Beyond the Collegium: My Proposal for a Merit-Based Judicial Selection System for India

“Let judges remain independent—but let the search for judges be independent of networks, fame and familiarity.”– – By Adv. Tarun Choudhury – Supreme Court Advocate

Table of Contents

A Proposal From a Lawyer Who Has Watched the System Closely

For more than twenty-five years, I have had the privilege of observing the Indian legal system from close quarters.

I have seen extraordinary judges. I have seen exceptionally talented advocates. I have also seen young lawyers with remarkable constitutional ability who, in my view, deserve to be noticed far beyond the professional circles in which they practise.

At the same time, I have heard a recurring concern from members of the Bar, litigants and ordinary citizens:

How exactly are candidates for the higher judiciary discovered, compared and ultimately selected?

Let me make my position clear at the very beginning.

I am not writing this article to attack the judiciary. I am writing it because I want to strengthen it.

Judicial Independence and Transparency

Judicial independence is non-negotiable. A judge must be able to decide a case without fear of the government, political parties, powerful individuals or public pressure.

But judicial independence and transparency in the discovery and assessment of judicial talent are not mutually exclusive.

In fact, I believe they can—and should—exist together.

The Supreme Court has itself taken important steps towards greater transparency in the appointment process. Recent disclosures have made considerably more information available regarding recommendations, candidate sources, appointment-related information and certain relationship disclosures.

Therefore, my argument is not that nothing is transparent.

My argument is more specific:

Transparency about a decision is not the same as an objectively demonstrable method of comparing merit before that decision is made.

That is the problem I want to address.

My Central Proposal: IJMIS

I propose that India should gradually develop a new judicial-selection architecture which I call the:

Indian Judicial Merit & Independence System

IJMIS

The idea behind IJMIS is simple.

I want India to have a system in which:

judicial talent is discovered broadly;
Professional merit is assessed independently;
Integrity is separately verified;
Conflicts are properly disclosed;
Political interference is prevented;
judicial independence remains constitutionally protected; and
The selection process becomes capable of being explained, evaluated and audited.

I am not proposing that the Union Government should control judicial appointments.

I am equally opposed to giving politicians the power to decide who becomes a judge.

That could create a danger greater than the problem we are attempting to solve.

Instead, I propose something fundamentally different:

Separate the stages of discovery, assessment, verification and final selection.

The broad architecture would be:

Talent Discovery → Independent Evidence Collection → Merit Assessment → Integrity & Conflict Verification → Judicial Selection → Constitutional Appointment

That separation is the heart of my proposal.

Why Do I Believe Reform Is Necessary?

The judiciary can determine almost every aspect of an individual’s life.

A judge may decide questions involving:

personal liberty;
property;
commercial disputes;
constitutional rights;
taxation;
criminal liability;
environmental protection;
governmental power;
family rights; and
institutional conflicts.

The quality of judicial appointments therefore affects not merely the legal profession but the entire country.

I do not suggest that the present collegium necessarily produces unsuitable judges.

That would be an unfair and unsupported generalisation.

My concern is different.

The institutional architecture should be stronger than the personalities operating it.

A good institutional system should continue to work properly even when the individuals running it change.

That, in my view, is the real test of institutional reform.

The Debate Should Not Be “Judges Versus Government”

For years, the national debate has often been reduced to one question:

Should judges appoint judges?

Or:

Should the government appoint judges?

I believe that is a false choice.

Neither extreme is desirable.

Government-controlled appointments can create the danger of political influence over the judiciary.

On the other hand, if the discovery, evaluation and recommendation of candidates are concentrated within a relatively small professional network, different risks can arise—such as institutional familiarity, professional-network concentration and subjective assessment.

So my answer is neither complete judicial control nor political control.

My principle is:

Pluralise the information, not the political power.

That, in one sentence, explains the philosophy behind IJMIS.

I Am Not Proposing Another NJAC

This distinction is extremely important.

The Supreme Court’s decision striking down the NJAC was fundamentally connected with the constitutional protection of judicial independence and the basic-structure doctrine.

Therefore, any serious proposal for reform must respect that constitutional reality.

I am not proposing:

Government control instead of judicial control.

I am proposing:

Judicial independence combined with professional, evidence-based and auditable selection.

The difference is substantial.

My proposal begins not by asking, “Who should control the judges?”

It begins by asking:

“How do we ensure that the best possible candidates are actually discovered and fairly evaluated?”

The First Pillar: A National Judicial Talent Pool

The first question any appointment system must answer is:

Who Gets Considered?

I propose creating a National Judicial Talent Pool.

Potential candidates should be discoverable through multiple legitimate routes.

Route 1 — Judicial Service

Outstanding district and subordinate judicial officers should have a clear pathway towards the higher judiciary.

Route 2 — The Independent Bar

Outstanding practising advocates should be identified through their actual professional record rather than merely through personal visibility.

Route 3 — Distinguished Legal Scholarship

Exceptional legal academics and jurists who satisfy constitutional eligibility requirements should also be capable of entering consideration.

Route 4 — Institutional Nomination

Recognised legal institutions and authorised bodies should be able to identify deserving candidates.

Route 5 — Judicial Recommendation

Judges should continue to be able to recommend outstanding candidates.

But there should be one important difference:

A recommendation should be an input into the process—not an appointment pathway by itself.

Knowing a judge personally or having a professional association with a judge should not automatically determine whether someone reaches the serious consideration stage.

The National Judicial Talent Registry

I therefore propose a secure:

National Judicial Talent Registry

This registry would not select judges.

Its purpose would be to make India’s judicial talent pool broader and more discoverable.

Subject to appropriate consent and privacy safeguards, relevant information could include:

years of practice;
areas of expertise;
significant litigation;
judicial experience;
important judgements;
legal publications;
disciplinary history;
integrity declarations;
conflict disclosures; and
professional references.

The purpose is simple:

We should not lose an exceptional candidate merely because nobody within the traditional professional network happened to recommend that person.

Three Broad Routes Into the Higher Judiciary

I believe India should deliberately recognise three principal pathways.

Track	Pathway	Purpose
Track A — Judicial Service	District Judiciary → High Court → Supreme Court	Recognise outstanding judicial officers through a structured career pathway.
Track B — Bar	Advocate → High Court → Supreme Court	Identify exceptional practising advocates through their professional record.
Track C — Exceptional Jurist	Academia / Constitutional Law / Specialist Legal Expertise → Higher Judiciary	Bring exceptional legal scholarship and specialist expertise into consideration.

This should not become a quota system.

It should be a talent-discovery system.

The purpose is not to artificially balance categories.

The purpose is to ensure that exceptional legal talent is not missed because it exists outside the most visible professional networks.

The Judicial Merit Assessment Authority

The next institutional layer would be the:

Judicial Merit Assessment Authority — JMAA

The JMAA would not appoint judges.

That separation is essential.

Its responsibility would be to collect evidence and conduct structured professional assessments.

Its membership could include appropriately selected:

retired judges;
senior advocates;
legal academics;
judicial administrators;
assessment specialists;
ethics professionals; and
other independent specialists.

Members should have fixed terms, strict conflict-of-interest rules and appropriate safeguards against institutional capture.

The Authority should not become another centre of power.

Its job should be much narrower:

Collect the evidence. Assess the evidence. Present the evidence.

The final constitutional decision should remain separate.

I Do Not Believe in Giving Candidates Marks Like School Students

I want to make one point very clear.

I do not propose a system where a candidate receives:

90/100 = Excellent
80/100 = Good
70/100 = Average

Judicial excellence cannot be reduced to a school examination.

A judge who disposes of cases rapidly is not necessarily a better judge.

A judge whose decision is reversed is not necessarily a poor judge.

A famous advocate is not automatically a good judge.

And an advocate who is not famous may possess extraordinary constitutional ability.

Therefore:

No single metric should ever determine judicial appointment.

The Judicial Evidence Profile

Instead of one numerical score, I propose that each candidate should have a:

Judicial Evidence Profile

It should broadly examine five dimensions.

1. Legal Excellence

This would include:

legal reasoning;
knowledge of law;
constitutional understanding;
complexity of cases handled; and
quality of legal analysis.

2. Judicial Capacity

This could include:

judgement writing;
procedural understanding;
case management;
ability to distinguish precedent; and
ability to balance competing rights.

3. Integrity

This would examine:

professional conduct;
disciplinary history;
relevant financial declarations;
complaints; and
conflicts of interest.

4. Constitutional Temperament

This is particularly important.

A judge needs more than legal knowledge.

The assessment should consider:

independence;
fairness;
judicial restraint;
proportionality;
respect for precedent; and
willingness to fairly consider opposing arguments.

5. Professional Reputation

Professional reputation should be assessed through independently verified evidence rather than mere popularity.

My Three-Evidence Rule

I propose a simple safeguard.

No candidate should reach the final selection stage without three independent categories of evidence supporting suitability.

These would be:

Evidence	What It Should Examine
Evidence 1 — Actual Professional Record	What has the candidate actually done?
Evidence 2 — Independent Assessment	How does the candidate perform when subjected to structured professional assessment?
Evidence 3 — Integrity and Professional Verification	What does independent verification reveal?

This would reduce the possibility that reputation alone determines appointment.

Here I propose one of the more innovative features of IJMIS.

Where reasonably possible, the first stage of professional assessment should be name-blind.

Instead of initially presenting:

“Senior Advocate X”

The assessor could receive:

“Candidate 1047.”

The assessor would first examine anonymised legal work.

Obviously, identity cannot remain hidden throughout the entire appointment process.

That is neither practical nor desirable.

But the first professional impression should ideally come from:

legal ability rather than fame,
family association,
institutional reputation, or
personal familiarity.

The United Kingdom’s Judicial Appointments Commission provides an example of structured assessment practices that India could study and adapt to its own constitutional framework.

The objective is not to copy another country.

The objective is to learn from what works.

The Judicial Simulation

I would introduce another important innovation.

Shortlisted candidates could be given a realistic judicial problem containing:

legislation;
constitutional provisions;
conflicting precedents;
disputed facts;
procedural objections; and
competing rights.

The candidate would then be asked to prepare:

An interim order
A final judgement
A counter-argument
A short oral hearing

This should not become another competitive examination.

It should be a simulation of judicial reasoning.

The fundamental question would be:

How does this person actually think when confronted with a difficult legal problem?

That may reveal something which professional reputation alone cannot.

My “Dissent Test”

I would go one step further.

A candidate should be asked to present:

the strongest argument supporting a proposition;
the strongest argument against it; and
the candidate’s final conclusion.

Why?

Because a good judge must understand the strongest case against his or her own conclusion.

Someone who cannot fairly articulate the opposing argument may possess legal knowledge but lack the judicial temperament required for constitutional adjudication.

Integrity Must Be a Threshold, Not a Score

I consider this fundamental.

Integrity should not be treated merely as another component in a mathematical formula.

Suppose someone is extraordinarily brilliant in law but has serious unresolved integrity concerns.

Should exceptional legal ability compensate for that?

My answer is:

No.

Therefore:

Integrity should be a threshold condition, not a compensating score.

Legal brilliance cannot purchase ethical fitness.

The Independent Conflict Registry

Before a candidate reaches final consideration, potential conflicts should be identified.

These could include:

family relationships with judges;
former chamber relationships;
major common clients;
professional partnerships;
significant financial relationships;
previous employment; and
other material professional connections.

But I would not automatically treat every relationship as disqualifying.

Instead:

Conflict should ordinarily mean disclosure and enhanced scrutiny—not automatic exclusion.

The objective is transparency and fairness.

Detecting Professional-Network Concentration

One of the most important safeguards in my proposal is an annual statistical review of where successful candidates are coming from.

The system could publish aggregate information showing:

Candidate Source	Considered	Shortlisted	Appointed
Judicial Service	—	—	—
Independent Bar	—	—	—
Academia / Jurists	—	—	—
Institutional Nominations	—	—	—

The figures would come from the actual system.

Why Does This Matter?

Suppose appointments repeatedly come overwhelmingly from a very small professional network.

That would not automatically prove nepotism.

But it would be an objective warning signal.

The system should then ask:

Are equally capable candidates outside that network being overlooked?

The Selection Concentration Index

I propose a new institutional measurement:

Selection Concentration Index — SCI

The SCI could measure the concentration of successful candidates across:

chambers;
law firms;
professional institutions;
geographical origin;
previous employment;
judicial-family connections; and
professional networks.

A persistently high concentration could trigger an independent audit.

The purpose is not to punish successful lawyers.

If the same chambers consistently produce outstanding candidates, there may be perfectly legitimate reasons.

The purpose is to determine whether the system is systematically overlooking talent outside those networks.

The Missed Talent Index

This, in my view, is one of the most important ideas in my proposal.

Most appointment systems ask:

Did we appoint the right people?

I propose that India should ask another question:

Whom did we fail to recognise?

Candidates who narrowly missed selection could, subject to privacy safeguards, be tracked for institutional learning.

After five years, an independent review could examine whether some repeatedly overlooked candidates later demonstrated exceptional professional or judicial performance.

If the system discovers that it repeatedly rejected people who subsequently became outstanding jurists, the methodology should be corrected.

