Introduction
The interplay between special intellectual property enactments and general procedural provisions governing appellate remedies often raises significant jurisdictional questions. In a crucial judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat examined whether a further intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against a single judge’s order passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arose out of an order dated February 27, 2023, passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad. Aggrieved by the Registry’s decision, statutory appeals were preferred before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. On July 11, 2025, a single judge of the High Court adjudicated the appeals. Following this determination, intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent were filed before the Division Bench. The respondents raised a preliminary objection contending that such appeals were barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the statutory framework of the 1999 Act.
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Procedural Timeline
| Stage | Event |
|---|---|
| February 27, 2023 | Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad, passed the impugned order. |
| Section 91 Appeal | Statutory appeals were filed before the High Court under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. |
| July 11, 2025 | A single judge decided the statutory appeals. |
| Subsequent Stage | Letters Patent Appeals under Clause 15 were filed before the Division Bench. |
| Preliminary Objection | Respondents challenged the maintainability of the intra-court appeals. |
Dispute Before the Court
The core legal question requiring adjudication was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent can be entertained against a decision rendered by a single judge exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
The appellants argued that the jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is an independent constitutional charter power that remains available unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded by statute. They contended that because the Registrar is an administrative authority and not a formal civil court, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to bar an intra-court appeal.
Conversely, the respondents argued that the Registrar functions as a quasi-judicial authority with full trappings of a court while deciding trademark disputes. Consequently, an appeal under Section 91 before a single judge is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. They submitted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars any second appeal from a single judge’s appellate order, and that Parliament consciously removed the provision for a second appeal when replacing the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 with the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Arguments of the Parties
| Appellants | Respondents |
|---|---|
| Clause 15 jurisdiction is an independent constitutional charter power. | The registrar functions as a quasi-judicial authority with the trappings of a civil court. |
| Power survives unless expressly or impliedly excluded. | Appeal under Section 91 is an appellate proceeding. |
| Registrar is an administrative authority. | Section 100A CPC bars a further intra-court appeal. |
| Section 100A CPC does not apply. | The 1999 Act intentionally omitted the second appellate remedy available under the 1958 Act. |
Reasoning and Analysis of the Court
The Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the powers vested in the Registrar under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the accompanying Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It noted that under Section 127 of the Act, the Registrar is endowed with explicit powers of a civil court, including receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing witness attendance, compelling document production, issuing commissions, and reviewing decisions. Moreover, orders regarding costs passed by the Registrar are executable as decrees of a civil court.
By examining established constitutional precedents regarding quasi-judicial authorities, the Court observed that the basic test to determine whether an authority possesses the trappings of a court is whether it has been conferred with statutory power to resolve a dispute between contesting parties in exercise of the State’s inherent judicial function. Because the Registrar decides substantial legal rights and liabilities through adversarial evidentiary procedure, the Registrar functions as a tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.
As a result, when a single judge hears a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the judge exercises appellate jurisdiction rather than original jurisdiction. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure contains a non-obstante clause overriding the Letters Patent and prohibiting any further appeal when a single judge decides an appeal from an order or decree.
Additionally, the Court evaluated the legislative history, highlighting that Section 109(5) of the repealed 1958 Act specifically provided for a second tier of appeal to a Division Bench, whereas Section 91 of the 1999 Act consciously omitted this provision. This omission reflects a clear legislative intent to restrict statutory appeals to a single appellate forum.
Key Findings of the Court
- The Registrar possesses several powers equivalent to those of a civil court under Section 127 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
- The Registrar adjudicates disputes affecting legal rights and liabilities through a quasi-judicial process.
- An appeal under Section 91 is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
- Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
- The omission of the second appellate remedy in the Trade Marks Act, 1999, reflects legislative intent.
Final Decision of the Court
The court sustained the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. It held that the intra-court appeals filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgement of the single judge were not maintainable and accordingly dismissed them.
Point of Law Settled
This judgement reaffirms that the Registrar of Trade Marks acts as a tribunal with the trappings of a civil court when adjudicating trademark controversies. Consequently, an appeal determined by a single judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, constitutes appellate adjudication. By application of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, further intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are completely barred.
Legal Principles Established
- The Registrar of Trade Marks functions as a tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.
- Appeals under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, are appellate proceedings.
- Section 100A CPC bars further intra-court appeals from a single judge’s appellate judgement.
- The omission of a second appellate forum in the 1999 Act demonstrates legislative intent.
Case Details
| Title of the Case | Raj Abhushan Bhandar vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr. |
|---|---|
| Date of Judgement | 23/07/2026 |
| Case Number | Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 |
| Name of Court | High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad |
| Name of Hon’ble Judge | Hon’ble Mrs Justice Sunita Agarwal, Chief Justice, and Hon’ble Mr Justice D.N. Ray |
| Written By | Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi |

