The Constitutional Question: Children’s Internet Access and Online Safety
The internet is no longer an optional space in a child’s life. It is a place where children learn, communicate, seek information and participate in social life. It is also a place where they may encounter grooming, sexual exploitation, coercion and Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Material (CSEAM). The constitutional challenge is therefore not whether children should be protected online. They should. The harder question is how far the State can go in protecting them without unnecessarily restricting the rights that digital access enables.
The Supreme Court’s Order in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish
In Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, the Supreme Court’s order dated 15 October 2026 gave this question fresh constitutional significance. The Court recognised the right to access and use the internet as a fundamental right under Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a), including for children irrespective of age. It also rejected the idea that child safety requires a blanket denial of internet access and focused instead on targeted safeguards against particular forms of online harm.
The order draws an important distinction between protecting children from harm and excluding children from the digital environment.
Fundamental Rights and Child Protection Under the Constitution
Children are not merely objects of protection. They are rights-holders. Article 15(3) permits the State to make special provisions for children, while Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression and Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. These guarantees do not disappear because the person exercising them is below eighteen.
Children are, however, differently situated from adults. Age, maturity and the design of a particular service may justify stronger safeguards. Article 15(3) itself recognises the legitimacy of special protection. But vulnerability cannot automatically become a constitutional licence for unrestricted prohibition. The question is whether the particular restriction is directed at a demonstrated risk and whether it goes further than necessary.
Internet Access and Constitutional Proportionality
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India recognised the constitutional importance of the internet as a medium through which protected freedoms are exercised and required restrictions affecting internet services to satisfy constitutional standards, including proportionality. In
In Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, the Court considered digital access in the context of Article 21 and accessibility. The recent proceedings concerning children place the same broader constitutional concern in a different setting: how can digital participation be made safer without treating access itself as the problem?
Indian Laws Governing Online Child Safety
India is not regulating online child safety in a legal vacuum. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 contains reporting obligations under Sections 19 to 21. Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 addresses specified electronic material involving children in sexually explicit acts or conduct. The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 also impose due-diligence obligations on intermediaries.
POCSO Act and the Information Technology Act
The Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish clarified the seriousness of offences involving CSEAM and the interaction between POCSO and Section 67B of the Information Technology Act. The continuing proceedings have also focused attention on intermediary responsibility in preventing and responding to the circulation of such material.
Why Targeted Online Safety Measures Matter
This matters because online harm has identifiable sources. An offender may groom a child, create or distribute illegal material, or use a platform to exploit a victim. A platform may fail to respond to a report. A technical system may allow material to circulate after it has been identified. These are problems of conduct, enforcement and platform responsibility. They cannot be solved merely by reducing the number of children who can access the internet.
Blanket Internet Restrictions and the Principle of Proportionality
A blanket restriction may nevertheless appear attractive because it is simple: if children cannot access a service, they cannot encounter its risks. Constitutional validity, however, depends on more than a legitimate protective purpose. The proportionality framework requires attention to the connection between the restriction and its objective, its necessity, the availability of less restrictive alternatives and the balance between the public benefit and the rights burden.
Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh and the proportionality principles subsequently applied in Anuradha Bhasin make this particularly relevant. Protecting children from sexual exploitation is plainly a legitimate objective. The harder question is whether the chosen restriction is necessary.
Targeted Safeguards Versus General Prohibitions
Consider the difference between risks. If the concern is unsolicited contact between a child and an unknown adult, restricting such contact, strengthening privacy settings and limiting discoverability may address the risk more directly than blocking the child’s access to an entire service. If the concern is CSEAM, detection, reporting, removal and investigation are more closely connected to the harm than a general prohibition on internet use.
This does not mean that every age-based restriction is unconstitutional. Some services, features or categories of content may justify strong limitations. The narrower constitutional point is that the State should be able to explain why the particular restriction is necessary and why a less intrusive but effective alternative would not adequately protect children.
Child Online Safety, Privacy and Age Verification
There is also a second constitutional difficulty: privacy. Age verification, parental controls and child-mode accounts may reduce some risks, but they can create new ones. A system requiring every user to submit an identity document may simplify age verification while encouraging platforms to collect and retain information they do not otherwise need. For children, unnecessary retention of identity and behavioural data can create a different form of vulnerability.
Data Minimisation and Privacy Protection
Where age assurance is necessary, data minimisation should therefore be central to its design. Establishing an age category should not automatically require permanent retention of a child’s identity or detailed record of online activity. Strong security, limited retention and meaningful oversight should accompany such systems. A safer internet should not become an unnecessarily more intrusive internet.
Private-by-Default Settings and Child-Mode Accounts
The Court’s recent consideration of child-mode accounts, private-by-default settings and restrictions on contact from unknown adults illustrates the possibility of targeted regulation. Their effectiveness and privacy implications should nevertheless be evaluated.
Digital Safety Education and Platform Accountability
Digital-safety education is another part of the answer. Children should understand grooming, coercion, sexual extortion and reporting mechanisms. Parents, schools and public authorities have an important role. But education cannot replace platform accountability or criminal enforcement. A child may understand online risks and still be targeted by an offender; a platform may have a reporting system and still respond inadequately.
Risk-Based Regulation for Children’s Online Safety
India should therefore move towards risk-based protection rather than broad digital exclusion. Platforms used by minors should have strong default privacy and safety settings, meaningful restrictions on unsolicited contact and accessible reporting mechanisms for CSEAM. Intermediaries should comply with statutory duties concerning unlawful material, while enforcement agencies should have the capacity to investigate offenders and preserve digital evidence.
Evidence-Based Age Assurance and Regulatory Review
Age-assurance mechanisms, where necessary, should incorporate strong privacy safeguards. Restrictions should also be evidence-based and periodically reviewed. If a measure does not materially reduce the targeted harm or merely pushes children towards less regulated digital spaces, its continued justification becomes difficult.
Distinguishing Illegal Material From Age-Sensitive Content
Regulation should also distinguish between illegal material and lawful content that may simply be inappropriate for a particular age group. CSEAM and other criminal material require a firm legal response. Lawful but age-sensitive material may instead call for age-appropriate design, parental involvement, education and proportionate controls. Treating both categories alike risks giving platforms excessive power over what children may read, watch or discuss.
The Constitutional Balance Between Safety and Digital Access
The constitutional objective should therefore be neither unrestricted access nor blanket exclusion. It should be a regulatory system in which the degree of restriction corresponds to the seriousness, likelihood and nature of the demonstrated risk.
Protecting children from online exploitation is an important constitutional and public-policy objective. But a serious risk does not determine the constitutional validity of every response to it. Children remain rights-holders while the state protects them.
Articles 15(3), 19(1)(a) and 21 Must Be Read Together
Articles 15(3), 19(1)(a) and 21 should be read together rather than treated as competing commitments. Article 15(3) enables special protection for children, while Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 require that protection to be implemented with respect for dignity, liberty, access to information and participation in modern society.
Conclusion: Making the Internet Safer for Children
The significance of Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish is the opportunity it creates to move beyond the assumption that children are safest when they are offline. Effective protection should focus on the conduct that causes harm, the platforms capable of preventing or limiting its circulation, and the institutions responsible for enforcing the law.
The better constitutional question is not how successfully India can keep children away from the internet, but how successfully it can make the internet safer for children without unnecessarily taking away the rights that digital access now enables.
