Introduction
Employment is an important test of whether a constitutional right works in everyday life. Legal recognition alone is not enough if a person cannot get or keep a job without hiding their identity, facing humiliation or being unfairly excluded. For transgender persons, discrimination can be direct, such as refusing to hire someone, or it can happen through ordinary workplace systems such as binary forms, identity checks, forced disclosure, unsuitable facilities, hostile behavior, and weak complaint systems. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jane Kaushik v. Union of India brings these problems within equality and employment law. 1
The case came from the experience of Jane Kaushik, a transgender woman and trained teacher, with two private unaided schools. Her petition showed the gap between the rights recognized under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, and the systems needed to enforce those rights. The Court therefore considered government duties, duties of private establishments, reasonable accommodation, government inaction, and public-law compensation. It described rights without implementation as an “empty formality.”²
The main question is whether Jane Kaushik turns transgender employment equality from a simple rule against discrimination into a practical set of duties. The judgment makes three important moves. First, it recognizes reasonable accommodation as part of substantive equality and the statutory scheme. Second, it treats continuing government inaction as capable of causing discrimination through omission. Third, it explains that Parliament has placed anti-discrimination duties on private establishments as well. The judgment is important, but questions remain about proof, remedies, institutional capacity, affirmative action, and the limits of accommodation. 3
This article uses a doctrinal and critical approach. Its main materials are the Constitution, the 2019 Act, the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020, National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, and Jane Kaushik. Employment research is also used to examine whether the legal framework deals with workplace and management barriers. The discussion is limited to employment discrimination and related grievance systems and does not attempt a complete study of family law, criminal law, or healthcare.
Constitutional and Statutory Framework
Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Articles 15 and 16 prohibit discrimination on the ground of sex in specified areas, while Articles 19 and 21 protect expression, autonomy, privacy, and dignity. In National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, the Supreme Court rejected a narrow biological view of sex and recognized self-identified gender as part of personality, dignity, and freedom. It directed governments to recognize transgender persons, protect self-identification, and take affirmative welfare measures. 4
NALSA moved gender identity from an issue of tolerance to one of enforceable rights. It also made clear that equality is not always achieved by applying exactly the same rule to everyone when people begin from unequal social positions. The decision linked Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 and recognized that exclusion from education or employment can affect status, expression, autonomy and material survival at the same time. Its practical weakness was that broad constitutional directions still needed laws, policies, budgets and accountable administration. 5
Parliament enacted the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, to protect transgender rights and welfare. Section 2(b) gives a broad definition of establishment covering public authorities and private bodies. Section 3 prohibits discrimination in areas including education, employment, healthcare, public goods and services, movement, property, public office, and care or custody. Sections 9 and 10 deal specifically with employment discrimination and require establishments to comply with the Act. Section 11 requires every establishment to appoint a complaint officer. 6
The Act therefore does more than prohibit a discriminatory rejection. It also places positive duties on governments and establishments. Recruitment, working conditions and complaint procedures must be organised so that transgender persons can participate safely and equally. A policy without a named officer, an accessible complaint channel, timelines, confidentiality and protection against retaliation cannot fully meet that purpose.
The 2020 Rules give more detail. Rules 11 to 13 deal with protective structures, equal opportunity policies, safe working environments, and complaint systems. They also recognize facilities, transport, security, confidentiality, and workplace arrangements as part of equal opportunity. Equality therefore concerns the conditions under which a person works, not only whether they are formally appointed. 7
There are still gaps in the legal scheme. It does not provide a detailed civil enforcement route for every employment violation, does not define reasonable accommodation as precisely as disability law, and does not clearly settle how proof should work when an employer gives a neutral explanation. Earlier scholarship had already noted that legal recognition without an enforceable right-to-work framework may not overcome social exclusion. 8
Facts and Procedural Background
Jane Kaushik had academic and teacher-training qualifications and was pursuing teaching as a career. In November 2022, the first school appointed her as a trained graduate teacher in English and social science. She worked there for eight days. According to her account, colleagues and students subjected her to name-calling, body shaming, and harassment because she did not fit expected gender norms. She complained to the principal, and the school accepted that at least one hostile incident had occurred. Kaushik said that she was forced to resign after a student became aware of her transgender identity. 9
The First School gave a different account. It said that it knew about her gender identity, gave her accommodation in the women’s hostel, and allowed access to women’s washrooms. It said that the employment ended because of performance and behavioral concerns. Later correspondence considered rehiring her after an assessment, but Kaushik did not attend the scheduled test, and the position was eventually filled. The different versions created an evidentiary problem because Article 32 proceedings do not normally allow a full trial of disputed facts. 10
The Second School involved a clearer sequence of events. After an interview, it gave Kaushik an offer for an English-teaching position, which she accepted. While she was travelling to Jamnagar, the school asked for identity documents. Kaushik alleged that after those documents revealed her transgender identity, the school denied her employment, refused her entry, and did not issue a formal termination letter. The school said the offer was conditional on verification and probation, that several candidates had received offers, and that the decision was administrative rather than based on identity. 11
Before approaching the Supreme Court, Kaushik approached several institutions. The National Commission for Women took cognisance and formed an inquiry committee. The National Council for Transgender Persons did not provide an effective response, while the National Human Rights Commission closed the matter because another body was considering it. The NCW inquiry noted the absence of service rules and proof of due procedure but ultimately found no discrimination by the First School. The movement between different forums showed how a right can become difficult to use when there is no effective specialized complaint route. 12
Issues and Submissions
The Court considered four main questions: whether the Union and States had positive constitutional and statutory duties to prevent discrimination; whether government inaction caused discrimination against the petitioner; whether the two schools discriminated on the ground of gender identity; and whether compensation should follow. This took the case beyond ordinary contract law and connected employer conduct, workplace conditions, and government enforcement failure. 13
Kaushik relied on sections 3, 9, 10, and 11 of the 2019 Act and Rules 11 to 13. She argued that these provisions created enforceable duties for governments and private establishments. She relied on NALSA, Shanavi Ponnusamy v. Ministry of Civil Aviation, and substantive-equality cases to argue that a bare prohibition was not enough. She also referred to the “but for” approach in Bostock v. Clayton County: if a decision would not have happened but for sex or gender identity, it can amount to prohibited discrimination. 14
The schools focused on private contract and disputed facts. The First School argued that the allegations could not properly be decided in summary writ proceedings and that the NCW had already considered the dispute. The Second School argued that an offer letter did not create permanent employment and that section 9 did not require it to appoint a particular applicant. Both schools therefore tried to frame the case as a private employment dispute without a sufficient public-law element. 15
That argument raises a valid concern because not every employment disagreement should become a constitutional case. Employers still have the right to assess qualifications, performance, and conduct. However, the 2019 Act expressly applies to private establishments. Once an adverse decision is reasonably connected to gender identity, an employer cannot avoid legal scrutiny simply by calling the relationship contractual. The issue is whether the stated professional reason is genuine or whether it hides or reproduces identity-based exclusion.
Decision and Ratio
The judgment begins with a problem of implementation. More than a decade after NALSA and several years after the 2019 Act, the Court found that measures in areas such as education, healthcare and employment were often superficial, irregular or absent. It observed that government inaction had allowed non-state establishments to keep compliance in a “cold freeze”. The point was that administration and enforcement can also become part of the equality problem, not only the wording of legislation.16
The first major holding concerns reasonable accommodation. Drawing from substantive-equality and disability-rights cases, the Court explained that equal protection can require positive steps and additional support. Gender identity is not a disability, but social systems can create disabling barriers when cisgender norms are treated as universal. The judgment describes this as societal disability and recognises a right to reasonable accommodation. The focus therefore moves from asking why an individual cannot fit a workplace to asking what the workplace can change to remove unnecessary barriers.17
Reasonable accommodation cannot mean asking someone to hide their identity or conform to stereotypes. It can include privacy-protective documentation, facilities consistent with gender identity, inclusive naming and dress practices, safe transport, staff sensitisation, correction of records and quick action against harassment. These measures should not depend only on a manager’s goodwill. They should be supported by a clear workplace policy.18
The second major contribution is the idea of omissive discrimination. Traditional discrimination cases often look for a hostile statement, action or written rule. Jane Kaushik also considers what happens when authorities simply fail to act. Examples include failing to create rules, appoint complaint officers, establish protection cells, provide appeal mechanisms, monitor establishments or respond to complaints. Where authorities have a positive duty, continued inaction can allow a predictable disadvantage to continue.19
The Court explained this through four parts of substantive equality: addressing disadvantage; dealing with stigma, stereotypes, prejudice and violence; giving affected people a voice; and accommodating difference so that structural change can occur. This approach asks not only whether a rule looks neutral, but also whether it continues older forms of exclusion or forces a person to give up part of their identity to participate.20
The third major point concerns horizontal application. Fundamental rights are generally protections against the State, but Parliament can place similar duties on private actors through legislation. The 2019 Act broadly defines establishments and regulates recruitment, employment, workplace policy and complaints. It therefore creates statutory equality duties for private establishments as well. A private school cannot avoid those duties simply because its employment relationship is contractual.21
The Court took a cautious approach to the First School. It found insufficient material to establish active or intentional discrimination, considering the accommodation provided, the later possibility of assessment and the NCW findings. At the same time, it criticised the school’s response to body shaming and its failure to follow policy and complaint-officer requirements. Not proving discriminatory termination does not mean that the workplace fully complied with the Act.22
The Second School was different. The close timing between identity disclosure through documents and withdrawal of the opportunity, along with the lack of a convincing explanation, supported an inference of discriminatory intent. The Court rejected the idea that section 9 would not apply because the appointment was not final. Otherwise, an employer could discriminate during the offer, verification or probation stage and avoid the law by saying that employment had not formally started.23
The Court awarded Rs 50,000 against the Second School and Rs 50,000 each against the Union and the two concerned States. It treated this as public-law compensation for the rights violation and government inaction rather than a complete replacement for private-law damages. The allocation of responsibility was also important: government was held responsible for the missing complaint and enforcement system, while the school was held responsible for the discriminatory recruitment conduct.24
Structural Directions
The Court’s directions went beyond compensation to Kaushik. Each State and Union Territory was directed to designate the appellate authority under Rule 9, create a welfare board under Rule 10, establish district and State Transgender Protection Cells under Rule 11, and ensure that every establishment appoints a complaint officer under section 11 and Rule 13. State Human Rights Commissions were identified as a forum for objections to decisions of heads of establishments. A nationwide toll-free helpline was also directed so that complaints could reach protection cells more quickly.25
The Court required these institutional steps within three months. It also created an advisory process chaired by former Delhi High Court judge Justice Asha Menon, with officials from ministries dealing with social justice, women and children, health, education, labour, personnel and law. The committee was asked to prepare a practical policy draft or report within six months after consultation with stakeholders and States and Union Territories.26
The committee’s work includes a model Equal Opportunity Policy for employment and education, identifying gaps in the Act and Rules, reasonable accommodation in public and workplace settings, a full complaint pathway, procedures for correcting names and gender in documents, inclusive healthcare and protection for people who do not undergo gender-affirming surgery. The Union is expected to formulate its policy after receiving the report. Until establishments make their own compliant policies, the model framework is intended to fill the gap.27
The continuing-mandamus approach is important because the Court did not stop after stating legal principles. It also required proof of compliance, circulation of the judgment and further reporting. This can help where responsibility is spread across many departments and States. Its success, however, depends on transparent reporting, funding, accessible information and action when deadlines are missed.28
Critical Analysis
One of the strongest parts of Jane Kaushik is its explanation that discrimination is not always deliberate hostility. Workplaces are often built around majority assumptions. Examples include binary forms, mismatched identity records, gendered facilities, informal disclosure practices and complaint officers who do not understand transgender rights. A rule may look neutral while placing a greater burden on transgender workers. The judgment gives courts and managers a way to look at how workplace systems operate instead of looking only for an openly discriminatory statement.29
The recognition of statutory duties for private establishments is also important for labour law. Much employment takes place outside government, so equality protection would be incomplete if private employers could simply avoid it. The Court based private responsibility on legislation rather than treating fundamental rights as directly applying to every private contract. This keeps the legal basis clear while confirming that private schools, companies and other establishments must organise employment consistently with the Act.30
There is still a difficulty in the treatment of the First School. Providing hostel or washroom access and later allowing a possible rehiring does not by itself answer whether resignation was forced or whether harassment affected the employment relationship. Accommodation in one area cannot automatically answer discrimination in another. A stronger analysis would separately examine whether harassment occurred, how management responded, whether the decision-maker knew about the protected identity and whether performance concerns existed before the complaint.
The judgment also could have given a clearer rule about proof. Employers rarely write down a discriminatory reason. An applicant may instead have evidence about timing, inconsistent explanations, unusual procedures, different treatment or a sudden request for identity documents. When these facts create a reasonable initial inference, the employer should provide specific evidence of a genuine non-discriminatory reason. The claimant can then show whether that explanation is inconsistent or false. This would make the “but for” approach more practical without assuming that every adverse decision is discriminatory.31
Reasonable accommodation is recognised clearly, but its limits are still not fully defined. Questions remain about cost, feasibility, safety, competing rights, who should start the process, what information can be requested and when confidentiality applies. A model policy should create a cooperative process, treat low-cost changes as normally reasonable and require a clear reason when an accommodation is refused.
The phrase societal disability is useful because it places attention on barriers created by social structures rather than treating transgender identity itself as a problem. It should not, however, turn transgender identity into a medical impairment. A better understanding is relational: rigid social rules can create barriers, and accommodation can remove those barriers. The Court’s protection of people who do not undergo surgery is also consistent with self-identification and bodily autonomy.32
The compensation raises another issue. Rs 50,000 gives formal recognition of the violation but may not reflect lost income, relocation costs, emotional harm or the cost of long proceedings. Public-law compensation is normally summary, but future cases could clarify when fuller damages may be claimed and what factors should affect the amount. Reinstatement may also be unsuitable where the workplace has become hostile. Other remedies can include back wages, future salary, neutral references, policy correction, training and protection against retaliation.33
The institutional directions are ambitious, but they also face the same implementation problem identified by the Court. A welfare board, complaint officer or protection cell can exist only on paper. Effective systems need named officials, public contact details, accessible filing, fixed timelines, written decisions, appeals, confidentiality, translation and disability access. Annual reports should record complaints, disposal time, relief and repeated barriers without exposing individual identities. Independent review and community participation would help distinguish working institutions from nominal compliance.
Affirmative action also remains less developed. NALSA called for measures addressing social and educational backwardness, while the 2019 Act mainly combines anti-discrimination rules with welfare duties. Accommodation helps an individual participate in a workplace, while affirmative action addresses under-representation caused by longer-term exclusion. Recruitment outreach, scholarships, apprenticeships, skill programmes and targeted public-employment measures therefore deserve further policy attention, subject to constitutional limits and proper consultation.34
Employment research supports the concern that implementation cannot stop at legal paperwork. Mishra and Negi argue that legal recognition needs an enforceable right-to-work framework and wider social change. Naman Sharma identifies managerial hesitation and stigma as barriers to hiring transgender workers and suggests organisational steps for inclusion. This means managers, supervisors and disciplinary authorities also need to understand bias, confidentiality and accommodation.35
The relationship between NALSA and Jane Kaushik is important. NALSA established constitutional recognition and called for affirmative action, but it came before the present statutory machinery. Jane Kaushik does not replace NALSA. Instead, it asks why its promise remained incomplete after Parliament enacted a specific law. The later judgment therefore focuses on implementation and connects constitutional rights to offices, policies, complaint routes and deadlines.36
The judgment also helps explain the relationship between identity and documents. Employers may need identity documents for payroll, taxation, qualifications or safeguarding, but collecting them can also force a person to disclose information that they did not intend to share. Verification of a legitimate credential does not require unrestricted circulation of former names, medical history or surgery information. Data minimisation, limited use and access control should therefore be part of reasonable accommodation. After verification, workplace communication should normally use the employee’s affirmed name and gender, while older records remain confidential.37
Privacy matters especially during recruitment because applicants have little bargaining power. A document request just before joining may look routine but can reveal information that had nothing to do with interview performance. Employers should explain in advance which documents are needed, why they are needed, who can see them and how inconsistencies will be handled. A confidential officer can manage name or gender changes. This would reduce unnecessary suspicion and stop identity verification from becoming a second interview based on prejudice.
Implementation should also consider overlapping forms of disadvantage. Transgender persons do not experience employment in the same way. Caste, religion, disability, region, language, economic position and family support can affect the barriers they face. A policy designed for a large city may not work equally well for a low-income worker in a residential school or for someone whose records come from different States. Complaint data and consultation should identify these overlapping barriers without forcing people to disclose unnecessary information.
Education needs clear responsibility between school management and regulators. Management controls recruitment and discipline, while education departments, boards and affiliating authorities can make compliance part of recognition. They should require regular confirmation of equal opportunity policies, complaint officers and staff training. Where a complaint concerns discriminatory recruitment or termination, regulators should be able to request records and monitor corrective action. This does not remove educational autonomy; it places that autonomy within statutory equality duties.38
A staged compliance model may make implementation easier. First, every establishment should publish its policy, appoint responsible officers and correct forms and records. Second, it should train managers, identify physical and procedural barriers and create a confidential accommodation process. Third, an external authority should review outcomes such as unexplained offer withdrawals, complaint disposal and repeated harassment. Support and sanctions can be adjusted according to the size of the organisation while keeping basic rights the same.
It is also important to separate what the Court actually held from recommendations made in this article. The Court recognised reasonable accommodation, omissive discrimination, statutory duties of private establishments, compensation and structural directions. The proposed burden-shifting test, wider damages framework, regulatory audits and detailed privacy rules are recommendations made here. Keeping that distinction clear avoids presenting suggestions as precedent and makes the critical analysis more accurate.39
Workplace Implementation
During recruitment, establishments should remove unnecessary sex markers, allow self-identified names alongside legally required records and limit access to identity documents. Interview panels should use standard criteria and keep scoring records. If an offer is withdrawn after identity verification, the employer should provide a prompt written explanation based on criteria that existed before the dispute. This protects applicants and also gives employers evidence that decisions were based on genuine professional reasons.
During employment, an equal opportunity policy should cover names and pronouns, uniforms, facilities, housing, travel, healthcare benefits, medical leave, data privacy and administrative changes. Employees should not be forced to disclose medical history or surgery except where the law genuinely requires it and the request is proportionate. Complaint procedures should cover misgendering, outing, body shaming, exclusion and retaliation, while distinguishing an isolated mistake from repeated hostile conduct through context and response.
The complaint officer must be able to act even when the complaint concerns senior staff. A complainant should receive an acknowledgement, interim protection where needed, an opportunity to submit material, a reasoned decision and information about appeal. Informal settlement can be offered but should not be forced in serious cases involving harassment, retaliation or termination. Relevant recruitment, attendance, appraisal and email records should also be preserved so later review does not depend only on memory.
Schools need additional safeguards because teachers, students, parents, hostels and residential facilities can all be involved. Inclusion should not depend on expected parental discomfort. Schools should train staff and students, use age-appropriate anti-bullying rules, protect employee privacy and address misinformation. A transgender teacher’s identity is not professional misconduct. If there are genuine performance concerns, they should be documented and handled through the same fair process used for other employees.
Government enforcement should combine support with accountability. Smaller establishments may need model forms and training, while repeated or deliberate violations may require stronger corrective action. Labour departments, education authorities, social-justice departments and human-rights commissions should use shared procedures rather than sending complainants from one office to another. A single-window system linked to State protection cells could reduce this problem and preserve a record of what happened.
A practical compliance system should separate prevention, accommodation and remedy. Prevention includes policy, inclusive recruitment, regular training and management responsibility. Accommodation is a confidential process aimed at a particular barrier. Remedy begins when prevention fails and requires an accessible complaint channel, interim protection, impartial inquiry, written reasons, appeal and suitable relief. Keeping these stages separate prevents an employer from using the existence of a policy as proof that discrimination could not have happened.