That creates something we rarely build into institutions:

A Genuine Learning Loop

The Judicial Selection Council

Once independent assessment and integrity verification are completed, the final recommendation should be made by a constitutionally protected:

Judicial Selection Council

My preliminary model would contemplate seven members:

Chief Justice of India — Chairperson;
two senior Supreme Court judges;
one Chief Justice of a High Court;
one distinguished retired judge;
one distinguished constitutional/legal academic or jurist; and
one independent, non-political public member with demonstrated expertise in constitutional governance.

The exact constitutional composition would require extensive consultation and legal scrutiny.

But my fundamental principle is clear:

The judiciary must retain a decisive role, but the judiciary should not be the only institutional source of candidate discovery and assessment.

Why I Would Not Give the Law Minister a Voting Seat

This is deliberate.

The government has legitimate constitutional responsibilities in the appointment process.

It should be able to provide relevant:

verification;
security information;
constitutional processing; and
adverse information supported by evidence.

But giving the political executive a decisive vote over judicial appointments creates an unacceptable risk of political influence.

The government should have a voice where constitutionally appropriate.

It should not have unrestricted political control over who becomes a judge.

Government Objections Must Be Evidence-Based

If the government objects to a candidate, it should not be sufficient to say:

“We do not like this candidate.”

The objection should be:

specific;
evidence-based;
legally relevant; and
documented.

The government should have to say:

“Here is the relevant information, and here is why it matters.”

Where confidentiality and security considerations permit, the candidate should have an appropriate opportunity to respond.

The final constitutional assessment should remain with the Judicial Selection Council.

My “Explain-or-Reconsider” Rule

Suppose the independent assessment places Candidate Above is Candidate B.

The Selection Council nevertheless chooses Candidate B.

I do not believe that should automatically invalidate the decision.

A constitutional body must retain the ability to exercise judgement.

But the departure should be capable of explanation.

The Council should record appropriate confidential reasons explaining why it departed from the material assessment.

If the reasons do not adequately address significant evidence, the matter should return for reconsideration.

In simple terms:

Accountability without political control.

Solving the Vacancy Problem

There is another practical problem that judicial-selection reform cannot ignore:

Vacancies

According to the Department of Justice data cited in my proposal, as of 1 June 2026 there were 333 vacancies in the High Courts against a sanctioned strength of 1,122, while the Supreme Court had six vacancies against a sanctioned strength of 38.

We cannot sensibly operate a system that begins searching for candidates only after a vacancy occurs.

I therefore propose the following:

Rolling Judicial Talent Pool

with three categories.

Pool A — Ready

Candidates eligible for immediate consideration.

Pool B — Near Ready

Candidates are likely to become eligible within approximately twelve months.

Pool C — Emerging

Outstanding candidates who should be monitored for future eligibility.

The philosophy changes from:

Vacancy → Search → Delay

to:

Continuous Talent Identification → Vacancy → Immediate Selection

My Proposed Appointment Clock

Where a vacancy can be anticipated, the process should begin well in advance.

For example:

12 Months Before Anticipated Vacancy

Talent assessment begins.

9 Months

Candidate pool established.

6 Months

Merit assessment completed.

3 Months

Integrity and conflict verification completed.

Vacancy

The final recommendation is substantially ready.

I would aim for an ordinary selection process to be completed in approximately six months.

The precise statutory or administrative timelines would, of course, need careful constitutional design.

But the principle is straightforward:

We should stop treating predictable vacancies as unpredictable events.

Supreme Court Appointments Should Have an Even Higher Threshold

For an appointment to the Supreme Court, the assessment should become more demanding.

The system should consider:

constitutional jurisprudence;
quality of legal reasoning;
institutional judgement;
independence;
judicial temperament;
ability to handle complex constitutional questions;
consistency; and
institutional leadership.

The system should recognise both:

exceptional High Court judges

and

exceptional members of the Bar.

Neither route should automatically be regarded as superior.

Chief Justice Appointments

I would retain seniority as a strong presumption for appointment as Chief Justice.

Seniority provides predictability and reduces opportunities for arbitrary preference.

But seniority should not become an absolute entitlement where serious concerns regarding integrity, competence or institutional suitability exist.

If the normal seniority principle is departed from, reasons should be recorded.

What I Would Not Do

My proposal deliberately rejects several approaches.

I Would Not Support Government-Controlled Judicial Appointments

Judicial independence could be compromised.

I Would Not Support Parliamentary Confirmation Hearings

They could politicise judicial appointments.

I Would Not Create a Pure Examination System

Judging is not merely examination performance.

I Would Not Rely Upon AI-Based Judicial Ranking

Algorithmic bias can become invisible institutional bias.

