Supreme Court on Section 69 BNS: A Broken Promise to Marry Is Not Automatically a Crime
When does a promise to marry become a criminal offense? And when is it simply a promise that could not ultimately be fulfilled?
The question has acquired renewed importance after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 987.
The case presented a familiar but legally difficult situation. A man and a woman entered into a romantic relationship. There was a discussion about marriage. They subsequently had a physical relationship. The relationship eventually broke down, and the marriage never took place.
The man was then prosecuted under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
The Supreme Court, however, found that the allegations themselves did not establish that the promise of marriage was false when it was made. The Court therefore quashed the FIR.
The judgment is important because it draws a line that criminal law cannot afford to blur:
- There is a difference between a man who never intended to marry and a man who genuinely intended to marry but, for reasons arising later, ultimately did not.
That distinction goes to the heart of Section 69 BNS.
What Was the Dispute Before the Supreme Court?
The case arose from an FIR registered at Sayajiganh Police Station in Vadodara City, Gujarat, on 20 May 2025.
The appellant, Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani, challenged the criminal proceedings arising from allegations made by a woman with whom he had been in a relationship.
According to the complaint, the two had initially met through a digital platform. What began as a friendship developed into a romantic relationship.
When they subsequently met in person, the appellant expressed his desire to marry her.
The complaint stated that they had sexual relations on 12 February 2024 and that the woman later stayed with him at a hotel for two days in April 2024.
The relationship, however, did not culminate in marriage.
The complaint attributed the eventual refusal to marry to opposition from the appellant’s mother.
That detail became significant when the matter reached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Looked at the Beginning of the Relationship—Not Just Its End
This is perhaps the most important aspect of the judgment.
When a relationship ends without marriage, it is tempting to look backwards and assume that the promise of marriage must have been false.
Criminal law, however, requires a more careful examination.
The question under Section 69 BNS is not simply:
“Did the man eventually marry the woman?”
The more important question is
“Did he intend to fulfill the promise when he made it?”
That distinction is built into the language of Section 69 itself.
The provision applies where sexual intercourse takes place pursuant to a promise to marry made without any intention of fulfilling that promise, provided the conduct does not amount to rape.
Therefore, the intention existing at the time of the promise becomes critical.
A subsequent failure to marry cannot, by itself, prove what a person’s intention was months or years earlier.
A Genuine Promise and a False Promise Are Not the Same Thing
The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, where it had explained the distinction between a false promise and a genuine promise that subsequently becomes impossible to fulfill.
This distinction is not merely semantic.
Imagine two very different situations.
A Promise Made Without Intention to Marry
In the first, a man has no intention whatsoever of marrying a woman. He nevertheless deliberately tells her that he will marry her because he wants to obtain a sexual relationship. If the other statutory requirements are established, that conduct may attract Section 69 BNS.
A Genuine Promise That Later Fails
In the second, a man genuinely intends to marry the woman. The relationship continues for some time, but circumstances subsequently change. Family opposition develops, the parties fall apart, or some other unforeseen circumstance makes the proposed marriage impossible.
The outcome is the same in one respect: the marriage does not happen.
But the legal question is not the same.
In the first situation, the allegation is one of deception from the beginning.
In the second, the promise may have been genuine when it was made.
Criminal law cannot simply treat the two situations as identical.
What Did the Supreme Court Find in Kalyani’s Case?
The bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran examined the allegations contained in the complaint.
The court found that the complaint itself indicated a consensual relationship.
More importantly, the complaint did not contain material showing that the appellant had entered into the relationship with a predetermined intention never to marry.
The Court also noted that the complaint did not state that the woman had agreed to the first sexual relationship solely because of a promise of marriage.
The circumstances alleged in the complaint, therefore, did not, in the court’s assessment, disclose the kind of deception contemplated by Section 69 BNS.
There was another important fact.
The complaint itself stated that the appellant subsequently refused to marry because his mother was not agreeable to the marriage.
That circumstance did not establish that the appellant had been dishonest when the promise was originally made.
And that is precisely where the distinction between a broken promise and a false promise becomes important.
Section 69 BNS: The Words “Without Any Intention” Matter
Section 69 is a new provision under India’s post-IPC criminal law framework.
It deals with sexual intercourse by specified deceitful means, including a situation where a promise to marry is made without any intention of fulfilling it and where the conduct does not amount to rape.
The words chosen by Parliament matter.
The provision does not say that every failure to marry is an offense.
It focuses on a promise made without the intention of fulfilling it.
That means the prosecution cannot stop at establishing that:
- A promise of marriage was made;
- a sexual relationship followed; and
- The marriage eventually did not take place.
There must be material capable of establishing the requisite deceptive intention.
This does not mean that such intention must always be proved by a direct admission. Intention can, as in other criminal cases, be inferred from circumstances and conduct.
But the inference cannot simply be
“The marriage did not happen; therefore, the promise was false.”
That would collapse an important distinction in criminal law.
The Earlier IPC Position Also Matters
Before the BNS came into force, allegations concerning sexual relations on a false promise of marriage were often examined in the context of Section 375 IPC, dealing with rape, and Section 90 IPC, concerning consent obtained under fear or misconception of fact.
The Supreme Court had repeatedly cautioned against treating every broken promise of marriage as equivalent to a false promise that vitiated consent.
The decision in Deepak Gulati remains particularly relevant.
The Court had recognized that there can be cases where a person genuinely intends to marry but subsequently cannot do so because of circumstances that were not present when the promise was made.
The BNS has now separately created Section 69.
But the basic question of deception remains central.
This Judgment Does Not Mean Every False Promise Case Will Fail
It is equally important not to read the judgment too broadly.
The Supreme Court has not said that Section 69 BNS is confined to cases where the accused expressly admits that he never intended to marry.
Nor has the Court said that a complaint alleging a false promise can never proceed.
If the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that a person made a promise of marriage while having no intention of fulfilling it, and the other ingredients of Section 69 are established, criminal liability may follow.
The judgment instead emphasizes that the prosecution must establish the statutory ingredients.
A genuine relationship that subsequently collapses cannot automatically be converted into a criminal prosecution merely because marriage had once been contemplated.
Why the Distinction Matters
There is a larger principle here.
Criminal law operates at the boundary between wrongdoing and disappointment.
Not every morally painful or emotionally damaging event is necessarily a criminal offense.
A relationship may begin sincerely and end badly. People may change their minds. Families may intervene. Circumstances may change. Relationships may become incompatible.
Those developments can have profound personal consequences.
But Section 69 BNS addresses something more specific: sexual intercourse obtained through the kind of deception described by the statute.
The prosecution therefore has to confront the question of deception, rather than simply point to the eventual failure of the relationship.
The Supreme Court’s Message on Section 69 BNS
The judgment can therefore be reduced to one important proposition:
The failure of a relationship and the existence of a fraudulent promise are two different questions.
A promise that was false from the beginning may have criminal consequences.
A promise that was genuine when made but later became impossible to fulfill does not automatically become a criminal deception merely because the marriage never took place.
That is the line the Supreme Court has drawn.
What Courts Will Look For in Future Section 69 Cases
The judgment is likely to make the surrounding circumstances particularly important in future prosecutions under Section 69 BNS.
Courts may have to examine questions such as
- Was there actually a promise to marry?
- What was the nature of the relationship when the promise was made?
- Was there evidence suggesting that the accused never intended to marry?
- Was the promise allegedly used as a means of obtaining sexual relations?
- What happened between the promise and the eventual refusal to marry?
- Does the complaint itself disclose circumstances suggesting that the intention was genuine at the beginning?
These questions are likely to be more important than the bare fact that a marriage ultimately did not take place.
A Word of Caution
The judgment should not be understood as giving anyone a license to make false promises of marriage.
Section 69 BNS was enacted precisely to address specified forms of deceitful sexual conduct that fall short of rape but nevertheless involve criminal wrongdoing.
At the same time, the criminal process carries serious consequences. A person cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution merely because a relationship that once appeared headed towards marriage subsequently failed, unless the allegations and material disclose the ingredients of the offense.
That balance is essential.
The law must protect individuals from deliberate deception without turning every failed relationship into a criminal prosecution.
The Final Decision
After examining the allegations, the Supreme Court found that the complaint did not disclose the necessary ingredients of an offense under Section 69 BNS.
The Court accordingly allowed the appeal and quashed the FIR and consequential proceedings.
The decision was delivered on 7 September 2026 by the Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.
Case at a Glance
| Particular | Details |
|---|---|
| Case | Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat & Anr. |
| Citation | 2026 INSC 987 |
| Court | Supreme Court of India |
| Decision Date | 7 September 2026 |
| Bench | Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran |
| Principal Provision | Section 69, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 |
| Earlier Provisions Discussed | Sections 375 and 90, IPC |
| Important Precedent | Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana |
| FIR | No. 11196030250292 |
| Police Station | Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City |
| Outcome | FIR and proceedings quashed |
Conclusion: A Failed Promise Is Not Necessarily a False Promise
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat is an important early interpretation of Section 69 BNS.
Its significance lies in a simple but fundamental principle.
Criminal liability cannot be determined merely by looking at how a relationship ended. The law must examine what the accused intended when the alleged promise was made.
If the promise was a deception from the beginning, Section 69 may apply when its statutory requirements are proved.
But if the intention to marry was genuine and circumstances later prevented the marriage, the mere fact that the relationship failed does not automatically transform the original promise into a criminal offense.
The distinction is subtle but legally decisive.
And as Section 69 BNS begins to generate more litigation, this distinction between a false promise from the outset and a genuine promise that subsequently failed is likely to become one of the most important questions courts will have to answer.
This article is for general legal information and should not be treated as legal advice in any individual case.