Evidence and confidentiality also need clear rules. Access to identity documents should be limited to people who genuinely need them, and disclosure should be recorded. Recruitment records, interview scores and reasons for withdrawing offers should be retained for a fixed period. Where an adverse decision follows closely after identity disclosure, unexplained failure to produce relevant records may support an adverse inference. Compliance data should remain aggregated so patterns can be identified without exposing individuals.
Special attention is needed for contract teachers, probationers, trainees, consultants, platform workers and outsourced staff. These workers can be more insecure, while organisations may try to avoid responsibility by relying on contractual labels. The Act’s broad definition of establishment and employment-related matters should be applied by looking at who controls recruitment, working conditions, discipline and workplace access. Principal employers should place similar equality duties in vendor contracts and should not use outsourcing to avoid them.40
Internal complaint officers cannot always be the final decision-makers about their own establishment. State procedures should provide an external appeal forum with power to obtain records, order interim protection, direct corrections and recommend compensation or prosecution where appropriate. Labour inspectors and education regulators should include transgender-equality compliance in routine reviews and should look at actual accessibility, not just paperwork. Community organisations can also identify barriers that a standard checklist may miss.
These measures do not remove ordinary workplace standards. Transgender workers remain subject to genuine performance requirements, and employers are not required to appoint an unqualified candidate. The important point is that the standards should be genuine, applied consistently, documented before controversy and assessed without humiliation. Managerial authority remains, but it operates within equality, dignity, reasonable accommodation and fair procedure.
Conclusion And Suggestions
Jane Kaushik moves Indian equality law toward a practical understanding of transgender employment rights. The recognition of reasonable accommodation, omissive discrimination and statutory duties for private establishments goes beyond formal equal treatment and places responsibility on both governments and employers. At the same time, the judgment does not treat every disputed employment decision as automatically discriminatory. Employers can make merit-based decisions, but “merit” cannot become an unexplained reason introduced only after a person’s identity becomes known.41
The first priority is full implementation of the Court’s directions. Governments should publish a dashboard showing appellate authorities, welfare boards, protection cells, helplines and complaint officers, along with contact details, jurisdiction and procedure. The Union’s model Equal Opportunity Policy should set minimum standards while allowing practical differences between education, corporate employment, healthcare and residential workplaces.
Second, the Act or Rules should define reasonable accommodation for gender identity and expression. It should cover necessary changes that do not create a disproportionate burden, require an interactive process, protect privacy and place the burden of proving disproportionate hardship on the establishment. Refusals should be written, specific and open to appeal. Low-cost changes involving names, records, dress and facilities should normally be treated as reasonable.
Third, employment discrimination should use a clearer burden-shifting process. The claimant should first show facts that support an initial inference of discrimination. The employer should then provide a genuine, documented and non-discriminatory reason. The claimant should have an opportunity to show inconsistency or pretext. Remedies can include compensation, back pay or future pay, policy correction, neutral references, training, protection against retaliation and costs.42
Fourth, transgender persons should take part in policy design, monitoring and review. The principle of “nothing about us, without us” should guide advisory bodies, welfare boards and workplace consultation. Participation should include people with different regional, caste, class, disability and gender-expression experiences. Data collection should be voluntary and confidential and should identify barriers rather than police identity.43
Finally, implementation should be measured by actual outcomes. Governments should publish whether required bodies meet regularly, whether helplines answer calls, how long complaints take and what action follows. Establishments should report anonymised information on recruitment, accommodation requests and complaint disposal without using targets that force identity disclosure. An independent review after two years could show whether the framework has reduced exclusion or only produced paperwork.
Access to legal assistance is also important. Workers may not recognise subtle discrimination, preserve relevant records or know the correct forum. State Legal Services Authorities should provide plain-language guidance, confidential initial advice and support for complaints before protection cells, human-rights commissions and courts. Trade unions and professional associations can also include gender-identity discrimination in their policies and services. Rights become useful when people can understand the process, get help and pursue a complaint without losing their livelihood.44
The decision also reflects a wider labour-law principle: workplace power should be exercised through fair reasons and a process that can be reviewed. Equality law does not remove management discretion, but it places limits on that discretion where prejudice can affect entry, evaluation or exit. Good record keeping, complaint handling, accommodation and reasoned decisions can therefore improve both fairness and workplace administration. Jane Kaushik is important not only because of transgender rights but also because it shows how employment power should be exercised.