I Would Not Rely Upon Pure Seniority

Longevity is not the same as excellence.

I Would Not Rely Upon Pure Reputation

Reputation can be influenced by professional networks.

I Would Not Rely Upon Pure Numerical Scoring

Every metric can eventually be manipulated.

And I Would Not Abolish the Collegium Overnight

Constitutional confrontation is unnecessary when a safer transition is available.

My Most Practical Recommendation: Do Not Abolish the Collegium on Day One

This is where I believe my proposal is fundamentally different from a conventional “replace the collegium” argument.

I am not asking India to take a constitutional leap into the unknown.

I propose a transition model.

Phase I — Build the Assessment Infrastructure

Retain the existing constitutional mechanism.

Create an independent judicial merit assessment secretariat.

The collegium continues to make constitutional recommendations.

But it receives an independent evidence dossier.

In other words:

Do not immediately change who has the constitutional power.

First improve the information available to the people exercising that power.

Phase II — Test It

Operate the new system for approximately two years.

Measure:

quality of candidate discovery;
diversity of candidate sources;
appointment speed;
professional-network concentration;
assessment reliability;
integrity findings;
missed talent; and
subsequent performance.

If the system performs badly:

Change it or abandon it.

If it performs well:

Proceed to Phase III.

Phase III — Constitutional Reform Only After Evidence

Only after sufficient evidence has been generated should Parliament consider whether a constitutional amendment is necessary to transform the existing collegium structure into a judicial selection council.

This approach is, in my view, far safer than beginning with:

“Abolish the collegium immediately.”

My philosophy is:

Build it. Test it. Prove it. Then constitutionalise it.

The Historical Back-Test

Before changing the Constitution, I would conduct another experiment.

Take judicial appointments made during the previous five to ten years.

Remove the names.

Provide independent assessors with the professional evidence.

Then ask:

Who would this system have selected?

The results can then be compared with the actual appointments.

If the proposed system consistently identifies candidates whom independent experts regard as stronger, that provides meaningful evidence in favour of reform.

But if the proposed system performs worse, I would not support implementing it.

That safeguard is essential.

A reform proposal should be willing to fail its own test.

My Proposed 18-Month Pilot

I propose initially testing the system in two High Courts.

The pilot should operate as a shadow selection system.

It should not pretend to override the existing constitutional framework.

Proposed Duration

18 months

Potential Candidate Universe

Approximately 200–300 candidates, subject to actual eligibility and vacancy cycles.

Preliminary Planning Estimate

Approximately ₹10–20 crore for the pilot.

This is only a policy estimate and not an official government cost.

The principal costs would involve:

professional staff;
secure information systems;
independent assessors;
integrity verification;
legal and constitutional research; and
independent evaluation.

The First Ten Actions

If I were asked to operationalise this proposal, I would begin with ten steps:

1. Create an Independent Pilot Governing Board

2. Map the Existing Appointment Process

3. Collect Historical Appointment Data

4. Develop the Judicial Merit Framework

5. Create the Prototype National Judicial Talent Registry

6. Develop the Anonymisation System

7. Develop Judicial Simulations

8. Recruit Independent Assessors

9. Run the Historical Back-Test

10. Publish an Independent Pilot Evaluation

This would transform the debate from theory into evidence.

How Will We Know Whether IJMIS Works?

I believe every institutional reform should have measurable outcomes.

I would therefore assess five broad areas.

Merit

quality of the candidate pool;
assessment reliability;
independent expert review.

Independence

political interference;
Government objections;
judicial decision-making independence.

Transparency

process documentation;
completeness of records;
reasoned departures.

Efficiency

time from anticipated vacancy to recommendation;
vacancy duration;
processing time.

Fairness

diversity of candidate sources;
professional-network concentration;
missed talent;
conflict disclosure.

The Five-Year Audit

Every five years, an independent audit should ask some uncomfortable questions.

Who was considered?

Who was shortlisted?

Who was appointed?

Why?

Who was overlooked?

Were particular networks disproportionately successful?

Were appointments timely?

Did government objections materially influence selection?

Was judicial independence protected?

Did the system discover exceptional candidates outside traditional networks?

And finally:

Is the system actually producing better judges?

If the answer is no, the system must change.

Ten Criticisms I Expect—and My Answers

“Isn’t This Simply NJAC Under Another Name?”

No.

NJAC primarily concerned the composition of the appointment body.

My proposal first changes the candidate pipeline, evidence architecture and assessment mechanism.

“Merit Cannot Be Measured.”

I agree that judicial merit cannot be perfectly measured.

