues Before the Court

Given these arguments, the court formulated and examined three principal issues to decide whether Rule 3 should be deemed unconstitutional:

1. Essential Religious Practice: Is the restriction on women (ages 10–50) entering a place of worship considered an essential religious practice in Hinduism according to Article 25?
   The “essentiality” doctrine developed by the courts through various rulings states that protection under Article 25 can only be claimed for essential religious practices of one’s faith.
2. Denominational Character: Does the Ayyappa Temple possess a denominational character and have the right to establish rules governing their religious practices under Article 26 of the Constitution?
   This question was vital because the validity of the entry prohibition depended on this determination.
3. Gender Discrimination: Does this exclusionary practice constitute discrimination against women under Article 14 of the Constitution?
   The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s critical task was to balance the two fundamental rights of equality and religion while upholding the secular nature of the Indian polity.

Ruling on Fundamental Religious Rituals

The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated its stance that the right under Article 25 exists only with regard to essential religious practices. In other words, the term “religion” under Article 25 shall include and be confined to all such rituals and practices which are integral to one’s faith.

To determine this, in some cases, the court has relied on religious texts, empirical behaviour of followers, and, in others, whether the practice existed at the time the religion originated. The Temple Board maintained that the beliefs and rituals of the Ayyappan faith—which include restricting women’s entry—were conveyed by Lord Ayyappa to the king of Pandalam who built the temple, and this is documented in the temple’s Sthal Purana, known as the Bhuthanatha Geetha.

It was further argued that the exclusion of certain women arises from the celibate nature of the deity worshipped there, and such a practice is vital to their belief system.

Majority Opinion and Observations

• The majority opinion stated that preventing women from accessing places of worship does not constitute an essential practice of the Hindu religion.
• Conversely, it is essential within Hinduism to permit women to enter temples as devotees.
• The court observed that the exclusionary practice seems to have begun only in 1950, lacking the timeless and unchanging quality necessary for it to be termed an “essential religious practice.”
• Justice Chandrachud pointed out that since the practice of exclusion has not been uniformly maintained, the claim that it stems from a shared religious belief regarding the celibate nature of the deity has not been substantiated.
• Justice Mishra, referencing the second Ananda Marga case, concluded that the significance of this exclusionary practice is not so profound that failing to observe it would change the very nature of Hinduism.

Ruling on Denominational Character

Relying upon Shirur Matt¹ and S. P. Mittal² case, the Court reiterated that to constitute a distinct religious denomination, there shall be a common faith, common organisation, and a distinctive name. It was held that the followers of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a distinct religious denomination as the first condition is not fulfilled since people belonging to different faiths or non-followers are also allowed to enter the temple.

Justice Malhotra’s Dissenting Opinion

However, Justice Malhotra, in her dissenting judgment, opined that:

• Observance of the 41-day Vratham by male devotees and exclusion of women between 10–50 years were distinguishable customs and usages of the Ayyappan faith.
• Such custom was founded on the common faith of the deity being a yogi¹⁴ or Naisthik Bhramachari and constitutes the sanctum sanctorum of such faith.

Referring to the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s observations in the S. P. Mittal case, she urged that a wider interpretation is warranted while determining denominational character under Article 26:

“Any freedom or right involving the conscience must naturally receive a wide interpretation, and the expression religion and religious denomination must therefore be interpreted in no narrow, stifling sense but in a liberal, expansive way.”

Ruling on Violation of Articles 14 and 25

In this case, it seems there are two conflicting fundamental rights: the right of the Temple Board to manage its own religious practices, including regulating entry into the temple, and the right of women devotees to have equal access to worship their deity. Thus, an important question emerges: can the right to religion be evaluated strictly under the principles of equality?

Majority Opinion

The majority determined that the fundamental rights to equality and religion for women are infringed by the contested Rule 3, deeming it unconstitutional and subject to elimination.

• Justice Chandrachud remarked that all individuals are created equal, stating, “To exclude women from worship by allowing the right to worship to men places women in a subordinate position.”
• Justice Mishra noted that the right under Article 25 is granted to “all persons,” including women, and this right does not pertain to gender or biological aspects.

Dissenting View of Justice Malhotra

However, Justice Malhotra, in her dissenting view, pointed out that assessing essential religious practices against the standards of fundamental equality could have serious consequences, particularly in a religiously diverse nation like India.

Additionally, she explained that the term “equally entitled to” in Article 25 implies that every devotee has an equal right to practice their religion according to its principles. Consequently, if the beliefs of a faith necessitate the exclusion of women, the right of female devotees to practice their religion becomes contingent on those religious beliefs.