Finally, publishing policies is not enough. Senior management should take responsibility for compliance, recruitment and line managers should receive regular training, complaint outcomes should be used to improve policy, and regulators should check both documents and actual workplace access. The effect of Jane Kaushik should ultimately be seen in whether a transgender applicant can enter a workplace, control who receives information about their identity, work without humiliation and obtain a timely remedy when equality fails.
Endnotes
1. Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1248, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1405 of 2023 (Sup. Ct. India Oct. 17, 2025), paras. 4–11.
2. Id. paras. 1–3.
3. Id. paras. 43–68, 131–77.
4. INDIA CONST. arts. 14–16, 19 & 21; National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 S.C.C. 438 (India).
5. National Legal Services Authority, (2014) 5 S.C.C. 438.
6. Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, No. 40 of 2019, §§ 2(b), 3, 8–11, INDIA CODE (2019).
7. Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020, rr. 11–13, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, pt. II, sec. 3(i) (Sept. 29, 2020).
8. Utkarsh K. Mishra & Abhishek Negi, Transgender and the Right to Employment in India: Analysing the Trajectories of Discrimination, 9 BESTUUR 26, 26–33 (2021), https://doi.org/10.20961/bestuur.v9i1.51997.
9. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 4–6.
10. Id. paras. 7, 152–59.
11. Id. paras. 8–9, 160–63.
12. Id. paras. 10–11.
13. Id. para. 28.
14. Id. paras. 12–21; Shanavi Ponnusamy v. Ministry of Civil Aviation, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1581; Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020).
15. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 22–27; St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, (2023) 4 S.C.C. 498 (India).
16. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 29–42.
17. Id. paras. 43–65; Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission, (2021) 5 S.C.C. 370 (India); Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1025.
18. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 51–55, 141–42, 206.
19. Id. paras. 66–68, 115–30.
20. Id. paras. 69–114; Sandra Fredman, Substantive Equality Revisited, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 712 (2016).
21. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 131–50; Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 S.C.C. 1 (India).
22. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 152–59.
23. Id. paras. 160–63.
24. Id. paras. 164–77, 214; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 746 (India); Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 S.C.C. 761 (India).
25. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 199–200.
26. Id. paras. 201–05.
27. Id. paras. 206–17.
28. Id. paras. 218–21.
29. Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India, (2021) 15 S.C.C. 125 (India); Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 73–96.
30. Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act §§ 2(b), 3, 9–11; Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 131–50.
31. Bostock, 590 U.S. 644; Lt. Col. Nitisha, (2021) 15 S.C.C. 125.
32. National Legal Services Authority, (2014) 5 S.C.C. 438; Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 55, 206.
33. Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 S.C.C. 141 (India); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 395 (India); Nilabati Behera, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 746.
34. National Legal Services Authority, (2014) 5 S.C.C. 438; Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act § 8.
35. Mishra & Negi, supra note 8; Naman Sharma, Breaking Down Barriers: Addressing Managerial Hesitancy Towards Hiring Transgender Employees, 33 INT’L J. ORG. ANALYSIS 645, 645–64 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOA-08-2023-3918.
36. National Legal Services Authority, (2014) 5 S.C.C. 438; Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 1–3, 178–221.
37. K.S. Puttaswamy, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1; Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 141–42, 206.
38. Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act §§ 9–11; Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 199–217.
39. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 152–77, 199–221.
40. Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act §§ 2(b), 3, 9–11; Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 131–50.
41. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 29–68, 131–77.
42. Bostock, 590 U.S. 644; Lt. Col. Nitisha, (2021) 15 S.C.C. 125; Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 160–77.
43. Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 97–114, 201–12; Nipun Malhotra v. Sony Pictures Films India (P) Ltd., 2024 INSC 465.
44. Legal Services Authorities Act, No. 39 of 1987, §§ 4, 7 & 12, INDIA CODE (1987); Jane Kaushik, 2025 INSC 1248, paras. 199–221.
Written By: Vanshita Belani, Master of Labour Welfare Veer Narmad South Gujarat University