That is precisely why I do not propose a single merit score.

I propose multiple independent streams of evidence.

“The Assessment Authority Itself Could Become Biased.”

Absolutely.

That risk exists.

Therefore, it needs:

fixed terms;
rotating assessors;
conflict rules;
random audits;
independent oversight; and
statistical bias testing.

“Candidates Will Learn to Game the System.”

Possibly.

Every human system can be gamed.

That is why no single metric should determine appointment.

“Political Governments Will Eventually Capture the System.”

That is precisely why the political executive should not control the final Selection Council.

“Judges Will Capture the Assessment Authority.”

That is why the assessment architecture should have broader professional participation and independent safeguards.

Perfect blindness is impossible.

But partial blindness is useful.

The objective is not perfection.

The objective is to reduce early identity-based influence.

“Famous Lawyers Will Still Have an Advantage.”

Possibly.

But the system can ask a much better question:

Is that advantage supported by demonstrated competence?

“This Will Become Another Bureaucratic Process.”

That is a genuine danger.

The answer is to keep the system evidence-based but administratively lean.

“Why Not Simply Improve the Collegium?”

My answer is:

That is exactly where I would begin.

If an independent merit-assessment system significantly improves the functioning of the collegium, perhaps the constitutional structure does not need to be radically altered.

I am not interested in changing institutions merely for the sake of changing institutions.

I am interested in producing better judges through a better system.

The Constitutional Route

Any permanent replacement of the collegium must be approached with exceptional constitutional care.

Articles 124 and 217 govern appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts, while the Judges Cases and the Supreme Court’s 2015 NJAC judgement form an important part of the constitutional background.

The post-NJAC developments concerning transparency, eligibility criteria, a secretariat, complaints and recording of dissent are also highly relevant.

Therefore, my first-stage proposal is intentionally conservative:

Improve the machinery before attempting to rewrite the constitutional structure.

My Proposed Constitutional End-State

If the pilot succeeds, I would ultimately support consideration of a constitutional amendment creating a:

Judicial Selection Council of India

The Council should have:

Judicial majority;
Fixed tenure;
Protected independence;
An independent secretariat;
Transparent selection criteria;
Strict conflict rules;
Defined timelines;
Reasoned decisions;
Protection against political veto; and
Periodic institutional audit.

The Council should replace the collegium as the final judicial-selection mechanism only after the evidence-based infrastructure has been tested and shown to work.

The Complete Architecture

My proposed system would ultimately look like this:

Citizens & Legal Community

↓

National Judicial Talent Pool

↓

Judicial Merit Assessment Authority

↓

Independent Integrity & Conflict Review

↓

Judicial Selection Council

↓

President of India

↓

Judicial Training & Institutional Support

↓

Five-Year Independent Audit

↓

Improved Selection Framework

↓

Back to the Talent Pool

This creates a closed institutional learning loop.

Selection generates data.

Data generates evaluation.

Evaluation generates institutional improvement.

Institutional improvement strengthens future selection.

My Central Reform Principle

After examining the problem, I have reached one central conclusion:

No institution should have exclusive control over both the candidate pool and the final selection.

But there is an equally important second principle:

No political institution should have control over the judiciary.

These principles are not contradictory.

They can coexist.

That is precisely what IJMIS attempts to achieve.

The Three Models

The difference can be stated very simply.

Present Model

Judicial Ecosystem → Recommendation → Collegium Evaluation → Appointment

Government-Controlled Model

Executive → Political/Administrative Selection → Appointment

My IJMIS Model

Open Talent Discovery → Independent Evidence → Structured Assessment → Integrity Verification → Judicial-Majority Selection → Constitutional Appointment → Independent Audit

That is the fundamental change I am proposing.

My Final Position

I do not claim that the present collegium system produces bad judges.

Nor do I claim that every appointment made through the collegium is biased.

Such sweeping claims would require evidence, and I do not believe constitutional reform should be built upon allegations that cannot be demonstrated.

My argument is different.

And I believe it is stronger.

The constitutional judiciary is too important to depend upon any system whose comparative assessment of merit cannot be independently demonstrated.

India needs a judicial-selection system in which:

Merit can be tested;
Candidates can come from outside traditional networks;
Integrity can be independently verified;
Conflicts can be disclosed;
Professional networks can be audited;
Government interference can be prevented;
Judicial independence can be protected;
Appointments can be made faster, and
The system itself can learn from its mistakes.

That is what I have attempted to build through IJMIS.

My Final Proposal to India

I would therefore not abolish the collegium tomorrow.

Instead, I propose ten practical steps.

First

Build the Judicial Merit Assessment Authority.

Second

Create the National Judicial Talent Pool.

Third

Introduce independent, structured and partially blind assessment.

Fourth

Separate integrity and conflict investigation from merit assessment.

Fifth

Create measurable indicators for selection concentration and missed talent.

Sixth

Run the new architecture alongside the existing constitutional mechanism.

Seventh

Back-test it against historical appointments.

Eighth

Conduct a controlled 18-month pilot.

Ninth

Publish the independent results.

Tenth

If the evidence demonstrates that the new architecture produces a better, fairer and more reliable selection process, consider the constitutional amendment necessary to transform the collegium into a judicial selection council.

This approach gives India something that constitutional reform desperately needs:

A safety valve.

We do not have to choose between preserving the present system forever and abolishing it overnight.

We can test the alternative first.

The Reform I Am Ultimately Seeking

I am not seeking:

Government control of judges.

I am not seeking:

Political control of the judiciary.

I am not even seeking:

Judicial control simply for the sake of judicial control.

What I am seeking is something more fundamental:

A judiciary selected through the widest possible search for talent, the strongest possible examination of merit, the strictest possible scrutiny of integrity, and a constitutionally protected decision-making process free from political domination.

That, in my view, is the balance that a mature constitutional democracy should strive for.

My Vision for India’s Judiciary

India is one of the world’s largest democracies and one of its most important constitutional jurisdictions.

We should therefore be capable of designing a judicial-selection system that is uniquely Indian.

We do not need to blindly copy Britain.

We do not need to copy America.

We do not need to recreate NJAC exactly as it was.

We can learn from international experience while designing a system suited to India’s constitutional history, federal structure, enormous Bar, judicial traditions and commitment to judicial independence.

The Indian solution should combine:

Judicial Independence

with

Professional Merit Assessment

and

Institutional Accountability.

That is the objective of my proposal.

If I Had to Reduce My Proposal to Three Principles

If I were asked to reduce this entire proposal to one principle, I would say:

Let judges remain independent, but let the search for judges become independent.

If I were asked to reduce it to one institutional reform:

Separate candidate discovery and evidence-based merit assessment from final judicial selection.

And if I were asked to reduce it to one test:

Do not ask only whom the system selected. Ask whom the system overlooked.

That is how an appointment system learns.

Conclusion: India Can Do Better Without Sacrificing Judicial Independence

I believe India’s judicial appointment debate has been trapped for too long between two extremes:

Collegium Versus Government

I propose that we move beyond that binary debate.

The real objective should be:

Independent Judiciary + Genuine Merit + Broad Talent Discovery + Integrity + Transparency + Speed + Accountability

That is why I place before the legal community, the judiciary, Parliament, the government, academics, members of the Bar and the citizens of India my proposal for the:

Indian Judicial Merit & Independence System — IJMIS

I do not present this as a claim that I have discovered a perfect system.

No human institution can be perfect.

I present it as something more useful:

A system that can be tested.

If it produces better results, improve it and expand it.

If it fails, correct it.

If the evidence ultimately demonstrates that the existing system performs better, retain what works.

But India should not have to choose between judicial independence and merit-based accountability.

We should build a system capable of protecting both.

That is the judicial reform I propose.

About the Author

Adv. Tarun Choudhury

Supreme Court Advocate | 25+ Years of Legal Experience

This proposal is presented as a legal-policy intervention for public discussion and debate. It is not intended to undermine judicial independence but to explore whether India can develop a more open, evidence-based, accountable and institutionally resilient method of identifying and selecting judicial talent.

Selected Research Basis

The proposal draws upon the constitutional and institutional framework surrounding judicial appointments, including Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution, the Judges Cases, the 2015 NJAC litigation, developments concerning transparency in judicial appointments, and contemporary judicial-vacancy data. The source material notes the Supreme Court’s increased publication of appointment-related information and the Department of Justice vacancy figures used in this proposal.

Need Legal Guidance or a Second Opinion?

Adv. Tarun Choudhury

Supreme Court Advocate | 25+ Years of Legal Experience

Whether you need legal advice, strategic guidance, case assessment, or assistance with a complex legal matter, you can get in touch directly.

📞 Call: 9891244487
💬 WhatsApp: 9891244487

Take the right legal step with experienced guidance.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

1. What Is the Indian Judicial Merit & Independence System (IJMIS)?

The Indian Judicial Merit & Independence System (IJMIS) is a proposed judicial appointment reform model designed to combine judicial independence, merit-based judicial selection, transparent assessment, integrity verification and institutional accountability without giving political control over judicial appointments.

2. How Would IJMIS Replace the Collegium System in India?

The proposal does not recommend abolishing the Collegium System immediately. Instead, it proposes a phased transition beginning with an independent Judicial Merit Assessment Authority (JMAA), a National Judicial Talent Pool, structured merit assessment and a pilot programme. If the system proves successful, the existing Collegium could eventually be transformed into a constitutionally protected Judicial Selection Council.

3. How Would Merit Be Assessed for Appointment as a High Court or Supreme Court Judge?

The proposal rejects a simple marks-based judicial selection system. Instead, candidates would receive a judicial evidence profile examining legal excellence, judicial capacity, integrity, constitutional temperament and professional reputation. It also proposes structured assessments, partially name-blind evaluation and realistic judicial simulations to evaluate legal reasoning and judicial temperament.

4. How Will the Proposed Judicial Selection System Prevent Political Interference and Favouritism?

IJMIS seeks to protect judicial independence by preventing the political executive from having unrestricted control over judicial appointments. At the same time, it proposes independent evidence collection, conflict-of-interest verification, professional-network analysis, a Selection Concentration Index (SCI) and reasoned decision-making to identify potential favouritism or excessive institutional concentration.

5. What Is the Practical Solution Proposed for Reforming Judicial Appointments in India?

The proposal recommends a phased and evidence-based judicial appointment reform rather than immediate abolition of the Collegium. It proposes creating the Judicial Merit Assessment Authority, establishing a National Judicial Talent Pool, introducing independent and partially blind merit assessment, conducting a historical back-test, running an 18-month pilot programme, measuring its results and only then considering constitutional reform.

🔑 Key Takeaways: Proposed Reform of India’s Collegium System

IJMIS proposes a new approach to judicial appointments in India by combining judicial independence, merit-based selection, transparency, integrity verification and institutional accountability.
The proposal does not advocate immediate abolition of the Collegium System. Instead, it recommends a phased transition, beginning with an independent merit-assessment mechanism and testing the model before any constitutional change.
Judicial talent should be discovered from a much wider pool. The proposed National Judicial Talent Pool would identify suitable candidates from the judicial service, independent bar, legal academia, recognised institutions and judicial recommendations.
Merit should not be reduced to a single numerical score. IJMIS proposes a judicial evidence profile covering legal excellence, judicial capacity, integrity, constitutional temperament and professional reputation.
Integrity would be a threshold requirement rather than a compensating score. Exceptional legal ability should not outweigh serious unresolved integrity concerns.
Partially name-blind assessment could reduce professional-network bias. The proposal suggests that candidates should initially be assessed, wherever practical, on anonymised professional work rather than fame, family connections or institutional reputation.
Judicial simulations could test real-world judicial reasoning. Shortlisted candidates could be assessed through difficult legal problems requiring judgements, counterarguments and oral submissions.
The proposal introduces the “Three-Evidence Rule”. A candidate should have an actual professional record, independent assessment and independent integrity/professional verification before reaching final selection.
IJMIS seeks to detect favouritism without automatically labelling it as nepotism. The proposed Selection Concentration Index (SCI) would identify excessive concentration of appointments around particular chambers, institutions, professional networks or other connections.
The “Missed Talent Index” asks an important new question: “Whom did the system overlook?” The proposal recommends tracking narrowly unsuccessful candidates to determine whether the selection methodology repeatedly misses exceptional legal talent.
The government should not have unrestricted political control over judicial appointments. Government objections should be specific, evidence-based, legally relevant and documented, while the final constitutional assessment should remain protected from political domination.
Judicial vacancies require a proactive solution. The proposed Rolling Judicial Talent Pool would classify candidates as “Ready”, “Near Ready” and “Emerging” so that the system can prepare for predictable vacancies rather than beginning the search only after a vacancy arises.
The proposal recommends an 18-month pilot before constitutional transformation. The system should first be tested in two High Courts, subjected to independent evaluation and compared against historical appointments.
The ultimate objective is not simply to replace the Collegium. The deeper objective is to create a judicial appointment system where the search for judicial talent is broad and independent, merit is evidence-based, integrity is rigorously examined, political interference is restricted, and judicial independence remains constitutionally protected.

Summary

IJMIS proposes a phased reform of India’s Collegium System through independent judicial talent discovery, evidence-based merit assessment, integrity verification, conflict checks, anti-favouritism audits and a judicial-majority selection mechanism—while protecting judicial independence from political control.

What's Hot

Tags

Categories